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Contributing to a larger canon of work that investigates how the presence of civil 
society organisations in authoritarian settings influences the durability of regimes in 
power, this thesis sets out to explain how the relationship between the Ethiopian 
state, under the rule of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), and civil society organisations, affected regime stability. 
I demonstrate that the EPRDF tried to use civil society organisations to bolster its 
rule through: (1) curbing the power of civil society organisations to prevent 
challenges to its rule; and (2) mobilising civil society organisations as part of its 
developmental state programme. However, I argue that the EPRDF prioritised control 
at times at the expense of developmental objectives. While this prevented open 
contestation from civil society organisations, it indirectly weakened the EPRDF’s rule 
in two ways. First, the oppression of civil society organisations reduced their ability 
to function as a bridge between the Ethiopian people and the state, creating a 
vacuum between the state and citizens. Second, the control established over civil 
society organisations decreased the EPRDF’s ability to mobilise them behind its 
developmental state programme on which it tried to build political legitimacy. 
Drawing on 14 months of fieldwork, this thesis renders the micro-politics of civil 
society - state relations visible. The analysis goes beyond the publicly observable 
“silence”, characterised by the absence of open contestation by civil society 
organisations, and demonstrates the existence of negotiation and conflicts between 
actors and organisations operating in both spheres. Instead of taking the concepts of 
civil society and the state for granted, the thesis explores their empirical 
manifestations in Ethiopia. The contribution of this thesis lies in the nuance of the 
analysis, shedding light on how different state and civil society organisations, and the 




“How do we study power relations when the powerless are 
often obliged to adopt a strategic pose in the presence of 
the powerful and when the powerful may have an interest 
in overdramatizing their reputation and mastery? If we 
take all of this at face value we risk mistaking what may be 
a tactic for the whole story. Instead, I try to make out a case 
for a different study of power that uncovers contradictions, 
tensions, and immanent possibilities. Every subordinate 
group creates, out of its ordeal, a "hidden transcript" that 
represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of 
the dominant. The powerful, for their part, also develop a 
hidden transcript representing the practices and claims of 
their rule that cannot be openly avowed. A comparison of 
the hidden transcript of the weak with that of the powerful 
and of both hidden transcripts to the public transcript of 
power relations offers a substantially new way of 
understanding resistance to domination” (Scott, 1990: xii). 
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 5 
Acknowledgements 
First, I’d like to acknowledge the importance of the following academic institutions, 
without which this PhD would not have been possible:  
The London School of Economics and Political Sciences (LSE) which I thank for 
funding this project as part of an LSE studentship. At the LSE, I owe my thanks to 
Professor James Putzel for accepting me onto the PhD programme and providing 
thought-provoking supervision throughout the process; I am grateful for the chance 
you gave me. I’d also like to thank Professor David Lewis for joining the project as a 
second supervisor, for his thorough engagement with my work and his eye for detail. 
The Department of Government at Uppsala University I thank for hosting me as 
a Guest PhD student. Further, I would like to thank Anna Jarstad, Johanna Söderström 
and Helena Wockelberg, for facilitating my stay. My thanks go also to Anders Sjögren, 
Jenny Jansson, Oscar Almén and Maria Eriksson Baaz for providing valuable feedback 
on my work. 
In Addis Ababa, my grateful thanks go to the French Centre of Ethiopian Studies 
and the Institute of Ethiopian Studies at Addis Ababa University, for supporting my 
fieldwork both logistically and financially. I’d also like to thank David Ambrosetti and 
Ahmed Hassen for providing academic and administrative support throughout the 
process. 
Many people told me that a PhD is a lonely journey on which to embark. 
However, in my case, I can only say I felt I had the support of a whole village. While I 
had to write the thesis alone, I received a lot of support over the past four years, 
without which this whole project would not have been feasible.  
My first and special thanks go to the two hundred plus individuals who 
participated in this research project, in interviews, focus groups, informal 
conversations, bus rides, walks and other encounters, and who shared their 
knowledge and reflections that shaped my experience of Ethiopia. For reasons of 
anonymity and confidentiality I cannot name them here, but it is their stories that 
form the basis of this work.  
 6 
Next I would like to recognise all those who have made Addis Ababa a second 
home for me and who have accompanied me on my fieldwork journey. There are no 
words to describe what you as people mean to me, or your contributions to this 
project, I can but say thank you: 
Margaux and Ayu, your house has become a second home for me, and you, my 
extended family. Thank you for taking me in, for teaching me survival skills for 
fieldwork, and for the many evenings spent on our terrace or out and about in Addis. 
Abdi, thank you for your friendship, for embarking on joint adventures, and for 
making sure I was up to date with the latest developments in Ethiopian politics. Beza, 
I am thankful and grateful for your relentless support to my research, for your lessons 
on life and for the many hours spent together. Bini, thank you for approaching me 
that day when I was ready to give up, for offering your help, and for making sure I 
didn’t leave stones unturned. Yohannes and Teshome, thank you for sharing your 
knowledge, for supporting my adventures logistically, and for all the time you 
dedicated to helping me negotiating the fieldwork jungle. Ahmedin and Damtaw, I 
am grateful that you shared your stories with me, took the time to explain all the 
little details I was hunting after and helped me digging through stacks of papers to 
make sure I got all the information I needed. Your courage and dedication have 
inspired me during my research. Abadir, thank you so much for your continuous 
support throughout these four years and for our countless inspiring discussions on 
Ethiopian politics. Hale, Gedi, Hanna, Kal and Blen, thank you for your friendship and 
for accompanying me on the PhD journey. Thank you, Danu, for ensuring that I 
learned to find my way around Addis, for drawing maps on paper, and for picking me 
up wherever and whenever to make sure I got home safely when I was wandering 
around Addis at late hours. A big thank you to the crew from the French Centre - 
Thomas, Amélie, Hanna, Alexandre, Mehedi, Sebastien, Cloe and Anne-Liz - for 
sharing many memorable moments in Ethiopia.  
There are many others who deserve thanks for helping me on this PhD journey: 
In Uppsala, I’d like to thank Lutz and Lauri for welcoming me on day one and 
helping me to find my place back in Sweden, and for the emergency sugar deliveries 
on the many work weekends towards the end of the PhD. Karin, without you the final 
stretch would have been impossible to manage. Thanks to you I stayed (mostly) sane. 
 7 
I’m thankful for meeting you Nazita and for the academic and personal support you 
offered. Michal, Marcus and Johanna, thank you for keeping me anchored in reality 
and for providing much needed distractions from work. Thank you as well to the 
fellow PhD students, academics and administrators for welcoming me to the 
department and for providing a caring and productive environment to write up my 
PhD. Ingela and Joakim, thank you for hosting me upon my return to Sweden, the 
many hours spent at Aka together and the support provided throughout the years.  
In London, I would like to thank Lucy for accompanying me on this four-year 
journey, and for teaching me about time, the politics of waiting and public goods in 
India. A big thank you as well to the rest of the PhD crew Liz, Brian and Rebecca, for 
sharing this adventure and well done for hanging in there. Georgie, thank you for 
hosting me, for your friendship, and for taking breaks in the writing madness. Ben 
and Pritish thank you for our many exchanges and inspiring discussions on Rwanda 
and Ethiopia. Hirit, thank you for dedicating so many afternoons to my Amharic 
lessons, and for sharing your stories and insights about Ethiopia over our coffee 
breaks. Aljosha, I am grateful that we met, for your help with housing, visits in 
Sweden and the letters from Down Under. I would also like to thank the staff and 
teachers at “The Place” whom I met during evening classes and summer schools, and 
who allowed me to exchange my PhD studies for contemporary dance classes, 
fostered my creativity and provided a much-needed counterweight.  
Anna, the past four years had more challenges for both of us than we could have 
anticipated, but we made it. I am endlessly grateful for your support, your 
understanding and your kindness. Thanks to you, there was normality in the 
abnormal, and space to breathe and laugh. Emma, you came into my life in the 
beginning of the PhD and became a stable constant that I wouldn’t want to miss. 
Isabelle, Camila, Gustav and Christian, thank you for poking at my PhD-bubble in 
regular intervals and for making sure I got sufficient breaks in the real-world.  
Last but not least, I’d like to thank David and Nigel. Thank you for the 
encouragement and advice offered along my PhD journey and for being the two 
extra-fathers in my life. Your support has been, and always will be, invaluable. Thank 
you to my sister Clara; your strength and dedication in life are inspiring. I am grateful 
to my parents, Cornelia and Christophe, without whom I wouldn’t have been able to 
 8 
accomplish this task - You made sure you raised us to be curious about the world, 
encouraged us to leave our comfort zones, and taught us life skills to explore foreign 
places. From you, we learned that home is where you decide it is rather than a fixed 
geographical location, and that the foreign can become the familiar. 
 9 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................ 3 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................. 5 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................. 9 
List of Tables and Figures: ................................................................................... 12 
Table of Acronyms .............................................................................................. 13 
Prologue ............................................................................................................. 16 
Chapter 1: Civil Society, The State and Stability of Authoritarian Rule in Ethiopia 21 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 21 
The Case and the Research Context ................................................................................ 26 
The Empirical, Theoretical and Methodological Approach ............................................... 30 
Building on Extant Literature: Civil Society, Authoritarian Rule and Development in 
Ethiopia ......................................................................................................................... 30 
Embracing Ethnography in Political Sciences ................................................................ 32 
Finding Anchorage in Sociological Theories of the State and Civil Society ................... 34 
Relevance and Contributions of the Thesis ...................................................................... 36 
Advancing Knowledge on Civil Society – State Relations in Ethiopia ............................ 36 
A Heuristic, not Predictive Analytical Approach ............................................................ 39 
Methods for Researching Restrictive Political Spaces ................................................... 41 
Structure of the Thesis .................................................................................................... 42 
Chapter 2: One State, Many Bargains: Co-optation, Cooperation, Co-existence, 
Contestation ....................................................................................................... 45 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 45 
Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................... 46 
Civil Society and Democratic Theory ............................................................................. 46 
From Civil Society to Corporatism ................................................................................. 48 
Towards an Integrated State – Civil Society Framework ............................................... 50 
Analytical Framework ..................................................................................................... 58 
Co-optation ................................................................................................................... 61 
Co-operation ................................................................................................................. 62 
Co-existence .................................................................................................................. 62 
Contestation .................................................................................................................. 63 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 64 
Chapter 3: Studying Restricted Political Spaces – Reflections on Research Design, 
Methods and Ethics ............................................................................................ 66 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 66 
Research Design and Research Execution ........................................................................ 68 
The Case Selection ........................................................................................................ 69 
Data Collection and Sampling ....................................................................................... 74 
Accessing the Field ........................................................................................................ 78 
Interview Strategies ...................................................................................................... 81 
Fieldwork Practices and Research Ethics ......................................................................... 89 
(C)overt Research? ........................................................................................................ 89 
Anonymity, Confidentiality and Data Protection .......................................................... 92 
 10 
Research Assistants ....................................................................................................... 94 
Race, Class, Gender and Positionality in Interviews ...................................................... 95 
Risks ............................................................................................................................... 98 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 100 
Chapter 4: State and Society under the (Un-)‘Democratic Developmental State’ 
Model ................................................................................................................ 102 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 102 
The State under the EPRDF rule .................................................................................... 104 
The Political Settlement .............................................................................................. 104 
Mengist: State, Government and the Party ................................................................ 111 
The Ethiopian Democratic Developmental State Model ............................................. 115 
Society under the EPRDF rule ........................................................................................ 122 
Every-day encounters with the Ethiopian State .......................................................... 122 
State, Private Sector and the Politics of Developmentalism ....................................... 128 
The Role of Civil Society Organisations in the EPRDF’s Developmental State Project 131 
International Donors and the EPRDF ............................................................................. 136 
The 2015/18 political crisis: Mengist yellem? ................................................................ 137 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 141 
Chapter 5: The Politics of State – Trade Union Relations in Contemporary Ethiopia
 .......................................................................................................................... 143 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 143 
Brief History of the Ethiopian Labour Movement – 1960s to 1990s ............................... 145 
Realigning EPRDF and Labour Union Priorities ............................................................... 150 
EPRDF Supervised Restructuring of Trade Unions ...................................................... 151 
The EPRDF Labader Committee as Tool for Continuous Control ................................ 154 
Infiltration of Trade Unions Through Control Over Election of Union Leaders ........... 156 
Repression and Threat as Tools to Prevent Contestation ........................................... 159 
Trade Unions and the EPRDF’s Aspiring Developmental State ....................................... 160 
From Co-optation to Contestation – The EPRDF Government and Trade Unions ............ 166 
Co-optation ................................................................................................................. 167 
Cooperation ................................................................................................................ 170 
Co-existence ................................................................................................................ 173 
Contestation ................................................................................................................ 175 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 178 
Chapter 6: Chambers of Commerce and State-Led Development in Ethiopia – From 
Contestation to Political Alignment? .................................................................. 180 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 181 
A Brief History of Chambers of Commerce in Ethiopia: 1947 - 2003 ............................... 183 
Realigning the Chambers to the EPRDF’s Developmental Agenda .................................. 188 
Proclamation No. 341/2003: Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association 
Establishment Proclamation ....................................................................................... 189 
On the Creation of a Dysfunctional Chamber System ................................................. 192 
Pre-empting Contestation – State Control and Obsolete Chambers .......................... 201 
Lasting Impact of the Chambers’ Political Activism: Mistrust and Control ................. 203 
From Co-optation to Contestation – The EPRDF and Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral 
Associations .................................................................................................................. 205 
Co-optation ................................................................................................................. 206 
Cooperation ................................................................................................................ 209 
Coexistence ................................................................................................................. 213 
Contestation ................................................................................................................ 215 
 11 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 217 
Chapter 7: Charities and Societies and the Securitisation of Civic Activism ......... 220 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 221 
A Brief History of Charities and Societies under the EPRDF Regime ............................... 223 
Realigning Charities and Societies to EPRDF Politics: A New Legal Framework .............. 227 
The Provisions of the Charities and Societies Proclamation ....................................... 227 
The Drafting Process of the Proclamation ................................................................... 230 
The Establishment and Operation of the Charities and Societies Agency .................. 234 
The Impact of the Proclamation on Civil Society, Donors and the State ..................... 239 
From Co-optation to Contestation – The EPRDF and Charities and Societies .................. 249 
Co-optation ................................................................................................................. 249 
Cooperation ................................................................................................................ 253 
Co-existence ................................................................................................................ 256 
Contestation ................................................................................................................ 258 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 261 
Chapter 8: The Politics of “Public Silence” - Civil Society, Authoritarianism and 
Regime Stability in Ethiopia ............................................................................... 264 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 265 
Answering the Research Question- The Empirical Contribution ..................................... 265 
The Politics of Repression: From Public Dissent to State Control ............................... 267 
Removed Despotism not Embedded Autonomy: Civil Society and Developmentalism
 ..................................................................................................................................... 272 
Revisiting the Analytical Framework: Co-optation, Cooperation, Coexistence, Contestation 
- The Theoretical Contribution ...................................................................................... 276 
The Politics of Civil Society – State Relations under the Microscope – A methodological 
contribution .................................................................................................................. 282 
Avenues for Future Research ........................................................................................ 284 
The Roots of Fragility: Ethnic Politics, Despotic and Infrastructural Power .................... 287 
Epilogue ............................................................................................................ 291 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 295 
Annex I .............................................................................................................. 344 
List of Interviews ........................................................................................................... 344 
Interviews by Sector/Category ...................................................................................... 349 
List of Workshops and Events Attended ........................................................................ 349 
List of Focus Groups ...................................................................................................... 352 
List of Preparatory Interviews ....................................................................................... 352 
Annex II ............................................................................................................. 353 
Data on Economic Growth and Development in Ethiopia .............................................. 353 
Selected Human Development Indicators ..................................................................... 358 
Annex III ............................................................................................................ 362 
Phases of the EPRDF Rule, 1991-2018 ............................................................................ 362 
 
 12 
List of Tables and Figures: 
Figure 1: Classification of Interactions Between Civil Society and State Actors .................... 35 
Figure 2: Classification of Interactions between State and Civil Society Organisations ......... 60 
Figure 3: Ethnic Distribution in Ethiopian Society ................................................................ 105 
Figure 4: Photograph, Meeting of Trade Unionists, 1994 .................................................... 153 
Figure 5: Cover and First Page, Ethiopian Trade Journal Vol. IV No. 2 January 1966 ........... 184 
Figure 6: Excerpts from Nigdina Limat November 1988 (left) and Nigdina Limat June 1988 
(right) ........................................................................................................................... 186 
Figure 7: Excerpts from Nigdina Limat December 1996 (left) and March 19997 (right) ...... 187 
Figure 8: Excerpts from Addis Business January (left) and April 2000 (right) ...................... 188 
Figure 9: Structure of the Chamber System in Ethiopia ....................................................... 194 
 
Table 1: Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 13 
Table 2: Number of Interviewees per Stakeholder Group ..................................................... 75 
Table 3: Initial Categories of Questions for the Research Scoping ........................................ 83 
Table 4: Dominant Narratives Per Stakeholder Group .......................................................... 86 
Table 5: Federal Government Permanent Employees by Ethnic Group (in %)  ................... 110 
Table 6: Data on Economic Growth and Development in Ethiopia ...................................... 119 
Table 7:Local Government Structures in Ethiopia ............................................................... 124 
Table 8: Number of Trade Union Members per Sector and Percentage Growth of Membership 
per year, 2009-2016 .................................................................................................... 163 
Table 9: Timeline of the Drafting Process of the ChSP ......................................................... 234 
Table 10: Organisations Particularly Affected by the Implementation of the ChSP ............ 241 
Table 11: Mandate and funding sources of charities and societies according to the ChSP and 
relationship to ChSA .................................................................................................... 245 
Table 12: Simplified presentation of the existing links between types/sources of power and 
interactions between state and civil society organisations ........................................ 280 
Table 13: Number of Interviewees per Stakeholder Group ................................................. 349 
Table 14: Observation at Public Events ................................................................................ 349 
Table 15: Focus Groups with members and beneficiaries of Ethiopian Resident Charities . 352 
Table 16: List of Preparatory Interviews .............................................................................. 352 
Table 17: Data on Economic Growth and Development in Ethiopia .................................... 353 
Table 18: Selected Human Development Indicators ............................................................ 358 
Table 19: Phases of EPRDF Rule, Developments in the State, The EPRDF, The Family, The 
Market and Civil Society .............................................................................................. 362 
 
 13 
Table of Acronyms 
Table 1: Acronyms 
AACCSA Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association 
AALC African American Labour Congress 
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
AETU All Ethiopian Trade Union 
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labour Congress of Industrial 
Organisations 
ANDM Amhara National Democratic Movement 
APAP Action Professionals' Association for People 
BMO Business Membership Organisation 
BoLSA Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs 
BPR Business Process Reengineering 
BTU Basic Trade Union 
CAB Communication Affairs Bureau 
CBE Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
CCRDA Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association 
CELU Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions 
CETU Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions 
ChSA Charities and Societies Agency 
ChSP Charities and Societies Proclamation 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CRDA Christian Relief and Development Association 
CSF Civil Society Fund 
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
CUD Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
DA Development Agent 
EBA Ethiopian Bar Association 
ECCSA Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association 
ECSF Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum 
 14 
EEA Ethiopian Economics Association 
EHRCO Ethiopian Human Rights Council 
EIC Ethiopian Investment Commission 
ELA Ethiopian Lawyers Association 
ELAMA Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Union (Amharic acronym) 
EPDM Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement 
EPRDF Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
EPRP Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party 
ERIS Electoral Reform International Services 
EWLA Ethiopian Women's Lawyers Association 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GERD Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
GNI Gross National Income 
GONGO Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation 
HRCO Human Rights Council 
HTP Harmful Traditional Practices 
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation 
IUF International Union of Food, Agriculture, Hotel, Restaurant,  
Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations 
MeTEC Metal and Engineering Corporation 
MoFEC Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
MoLSA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
MoWCYA Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs 
NEBE National Election Board of Ethiopia 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations 
OATUU Organisation of African Trade Union Unity 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 15 
OLF Oromo Liberation Front 
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front 
OPDO Oromo People's Democratic Organisation 
OSJE Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia 
PDO People's Democratic Organisation 
PM Prime Minister 
PMO Prime Minister's Office 
PPCF Public Private Consultative Forum 
PSRC Policy Study and Research Centre 
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme 
SEPDM Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic Movement  
SNNP Southern Nations Nationalities and People 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 
TPDM Tigray People's Democratic Movement 
TPLF Tigrayan People Liberation Front 
TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Programme 
UEWCA Union of Ethiopian Women Charitable Associations 
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
VPN Virtual Private Network 





Addis Ababa, 24.10.2016 [local date: Tekemt 14 2009] 
7 o’clock [1 o’clock local time] in Kasanchis [central district in Addis Ababa]. I get off 
the ‘taxi’1[minibus], together with the 18 other passengers that have been crammed 
into a 10 seater with the driver and the ‘weyala’ [conductor]. I pass the lines of 
beggars, sitting or standing at the ‘taxi’ stops, many blind or with other handicaps. I 
give the change from my ‘taxi’ fare to one of them, as I do every morning; the degree 
of their hardship doesn’t cease to touch me. Kasanchis is buzzing with people on their 
way to work. It has been two weeks since the state of emergency was declared, but 
life in the capital carries on. After some initial disruptions, relative calm has been re-
established and the narrative of political crisis in the regions has become the new 
normal. The protests are primarily led by youth in Oromia [central region in Ethiopia] 
and Amhara [north-central highlands]; chanting ‘Down down woyane2’, they question 
the government’s developmental state narrative, denouncing the regime’s ethnic bias 
in favour of Tigrayans and demanding the end of political repression. They demand 
participation and fair distribution of wealth, economic resources and political power. 
Heading to Meskel square, I pass the construction site for a new multi-storey 
building just next to the Intercontinental Hotel. On the other side of the existing 
Intercontinental, they are building a new Intercontinental, close to the Elilly hotel, the 
Jupiter, the Radison and the Hilton. As I pass the Lime Tree cafe close to the UNECA 
compound, a small crowd is watching police officers dragging a beggar and her 
children into their car. Public begging is outlawed, it does not fit with the EPRDF’s 
[ruling coalition] developmental image. Before President Obama’s visit in 2015, the 
government collected beggars by the truck load and drove them out of the capital. I 
cross under the new light railway that resembles the tram in Stockholm in its design. 
The Chinese have built it, just like the Tekeze Dam, the Addis Ababa Ring Road, the 
                                                        
1 Minibuses in Ethiopia are called taxis, while normal taxis are called contracts or contract taxis. 
2 The term ‘woyane’ means rebel and used to have a positive connotation, alluding to the victory 
against the Derg as well as an earlier peasant rebellion in Tigray (in 1943) against the regime of Haile 
Selassie. However, later it got associated with the ethnic favouritism of Tigrayans under the EPRDF 
rule (Lefort, 2017; Prunier, 2010: 191f). 
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Addis Ababa-Adama Express Way and the Addis-Djibuti railway. The whole capital 
city is a construction site with hotels, office buildings and malls being erected 
everywhere. The billboards on Meskel square are featuring Ethiopian Airlines’ new 
destinations. I catch another ‘taxi’ in front of the Red Terror Martyr’s Memorial 
Museum, featuring the grand failures of Ethiopia’s two previous regimes: the fall of 
Emperor Haile Selassie and the terror under the Derg regime. ‘Hulet ke hamsa’ (2.50 
birr) states the ‘weyala’ when I squeeze into the taxi heading to Bole. I cannot but 
wonder: Is Ethiopia on its way to becoming a middle-income country as the ruling 
party promises? Who benefits from the development and what about all the people 
who are being left out? What differentiates the EPRDF regime from its predecessors 
who also had grand development plans but failed? 
My first interview of the day is with a high-ranking public official. He is part of the 
inner circle around the Prime Minister and has worked on several of the EPRDF’s mega 
infrastructure projects. Massive black leather sofas and a large wooden desk occupy 
the centre of his office and a picture of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is hanging 
on the wall. My interview partner tells me about the EPRDF’s developmental 
endeavours. He draws parallels between the Asian Developmental States and the 
EPRDF’s development programme. While he appears genuinely well informed about 
the history and theory of developmental states, he also repeats key phrases from the 
party pamphlets. He doesn’t fail to label NGOs as ‘rent-seekers’ and ‘neoliberal 
foreign agents’, whose leaders are ‘chauvinists’ and ‘narrow-nationalists’. When I ask 
him about the current political situation, he tells me that the protests are already 
under control and that social media are exaggerating their extent. He states that the 
protests are ‘developmental’, led by youths that have yet to benefit from the EPRDF’s 
programme. The answer, he suggests, is more development. While he brushes aside 
the protests, he spends a lot of time explaining the importance of control and stability. 
His words convey a genuine concern about the ongoing public protests, which is 
perplexing: Why the fear? Why the focus on control, if the party benefits from the 
support it claims to have? After all, it won 100% of the votes in the national elections 
in 2015. And what about the developmental narrative: Does development really bring 
regime legitimacy as the EPRDF claims? Are the two compatible or is there a tension 
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between the kind of policies needed for development and those that ensure regime 
survival? 
I spend the rest of the day with three different civil society organisations. While 
the first one lauds the EPRDF’s developmental endeavours and downplays the 
protests, the second one denounces its human rights violations and the third one 
expresses its worry about the political instability. The first organisation explains that 
it has been working with the youth in Oromia to help the government calm the 
protests, the second one recounts the problems it has had while investigating the 
military response to the protests, while the third organisation states that it’s 
impossible to join the protests without suffering repression. Two out of three of 
today’s interviewees did not want to schedule appointments via email because they 
feared that the government was reading emails. Although I have been working with 
all three organisations for months, interviewees are still cautious about sharing 
politically sensitive information. Like the other civil society organisations I have met 
so far, none of the organisations interviewed today participates in the protests, if it is 
not on behalf of the government to calm the citizens. While many civil society 
organisations are critical of the EPRDF regime, few directly question it. After months 
of fieldwork I am still not sure I know the answers to many of my questions: What is 
civil society in Ethiopia and how are organisations linked to the EPRDF? Why are the 
civil society organisations not joining the anti-government protests? How does the 
government’s discourse on participation go together with the accounts of political 
control and (self-)censorship? 
Before heading home, I meet friends in Kasanchis. We exchange the latest 
information and rumours on the protests and the political situation in Ethiopia. The 
protests have escalated in the regions despite the heavy military intervention and 
curfews. Stay-at-home protests are being staged across Amhara and Oromia regional 
states and protesters are being put into ‘retraining camps’. A friend’s seventy-two-
year-old father has been imprisoned under dubious allegations. Some of our friends 
and contacts have disappeared and we haven’t been able to reach them. But it’s not 
only citizens anymore who are questioning the EPRDF regime; the dynamics are 
changing. The protests have made the split in the ruling coalition visible and coalition 
members use the protests to advance political demands within it. Especially in Oromia 
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and Amhara, local politicians have started to question federal politics, to disclose 
short comings in public services and to demand devolution of power. Given the extent 
of the protests, one has to ask: Is the EPRDF really the coherent and disciplined 
coalition that everyone assumes it to be? Will the crisis in the EPRDF lead to a crisis in 
the state? 
I look at my watch, 5pm [11 o’clock local time], time to head home. When I get 
off the ‘taxi’, I can already see the queue for the ‘kebele3 souk4’. Sugar has arrived 
after weeks of shortage. We have no gas for cooking either and many petrol stations 
are closed: ‘gas ena fuel yellem’ [there is no gas and fuel]. Since the state of 
emergency, supply is even more erratic than usual. The neighbours say hello and I 
engage in the usual exchange of greeting phrases. Joining the queue, I observe my 
environment and try to catch snatches of people’s conversations. Participating in this 
collective ritual is a continuous learning process about society and politics in this 
country. My flatmate has informed the ‘kebele’ officer that I’ll pick up the sugar for 
our household. As he knows us he doesn’t ask for the ‘kebele’ card. When it’s my turn 
the woman behind me tells me to get the sugar weighed as she is worried that the 
‘kebele’ employee will try to fool me. It’s not often that Ethiopians see ‘farenjis’ 
[foreigners] using public services but when they do most worry we don’t know the 
rules and prices. The ‘kebele’ employee smiles at me and weighs the sugar, 5kg. The 
woman behind me checks the scale and nods approvingly. I walk home with the bag 
full of sugar in my arms, carefully holding it to avoid the plastic from tearing. It’s pitch 
black, the third evening in a row with power outage. It is still unclear to me how the 
rapid visible infrastructure development goes together with the constant shortages 
of some basic goods and services. How is the narrative of development compatible 
with lack in basic service provision and the visible poverty and destitution of so many 
citizens? 
                                                        
3 The kebele is often referred to as peasant or neighbourhood association and constitutes a low-level 
administrative unit in Ethiopia. For more information on the country’s administrative structures see 
pages 124f. 
4 Souk is a small shop and its wooden frames are often covered by corrugated iron and tarps. The 
kebele souk is the shop where inhabitants of the kebele who hold kebele cards can buy subsidised food 
staples like sugar, rice, flour and cooking oil. 
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Sitting on the terrace at home we eat ‘kollo’ [roasted barley, chickpeas and 
peanuts], hoping that the power will come back soon. I think about my day and I 
cannot but wonder how all the tiny puzzle pieces are fitting together: Is the EPRDF 
really building a developmental state or is it just another authoritarian regime? Why 
are people protesting? Where do civil society organisations fit in the picture? And 
where is the country heading? 
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Chapter 1: Civil Society, The State and Stability of Authoritarian 
Rule in Ethiopia 
Introduction 
“You have been told to go grubbing in the library thereby 
accumulating a mass of notes and a liberal coating of grime. You 
have been told to choose problems wherever you find musty stacks 
of routine records. This is called ‘getting your hands dirty in real 
research’. Those who counsel you thus are wise and honourable 
men. But one thing more is needful: first hand observation. Go sit in 
the lounges of the luxury hotels and on the doorsteps of the flop-
houses; sit on the Gold Coast settees and the slum shakedowns; sit 
in the orchestra hall and in the Star and Garter Burlesque. In short 
[ladies and5] gentlemen, go get the seat of your pants dirty in real 
research.” (Park quoted in Prus, 1996) 
How does the presence of civil society organisations in authoritarian settings affect 
regime stability? For a long time, Tocquevillian (Tocqueville de, 1835a, 1835b) 
approaches to civil society dominated in political science and stipulated that, 
especially in non-democratic settings, the principal role of civil society organisations 
was to check state power and provide space for resistance to repressive regimes 
(Fung, 2003: 516). A strong civil society, measured by associational density, was said 
to be necessary for countries’ ability to embark on democratic transition processes 
and hence civil society was perceived as a danger to authoritarian rule (Fukuyama, 
2001: 11). However, the normative assumption linking civil society to democracy has 
increasingly been challenged, not least because most 21st century authoritarian 
regimes coexist with a variety of different organisations labelled as members of civil 
society and only few prohibit almost all types of civil society organisations to operate 
(Cavatorta, 2013a). This has raised questions regarding the character of 
contemporary authoritarian regimes and civil society in these settings, as well as 
about the relationship between authoritarian regimes and civil society organisations. 
A quickly expanding canon of work has explored the coexistence of 
contemporary authoritarian states with civil society organisations and contributed 
                                                        
5 Words inserted by the author. 
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insights into why the presence of civil society organisations has not systematically 
favoured democratisation processes. The majority of case studies undertaken 
comprised countries in Asia (Hildebrandt, 2013; Lewis, 2011; Read and Pekkanen, 
2009; Teets, 2014), the Middle East (Aarts and Cavatorta, 2013; Clark, 2013; 
Kawakibi, 2013) and North Africa (Chomiak and Entelis, 2013; Liverani, 2008), but to 
a lesser degree Sub-Saharan Africa (Helliker, 2012; LeVan, 2011). While differing in 
their approaches, a common denominator of many studies lay in their questioning of 
Tocquevillian approaches to civil society. Studies challenged the idea that civil society 
was independent from the state and called into question the assumption that civil 
society promoted democracy (Cavatorta, 2013b; Clarke, 2012; Hildebrandt, 2013). 
Research demonstrated that, civil society organisations often reproduced and 
reinforced non-democratic structures and discourses within their own organisations, 
reflecting the larger political structures and tradition within the country (Jamal, 2009; 
Khatib, 2013; LeVan, 2011). Moreover, studies found that both state and civil society 
organisations built mutually beneficial forms of interactions based on an overlap of 
agendas (Hildebrandt, 2013). In exchange for compliance to political power 
structures and to accepted forms of expressing demands, many civil society 
organisations specialised in service provision, filling gaps where the state did not 
reach. States often tolerated, if not supported, such activities, as they decreased the 
likelihood of grievances among the population that could possibly threaten regime 
stability (Haddad, 2013; Hsu, 2010; Kawakibi, 2013). 
Case studies often focused on explaining why civil society organisations did not 
promote democratisation, emphasising the strict control that states exercised over 
civil society activism and demonstrating how civil society organisations fit their work 
within state-sanctioned parameters (Kawakibi, 2013; Khatib, 2013; Teets, 2014). 
Rather than exploring the multiplicity of different relationships existing between 
state and civil society organisations, studies focused on those explaining regime 
durability. While they acknowledged the strategic behaviour of civil society 
organisations in negotiating more space for action, they held that the strong power 
imbalance in favour of the state severely constrained the ability of civil society 
organisations to push an agenda independent from the state (Durac, 2013; 
Hildebrandt, 2013; Rivetti, 2013). This state-centric approach, while well suited to 
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explain control and co-optation of civil society organisations, failed to adequately 
reflect that states were not completely autonomous from civil society and that 
control was never complete. 
Ethnographies of civil society – state relations in non-democratic settings 
contributed to a more nuanced analysis than many state centric approaches. They 
demonstrated that neither the state nor civil society were homogenous entities and 
that there existed linkages between actors operating in both spheres (Harriss, 2006: 
455f). Some state organisations were more susceptible to influence from specific civil 
society organisations than others and vice-versa (Fu, 2017a: 446; Koppelman, 2017: 
52f). Research revealed extant differences regarding the degree of repression that 
state offices exercised on civil society organisations, both between (Ferguson and 
Gupta, 2002: 988ff) and within (Fu, 2017a: 453f) different administrative levels. 
Moreover, although large-scale open contestation was a rare occurrence in 
authoritarian regimes, this did not signify the absence of bargaining and conflict 
between civil society and state actors (Gready, 2010: 644ff; Lee and Zhang, 2013: 
1487ff). Instead, negotiations between state and civil society organisations were 
often carried out behind closed doors rather than in public spaces (Barkan et al., 
1991: 476ff; Spires, 2011: 13ff). The inability of authoritarian states to supervise all 
civil society organisations at all times and to coordinate control between and within 
different administrative levels created spaces for their operation (Fu, 2017a: 453ff). 
Finally, a high degree of state repression in some cases provoked more open forms 
of contestation, threatening regime stability. Consequently, allowing contained 
forms of contestation was found to be beneficial for regime stability (Lorentzen, 
2013: 129). Taken together, insights from ethnographies showed that despite high 
degrees of state control over civil society in authoritarian settings, civil society 
organisations could both support and weaken regime stability and that it was 
necessary to go beyond the absence of public protests to understand the politics of 
domination and resistance between civil society and state organisations (Ito, 2011: 
426). 
Studies on civil society - state relations in authoritarian settings found that civil 
society organisations affected regime stability through two main channels: (1) 
presence/absence of contestations of the regime and (2) (in)ability of regimes to use 
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civil society organisations to bolster their rule (Hsu, 2010; Khatib, 2013; Yerkes, 2012). 
The absence of contestation by civil society organisations can be termed “negative 
stability”, the non-existence of a direct threat. While historically, the capacity of 
regimes to prevent public contention proved important for their immediate stability, 
it often failed to ensure stability in the longer term. Excessive repression often fuelled 
rather than prevented contestation (Mann, 1984: 211). The “safety valve”6 function 
that civil society organisations fulfilled in democratic settings, the expression of 
demands in society and the provision of services to improve the lives of citizens, was 
compromised in authoritarian settings by the exercise of strict state control (Evans, 
2006: 156; Radon and Pecharroman, 2016). However, to avoid the build-up of 
tensions to a point where it could cause protests, authoritarian regimes in several 
cases tried to manufacture “safety valves” and allowed, for example, contained 
contestation, institutionalised mechanisms to express demands in certain areas and 
encouraged civil society organisations to meet some of the citizens’ social demands 
(Fu, 2017b; Hassid, 2012; Wiktorowicz, 2000: 47). In contrast to negative stability, 
“positive stability” was found to bolster governments’ rule, through creating links 
with the population and/or catering to their needs, instead of simply preventing 
challenges to regimes in power (Hsu and Hasmath, 2014; Ziegler, 2010). 
Consequently, when analysing the effect of civil society organisations on regime 
stability, both components – negative and positive stability – have to be taken into 
account. 
Taking the existing literature as a starting point, this thesis explores the empirical 
manifestations of civil society organisations in Ethiopia and analyses their 
relationship to the state. The main question it sets out to answer is: 
                                                        
6 According to Radon and Pecharroman (2016: 43), in democratic countries, “Civil society also acts as 
a safety valve to ease tensions that invariably arise throughout a society's natural evolution, and to be 
the eyes and ears for improving a society. A civil society that is not threatened and not repressed can 
serve as a barometer for policymakers, since it provides continuous feedback about how citizens feel 
about government initiatives. It can express citizens' needs, aspirations, and desires. Furthermore, civil 
society is the perfect platform for innovation and entrepreneurial initiatives that are focused on 
improving citizens' lives and the economies of their countries. In fact, investing in and supporting civil 
society can minimize, and perhaps even prevent, future social conflict”. The absence of such a “safety 
valve” posed risks to authoritarian regimes, that lacked information about demands in society and the 
capacity to meet them. 
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“How have the relationships between the Ethiopian state under the 
EPRDF rule and different types of civil society organisations affected 
regime stability?” 
To explore the question, I study the relationships between state organisations 
and three different types of civil society organisations, including both membership 
and non-membership-based organisations representing different social classes, 
namely (1) trade unions, (2) chambers of commerce and (3) charities and societies7. 
Contrary to many previous studies on civil society – state relations in 
authoritarian settings, the thesis does not set out to inquire if the growth of civil 
society organisations in Ethiopia will lead to democratisation, nor does it primarily 
aim at explaining why civil society organisations coexist with the authoritarian state. 
While both questions are interesting, they require as a first step an empirically 
grounded analysis of existing civil society - state relations and an understanding of 
how they influence regime stability, both positively and negatively. Based on insights 
from previous studies, the approach I take is designed to capture the relationships 
between different state and civil society organisations, the continuous negotiations 
and the changes in relationships over time. Instead of taking the concepts of civil 
society and the state for granted, the thesis explores their empirical manifestations 
in Ethiopia. The contribution of this thesis lies in the nuance of its analysis, shedding 
light on how different state and civil society organisations and the respective actors 
working within them are linked and engage with each other. Rather than focusing on 
the macro-level, I provide a close-up view of different types of interactions between 
state and civil society organisations and reflect on how these affect regime stability. 
The following sections of the chapter are structured as follows. The first part 
briefly explains the case selection and outlines the research context, describing the 
political and socioeconomic environment in which the research took place. The 
second section describes the approach taken and details how the thesis builds on 
prior research, explains the methods used, the theoretical anchorage of the thesis 
and the analytical framework built to guide the analysis. The third section outlines 
                                                        
7 The third category includes all types of actors falling under the Charities and Societies Proclamation 
from 2009. Organisations in this category are diverse and range from NGOs and professional 
associations to mass organisations. 
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the contribution of the research, in terms of empirical findings, methodological and 
theoretical innovation. The final part of the chapter provides an overview over the 
structure of the thesis. 
The Case and the Research Context 
Contrary to many other authoritarian countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa, in 
Spring 2015 when I selected Ethiopia as a case study, the country had a strong and 
centralised state apparatus and was not afflicted by large-scale armed conflict (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). The ERPDF (ruling coalition of four ethnic-based 
parties) was said to be cohesive and able to fend off contestation of its rule, with little 
indication of regime instability (Abbink, 2017a; Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Vaughan, 
2011). Preparatory interviews conducted during the research design phase 
confirmed that the patterns of interaction between civil society and the state in 
Ethiopia featured similarities to those observed in many other stable authoritarian 
settings, indicating that Ethiopia could be considered as part of a larger group of cases 
with respect to civil society - state relations8. Moreover, existing research often 
portrayed civil society organisations as co-opted and the “public silence”, the 
absence of open contention, was taken as a sign that civil society organisations did 
not threaten regime stability in Ethiopia (Brechenmacher, 2017: 65ff; Dupuy et al., 
2015; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8). 
Since the EPRDF came into power in 1991, Ethiopia has become known for two 
trends: sustained and accelerated socio-economic development and increasingly 
authoritarian rule. The country’s GDP growth rates between 2005 and 2016 were 
                                                        
8 Similar to findings from studies conducted in China (Hildebrandt, 2013), Russia (Mikirova et al., 2013), 
Syria pre-2012 (Kawakibi, 2013) and Jordan (Clark, 2013), the EPRDF was for example said to have 
devised a system that differentially regulated civil society actors with the aim of eliminating threats to 
the regime and using civil society to address some of the pressing socioeconomic issues that arose 
from the country’s recent rapid development and that the state could not address (International NGO, 
Director, 2015; International NGO, Project Manager, 2015). Interviewees also explained that 
interactions between state and civil society differed between various types of state and civil society 
organisations, as did the individual space and negotiating power that CSOs had (International NGO, 
Country Analyst, 2015; Researcher, Ethiopian, 2015a; Researcher, International, 2015). Civil society in 
Ethiopia was said to be closely linked to the state (Researcher, Ethiopian, 2015b, 2015c) and 
cooperating with the state was often perceived as the only way of pushing agendas in different subject 
areas, leading an interviewee to conclude that “Sometimes getting closer to the state means gaining 
more influence” (Consultant, International, 2015). 
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positive at around 10%, and Ethiopia ranked second among African countries in terms 
of poverty reduction over the same time period (The World Bank, 2016). Between 
2000 and 2015, life expectancy increased from 51.9 to 64.6 years, mean years of 
schooling rose from 1.5 to 2.6 years and the GNI per capita (in $ PPP in 2011) grew 
from $617 to $1523 according to the 2016 Human Development Report9. At the same 
time, both statistical indices and qualitative studies unanimously labelled Ethiopia 
unfree in terms of civil and political rights and media freedom and classified it as 
authoritarian10, noting a worsening tendency over the past decade (Abbink and 
Hagmann, 2016). Ethiopia ranked 129th out of 167 countries world-wide and 30th out 
of 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa on the 2017 Democracy Index (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2018: 8, 33). Ethiopia was also listed as one of the worst offenders 
with respect to media freedom (Gagliardone, 2014), ranking in the same category as 
China, North Korea and Eritrea (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018: 42). 
Although the EPRDF has often been described as a cohesive organisation (Abbink, 
2017a; Arriola and Lyons, 2016), the political settlement on which its rule was built 
was fragile. The ruling coalition was led by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front), 
a party representing a small ethnic minority from the country’s northernmost region, 
which raised questions about the regime’s ability to generate political legitimacy 
through representation. Although the EPRDF was formally a coalition of equals, 
embodying a power sharing agreement between the country’s four central regions, 
according to Tadesse and Young (2003: 398) “it never lost its minority identification”. 
To compensate for the lack of representativeness, the EPRDF tried to generate 
legitimacy over performance in development and since the early 2000s it has pursued 
the self-proclaimed ‘Democratic Developmental State’ model (Meles, 2011: 169). 
Emulating development policies used by the Asian Tigers, the EPRDF has focused on 
promoting industrialisation through investment in labour intensive sectors such as 
agroindustry and light manufacturing (Meles, 2006), earning it the nickname ‘African 
Lion’ (Yared et al., 2016). While Ethiopia was said to be one of the clearest examples 
                                                        
9 http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
10 See for example the 2018 Freedom House Index: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2018/ethiopia (last accessed 13.12.2018) or the World Bank’s World Wide Governance 
Indicators: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
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of an aspiring developmental state in Africa (Clapham, 2018: 1151), studies found 
that, like its Asian role models, it was based on authoritarian, not liberal democratic 
politics (Eyob, 2017; Hauge and Chang, Forthcoming; Weis, 2016). 
After an initial decade of relative political opening in the 1990s, the space for civil 
society in Ethiopia has shrunk significantly since the early 2000s, partly as a result of 
CSO engagement in the 2005 elections and the ensuing political crisis (Lefort, 2007; 
Melakou, 2008). The 2005 elections were the freest elections that took place under 
the EPRDF regime. However, the ruling coalition closed the political space soon after 
the elections as it lost many seats in the federal parliament and in the Addis Ababa 
City Council. In the aftermath of the 2005 elections the EPRDF further focused on the 
promotion of accelerated and sustained development to engender legitimacy 
(Abbink, 2006; Smith, 2007). To prevent open contention, it adopted laws restricting 
freedom of speech and civic activism such as the Anti-terrorism Proclamation, the 
Charities and Societies Proclamation and the Freedom of the Mass Media and Access 
to Information Proclamation (Proclamation No. 590, 2008; Proclamation No. 621, 
2009; Proclamation No. 652, 2009). Civic activism was countered with repression 
(Smith, 2007; Weis, 2016: 261f) and although the number of registered civil society 
organisations in Ethiopia grew between 1991 to 2014 (Gebre, 2016), the EPRDF rule 
became more authoritarian. The EPRDF’s approach towards civil society has been 
commonly characterised as focused on preventing contestation and securing its rule, 
with no indication of a potential opening of the associational space (Burgess, 2012; 
Dupuy et al., 2015; Yitayehu, 2010). However, evidence also suggests that the EPRDF 
went beyond repression and manufactured civil society with the aim of using it to 
legitimise its rule (Di Nunzio, 2015; Eyob, 2017). 
While studies found that the EPRDF’s repressive rule caused grievances and 
subversive behaviour among citizens (Di Nunzio, 2014; Emmenegger, 2016; 
Emmenegger et al., 2011; Lefort, 2013; Planel, 2014), since the upheavals around the 
2005 elections (Smith, 2007), popular discontent, for a long time, did not translate 
into public contestation. The EPRDF’s high degree of penetration of society was often 
said to generate regime stability and the outbreak of large-scale anti-government 
protests in 2015, which plunged the EPRDF into the biggest political crisis since the 
beginning of its rule in 1991 came as a surprise to many. The protests that denounced 
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the regime’s ethnic politics, its repressive character and the unfair distribution of 
resources and wealth between regions, ethnicities and individuals, clearly revealed 
that the EPRDF had failed in its attempt to build legitimacy on developmental 
outputs. It also showed that previous research that had taken the “public silence” of 
civil society organisations and citizens as a sign of regime stability had actually failed 
to capture the extent to which the EPRDF rule had caused grievances. 
The protests in 2015/18 were primarily led by youth in Oromia and later also 
Amhara regional states but quickly gained support among other demographics and 
other social and professional groups. Formal civil society organisations did not 
participate in the large-scale regime contestation, which provided an interesting 
angle to reflect on the effect of civil society – state relations on regime stability. While 
it was tempting to take the non-involvement of civil society organisations as a sign 
that they did not threaten regime stability, it was important to go beyond this 
preliminary analysis for at least three reasons. First, excessive repression of civic 
activism is known to have fuelled public protests in other contexts (Lee and Zhang, 
2013: 1476f; Mann, 1984: 211; Slater and Fenner, 2011: 20) and thus the policing of 
civil society organisations might indirectly have threatened regime stability. Second, 
research on civil society - state relations in authoritarian contexts has shown that a 
lot of the interactions between civil society and state organisations did not take place 
in the realm of formal politics, rendering negotiations and conflicts often invisible to 
the public eye (Fu, 2017c; Richter and Hatch, 2013). Consequently, “the public 
silence” of civil society organisations in Ethiopia had possibly hidden existing conflicts 
and supported a false sense of regime stability. Third, given that the regime tried to 
engender legitimacy through developmental performance, it was necessary to 
inquire in how far its relationship to different civil society actors helped or hindered 
the operationalisation of its developmental state programme. Studies on the Asian 
developmental states found that the relationship between states and civil society 
organisations had been influenced by their economic doctrine (Read and Pekkanen, 
2009: 10f) and that it was an important part of their success, marked both by 
repression to prevent contestation, as well mobilisation to support the 
implementation of developmental policies (Deyo, 1987a; Evans, 1995; Kim, 1997). 
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The Empirical, Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
Building on Extant Literature: Civil Society, Authoritarian Rule and Development in 
Ethiopia 
While the literature on the contemporary Ethiopian state has grown considerably 
over the past decade, scholarship so far has focused on ethnic federalism (Abbink, 
2011; Asnake, 2013; Assefa, 2012), electoral authoritarianism (Aalen and Tronvoll, 
2009a; Abbink, 2017a; Di Nunzio, 2014; Tronvoll, 2009; Tronvoll and Hagmann, 2012) 
and the ideological bases of the EPRDF regime (Bach, 2011; Hagmann and Abbink, 
2011; Merera, 2011; Vaughan, 2011). Only a few studies have explored the 
relationship between the EPRDF and civil society organisations, and the majority of 
those have studied NGOs (Burgess, 2012; Dupuy et al., 2015; Sisay, 2012; Yitayehu, 
2010). While several have made notes on trade unions in passing (Fei et al., 2017: 
O469; Hauge, 2017: 195), only a few have analysed the relationships between 
organised labour and the Ethiopian state under the EPRDF regime (Admasie, 2018a; 
Assefa, 2003; Mehari, 2013; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8). Aside from passing remarks 
(Altenburg, 2010: 14; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011: 23; Weis, 2014: 274f), there 
have been even fewer academic studies on chambers of commerce. Some studies 
analysed community based organisations and other informal/non-registered types of 
civil society organisations, however the focus of these studies has been on 
organisational functioning rather than civil society – state relations (Dejene, 2010; 
Pankhurst, 2008; Pankhurst and Mariam, 2000). 
A significant portion of the extant literature on civil society and the state, has 
focused on explaining why the country has not yet democratised. Reflecting 
Tocquevillian ideas on democracy and civil society, in Ethiopia, the weakness of civil 
society has been said to hinder a transition towards democracy in the country. 
Scholars often stated that civil society in Ethiopia lacked strength and was co-opted 
and the state was portrayed as quasi omnipotent in its ability to control civil society 
and make it work in its favour (Burgess, 2012; Dupuy et al., 2015; Hyden and 
Hailemariam, 2003; Sisay, 2012). While referring to the bigger legal and political 
framework in Ethiopia to explain the lack of activism among civil society organisations 
(Gagliardone, 2014; Jalale and Wolff, 2017), little was actually known about concrete 
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mechanisms of control established and tools used to sustain control over longer 
periods of time. Moreover, assuming that civil society organisations were 
handmaidens of the state, studies failed to inquire in how far they were able to 
represent the interests of their members and beneficiaries in their interactions with 
state organisations. Focusing on the absence of public contestation, studies failed to 
capture the bargaining between civil society and state actors that did not take place 
in the public sphere and the formal political realm. 
Despite the scarcity of literature on civil society and the state under the EPRDF 
regime, there exists a growing canon of work on the EPRDF’s development model, 
and state-society relations under it, that indirectly reflects on state-society relations 
and regime stability. Scholarly debates have been characterised by competing 
discourses and a clear split revolved around the question of whether the EPRDF was 
truly committed to building a developmental state modelled after its Asian 
predecessors (Arkebe, 2015; Mulu, 2013; Weis, 2016), or whether the discourse of 
developmentalism was primarily a smokescreen for authoritarian rule (Emmenegger, 
2016; Lefort, 2012; Planel, 2014). Was the EPRDF’s undemocratic rule a means to an 
end, serving as a tool to achieve sustained and accelerated development? Or was it 
an end in itself insofar as it ensured the EPRDF’s rule at all costs? These questions 
were important to reflect on regime stability, given that the EPRDF tried to build 
legitimacy on developmental outputs. 
Several scholars studying industrial policies, growth and development in Ethiopia 
have been cautiously optimistic about the operationalisation of a developmental 
state and the EPRDF’s ability to build legitimacy on developmental performance 
(Arkebe, 2015; Brautigam et al., 2016; Hauge and Chang, Forthcoming: 13f; Mulu, 
2013). The stability of the EPRDF rule, the coalition’s organisational cohesiveness and 
its ability to prevent large-scale contention were seen as key for its ability to 
implement its ambitious development plans (de Waal, 2013a; Weis, 2016). 
However, other studies found that the regime’s repressive character and ethnic 
politics posed problems regarding its ability to implement developmental policies 
and to foster legitimacy and gain popular support (Aalen, 2014; Chinigò and Fantini, 
2015; Clapham, 2018). Ethnographies of development interventions in rural and 
urban areas found that the control and coercion exercised by local public officials on 
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citizens, produced paradoxical outcomes, both reaffirming state power and 
provoking subversive behaviour due to excessive control (Di Nunzio, 2015; 
Emmenegger, 2016; Segers et al., 2008). Several studies also recorded that the 
regime’s focus on political control took primacy over the EPRDF’s developmental 
agenda, hindering rather than promoting development (Lefort, 2012; Planel, 2014; 
Smit et al., 2017). 
Taking the above-mentioned findings into account, it is evident that to study how 
civil society – state relations under the EPRDF affected regime stability, it was not 
enough to analyse the EPRDF’s capacity to exercise control over civil society to 
prevent contestation, as previous studies had done. To understand domination and 
resistance and their impact on regime stability, it was important to capture hidden 
practices of every-day control over civil society organisations, as well as hidden 
bargaining, conflicts and contestation between civil society and state actors and 
analyse those in relationship to what Scott has termed “public transcript of power 
relations” - “[…] the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate 
(Scott, 1990: 2). Moreover, the analysis also had to reflect on the ability of the EPRDF 
to mobilise civil society organisations behind its developmental state programme on 
which it tried to build legitimacy. 
Embracing Ethnography in Political Sciences 
Following a larger trend in qualitative political sciences towards context-sensitive 
analyses of political phenomena (Aronoff and Kubik, 2012: xvi), I opted for an 
ethnographic approach to fieldwork and data gathering. Ethnography –  
“social research based on the close-up, on the-ground observation 
of people and institutions in real time and space, in which the 
investigator embeds herself near (or within) the phenomenon so as 
to detect how and why agents on the scene act, think and feel the 
way they do” (Wacquant 2003, 5)  
- is uniquely suited to explore the grey zones of politics in which large parts of 
civil society - state relations fall (Auyero and Joseph, 2007: 5). To understand how 
civil society - state relations affected regime stability, it was necessary to observe 
their day-to-day interactions in real life. Moreover, to explore the empirical realities 
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of civil society - state relations in Ethiopia, it was important to uncover the hidden 
links and interactions between them, rather than solely focusing on their formal and 
publicly observable relationships. Studying the politics of public silence required 
understanding why civil society organisations did not engage in open public 
contestation, how they bargained with and contested state power outside of the 
public realm, as well as how the state ensured every-day policing of civil society 
organisations. 
In contrast to many traditional ethnographies of state-society relations in 
Ethiopia conducted by anthropologists and sociologists that have explored the 
interactions between individuals in society and local public officials (Di Nunzio, 2015; 
Emmenegger, 2016; Lefort, 2012; Planel, 2014; Smit et al., 2017), I took a meso11, and 
not micro, level approach. While I disaggregated the state and civil society, I looked 
at how organisations in the state and civil society, through their leaders and staff, 
and the existing social and political framework were linked to each other and 
interacted. I used the macro-level context – information on the EPRDF rule, the 
political settlement and the developmental state programme - and insights into 
micro-level interactions between state and civil society actors, to explain interactions 
between organisations in state and civil society. 
In total, I spent 14 months in Ethiopia and conducted over two hundred semi-
structured and unstructured interviews. The interviews were complemented by 
countless informal conversations and observations within civil society organisations, 
at public meetings and events. I started my fieldwork in October 2015 with a scoping 
trip (1.5 months), around the time when large-scale public protests broke out in 
Oromia. I conducted the majority of my fieldwork in 2016 (10 months), but I also 
undertook shorter field visits in 2017 and 2018 (2.5 months). My fieldwork covered 
two states of emergency declared in 2016 and 2018, respectively, including field visits 
                                                        
11 For the purpose of this research, I define the levels of analysis as follows: Marco-level analyses study 
the structures and institutions of different spheres in society, the state, the market, civil society etc., 
whereas micro-level analyses focus on individuals in the respective spheres. Meso-level analyses study 
organisations, groups of people, in the different spheres. 
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to “red-zones” in Oromia administered by the Command Post12 in 2017. I was in the 
field when former Prime Minister Hailemariam Deselegn resigned as a result of the 
unceasing anti-government protests in February 2018 and I also participated in 
workshops between state officials, politicians, scholars and social activists discussing 
the future of Ethiopian political and economic development in May 2018. My 
fieldwork has therefore spanned a period of three years of political crisis, from the 
outset of the anti-government protests in 2015 until the announcement of political 
changes in 2018, which provided a unique opportunity to reflect on questions of civil 
society and regime stability in Ethiopia. 
Finding Anchorage in Sociological Theories of the State and Civil Society 
To capture the relational character of civil society and the state, I draw on sociological 
theories of the state and civil society (Chandhoke, 1995; Mann, 1984; Migdal, 1994), 
not neo-Toquevillian approaches that defined them as separate spheres (Fukuyama, 
2001; Gellner, 1994; Putnam et al., 1994). This allows for exploring the nature and 
degree of the respective independence or autonomy of civil society and the state and 
also for studying the consequences that such independence produces in terms of 
interactions between organisations in both spheres. Moreover, the approach is 
suited for disaggregating both the macro-spheres of state and civil society, to capture 
the heterogeneity of different organisations populating them. Given that the aim of 
the thesis is to explore how the relationship between the Ethiopian state under the 
EPRDF rule and civil society organisations affected regime stability both positively 
and negatively, the analytical framework proposed is of heuristic, not predictive, 
character. Instead it focuses on the links, interactions, negotiations and struggle for 
power between different organisations and actors in civil society and the state. 
I introduce four ideal types of interactions between civil society and state actors: 
1) co-optation, 2) cooperation, 3) coexistence and 4) contestation, based on findings 
from research on the voluntary sector in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Bebbington, 1997; Bratton, 1989; Clark, 1995; Fowler, 2000). The idea that the 
                                                        
12 The state of emergency proclamation (Proclamation No. 984, 2016) stipulated that the Prime 
Minister in Office led the Command post. Siraj Feyissa, Ethiopian Defence Minister acted as the 
Command Post Secretariat. 
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relationship between states and civil societies is characterised by a multitude of 
different interactions, is anchored in the insight that civil society can be both the 
arena where state hegemony is stabilised or where it is challenged and overthrown 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 489–495). Civil society organisations and their actions can 
support or contest the state hegemonic project and they signify both the promise of 
legitimising the state, as well as the danger of overthrowing it. Civil society and the 
state are simultaneously constrained and enabled by each other, the relationship 
being co-dependent, not simply oppositional (Chandhoke, 1995, pp. 65–69). 
Historically, states have had to consult, debate and bargain with actors in civil society 
and the respective power and resources influenced outcomes of interactions. 
 
Figure 1 displays the proposed framework that categorises interactions between 
organisations in the state and in civil society reaching from co-optation - state 
controls the activities of a civil society organisation - to contestation - a civil society 
organisation challenges the state and/or its policies - over various forms of 
cooperation and coexistence.13 The interactions between civil society organisations 
and the state can vary, for example depending on the specific organisations in the 
state and civil society involved and the issue area concerned. As such, civil society 
organisations can simultaneously contest an organisation/actor within the state and 
                                                        
13 For a more detailed discussion of the analytical framework, see chapter 2. 

















Figure 1: Classification of Interactions Between Civil Society and State Actors 
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cooperate with another. Moreover, patterns of interaction can also change over 
time. An organisation that has contested the state can be forcefully realigned or an 
organisation that has previously been controlled can become more independent. 
Interactions are driven by the overlap of the respective agendas, the power 
constellation within and between the state and civil society and the costs and 
benefits associated to taking decisions contradicting the distribution of power. 
Moreover, organisations can contest policies, without necessarily contesting the 
polity as such and the specific nature of the contestation will also determine the state 
response. Although agendas of state and civil society can overlap, they do so to 
differing degrees: the bigger the difference between state priorities and the agenda 
of civil society organisations, the smaller the avenues for cooperation, and the higher 
the chances of contestation and confrontation with authority. 
Relevance and Contributions of the Thesis 
Advancing Knowledge on Civil Society – State Relations in Ethiopia 
The thesis contributes to the study of civil society - state relations in authoritarian 
countries, and offers an empirically-grounded study of the Ethiopian case. Specific to 
Ethiopian studies, it fills a research gap with respect to the relationship between the 
Ethiopian state under the EPRDF regime and formal civil society organisations. 
Moreover, it bridges the gap between two different strands of research, the first one 
focusing on the developmental state and the country’s economy, the second one 
studying the system of government and the politics of the EPRDF rule. 
The thesis systematically captures the relations between state organisations and 
three different types of civil society organisations, namely (1) trade unions, (2) 
chambers of commerce and (3) charities and societies. Disaggregating both the state 
and civil society, this research shows how different parts of the state are connected 
to distinct civil society organisations and maps the variety of interactions existing 
between organisations operating in both spheres. 
The findings of the research challenge previous work that portrayed Ethiopian 
civil society organisations as docile and co-opted (Brechenmacher, 2017; Burgess, 
2012; Dupuy et al., 2015; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8). Although the EPRDF regime 
 37 
exercised strong control over civil society organisations, the latter did not just 
function as an extended arm of the state, but engaged in continuous negotiations 
with state organisations and tried in many cases to push the agendas of their 
members and/or beneficiaries. Trade unions for example advocated for the 
introduction of a minimum salary, chambers of commerce tried to influence the 
country’s development plans and charities demanded state offices to provide public 
services and enforce laws. Moreover, contrary to assumptions in previous research, 
I found that the absence of public contestation was not only the result of state 
domination over civil society but also, in several cases, it reflected strategic choices 
by civil society organisations. Refraining from open contention was used to improve 
relationships with state organisations and increase space for action, as well as to 
avoid attracting the state’s attention and operate at a distance from it. 
The thesis questions the idea that civil society organisations are always most 
effective when independent from the state. I demonstrate that in all three civil 
society sectors under study, organisations with close political ties to the ruling 
coalition were better able to influence political decision makers and civil servants 
than those that were more independent. Consequently, I find that co-optation can 
bear seeds for subversion of power structures and even more open contestation. The 
integration of civil society organisations into state structures, while significantly 
changing them, often did not lead to a complete transformation of organisations 
concerned, nor did it just affect the civil society organisations, instead state 
structures also became altered. 
Another important contribution of this thesis lies in providing insights into the 
grey zones of politics between civil society and state organisations. My research 
reveals that much of the bargaining between civil society and state organisations 
happened behind closed doors. Civil society organisations used their personal 
contacts in state offices to influence political decision-making, often subverting 
rather than publicly contesting power. Instead of staging protests against the EPRDF’s 
failure to enforce workers’ rights to organisation, the trade unions, for example, 
managed to gain support from the Ministry of Labour for a national unionisation 
campaign in 2015/16, by repeatedly visiting the office and setting up formal and 
informal meetings with their contacts in the ministry. The chambers of commerce 
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were able to solve problems regarding registration of business membership 
organisations in 2015/16, thanks to their close contacts with the Ministry of Trade 
and high-ranking EPRDF cadres in other state offices. Similar to the case of the trade 
unions, instead of publicly protesting, representatives from the chambers visited 
state offices and negotiated with their contacts. Charities and societies, especially at 
the local level, bargained with state officials for more space to work on politically 
sensitive issues, anything related to people’s rights, in exchange for providing social 
services to citizens for which state offices lacked resources and capacities for. 
My analysis further reveals that the macro-level framework, such as restrictive 
legislation hindering the work of civil society organisation, was not sufficient to 
explain the lack of activism among civil society organisations. To sustain control over 
civil society organisations over time, the EPRDF in all three civil society sectors under 
study established mechanisms of every-day control. However, in interviews, party 
cadres, state officials and EPRDF-affiliated CSOs mostly denied the existence of such 
practices. In the case of the trade unions a dedicated party body oversaw their daily 
work, but it was not part of the official state structures and did not formally exist. 
Control over the chambers of commerce was less institutionalised than in the case of 
the trade unions, with chamber leaders and staff receiving instructions through 
phone calls from, or personal meetings with, state officials and EPRDF cadres. The 
oversight body for charities and societies was directly linked to the security apparatus 
and relied on continuous monitoring and its ability to deny or revoke licences to keep 
civil society organisations falling under its mandate in line. 
A final empirical contribution of this thesis lies in demonstrating that the EPRDF 
regime did not just clamp down on civil society organisations. Rather, like its Asian 
role models (Evans, 1995; Rhee, 2002; Unger and Chan, 2015), it tried to mobilise 
them as part of its developmental state project. My findings show that the EPRDF had 
clear plans of how to use different types of civil society organisations to ensure 
resources and support for its developmental endeavours. It tried for example to use 
trade unions to control the growing claims of workers that emerged as the country’s 
industrialisation process picked up speed, whereas it pushed the chambers of 
commerce to align the business sector with the EPRDF’s developmental priorities. 
The EPRDF attempted to use charities to secure international funding for 
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development interventions and mass societies to mobilise their members behind the 
EPRDF’s development project. Despite the EPRDF’s intentions, I find that the ruling 
coalition in many cases did not succeed in its attempt to use civil society for 
development, as security concerns and attempts to prevent possible contestation 
hindered a coherent mobilisation of civil society organisations. Control was the core 
priority when it came to the EPRDF’s approach to civil society. 
One of this thesis’ main contributions lies in demonstrating that the relationship 
between civil society organisations and the state in Ethiopia both strengthened and 
weakened regime stability. While it prevented public contestation, the strict control 
exercised by state over civil society organisations created a vacuum between the 
state and society and led to a lack of embeddedness of the EPRDF. The EPRDF’s 
repressive rule created grievances among the population that could not be aired and 
eventually led to public protests in 2015/18. Moreover, the focus on control over 
mobilisation for development also indirectly posed problems for regime stability, as 
the EPRDF tried to build legitimacy on developmental outputs. Ironically, the focus 
on regime survival and preventing contestation ultimately fuelled contestation, 
hindered development and decreased regime stability. 
A Heuristic, not Predictive Analytical Approach 
Studies have noted that neither state-centric nor society-centric approaches to 
analysing civil society - state relations can adequately capture the complexity of their 
relationship (Aronoff and Kubik, 2012: Chapter 8; Fu, 2017c; Lee and Zhang, 2013; 
Spires, 2011). Rooted in corporatism theories, the first one had the tendency to 
overemphasize the role of the state in the control over civil society, whereas the 
second, anchored in Tocquevillian approaches to civil society, lay too much emphasis 
on its democratising potential. Several scholars have called for empirically-grounded 
theory building to provide new insights into civil society - state relations (Howell, 
2012; Spires, 2011). My research sets out to contribute to filling this theoretical gap 
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through adopting an abductive approach14 to analysing civil society - state relations 
in Ethiopia. Building on pre-existing theories and previous research on state - civil 
society relations and refining them through empirical observations, I offer an 
approach focusing on the conceptual linkages rather than conceptual differences. 
Contrary to classical grounded theory that constructs theories entirely inductively 
(Charmaz, 1996), I aim at “generating novel theoretical insights that reframe 
empirical findings in contrast to existing theories” (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012: 
174). 
The analytical innovation lies in proposing a framework that captures 
interactions reaching from co-optation to contestation, spanning the possible range 
of interactions between civil society and state organisations, rather than primarily 
focusing on one, as both state-centric and society-centric approaches have done. 
Moreover, it allows for breaking down the relationship between civil society and 
state organisations to the level of interactions, rather than reasoning at the 
organisational level. Approaches that have tried to categorise civil society 
organisations according to whether they were for example co-opted (Khatib, 2013; 
Rivetti, 2013) or contesting (Chomiak and Entelis, 2013; Simpson, 2013), often have 
failed to acknowledge that despite the existence of larger patterns, civil society and 
state organisations engaged in a variety of different interactions. Simply because a 
state organisation controlled the selection of leaders of a civil society organisation, it 
did not mean that the organisation never contested the state or was not able to enter 
into cooperative agreements with state organisations that benefitted its members, 
or never tried to distance itself from the state through seeking coexistence (Howell, 
2003, 2008). At the same time, an organisation that primarily contested the state was 
not necessarily immune to state influence and might on some occasions decide to 
cooperate with state organisations or opt for coexistence where contestation was 
too costly (Dupuy et al., 2015; Hemment, 2004). 
                                                        
14 “Abductive analysis constitutes a qualitative data analysis approach aimed at theory construction. 
This approach rests on the cultivation of anomalous and surprising empirical findings against a 
background of multiple existing sociological theories and through systematic methodological analysis” 
(Timmermans and Tavory, 2012: 169). 
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Methods for Researching Restrictive Political Spaces 
This thesis contributes to an ongoing discussion on research methods and ethics in 
relation to exploring politically sensitive questions in policed environments 
(Armbruster and Lærke, 2010; Huggins and Glebbeek, 2009a; Li, 2008)15. Questions 
of access, fear of informants, surveillance and threats have often rendered the use of 
traditional research methods and designs impracticable and posed demands for the 
development of methodically rigorous and ethically sound procedures customised to 
these contexts. 
Previous attempts to study informal or sensitive political practices in Ethiopia, 
such as corruption or political rule, through traditional methods like surveys have 
often failed. A case in point was the attempt to include Ethiopia in the Afro-
Barometer in 2013. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents in the survey indicated that 
they thought the interviewer had been sent to them by the government, testifying to 
the constant fear of surveillance in the country. Eighty-one percent of citizens 
surveyed reported that they were satisfied with “how democracy works” in Ethiopia. 
And, only eight percent of people interviewed reported that opposition parties and 
their supporters were regularly silenced by the government. Asked about corruption, 
a large proportion of Ethiopians surveyed said they “didn’t know” about the level of 
corruption in the country and less than three percent of people indicated that they 
had paid bribes to access public services. A large proportion of surveyors reported 
that respondents were suspicious and ill at ease (Mattes and Mulu, 2016). The survey 
results stand in stark contrast to other measurements of democracy and freedom of 
speech and corruption in the country16 (Fund for Peace, 2017; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2018) and raise questions as to how free people felt to answer 
survey questions. 
Using an ethnographic approach based on long-term and in-depth fieldwork 
allowed me to deal with people’s fear and over time create safe spaces for exchange 
of information. This was especially important as the political situation in the country 
deteriorated because of the political protests in 2015/16. While ethnographic 
                                                        
15 For more information on researching restricted political settings in chapter 3. 
16 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/ethiopia (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
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approaches in the research on state-society relations in Ethiopia are no novelty, most 
have focused on micro-level interactions between individuals in society and the local 
state (Di Nunzio, 2015; Emmenegger, 2016; Planel, 2014). Previous research on civil 
society and the state at higher administrative levels has mostly focused on formal 
politics and relied on secondary literature and written documentation, supplemented 
by key informant interviews with elites in both sectors. Studies did not explore the 
politics of civil society - state relations through long term observations and repeated 
interactions with different actors in state and civil society, nor did they sufficiently 
cover the grey zone of politics (Burgess, 2012; Dupuy et al., 2015; Yitayehu, 2010). 
While research captured bigger trends, it failed to adequately disaggregate the state 
and civil society and to capture the details of their relationships and interactions. The 
contribution of this thesis lies in applying an ethnographic approach to researching 
the relationship between state and civil society and the grey zones of Ethiopian 
politics, focusing on organisations rather than individuals and enhancing the 
understanding of the politics of civil society - state relations in the country. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The chapters in the thesis are structured as follows: 
Chapter two lays out the theoretical and analytical foundations for the study. The 
chapter begins by briefly reviewing the state of civil society research, tracing how 
theoretical and methodological approaches have changed over the past decades. 
Next, it sets out the theoretical foundation for the study of civil society - state 
relations, defining key terms and addressing some of the relevant scholarly debates. 
The last part of the chapter develops an analytical framework for the study of civil 
society and the state in Ethiopia, drawing on sociological theories and empirical 
studies of state and civil society. 
Chapter three reflects on the methodological and ethical challenges that I 
encountered doing research on civil society - state relations in Ethiopia and discusses 
the use of ethnographic research methods in the study of politics. The chapter first 
describes the research design and implementation, explaining the case selection, 
data collection strategies and sampling, as well as discussing access to the field and 
interview strategies. The chapter then focuses on fieldwork practices and ethics, 
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reflecting on the nature of the research project and questions relating to anonymity, 
confidentiality and data protection and explains the use of research assistants, my 
positionality and risks related to the project. 
Chapter four reviews the literature on state and society in Ethiopia under the 
EPRDF regime and sets the foundational background for the subsequent analysis of 
civil society - state relations in Ethiopia. The chapter reflects on the nature of the 
state, its autonomous power from society and its relationships to other spheres in 
society (the market, the family and civil society). The chapter first discusses the 
origins of the EPRDF regime, the character of its rule and its chosen economic 
development model. Next, it discusses the interactions between the Ethiopian state 
under the EPRDF, citizens, the private sector and civil society organisations. Finally, 
the chapter describes the relationship between international donors and the EPRDF 
regime and briefly explains the origins and development of the 2015-18 political 
crisis. 
Chapters five to seven present the empirical findings, all following a similar 
structure. Chapters five and six provide, where compatible with protection of 
informants’ anonymity, detailed examples of different trade unions and chambers of 
commerce. Given the relatively recent history of conflict between charities, societies 
and the EPRDF regime and ensuing problems for anonymity and confidentiality, 
chapter seven contains few references to specific organisations. After discussions 
with colleagues at Addis Ababa University, I decided to structure the analysis around 
the different categories of civil society organisations falling under the ChSP, rather 
than individual stories of civil society organisations. 
Chapter five investigates the relationships and patterns of interaction between 
the state and trade unions in Ethiopia since 1991. It studies the functioning of trade 
unions under the EPRDF regime and analyses how the operationalisation of the 
EPRDF’s developmental state project since the early 2000s has affected the 
development of trade unions and shaped their role within the state. To contextualise 
the analysis, the chapter first provides a brief historical overview on the labour 
movement in Ethiopia. Next, it explores the mechanisms used by the EPRDF to 
establish control over trade unions. The chapter concludes by looking at the patterns 
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of interaction between state organisations and trade unions during the period of my 
fieldwork. 
Chapter six explores how the existing social and political structures shaped the 
relationship between the state and chambers of commerce in Ethiopia. In the first 
part of the chapter, I provide a brief historical overview of the development of the 
chamber system in Ethiopia to contextualise the analysis. The second part of the 
chapter explores how the state and organisations in the chambers system relate to 
each other and identifies the mechanisms used by different public offices to establish 
and maintain control over the chambers. In the last part, I analyse the patterns of 
interaction between state representatives and representatives of the chambers 
system observed during my fieldwork, studying how different parts of the state 
related to different parts of the chamber system. 
Chapter seven studies the relationships and interactions between state 
organisations and charities and societies in Ethiopia. It explores the roots of the 2009 
Charities and Societies Proclamation (ChSP), as well as its application, to analyse how 
it structured the relationship between the state and charities and societies in 
Ethiopia. To contextualise the ChSP, the chapter begins by briefly outlining the 
development of the relationship between the EPRDF government and charities and 
societies since 1991. The second part then explores the legal provisions of the ChSP, 
its drafting process, application and impact. Lastly, the chapter maps and analyses 
interactions between state organisations and charities and societies, ranging from 
co-optation to contestation. 
Chapter eight draws the conclusions from the previous chapters. It compares the 
empirical evidence presented in chapters five to seven. The chapter also relates 
empirical findings back to the theoretical and analytical propositions in chapter 2. 
Next, it evaluates the implications of the findings for the study of politics in Ethiopia. 
Finally, it reflects on future avenues for research. 
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Chapter 2: One State, Many Bargains: Co-optation, 
Cooperation, Co-existence, Contestation 
Introduction 
“That civil society may be considered a normative necessity in 
political philosophy does not by any means imply that its existence 
is inevitable empirically” (Harbeson, 1994: 295). 
This chapter lays the theoretical and analytical foundations for the study. The first 
part of the chapter briefly describes the state of civil society research, while the main 
part of the chapter lays out the theoretical foundation for the study of civil society - 
state relations and develops an analytical framework for the study at hand. 
Much qualitative research on civil society has confirmed Harbeson’s statement 
and exposed the fact that normative liberal civil society theories, that stipulate a 
causal link between civil society and democracy, do not withstand empirical testing 
(Hann and Dunn, 1996; Harbeson et al., 1994; Hsu and Hasmath, 2014; Teets, 2014). 
Not even in the West where liberal theories originated has civil society always fulfilled 
the ideals stipulated by prominent normative interpretations (Berman, 1997a; 
Brandsen et al., 2014; Putzel, 1997: 943ff; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999: 1). These 
findings led some scholars to dismiss liberal civil society theories as valid analytical 
frameworks for empirical investigations, either due to their ethnocentric character 
(Hann, Chris, 1996; White, 1996b) or their lack of explanatory power (Hildebrandt, 
2013; Unger and Chan, 2015). 
Although liberal approaches to civil society are just one of many existing 
theoretical frames, studies revealed that they have often been treated as the sole 
valid reference point (Hildebrandt, 2013: 7f; Spires, 2011: 3f). This is partly due to the 
fact that civil society has become a corner stone in the ideological project for liberal 
democracy (Fukuyama, 2001) and partly because its liberal interpretation has shown 
the “capacity to inspire action” (Lewis, 2002: 569)17. Unfortunately, this means that 
                                                        
17 People living under authoritarian rule have found the concept both emotionally and intellectually 
appealing and referred to it in their struggles for political and democratic rights (Aronoff and Kubik, 
2012: 201). 
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the concept of civil society has often been relegated to a political ideal, its definition 
remaining linked to a regime type (democracy) and a specific geographical context 
(the Western world). 
Drawing on sociological theories and empirical studies of the state and civil 
society, I propose a theoretical approach that goes beyond democratic theory and 
links society to the state, not a specific regime type or geographic context. The 
framework is dualistic and understands civil society and the state as relational 
concepts. Although it sees them as analytically and empirically separate, the 
proposed framework explores the nature and degree of the respective 
independence/autonomy of civil society and the state and the consequences such 
independence produces in terms of observable interactions between states and their 
civil societies. The framework proposed is of heuristic, not predictive, character and 
focuses on the links, interactions, negotiations and struggle for power between states 
and their civil societies. 
Theoretical Framework 
Civil Society and Democratic Theory 
Although the concept of civil society has a long and contested epistemological 
history18, the dominant paradigm in civil society theory is constituted of liberal neo-
Tocquevillian approaches (Hildebrandt, 2013: 7f; Obadare, 2011). Neo-Tocquevillian 
definitions - while differing on specifics - assume that civil society is a  
“community of associations [...] characterised by non-violence, 
discourse, self-organisation, recognition of plurality and oriented 
towards general goals and civility (Keane, 2006: VII)”. Civil society 
is seen as “a necessary condition for modern liberal democracy” as 
it “serves to balance the power of the state and to protect 
individuals from the state’s power” (Fukuyama, 2001: 11).  
Michael Walzer has termed this line of reasoning “the civil society argument” (Walzer, 
1991). Civil society and the state according to this tradition have been defined in 
                                                        
18 The epistemological history of the term civil society has been well summarised in previous research 
and scholars have carefully traced how the concept’s meaning and definition have evolved (Adloff, 
2005; Chambers and Kymlicka, 2002; Chandhoke, 1995). 
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opposition, not in relation, to each other (Anheier, 2004, 2009). Scholars have further 
bestowed the state with a negative connotation - potentially repressive - and civil 
society with a positive one -democratic agent (Diamond, 2012: 140; Gellner, 1994: 
Chapter 1; Tocqueville de, 1835b: Chapter 4). Anticipating the abuse of power by the 
state, such theories have assigned the responsibility to curb state power to civil 
society (Anheier, 2007; Powell, 2011; Smith, 1776: Book 1) and interactions between 
the state and civil society have been conceived as a zero sum game (Clarke, 2012: 
Chapter 1). 
The “third wave of democratisation” (Huntington, 1993; Shin, 1994) sparked 
much enthusiasm about the potential of civil society to promote democracy, and 
research initially focused on empirically delineating the concept and on exploring the 
presupposed causal link between civil society and democracy (Anheier, 2007: 5; 
Heinrich, 2005: 212; Salamon, 2010). This approach led to a focus on measuring and 
mapping in civil society research, as studies analysed the organisational density and 
diversity of civil society in different contexts (Anheier, 2004; Heinrich, 2005, 2007; 
Putnam, 1995; Putnam et al., 1994; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). In the Tocquevillian 
tradition, associationalism was often taken as a proxy to measure the presence of 
civil society (Biekart, 2008; Fukuyama, 2001: 13; Keane, 2003: 4f): the number and 
size of associations were used as indicators of a flourishing (high numbers and large 
economic size) or poor (low numbers and little economic size) civil society. Moreover, 
the presence or absence of civil society was used as an indicator to predict and 
measure the quality of democracy (Heinrich, 2007; Marshall et al., 2014; Putnam, 
1995; Putnam et al., 1994; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). 
Despite the large amount of research done, scholars have not yet been able to 
reach a consensus regarding what to include in the measurement of civil society 
(Appe, 2013: 63; Obadare, 2011: 427). Critics have questioned the operationalisation 
of the concept of civil society, as statistical measurements have largely been limited 
to the economic size of the non-profit sector and have failed to reflect the political 
meaning of the concept (Biekart, 2008; Katz, 2006; Obadare, 2011). The focus on 
measuring the presence of formal organisations has excluded informal and non-
registered actors in civil society, providing a skewed picture of the actors inhabiting 
the realm of civil society. Finally, the recent growth of civil society organisations in 
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stable authoritarian settings has further challenged the hypotheses that the number 
and size of civil society organisations are valid independent variables when it comes 
to predicting democratisation or measuring democracy (Lewis, 2013). 
Although they have been more cautious about concluding the existence of a 
direct causal link between civil society and democracy, many qualitative studies have 
also stressed that the presence of civil society is a necessary condition for 
democratisation and institutionalisation of democracy (Bernhard, 1993; Ekiert and 
Kubik, 2004; Gold, 1990; Weigle and Butterfield, 1992). 
From Civil Society to Corporatism 
The failure of the “third wave of democratisation” to bring about sustainable 
democratic transitions in many countries (Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005; Lynch 
and Crawford, 2011; Rose and Shin, 2001), and the increasing co-existence of formal 
civil society organisations and non-democratic regimes, has stimulated a critical 
engagement with the concept of civil society. Qualitative research has shown that 
the local manifestations of civil society are much more complex than suggested by 
liberal political thought. Contrary to stipulations of liberal theories, empirical studies 
found that the delineation between civil society and the state is not clear cut, 
meaning that civil society has to be analysed in relation, rather than in opposition, to 
the state (Helliker, 2012; LeVan, 2011). Moreover, studies challenged the teleological 
reading of civil society as a promoter of democracy and questioned its normative 
conceptualisation (Aronoff and Kubik, 2012: Chapter 8; Nord, 2000). Scholars 
revealed that civil society can be fractionalised and a terrain for conflict, rather than 
pluralistic and “civil” (Clarke, 2012; Jamal, 2012), and that organisations operating in 
its realm can feature undemocratic internal structures and/or advance undemocratic 
and particularistic agendas (Mohan, 2002; Skocpol, 2016). Studies also discovered 
that a strong but “uncivil” civil society can weaken the state, causing political turmoil 
(Jamal, 2009), and that a dense associational landscape can be used to mobilise 
populations behind undemocratic movements that threaten democracy (Berman, 
1997a, 1997b). As a result, scholars argued that civil society can be both a promoter 
of democracy as well as of authoritarianism and that it is not the quantity, but the 
character of the actors inhabiting civil society that play a role with respect to civil 
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society’s democratising potential (Aronoff and Kubik, 2012: 210; Bermeo, 2000: 238). 
Finally, studies showed that the focus on formal civil society organisations has 
diverted attention away from informal actors, such as unregistered or underground 
organisations, their role in civil society and their strategies of hidden resistance and 
subversion of repressive state structures (Fu, 2017c; Scott, 1985; Spires, 2011). 
Despite the conceptual relevance of civil society in debates around democratic theory 
and the transition paradigm, qualitative enquiries into the concept portrayed it as 
empirically largely meaningless. 
The recent growth of formal civil society organisations in non-democratic settings 
encouraged an enquiry into the role and function of civil society in persistent 
authoritarian contexts, beginning with the question of why democratic transitions 
were not taking place. Many studies abandoned civil society theories in favour of a 
more state centric analytical framework, suggesting that omnipotent authoritarian 
states prevented the development of independent civil society organisations and 
hence democracy (Balzer, 2003: 203ff; Doyle, 2016; Heurlin, 2010; Hsu and Hasmath, 
2014; Wiktorowicz, 2000). Although such studies moved away from the civil society 
centred approach, rather than deconstructing it, they deemed it as non-applicable in 
non-democratic contexts. Hence, the civil society argument implicitly remained a 
point of reference, even if it was not used as a frame of analysis. Corporatism19, 
replaced civil society theory in the analysis of state - civil society relationships in non-
democratic settings (Hildebrandt, 2013; Lam and Lam, 2013; Unger and Chan, 2015). 
Studies showed that what looked like civil society at first, was in fact quasi-
governmental organisations, with very limited ability to act independently from the 
state. Such research focused primarily on co-optation of CSOs, government organised 
non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) and cooperation between the 
government and CSOs in service provision. They argued that rather than helping 
democratic transitions, government organised civil society organisations stabilised 
                                                        
19 Corporatism according to Schmitter can be defined as “a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) 
by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports” (Schmitter, 1974: 93f). 
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and legitimised authoritarian regimes (Khatib, 2013; Richter and Hatch, 2013; Rivetti, 
2013). 
Towards an Integrated State – Civil Society Framework 
The prime failure of the approaches described above, was their attempt to link civil 
society to regime types (democracy or authoritarianism) rather than to the concept 
of the state. While the former research revealed linkages between civil society and 
democracy, the latter cast light on the emergence and working of government 
authorised associations in non-democratic settings. Nevertheless, none was truly 
able to capture the diverse links and interactions between civil society and state 
actors (Howell, 2012; Spires, 2011). More ethnographic studies on civil society have 
shown that neither the neo-Tocquevillian nor the corporatism approach are 
appropriate and, instead of reasoning in terms of regime types, ethnographies 
revealed the intricate links that exist between states and their civil societies. These 
studies showed how civil societies are constituted by their states as well as how civil 
societies constitute their states (Aronoff and Kubik, 2012: Chapter 8; Fu, 2017c; Lee 
and Zhang, 2013; Spires, 2011). The fact that studies found common elements in local 
manifestations of civil society and that they hinted at the importance of 
understanding civil societies and states as co-dependent, indicates the importance of 
developing an alternative framework to the state-centric or civil society-centric ones. 
The State as Political Organisation of Society 
As described above, the dominant civil society theories have linked the concept of 
civil society to a specific regime type (democracy) and many did not sufficiently 
engage with state theory (Gellner, 1994; Keane, 1998; Putnam, 1995; Salamon and 
Anheier, 1998). Rather than by its institutional characteristics, the state in the liberal 
tradition has often been defined by its functions: provision of security for the 
individual and an adequate legislative framework for the capitalist economy to thrive 
(Nozick, 1974: Chapter 5; Romani, 2015: 261f). According to Slater and Fenner (2011), 
through equating the state with the governments that run them, such approaches 
have turned the state into a technocratic rather than a political entity, reducing it to 
a specific mode of governing and concealing the political struggles within the state. 
 51 
This conception of the state is not only ahistorical, but it is also of no help to explain 
the links between civil society and the state. 
As there is no single function that has always exclusively been exercised by the 
state (Weber, 1946: 3), an institutional definition of the state is more helpful than a 
functional one. At its very base, “the state is a relation of men dominating men” 
(Weber, 1946: 5). Borrowing from Weber (1946) and Mann (1984, 187f), I define the 
state as a set of separate organisations and personnel, organised in a centralised 
power structure which commands over a defined territory, and which, in its 
consolidated form, possesses the monopoly of both binding rule making and the 
means of physical violence. 
To clearly separate the state from the government or the regime and to 
understand its relation to civil society, we have to go back to processes of state 
formation, in which diverse social actors and organisations struggle for power over 
society (Migdal, 1994: 8; Slater and Fenner, 2011). One possible way of theorising the 
state on the basis of its formation, is to define it as “based on a political settlement 
that embodies the distribution of power between contending social groups and social 
classes” (Putzel and Di John, 2012: 1). This means that states represent the formal 
codification of power blocks in a society at the point of the consolidation of the 
political settlement. The state can thus be understood as “the political organisation 
of society” (Chandhoke, 1995: 65–7) and although it is an organisation with distinctive 
characteristics, an aspiration to the monopoly over binding rule-making and coercive 
power (Chandhoke, 1995: 67; Mann, 1984: 187f), it is only one of many organisations 
of society (Migdal, 1994). Both the state and civil society are rooted in society and 
are therefore co-dependent, not independent from each other. Major changes in the 
power constellations in society are likely to affect the constellation of civil society and 
also to lead to questioning of the existing political settlement. While the state and 
civil society are two analytically distinct concepts, the boundaries between the two 
spheres are porous (Kohli and Shue, 1994: 294). 
Although the state is only one of many organisations of society and derives its 
power from the society it is founded on, it possesses a certain degree of autonomous 
power over civil society (Chandhoke, 1995: 67). Such autonomy lies in the ability of 
the state to “[…] formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the 
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demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society” (Skocpol, 1985: 9). This 
means that states are more than the apparatus for class rule (Mann, 1984: 201). 
While the state does not possess means of power that differ from those found in 
society, the source of its autonomous power lies in its territorial centralisation, 
whereas the reach and power of civil society organisations is more decentralised and 
diffuse (Mann, 1984: 199f; Migdal, 1988: 24f). This does not mean that the 
autonomous power of the state is the same at different administrative levels and that 
its territorial reach is complete (Migdal, 1994), but its power is more centralised than 
the power of civil society. Therefore, while autonomous power is real, it is not 
absolute. 
To conceptualise the states’ autonomous power vis-à-vis civil society, it is useful 
to draw on Michael Mann’s definitions of ‘infrastructural power’ - the capacity to 
penetrate civil society and enforce political decisions in its realm - and ‘despotic 
power’ - the capacity to undertake actions without consulting with civil society 
(Mann, 1984: 185, 206). While despotic power describes the coercive capabilities of 
a state - the power over civil society - infrastructural power describes its 
“penetrative” and “persuasive” administrative power - the power in civil society. 
Consequently, despotic power can be understood as negative power, as it is primarily 
repressive and aimed at preventing challenges to the state as well as to forcefully 
implementing goals/policies, while infrastructural power can be understood as 
positive power, as it describes the capacity of a state to implement goals/policies 
through administrative and other non-coercive means (Lucas, 1998: 91). 
To implement political decisions in the realm of civil society, states have 
established channels and mechanisms of institutional control that go beyond violent 
coercion, such as collection of taxes, registration of citizens and organisations 
(census, birth, marriage, licences etc.), schooling and socialisation of the citizenry, 
creation of dependence on public services and many more (vom Hau, 2008: 335f; 
Slater and Fenner, 2011: 20). However, infrastructural power looks different within 
and between states and can be summarised in the ability of the state to demand 
compliance from civil society for the realisation of state goals and policies (Soifer, 
2008: 238). This can for example be guaranteed through mobilisation of financial 
resources, manpower or other resources from civil society. Infrastructural power 
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cannot simply be measured by the degree of penetration of the state in civil society, 
but has to include reflections regarding the state’s capacity to mobilise resources and 
demand compliance. Infrastructural power is a two-way tool, allowing both the state 
to influence, and eventually control civil society, and civil society to influence the 
state. Historically, the more states have intervened in civil society, the more they 
have exposed themselves to the influence of the latter (Evans et al., 1985: 354; Kohli 
and Shue, 1994: 294; Mann, 2008: 356). Consequently, power autonomy has 
oscillated dialectically between civil societies, and states and states have never been 
entirely independent from the dominant power blocks in civil society (Evans et al., 
1985: 354ff; Mann, 1984: 185 & 206). 
States differ in the degree of autonomous power vis-à-vis their civil societies, 
both with respect to their despotic and their infrastructural power (Lee and Zhang, 
2013; Slater and Fenner, 2011). While large degrees of despotic power have 
historically been linked more to authoritarian than to democratic states, high degrees 
of infrastructural power have marked both democracies and autocracies (Mann, 
2008: 356f). Within the same regime type (democracy or autocracy), there can be 
large differences regarding the state’s capacity to penetrate civil society or to coerce 
it (Slater and Fenner, 2011: 16), which means that to understand the relationships 
between states and their civil society it is more helpful to reason according to 
dimensions of state power (weak or strong) than according to regime types. 
Although states’ despotic and infrastructural powers are linked, they can evolve 
both symmetrically or in opposition. It seems that despotic power can sometimes 
erode the social support necessary for high infrastructural power of states and that 
the cooperation and interaction between states and their civil societies needed for 
high infrastructural power can contradict despotic power (Lucas, 1998: 92; Velásquez 
Ospina, 2010: 56). However, some states achieved relatively high levels of despotic 
and infrastructural power, despite the fact that the two can contradict each other at 
times (Mann, 1984: 191). States with high despotic but little infrastructural power 
have historically proven not to be well equipped to deal with contention. Being 
unable to implement political decisions in the realm of civil society has often pushed 
states towards increased repression of civil society, which in some cases fuelled 
rather than calmed contestation of the state in question (Lee and Zhang, 2013: 1476f; 
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Mann, 1984: 211; Slater and Fenner, 2011: 20). In contrast, where a state has 
exhibited strong infrastructural power, the government which ran it had a large 
“capacity to penetrate civil society and enforce political decisions in its realm” (Mann, 
1984: 185) and as a result proven more stable and better able to deal with contention 
(Slater and Fenner, 2011: 18f). 
Infrastructural power has allowed states to deploy coercion within boundaries 
rather than unleashing unrestricted violence and mechanisms of control, and policing 
has been more subtle, but not less efficient, than open coercion. Infrastructurally 
strong states, have often used violent coercion as a tool of last resort, where 
mechanisms of infrastructural power failed to pre-empt open challenges to the 
regime. Such interventions have often been undertaken in a swift and efficient 
manner to restore order, rather than unleashing prolonged open violence. Close 
monitoring and creation of dependence on the state, have made withholding of 
public services and denying access to relevant permits, efficient tools to prevent 
contestation in case of non-compliance with government policies (Slater and Fenner, 
2011: 20f). A combination of high infrastructural and high despotic power in some 
states can explain their ability to manufacture and organise civil society according to 
their goals and policies, while avoiding and containing large-scale public contention 
(Lee and Zhang, 2013). 
The analysis above demonstrates the usefulness of focusing on the concept of 
the state and its autonomous power, rather than on regime types, to analyse its 
relation to, and interaction with, civil society. However, to capture civil society - state 
relations fully, it is important, contrary to Mann’s approach, not to focus only on 
“those centralised institutions generally called 'states', and [on] the powers of the 
personnel who staff them, at the higher levels generally termed the 'state elite'” 
(Mann, 1984: 188). Focusing only on the infrastructural power of the central state 
apparatus does not fully utilise the concept of infrastructural power, which, due to 
its spatial dimension - degree of territorial reach - and relational dimension - the state 
in civil society - invites the study of the variations of states’ infrastructural power at 
different administrative and geographical levels (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008: 222). 
Both the breadth (territorial reach) and the depth of infrastructural power (degree of 
penetration) are likely to differ within states and also change over time. 
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Civil Society – an institutional and functional definition 
Tying into sociological approaches to the state, civil society can be understood as the 
sphere for social organisation and as one of many organisational sites in society (the 
state, the family, the market etc.). It reflects existing power relations and 
socioeconomic, cultural and historical characteristics of the society it rests on 
(Chandhoke, 1995: 65ff; Gramsci, 1971: 490ff). The sphere of civil society is not static 
and the organisations inhabiting it differ between countries, within countries and 
change over time. This renders it challenging to find a universal definition of civil 
society and to meaningfully delineate it from other organisational spheres in society 
(Aronoff and Kubik, 2012: Chapter 8; Bermeo and Nord, 2000). 
Combining sociological theories about the state and civil society (Gramsci, 1971; 
Mann, 1984; Migdal, 1994) with findings from qualitative studies on civil society in 
developed and developing countries (Bermeo and Nord, 2000; Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 1999; Hann and Dunn, 1996; Harbeson et al., 1994; Skocpol and Fiorina, 
1999), I define civil society as follows: 
Civil society is the associational space between the family, the 
market and the state - overlapping with all three spheres - where 
formal and informal organisations interact and compete with each 
other and the state to pursue their interests. This sphere of 
collective action links society to the state. 
According to this definition, civil society includes a variety of different actors, 
differing in their degree of formality, independence from the state, the market and 
the family and their political and economic power. Professional associations and 
business associations, community based organisations and self-help groups, charities 
and NGOs, faith based organisations, advocacy coalitions and social movements are 
but some examples. While in capitalist countries civil society actors are often closely 
related to the market, and labour might be particularly strong, in developing 
countries traditional community based organisations linked to family and clan 
structures might be predominant. Within countries, there are likely to be differences 
between urban and rural areas and between different regions (Aronoff and Kubik, 
2012: Chapter 8; Bermeo and Nord, 2000; Hann, Chris, 1996; Harbeson et al., 1994; 
Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). The sphere of civil society is not static but constantly 
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evolving and its shape and the actors inhabiting it are influenced by developments in 
society and changes in the spheres surrounding it (Nord, 2000: XV). Contrary to neo-
Tocquevillian definitions that focus on associations, this definition includes informal 
organisations, such as social movements, non-registered entities and other loose 
groupings and allows for studying how actors in formal and informal organisations 
relate to each other and the state and how their form of organising influences their 
action. 
The definition proposed above does not define civil society as an arena separate 
from other arenas in society, but considers the overlaps between civil society, the 
state, the family and the market. It acknowledges that there are links between actors 
from all three spheres and that civil society actors can move, and over time become 
either more independent from, or more integrated into, other spheres. Changing 
power relations between spheres in society and also between different actors in 
society are likely to trigger such developments (Mann, 1984: 193ff; Migdal, 1994: 9). 
Empirical studies have shown that due to changes in power constellations, civil 
society organisations that were set up by states can over time become more 
independent (Unger and Chan, 1995: 32ff; White, 1996a) and organisations that were 
initially independent can be integrated into state structures (Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8). 
The reduction of the sphere for civil society, due to increasing despotic state power, 
does not only lead to a shrinking of civil society, but to a displacement of civil society 
actors into other spheres in society. Studies found that civil society actors in some 
cases moved into the family, the market and even the state itself, when their original 
sphere of action was reduced. In Poland and Eastern Germany the church played an 
important role in organising resistance against communist rule (Aronoff and Kubik, 
2012: 225; Buchowski, 1996), whereas in Nazi Germany the family became a refuge 
for civil society actors (Spulbeck, 1996). Business associations in some Asian countries 
proved crucial for democratisation (Unger and Chan, 1995, 2015) and state run 
universities in 19th century Europe became centres for civic activism (Nord, 2000: 
XXII). Where the official space for civil society was reduced by non-democratic 
governments, informal and non-registered actors in civil society became important 
sources of collective action (Fu, 2017c; Spires, 2011). 
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The above definition, in contrast to liberal approaches is non-normative and 
primarily descriptive, not suggesting any causal link between civil society and 
democracy. It acknowledges that civil society can be both the arena where state 
hegemony is stabilised or where it is challenged and overthrown (Gramsci, 1971: 
489–95; Mann, 1984: 201ff). As long as the power relations in the state reflect the 
power relations in civil society, the latter, in its majority, is unlikely to contest the 
former (Mann, 1984: 204). Contrary to normative approaches to civil society, the 
question of whether civil society contests the state is not linked to the (un)democratic 
character of the state, but is attributable to the distribution of power within and 
between the state and civil society. Just as much as civil society can support a 
democratic regime or stimulate democratisation by contesting an authoritarian one, 
civil society can back authoritarian regimes or overthrow democratic ones, as case 
studies of 19th century Portugal, Italy and Germany revealed (Bermeo, 2000: 238; 
Nord, 2000: XVI). The aim of civil society organisations and actors is primarily to 
represent their interests and the interests of their members vis-à-vis the state and 
other organisations in society, which can, but does not have to, mean pushing for 
democratisation (Gramsci, 1971: 2; Mann, 1984). 
Although the representation of interests involves a struggle for power and 
resources through engaging with the state and other civil society actors, it also 
includes the provision of services to members (Kalinowski, 2008: 343f). Sometimes 
transferring power to the state, rather than struggling for more power, has proven 
the best way to represent interests (Mann, 1984: 201ff). The forms of interest 
representation can be categorised as self-organisation and public engagement 
(Habermas, 1993: Chapter 1; Young, 2000: Chapter 5). The first one is directed 
internally to the organisation and its members and includes, among others, provision 
of non-market goods and services (Young, 2000: 164–7). The second one has an 
external direction and describes activities by which organisations make claims on the 
state (Habermas, 1993: 231–5). There is often an overlap between the self-
organisation and the public sphere function, and civil society organisations usually 
fulfil both to differing degrees. Especially in repressive settings, where public 
engagement is very limited, self-organisation activities have historically been used to 
prepare activities that are ultimately expressed in the public sphere. While many 
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authoritarian states limit public engagement more heavily than self-organisation 
activities (Lewis, 2013), this does not mean that organisations focusing on the latter 
entirely ignore the former (Clark, 2013). A potential danger for authoritarian states 
lies precisely in the fact that it is very difficult to selectively supress the public sphere 
function and allow only self-organisation activities. 
Although it is true, that states delineate civil society through laws and political 
action and hence define the sphere and its operational space, civil society activism 
seldom remains confined to this arena. Where civil society mobilised against 
repressive regimes and struggled for power, actors have often left the legally 
delineated sphere of civil society (Flower and Leonard, 1996; Hann, Chris, 1996; Nord, 
2000: XVX). 
Analytical Framework 
As described above, states are embedded in social ties and linked to society through 
institutionalised and informal channels (Evans et al., 2006: 3f). Interactions between 
states and their civil societies differ, depending on the degree of autonomous power 
that each of the actors possess vis-à-vis the others and can reach from co-optation – 
state controls civil society – to contestation – civil society threatens state hegemony 
- over various forms of cooperation and coexistence. Rather than a system of checks 
and balances, the interactions between state and civil society actors are 
characterised by negotiation, bargaining and sometimes conflict. The power 
constellation within and between the spheres and the costs and benefits associated 
to taking decisions contradicting the distribution of powers, determines the 
interactions between state and civil society actors. 
Neither the state nor civil society are monolithic or unitary actors. Focusing solely 
on the central state and formal civil society organisations may convey a skewed 
picture of the actual reach of the respective power of state and civil society (Kohli 
and Shue, 1994: 308). Power struggles between the state and civil society take place 
in different arenas and in some cases the outcomes of such struggles can be 
cumulative and impact on struggles in other arenas. Parts of the state may respond 
much more to pressure from certain parts of civil society than others (Lee and Zhang, 
2013; Skocpol, 1985: 12ff). Therefore we cannot measure the autonomous power of 
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states as a binary variable, but may need to embrace the concept of “dispersed 
domination” (Migdal, 1994: 9) where the state does not achieve the establishment 
of domination country wide and has to give in to pressures from civil society in certain 
locations and instances. 
A stance that a civil society organisation takes vis-à-vis the state can vary, for 
example, depending on the topic or the interlocutor. This means that organisations 
can simultaneously contest the state and cooperate with it (He and Huang, 2015; Lee 
and Zhang, 2013). The strategies that civil society organisations adopt towards the 
state can shift on the continuum between co-optation and contestation and change 
over time (Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8; Unger and Chan, 2015). Because we are likely to 
see patterns of interaction (e.g. a civil society actor may cooperate more than it 
contests), only a disaggregation of the different strategies adopted by different 
actors in civil society can shed light on the negotiations, bargaining and conflict taking 
place between civil society and the state. 
Drawing on the theoretical framework proposed above and empirical studies on 
civil society and states, we can identify four ideal types of interaction between the 
state and actors in civil society: co-optation, cooperation, coexistence and 
contestation (see Figure 2). The larger the discrepancy between the agenda of the 
state and the agenda of a civil society actor, the higher the probability that the latter 
will contest the former. The further a civil society actor approaches open 
contestation, the higher the probability that it will enter into confrontation with state 
authority. The higher the degree of despotic power of a state, the less likely it will be 
to tolerate public contestation and the more likely it is to respond with violent 
repression. The higher the degree of infrastructural power, the larger the probability 
that a state can co-opt civil society actors into its structures. However, co-optation 
will differ depending on whether high infrastructural power is combined with high or 
low despotic power. Where despotic power is high, states can forcefully co-opt 
dissident civil society actors. Where despotic power is low, due to the dual character 
of infrastructural power, dominant civil society actors (e.g. important economic 
lobbies) can in some instances co-opt the state rather than the other way around 
(Mann, 1984, 2008). Few observed interactions between state and civil society actors 
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will neatly fall into one category, but they can be interpreted and analysed in relation 
to the ideal types. 
The proposed framework has its genealogy in previous research on the voluntary 
sector in developing countries in the 1980s and 90s, that explored how NGOs and 
governments in developing countries interacted (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000; 
Rooy, 2013). While not proposing a coherent framework for analysing NGO-state 
relations, studies documented the existence of the four types of interactions named 
above. Research showed that governments in non-democratic settings, while 
welcoming the contribution of NGOs in terms of human and financial resources to 
development initiatives, tried to prevent them from pushing independent agendas 
from the state to avert contestation (Bebbington, 1997: 124f). They also documented 
that states on several occasions managed to establish control over NGOs and their 
resources, all the while showing that sometimes NGOs could function as vocal 
opposition to states (Backer and Carroll, 2001: 3f). Rather than finding harmonious 
relationships, scholars showed the existence of conflicts, all the while demonstrating 
that, where agendas of states and NGOs overlapped, they engaged in cooperative 
exchanges. Some NGOs were shown to prefer to operate at a distance from the state, 
implementing their projects in parallel, to prevent state influence on their 
organisation, whereas other NGOs were found to approach state actors to build trust 
to be able to operate (Bratton, 1989: 577ff; Clark, 1995: 593ff; Fowler, 2000: 640ff).  
Figure 2: Classification of Interactions between State and Civil Society Organisations 



















At an organisational level, co-optation can be defined as “the process of 
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy - determining structure of an 
organisation as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence” (Selznick, 
1948: 34). While this strategy helps states to establish domination over civil society, 
it might also cause internal changes in the state because of the need to accommodate 
the newly integrated actors. Co-optation seldom leads to total transformation of the 
organisation concerned and opens the possibility for struggle and contestation 
(Migdal, 1994: 25f)20, as research on mass-organisations in China has shown (Howell, 
2003, 2008). As co-optation reflects a state of tension between formal authority and 
social power, it is by definition a conflictual situation (Selznick, 1948: 35). To co-opt 
civil society organisations, infrastructural power is needed. While despotic power and 
repression is often used at the initial stages of co-optation and restructuring, to 
ensure compliance over time, states cannot simply rely on repression, as it has in 
many cases provoked resistance and contestation (Lucas, 1998; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 
8). To determine whether interactions between the state and an actor in civil society 
testify to co-optation it is important to enquire how far the organisation can voice 
disagreements with the state, how far it possesses an independent agenda and how 
far it manages to represent the interests of its members and pursues its own goals. 
Co-optation is not always easy to differentiate from cooperation, however there is a 
sound basis to argue that cooperation indicates a degree of mutual benefit in the 
interaction, while in the case of co-optation the state is the primary beneficiary. 
Interactions categorised as co-optation include, for example: an organisation 
collecting politically sensitive information from members and transmitting it to state 
officials; an organisation informing state officials about strikes or protests planned by 
its members; an organisation supporting policies harming its members; or an 
organisation collecting resources for the state. 
                                                        
20 Co-optation reflects the loss of independence of civil society actors vis-à-vis state organisations, but 
it cannot be measured in binary terms. Co-optation is seldom total and even if the top of an 
organisation is co-opted, this does not mean that the rest of the organisation is co-opted as well. 
Especially for mass-based organisations in authoritarian regimes, there exists a struggle of co-opted 
leadership to respond to political demands of the state and simultaneously accommodate the 
interests of their members as Buchowski’s (1996: 84) study on communist Poland described. 
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Co-operation between different state organisations and civil society actors is 
likely to occur where their respective agendas overlap, as for example, numerous 
studies on China show. This might be a shared goal, but it might also be the 
agreement of a trade-off, a tit-for-tat, by which both partners compromise to achieve 
their respective goals. Especially where state despotic power is high, cooperation 
with the state can be a strategy to foster trust among relevant public entities to 
expand the space of action of the organisation concerned, as a study of grassroots 
labour NGOs in Southern China revealed (He and Huang, 2015: 488f). Moreover, 
according to research on local protests in China, cooperation is the proof that the 
relationship between the state and civil society is not a zero-sum game, but can be 
mutually beneficial and bears mutually empowering elements (Lee and Zhang, 2013: 
1484f). Studies have often emphasized the autonomy of the state to set the terms 
for cooperation, however this has somewhat neglected the dual character of 
infrastructural power and the fact that the state depends on civil society actors both 
for support as well as for provision of services (Lee and Zhang, 2013: 1485). 
Cooperation might in some cases be a trade-off, where an organisation decides to 
give into state demands in exchange for political access, resources or more space for 
action in the future (Hildebrandt, 2013; Lee and Zhang, 2013). Combining 
cooperation with contestation has sometimes been sought as a means of avoiding 
co-optation, as illustrated by a study of participatory budgeting in Argentina (Holdo, 
2016: 380). Interactions falling under co-operation are wide-ranging and can include, 
for example, joint implementation of activities or support for the activities of both 
sides. Co-operation is marked by the fact that it can be seen as mutually beneficial, 
even if one part might benefit more than the other, or the benefits from cooperation 
are not immediate but to be reaped in the future. 
Co-existence in its most extreme form translates into complete disengagement 
from state structures as studies on civil society in China, Russia and Poland found. 
Underground labour organisations in China were for example found to choose this 
strategy, especially in their initial stages of organisation (Fu, 2017c: 500), whereas 
social networks in Russia focused on linking individual citizens but operated 
informally, to avoid directly engaging with the state (Gibson, 2001: 65f). Choosing to 
operate outside of the legal framework is often a strategy to avoid regulation and 
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control by the state (Spires, 2011). As disengagement from state structures and 
hidden organisation has in the past often been used as a strategy to organise open 
contestation against despotic states, these states have tried to reduce the 
opportunity of co-existence to avoid anti-regime plotting, e.g. in communist Poland 
(Wiktorowicz, 2000: 57). In a few instances civil society actors in authoritarian states, 
have been able to establish relationships of trust, through showing that they did not 
operate outside of the state permitted boundaries, which has allowed them to 
operate not far from, but at close distance to, the official state apparatus (He and 
Huang, 2015). A lot of the service provision activities that are not directly supported 
by, or implemented in cooperation with, states can fall under this category. Co-
existence can also be expressed in non-participation and disengagement from official 
processes and public organisations, favouring subversion of state structures and thus 
approaching contestation (Scott, 1985). 
Contestation 
Although contestation is often associated with public dissent, contestation can 
take very different forms, as case studies on countries in Asia, Europe and Latin 
America revealed. It is important to distinguish between challenges made on the 
policy level - most membership-based civil society organisations try to influence state 
policy to accommodate their interests - and those made to the polity - in politically 
restrictive environments a push for regime change is more rare because of the high 
costs associated with such activities, according to findings from the Philippines and 
Russia (Clark, 2013; Mikirova et al., 2013). Authoritarian states often set clear limits 
on what form of contestation is allowed (Ortmann, 2012: 19), however, several 
studies on civil society in China suggest that this is directed more towards group 
collective action than individual action (Gallagher, 2014: 82f; King et al., 2013). As 
part of infrastructural power mechanisms, small scale and contained contestation is 
sometimes allowed as a tool of information gathering (Lorentzen, 2013) and in some 
cases civil society actors have used the ability to contest at an individual level as a 
strategy to reduce the costs of contestation (Fu, 2017c: 518). Contestation can mean 
as well the construction of an alternative discourse (verbal criticism) and various 
overt and covert forms of subversion of power structures (Johnston, 2006). Especially 
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covert forms of contestation are not always easy to distinguish from co-existence and 
the more despotic a state, the more dangerous and costly open contestation is, as 
studies on contemporary China and post-totalitarian Germany concluded (Fu, 2017c: 
508; Spulbeck, 1996: 77). A few interactions falling under contestation can include 
opposing laws that hurt members of civil society organisations as well as open and 
hidden protest events. Contestation can be cumulative if the struggles in one arena 
have an impact on the outcomes of struggles in another arena. 
Conclusion 
As states are embedded in civil society while at the same time benefitting from 
autonomous power vis-à-vis the latter, civil society - state relations have to be 
conceptualised in a dual-theoretical framework. Although this insight is not new 
(Migdal, 1994; Skocpol, 1985), a great deal of empirical work on civil society and the 
state in social sciences has fallen into the one-angle trap (society-centric or state-
centric). Choosing either a society-centric or a state-centric approach has led to 
making an unhelpful distinction between civil society in democracies (society-centric) 
and civil society in authoritarian settings (state-centric). Both have analysed civil 
society in relation to regime types rather than to states, even if the name of the 
second approach mistakenly suggests the opposite. An exception to this rule can be 
found in many anthropological approaches with a long tradition of research 
confirming the need for a relational approach to civil society and the state (Hann and 
Dunn, 1996; Lee and Zhang, 2013; Scott, 1985). This chapter has combined relevant 
sociological theories with evidence from empirical studies to develop a theoretically 
and empirically grounded framework for analysing civil society - state relations. 
Although I propose abandoning the normative liberal framework, this does not 
mean that I negate the potential of civil society to promote democratisation and 
democracy. It simply means that I consider the pursuit of democracy as a possibility 
(Gramsci, 1971: 494, 532f,) rather than a necessity, or a defining characteristic of civil 
society (Tocqueville de, 1835b: 307). Opting for a sociological approach and tying it 
closely to empirical findings, I have aimed at constructing a “real type” definition of 
civil society, in contrast to an ideal type definition. In short, I have tried to distinguish 
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between civil society as a normative concept in political theory and an empirical 
concept in social sciences research without negating their connection. 
In the following chapters, these theoretical and analytical frameworks will be 
used to operationalise the concepts of civil society and the state in Ethiopia and to 
analyse the interactions existing between state and civil society actors. This includes 
an analysis of the political settlement reached in 1991 and the resulting levels of 
despotic and infrastructural powers of the Ethiopian state by 2018. The analysis of 
power structures will be disaggregated both within and between central and local 
state organisations. The interactions between the state and civil society will be 
studied comparatively, including case studies of three different types of civil society 
actors (trade unions, chambers of commerce and charities) and also disaggregated at 
different administrative levels. Interactions will be categorised in relation to the ideal 
types developed above. 
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Chapter 3: Studying Restricted Political Spaces – Reflections on 
Research Design, Methods and Ethics 
“If methodological problems question the reliability and validity of 
one’s data, then ethical dilemmas question the validity of the 
researcher’s actual presence” (Kellehear, 2002: 65). 
Introduction 
Addis Ababa, 24th of June 2016 [Säne 17 2008] 
The room was dark and hot. There were four of us sitting around a table: the former 
union president Awoll, the acting union president Yosef, the finance officer Girma and 
me21. Yosef and Girma had informed Awoll about my research and he had agreed to 
an interview. They had chosen the clinic where Awoll worked for our meeting, telling 
me that it was safe to talk here. Awoll sat across from me, he looked hunched and 
much older than his actual age. His suit was too big, which made him look even 
thinner. Apart from his vivid eyes, there was not much left of the charismatic union 
leader Girma and Yosef had described to me. Before I could properly start to introduce 
myself and my research, Awoll took the lead in the conversation. He asked me where 
I lived and about my family. He told me he didn’t like Kasanchis (where I lived): too 
many people, not safe enough. He also felt that as I was approaching thirty, it was 
time to think about a family, but he agreed that my research was important too. 
When he was satisfied with the information he received, Awoll started telling his 
story. I managed to interrupt him briefly to formally get his consent, but he didn’t 
seem the slightest bit interested. “It’s fine Camille” was all he said, “You can use 
whatever I say, I don’t care anymore”. Whether this was informed consent or not 
remains debatable. The interview took over three hours. Sometimes I would ask a 
question for clarification or follow up and Girma and Yosef occasionally filled in 
details, but mainly we listened. While Awoll told his story, tears ran down his cheeks. 
I asked him whether he wanted to stop or take a break, but he just continued. 
                                                        
21 I changed all names to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality. 
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Sometimes he became silent for a few seconds to compose himself or wipe away the 
tears, but he went on. Nearly twenty years had passed since his active time as a union 
president and still he remembered everything as if it had been yesterday. He talked 
about the big strike in the 1990s, detailing how security forces had closed the union’s 
office, and how trade unionists had been imprisoned. He talked about the threats and 
the physical violence the government had used to silence them, but he also 
remembered the solidarity of the workers and the collective resistance. He seemed 
most upset when talking about the people he hadn’t been able to save: those who 
had been exiled, those who had been killed and those who had disappeared. More 
tears came as he listed their names. Throughout the interview, I increasingly felt like 
a fraud, realising that I was a civil society researcher, who couldn’t imagine sacrificing 
her own wellbeing to fight against the system. I just couldn’t see myself doing what 
Awoll had done. I felt unprepared and cowardly, not sure how to handle the situation, 
but neither Awoll nor the two others questioned my integrity or work. On the contrary, 
Awoll told me to meet him next day at the union’s office to go through the archives 
and collect written proof for his story. He told me he wanted me to write the story of 
his trade union. Just like Girma and Yosef, that’s why they brought me to Awoll in the 
first place. The three of them were radically different from most trade unionists I had 
met before. They had a different story to tell and they wanted it heard. 
* * * 
In this chapter, I reflect on the methodological and ethical challenges that I 
encountered doing research on civil society - state relations in Ethiopia and discuss 
the use of ethnographic research methods in the study of politics. I also discuss the 
politics of carrying out ethnographic fieldwork on a sensitive topic in a climate of 
growing anti-government protests. The first part of the chapter discusses the 
research design and implementation, while the second part focuses on fieldwork 
practices and ethics. 
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Research Design and Research Execution 
Scholars have long acknowledged the need for more qualitative studies in civil society 
research and the weakness of normative civil society theories and quantitative 
approaches in exploring the presupposed causal link between civil society and 
democracy (Biekart, 2008; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Hann and Dunn, 1996; Katz, 
2006). The recent growth of civil society organisations in authoritarian settings has 
spurred research evaluating why the growth of civil society has not systematically 
brought about democratisation, why authoritarian states have allowed CSOs to 
multiply and how civil society and state actors are related to each other in non-
democratic settings. As noted in Chapter 2, many of those studies used corporatism 
theories to explain the relationships between CSOs and states in non-democratic 
states (Hildebrandt, 2013; Hsu and Hasmath, 2014; Unger and Chan, 2015). However, 
dominant theoretical framings of civil society - state relations that favoured a 
classification according to regime types - civil society theories for democratic 
contexts and corporatism models for undemocratic contexts - have been questioned 
due to their rather simplistic categorisation of links and interactions between civil 
society and state actors (Spires, 2011). 
My thesis responds to the need for more empirically grounded theory building 
on civil society - state relations and contributes to existing research by going beyond 
the dominant approaches. While exploratory in nature, I followed Cliffort Geertz’s 
advice who wrote: 
“Although one starts any effort at thick description, beyond the 
obvious and superficial, from a state of general bewilderment as to 
what the devil is going on - trying to find one's feet - one does not 
start (or ought not) intellectually empty-handed” (Geertz, 1994: 
228f).  
Consequently, I opted for an abductive approach (Timmermans and Tavory, 
2012), building on pre-existing theory, particularly sociological theories of the state 
and civil society. While going beyond the dominant civil society-corporatism debate, 
both my theoretical and analytical framework are anchored in existing theories and 
my research design is built on previous approaches to the topic. 
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The Case Selection22 
Consistent with the “growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing 
inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and 
cross-case comparisons” (Bennet and Bennett 2005, 18), I decided for a comparative 
case study of three different types of civil society organisations in Ethiopia. The actual 
units of analysis in my study consist of civil society organisations in each sector, which 
constituted embedded units in my cases. Hence I was able to undertake within, 
between and across comparisons of the sector and the organisational levels, which 
provided for a rich set of observations (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
I opted for a most similar case design, selecting cases on the dependent variable 
of interest – the dominant pattern of interaction between civil society organisations 
and the state – using process tracing to explain the divergent outcomes (Mahoney 
and Goertz, 2006: 239–40). Despite well-known reservations (King et al., 1994: 1), for 
hypothesis generating studies, the case selection on the dependent variable is 
common and in a most-similar case design it allows for tracing back the outcomes to 
a small set of explanatory variables (Gerring, 2006: 131). I chose the cases to reflect 
the largest possible variation in the dependent variable, hence including interactions 
reaching from co-optation to contestation. However, choosing most similar cases for 
understudied topics is not self-evident, because of the lack of an established set of 
control variables and a large-N dataset from which to choose (Gerring, 2006: 131). 
Given the scarcity of information on civil society - state relations in Ethiopia, I 
undertook a six-week long pilot study in October/November 2015 to select the cases. 
Based on desk research and the preparatory interviews I had pre-selected three 
possible sectors: (1) charities and societies, (2) professional associations, and (3) 
community-based organisations. However, once in the field, I realised that the first 
two categories were overlapping in terms of legal registration and that the last one 
posed significant access issues due to language barriers, leading me to choose (1) 
trade unions, (2) chambers of commerce and (3) charities and societies. 
The sectors chosen were constituted by formal organisations that were 
registered, or tried to get registered, and operated according to specific laws and 
                                                        
22 For information on the country case selection and the research context please see Chapter 1. 
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regulations (Proclamation No. 341, 2003; Proclamation No. 377, 2004; Proclamation 
No. 621, 2009). The formation of chambers of commerce, trade unions and charities 
and societies all date back to the second half of the twentieth century and the three 
civil society sectors represented organisations that at least formally operated 
independently from state structures and could, in theory, challenge state policies 
and, in some cases, even the state itself (Beyene, 2009; Dessalegn, 2002). 
The extant literature also provides reason to believe that these actors that I 
selected to study have the potential to challenge governments and promote political 
change (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007; Conaghan and Espinal, 1990; Rakner, 1992). In the 
Ethiopian context, these three types of organisations had been in major conflicts with 
the EPRDF regime, the trade unions in the 1990s, the chambers of commerce in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s and the charities and societies between 2005 and 2010. 
Subsequently, all three sectors saw significant organisational restructuring and 
changes in the regulatory framework governing their activity (Dupuy et al., 2015; 
Hagmann and Abbink, 2011: 584; International Labour Office, 1997a; Praeg, 2006: 
185f). As I discuss in more detail below, the three sectors in civil society differed in 
the degree of contentiousness in their individual relationships to the EPRDF regime. 
The case studies on trade unions and chambers of commerce, especially, spoke to 
the literature on the importance of state-business and state-labour relations in 
developmental states, which provided an additional theoretical justification for 
choosing these sectors. 
Trade unions in Ethiopia constitute the first case and were to a large extent 
directly controlled by the EPRDF. Since the restructuring of the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU) in the 1990s, the alignment of the unions’ work to 
state policies was ensured through numerous mechanisms, not least through 
infiltration (Docherty and Velden, 2012: 97; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8; Shinn and 
Ofcansky, 2013: 256f). Although there was variation as to the proximity between 
individual unions and the EPRDF regime, at least at confederation and federation 
level, unions were closely linked to the EPRDF structures. Unionisation was 
encouraged by the EPRDF government to control workers through party-affiliated 
unions and avoid a radicalisation of the labour movement. The EPRDF had a clear 
approach to trade unions marked by its chosen development model. Moreover, 
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unions were mobilised to legitimise and support the EPRDF rule, turning them into 
proponents of the regime. Although control of unions was far reaching, evidence 
suggests that there existed some modest conflict between unions and the EPRDF 
government (Hailu, 2010; Tamrat, 2014). 
The Chambers of Commerce in Ethiopia constituted the second case. Although 
to a lesser extent than the trade unions, chambers of commerce were closely linked 
to both EPRDF and state structures. The EPRDF was wary of the chambers of 
commerce and other business membership organisations (BMOs), as many had 
supported opposition parties in the past, especially around the 2000 and 2005 
national elections. To avoid contestation and align chambers and other BMOs with 
the EPRDF’s developmental state programme, the EPRDF government restructured 
the chamber system in 2003, introducing many new bodies controlled by party-
affiliated businesses and changing the set-up of existing ones to weaken vocal 
organisations (Teshome, 2014). Although the chambers were less vocal than in the 
past and did not engage in open contestation of the regime, some chambers 
struggled for more independence from the state and regularly pushed for policy 
change regarding private sector issues. The EPRDF tried to use the chambers to align 
the private sector with its developmental priorities. 
The last case featured all organisations falling under the 2009 Charities and 
Societies Proclamation. This sector included a wide array of different types of actors, 
such as NGOs, professional associations and mass-based organisations (Proclamation 
No. 621, 2009). NGOs and some professional associations used to receive foreign 
money for democracy promotion and other rights-based activities and many of them 
were very vocal during the 2005 election (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009b: 202; Dupuy et 
al., 2015). Although the 2009 proclamation cut foreign funding for any form of 
political activities, weakening and even eliminating many of the organisations that 
used to work on these topics, the relationship between the EPRDF government and 
most organisations operating in this sector, the exception being mass based 
organisations linked to EPRDF structures, remained contentious. Even organisations 
working on development activities inscribed in the country’s development plans ran 
into problems with the regulatory body for this sector. While the EPRDF tried to 
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mobilise charities and societies as part of its developmental state programme, 
security concerns often took primacy over developmental concerns. 
I excluded informal civil society organisations for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. Ethiopia has a longstanding tradition of community-based organisations 
that each fulfil specific functions and have their particular institutional set-up. Some 
examples are Iddirs, funerary associations, equb, credit groups and debo, agricultural 
labour groups. These associations have fulfilled important functions for their 
members encompassing, among others, social integration and economic safety nets 
(Pankhurst, 2008: 147). In their original format, such organisations have become 
known for their inward-looking character (Clapham, 2004: 80), although especially 
iddirs have historically been known for evolving and adopting functions such as 
labour representation and community development. However, when iddirs changed 
their mandate they were often forced to change their status into formally registered 
organisations such as trade unions and charities. Given that the research question 
aims to look at how civil society - state relations affected regime stability, I was 
particularly interested in those engaging in regular interactions with state 
organisations, rather than those operating in parallel to the state. Moreover, more 
informal organisations have historically not encountered major conflicts with the 
state, which was one of the selection criteria as I described above. Another group of 
informal civil society actors would have been activists. However, given the restrictive 
political climate in the country, those most active were often either imprisoned or 
working underground, which made the group difficult to access. A final reason for 
choosing formal civil society organisations was that I wanted to position my research 
within the larger canon of civil society organisations in authoritarian settings that 
often focused on registered rather than informal organisations or actors. 
While the focus of my study is on formal civil society organisations, the beginning 
of my fieldwork coincided with the onset of public protests and ended a few months 
after the acting Prime Minister resigned in February 2018, as a result of the incessant 
anti-EPRDF demonstrations. Public protests were very insightful for the research as 
they constituted an extreme case when it came to civil society - state relations in 
Ethiopia. The ethnic-based social movements, which spread from Oromia to Amhara 
and to other regions between 2015 and 2018, displayed large-scale public 
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contestation against the regime, though none of the organisations in the three 
sectors under study participated in the protests. While demanding more political 
freedom and participation, the ethno-regional character of the protest movements 
also spurred ethnic conflicts, posing doubts regarding their democratic essence. 
Despite their unforeseen character, the protests added an interesting component to 
my research enabling me to ask additional questions such as: Why did formal civil 
society not participate in the protests? And what did the protests tell us about 
perceived and actual regime stability? 
While my research design was informed by similar studies in other countries, I 
opted for introducing several important changes to address shortcomings of previous 
approaches. First, many past studies focused on one particular type of civil society 
actor, rather than comparing different organisational types (Clark, 2013; Haddad, 
2013; Hemment, 2004; Hsu, 2010; Spires, 2011). While the study of a type of CSO 
provided in-depth insights regarding its relationship to the state, the designs 
employed in these studies did not account for differences among different types of 
civil society actors and their relationships to states. However, comparing previous 
case studies, there was sound reason to believe that authoritarian regimes 
differentiated between various civil society organisations and targeted membership-
based organisations, especially mass associations, differently than non-membership-
based organisations, due the former’s ability to mobilise a large number of people 
(Aarts and Cavatorta, 2013; Evans et al., 2006; White, 1996a). Scholars who engaged 
in comparative case studies often compared the same type of organisation working 
across different policy issue areas (e.g. environment, health, human rights and 
others). This suggests that where state and CSO agendas overlapped and where issue 
areas were not contentious, CSOs had more freedom to operate (Hildebrandt, 2013; 
Yerkes, 2012). While providing interesting insights, such an approach is not well 
suited to explain within-sector differences and lingering questions remain: Why did 
CSOs working on the same issues have more/less success depending on their location 
in the country and why were some CSOs allowed to work on sensitive topics while 
others were not? (Mikirova et al., 2013). Drawing lessons learned from previous 
research designs, I opted for a comparative case study of different types of civil 
society actors, including both membership and non-membership-based actors 
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representing different social classes. Second, previous studies focused on explaining 
one particular type of interaction, such as co-optation (Khatib, 2013; Rivetti, 2013), 
cooperation (Hildebrandt, 2013; Park, 2009) or coexistence (Haddad, 2013) and 
categorised CSOs on a continuum between co-optation and contestation. In contrast, 
I opted for a more flexible approach. To account for the fact that the relationship 
between CSOs and state organisations was marked by different types of interactions 
and changed over time, I categorised interactions, rather than actors, to capture how 
CSOs engaged in different types interactions of with state representatives to push 
their agendas. 
Data Collection and Sampling 
As is common for qualitative research projects with an extensive fieldwork 
component, my research methods were influenced both by the research question, as 
well as the research environment and the changes taking place within it (Huggins and 
Glebbeek, 2009a). I opted for an ethnographic approach to data collection, 
embedding myself close to the phenomenon I wanted to study. I used in-depth 
interviews (semi-structured and unstructured), informal conversations, focus groups 
and participant and passive observation in combination. In a few instances, I also 
drew on covert observation of interaction and I used archival studies to complete and 
triangulate the data collected during my interviews and observations. 
In total, I conducted fourteen months of fieldwork between October 2015 and 
June 2018. The majority of data collected consists of in-depth interviews with 156 
individuals. I primarily interviewed leaders, staff and members of Ethiopian civil 
society organisations, politicians and civil servants, but also representatives from 
international NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donor organisations and experts in the 
field (see Table 2 below). Most interviews lasted between 30 and 240 minutes and I 
met several of my interview partners at least twice, adding up to a total of 217 
interviews. 
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Table 2: Number of Interviewees per Stakeholder Group 
Type of Actor23 Number of Interviewees Number of women among 
the interviewees 
Politicians and Civil Servants24 34 4 
Charities and Societies25 34 10 
Trade Unions26 29 1 
Chambers of Commerce and 
Sectoral Associations27 
28 5 
Experts28 17 0 
International Donors29 14 7 
 
Out of the 156 individuals interviewed, only 27 were women (5 at the chambers, 
4 civil servants, 7 working for donors, 10 working at charities and societies, 1 working 
at the trade unions). The participants of the focus groups that I conducted with 
beneficiaries from charities and societies were difficult to count. While I started each 
focus group with at least six participants, during the focus group discussions some of 
the initial participants left and new ones joined. From my field notes I concluded that 
at least 63 individuals participated in six different focus groups conducted in Addis 
Ababa, Hawassa, Sheshemene and Wonji in February and March 2017. 
Initially, I chose organisations and interviewees through snowball sampling. 
While this method is prone to selection bias (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) it offered 
a fruitful approach for my research because it allowed me to locate the most 
important organisations and interviewees for my study. For every sector, I wanted to 
access the widest possible number of perspectives on my topic. This was important 
to capture emerging themes and explore the features of my cases. My aim was to 
map out different discourses on civil society - state relations and to compare them, 
                                                        
23 Interviewees were classified according to the position they were interviewed in, meaning that both 
current and former employees/representatives/leaders were counted together. 
24 Includes politicians from the rank of Ministers, down to civil servants working as experts in kebele 
offices. It also includes civil servants employed at public universities in Ethiopia. 
25 Includes international charities and resident and Ethiopian charities and societies, as well as 
consortia of charities and societies. 
26 Includes employees and leaders of trade unions from basic trade unions up to confederation level, 
as well as two interviews with company management to follow up on an industrial conflict studied. 
27 Includes chambers of commerce and sectoral associations from municipal up to national level, as 
well as four business membership organisations that are members of the Addis Ababa Chamber of 
Commerce and Sectoral Associations. 
28 Primarily includes consultants working on development cooperation projects and researchers. 
29 Includes international and Ethiopian employees working at international donor organisations, both 
bilateral and multilateral. 
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leading me to differentiate between the official EPRDF discourse on civil society - 
state relations and other discourses among (1) CSOs that were closely linked to the 
ruling coalition; (2) more autonomous CSOs; (3) and finally international and national 
experts and donors. While not directly relevant to civil society - state relations, I 
included the last group to capture the perspective of educated observers. 
The data collection was shaped by the tense political climate in Ethiopia and the 
sensitivity of the research topic. Moreover, as different groups of interview partners 
had different alliances and agendas, this influenced the type of information they 
shared, as well as their narratives, similar to experiences reported by other scholars 
(Fredriksson, 2009: 160f; Söderström, 2016: 86f). Interviewees tried to shape my 
interpretations and convince me of the rightness of their story, which made 
triangulation beyond closed networks particularly important to establish facts and 
capture narratives from different groups explaining or interpreting facts. Although in 
many cases, facts could be established unambiguously through careful triangulation, 
I aimed to collect the widest possible array of narratives to inform my analysis rather 
than try to discover the truth of their interpretation. Moreover, despite the general 
narrative trends, there were interesting narrative variations in all groups, which 
helped broaden the analysis and allowed me to reflect on dominant group narratives. 
Once I had mapped out the different discourses on civil society - state relations, as 
well as the different categories of interactions, I increasingly shifted to theoretical 
sampling to develop my emerging theories, simultaneously collecting, coding and 
analysing data. 
I used multiple referral chains for my data collection, which reduced the risk of 
sampling from specific networks and decreased the influence of an initial informant 
on the overall sample. The initial informants were diverse and included CSOs, civil 
servants, INGOs, international donor representatives and experts both from Ethiopia 
and from abroad. Within state and civil society organisations, I made contacts with 
different employees and leaders to capture intra-organisational differences. 
Representativeness was not possible to reach in a small N qualitative study and 
therefore I reasoned in terms of theoretical saturation (Small, 2009). I collected data 
for my analytical and theoretical categories until saturation of information was 
reached. For example, saturation was met when I no longer received any new 
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relevant information and instead discovered the same patterns and interactions 
again and had verified the information obtained through triangulation. 
In addition to the in-depth interviews, I also used participant observation in civil 
society organisations, especially trade unions and chambers of commerce, and at 
meetings and conferences that brought together state representatives and CSOs. I 
entered the settings as a researcher and secured official permission beforehand. I 
also undertook more passive observations, for example at the Addis chamber’s 
annual meeting and board elections or the Ethiopian chamber’s workshop on 
manufacturing. At some public events, like the Addis Trade Fair or the Prime 
Minister’s Forum on Agro-Industrial Parks, I undertook covert observations. Although 
I did not undertake any observation at protest events for security reasons, I collected 
information on these through interviewees who had participated. As the fieldwork 
progressed I gained important insights through conversations and informal meetings 
with interviewees. Moreover, participating in daily life in Ethiopia provided important 
background information for the study. 
To complete the data from my interviews and observations and to triangulate 
information, I carried out archival studies. I primarily analysed newspaper articles 
from public and private English-speaking newspapers, especially from Addis Fortune, 
Addis Standard, the Reporter, Capital Newspaper and the Ethiopian Herald. While the 
first four newspapers listed offer some critical reflections on Ethiopian politics to 
diverging degrees, the last one is the official EPRDF newspaper. I also studied 
newspapers published by the chambers of commerce (Ethiopian Trade Journal, 
Nigdina Limat, Addis Business) and the trade unions. Further, I collected written 
documents on conflicts between civil society and state organisations, e.g. letters, 
court rulings and photos, at trade unions and chambers of commerce. Although I 
focused primarily on the timeframe between 1991 and 2018, I went back until the 
early 1960s in some instances, to triangulate information obtained during interviews. 
The archival studies allowed me to trace the evolution of CSOs in the sectors under 
study and to understand how the relation between CSOs and the state had evolved 
over time during the EPRDF regime. 
Given the quickly growing amount of data, I switched from coding by hand to 
using Nvivo after my pilot in autumn 2015. The software helped me to organise and 
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code my data. While I started with identifying bigger themes, I progressively refined 
my categories to develop my theories. I used thick description to analyse my findings, 
going beyond the mere description of facts (what happened) and providing tentative 
explanations as to how and why incidents unfolded. Process tracing allowed me to 
establish chains of incidents and to reveal causal mechanisms explaining 
observations. 
Accessing the Field 
I conducted most of my field work in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa since the regional 
states in Ethiopia had to implement centrally-decided policies without much space to 
deviate from those or plan and design their own policies (Assefa, 2012: 464). 
Moreover, especially for the chambers of commerce and trade unions their apex 
bodies and strongest members were located in and around Addis Ababa, as were the 
majority of charities and societies registered. Nevertheless, I still wanted to explore 
the regional dynamics of civil society - state relations in Ethiopia and capture the 
relative distance to the EPRDF government geographically but also 
ideologically/politically. The regions in Ethiopia featured diverging institutional ties 
to the EPRDF regime; some were closer and more supportive than others30. The 
intensifying waves of protests that spread from Oromia to Amhara and then to other 
regions in Ethiopia between November 2015 and June 2018 rendered fieldwork 
outside of Addis Ababa more complicated. Nevertheless, I undertook short trips 
(totalling roughly 1 month of fieldwork) to field sites in Oromia Regional State, 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) Regional State, and Amhara 
Regional State. Also, I had the opportunity to meet representatives from regional 
chambers and trade unions at sector wide events in and around Addis Ababa and 
many of the charities and societies I interviewed had regional offices and/or projects, 
providing important information regarding civil society - state relations beyond the 
federal level. 
Accessing the field required different strategies in the three sectors under study 
and due to the diverging channels of access, I had to separately and individually 
                                                        
30 See Chapter 4 for more details. 
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reflect on the potential biases that my form of “entrance into the field” could pose 
for my research. 
The trade unions turned out to be the most difficult to access and it took me 
three attempts to enter the sector. First, I was referred by an expert working for an 
international donor project that had cooperated with the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Trade Unions (CETU). Although the interviewee at CETU was open in the 
conversation, he did not want to refer me further to others in the organisation. It 
seemed to me that he preferred not to be associated officially with my research. In 
my second attempt, I reached out to the international cooperation and 
communication department of CETU. I got some further help, but the head of the 
department insisted on sitting in on the interviews that he scheduled for me. Before 
abandoning I decided to make a last attempt through a friend who worked at the ILO 
in Geneva. I obtained the contact details of the president of CETU who met me 
because I was referred to him through the ILO. From the president, I obtained the 
official consent for carrying out interviews in the confederation and the federations. 
This facilitated my research tremendously, as I could come and go without having to 
schedule official meetings and my presence became increasingly normalised. People 
started greeting me in the corridor. One of the junior staff interested in my research 
approached me after a while and volunteered to support me regarding access to 
unions and documentation. We agreed that he could become my research 
assistant31. I eventually attained access to CETU’s planning and monitoring 
department to get reports and data and was even offered a desk at which to work. 
While some executive committee members and employees remained distant and 
uncooperative, others approached me because they wanted to talk about their work 
and offer their perspective on trade unions in Ethiopia. Several came with concrete 
suggestion of issues to consider or to avoid, and I selected carefully which to follow. 
However, people’s attempt to influence my research project provided interesting 
information on internal politics in the unions and the union’s role in the bigger 
political framework in Ethiopia. Among basic trade unions at enterprise level, it was 
not easy to identify and get access to unions that were less state controlled and were 
                                                        
31 See discussion on research assistants below. 
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or had been in conflict with the state. Such information was protected, not readily 
available through the newspapers and was known only to a small network. Eventually 
I was referred through one federation and from there, together with support from 
my research assistant, I was able to access more. Through CETU I got access to 
interviewees working at the Ministry and Bureau of Labour in Addis Ababa, who 
referred me to new interviewees within the same organisation, and further to other 
state organisations. 
For the chambers of commerce, I got access through one of my interview 
partners from the charities and societies sector. I first attained access to the Addis 
Ababa Chamber of Commerce, where I was referred to an important gatekeeper. He 
was widely respected by his colleagues and regularly published articles in private 
newspapers exposing shortcomings of the EPRDF regime. From the Addis Chamber, I 
got access to the Oromia, Tigray, the national (Ethiopian) chambers and to other 
business membership organisations (e.g. in the coffee and construction sector). The 
Addis Chamber also facilitated my meeting with high level government officials at the 
Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry. I established contact directly with 
several of the other regional chambers and sectoral associations. As I was welcomed 
by the Addis Chamber and even took part in internal meetings and conferences they 
organised, through these I was also able to establish contact with representatives 
from both the state and the chambers. Access to the chambers seemed natural, to a 
point where I was told by one of my interview partners “You are good at sneaking in. 
You seem to belong here. No one asks questions anymore what you are doing” 
(Fieldnotes, 2016a). As the initial access had been relatively easy, for the chambers I 
had to reflect closely on whom I had to consciously include to get all possible 
perspectives. The 2003 chamber proclamation which restructured the whole sector 
helped me to identify new bodies introduced by the EPRDF government and allowed 
me to start identifying alliances in the sector. Although my first key informant in the 
sector reflected on the existence of different perspectives and actors, I had to 
specifically ask him to refer me to people and organisations in the state apparatus 
and more EPRDF affiliated chambers. Due to his previous work as a civil servant and 
his family relations, he had important links, and when asked, also established the 
contact for me. However, he considered the perspectives of the EPRDF government 
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and party-affiliated chambers as invalid and non-interesting and did not suggest my 
meeting them directly. Hence, I thought, initially, that the chamber sector was more 
independent than it actually was, as he referred me primarily to people in the same 
group as himself. Nevertheless, my first key informant was of tremendous 
importance for my research, both in terms of facilitating access, as well as offering 
reflections during our many informal conversations and meetings. 
For the charities and societies sector, I obtained access almost by accident. At a 
conference in London in 2015, I met an individual involved in the drafting of the 
controversial 2009 charities proclamation, who provided access to other relevant key 
stakeholders involved in the drafting process. Accessing the current regulatory body 
for charities and societies was not easy and I had to use three referral chains to enter 
it: a former employee of the Ministry of Justice, an employee of the French Embassy 
and a contact at the Addis Ababa University. To identify and access other government 
bodies who worked with charities and societies I relied on both civil servants as well 
as charities and societies I had interviewed. For the charities and societies, I used 
multiple referral chains, but access was comparatively easy. I identified organisations 
through reports in the newspapers and on the internet, through talking to colleagues 
at the Addis Ababa University and the French Centre of Ethiopian Studies. I also used 
an INGO and some of the international donors and their CSO support projects. 
Contrary to the trade union sector, in the case of the charities and societies, getting 
access to state affiliated CSOs was more difficult than to those that were more 
independent. Many were suspicious about my intentions and hence less willing to 
meet and discuss. Given the relative openness of the sector, I was less reliant on 
specific gatekeepers and facilitators than in the other two sectors. 
For all sectors under study, I contacted relevant international donors working 
with the CSOs and international organisations that worked in the three thematic 
areas under study. Getting access to the international community was easy and many 
referred me further to national and international experts. 
Interview Strategies 
I had to adapt the strategy chosen for interviews over the course of the fieldwork, 
partly due to the changing political circumstances and because my research 
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questions developed, but also because the different actors I wanted to access 
required different types of interview techniques. While I am neither an 
anthropologist nor a sociologist by training, an ethnographic approach to data 
collection was most suitable to answer my research questions, as it allowed for 
observing civil society - state relations in real time and for uncovering how and why 
civil society and state organisations interacted in certain ways (Wacquant, 2003: 5). I 
combined semi-structured interviews with unstructured interviews, informal 
conversations, different types of observation and analysis of documents I collected 
during fieldwork. This allowed me to write the “thickest” possible description of civil 
society - state relations, moving from documenting the “what” (the type of 
relationship I was observing) to explaining the “how” (the details of the different 
interactions) and “why” (the factors driving/influencing the patterns of interaction). 
For the scoping trip in autumn 2015, I developed guiding questions for the 
interviews, which I structured under broad categories (see Table 3). The main aim 
was to preliminarily document the existing relationships and links between the CSOs 
in the sectors under study and different state organisations. Further I was interested 
in testing the analytical framework, verifying the typology of interactions between 
the CSOs and the state and identifying strategies of CSOs to pursue their goals within 
the restricted political environment. Finally, I aimed at mapping out the agenda of 
the EPRDF government vis-à-vis the different types of civil society actors under study 
and document the tools used for regulating CSOs and framing their work. I 
formulated broad questions to capture initial answers to my questions, aiming at 
delimiting my research questions later in the process. I opted for creating formal 
interview settings for the first meeting with every interviewee, where I explained the 
research project, obtained their oral consent and used the guiding questions to 
collect the first information. 
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Table 3: Initial Categories of Questions for the Research Scoping 
CSOs History of the organisation, its structure, registration and finances 
Work and activities of the organisation 
Relationship to the state, interaction with state bodies and strategies 
adopted to reach organisational goals 
Civil servants, 
EPRDF officials 
History of civil society - state relations, definition of civil society and CSOs, 
state agenda for civil society 
State - civil society interactions, joined/cooperative work  
Strategies/regulations to manage CSOs 
Donors/experts  Civil society - state relations in Ethiopia 
The impact of the Charities Proclamation and Chamber Proclamation on 
the civil society landscape 
International involvement in civil society in Ethiopia 
 
As this initial fieldwork progressed I realized I was not obtaining the answers I 
was seeking. While I was able to establish dominant narratives of different actors, 
the EPRDF government, state-affiliated CSOs, more independent CSOs, donors and 
experts, it was difficult to clearly establish and explain different patterns of 
interactions. Initially, a lot of the data collected did not make sense. For example, I 
documented repression of CSOs that were working on relatively uncontested issues, 
such as education or health, while some CSOs working on politically sensitive topics 
could operate relatively freely, which led me to suspect that political connections and 
ethnicity played an important role for CSOs’ ability to operate. While I was told that 
the EPRDF government had established control over CSOs, it was difficult to identify 
the exact mechanisms. Within the state apparatus some organisations seemed to 
possess particular power to regulate and reprimand CSOs and did so against the 
interests of other state bodies which worked with these CSOs. However, this power 
often did not map onto the official structure of the state apparatus, leading me again 
to suspect the influence of party structures on official politics. When the protests 
unfolded, none of the organisations I was studying joined the movements, leading 
me to question whether I was studying civil society or just state organised civil society 
organisations. For the CSOs under study, I documented co-optation, cooperation and 
different forms of co-existence, but could not find contestation that went beyond 
criticising government policies to a moderate degree or subversion of state power 
through silent resistance. 
I continued semi-structured interviews with state officials and state affiliated 
CSOs and refined my interview questions to get more detailed answers to specific 
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puzzles. These interview partners preferred formal interview settings. Especially 
among staff in mid- and lower ranking positions, a concern was to provide me with 
potentially contentious information that could portray the EPRDF government in an 
unfavourable light. Hence many asked for meetings to be scheduled formally and 
copying in/informing their supervisors and interview questions to be submitted 
beforehand. The higher up in the EPRDF hierarchy, the less concerned people were 
about meeting me and answering my questions. In at least one of the state agencies 
I interviewed, the emails of the civil servants were checked by the agency’s 
information and communication department, which was reading all emails sent, and 
notified the concerned person about the receipt of the emails. 
In parallel to the semi-structured interviews I started in-depth unstructured 
interviews with more independent civil society actors and less aligned organisations, 
as well as with civil servants working at public universities. I focused on CSOs that in 
the past had experienced major conflicts with the EPRDF government, were still 
perceived as mostly independent, but had become silent over time. I captured the 
organisational histories and I included many people who had previously worked for 
these CSOs but had already left the organisation before my study. I started focusing 
on past conflicts between CSOs and the state, understanding that these moments 
had a large impact on the present interactions at play and were often also moments 
where direct control had been established. I also collected people’s life histories 
related to their work in the organisations, documenting state and EPRDF control 
mechanisms from the perspective of the individual, recording threats, torture, 
imprisonment, bribery and shedding light on who and which organisations in the 
state were involved. Some civil servants, mainly from public universities, were willing 
in informal conversations to shed light on intra-party and intra-state politics. From 
the unstructured interviews, I got new questions for the semi-structured interviews. 
Also, findings in one organisation or sector gave me ideas for questions for other 
CSOs and other sectors. My research questions became more detailed and refined 
during my fieldwork, often rendering it necessary for me to go back to interview 
partners I had already met. In parallel to the interviews, I negotiated access to be able 
to work at the trade unions and chambers of commerce and observe meetings among 
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charities and societies, which allowed me to increasingly collect data through 
observations, to complement that collected through the interviews. 
As our relationship progressed, many of the CSO representatives I met opted for 
more informal settings, and meetings continued in informal conversations past the 
initial and more formal interview. Emotional intelligence and openness became key 
for the project’s success. Similar to the experience of other researchers, I noted that 
how I formulated my questions and when and where I asked sensitive questions was 
crucial (Sehgal, 2009: 365). To obtain sensitive information, I often had to share 
personal experiences and some of my findings as well. Mostly, this meant showing 
that I knew what Skidmore termed the “open secrets” (Skidmore, 2009: 321) - 
detailed information known to my wider group of interviewees - to prove my 
knowledge and trustworthiness. For the more independent CSO community, this 
could mean for example knowing which organisation had recently been attacked by 
the EPRDF government. 
For a summary of dominant narratives of groups interviewed and examples of 
information provided, please refer to table four. 
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Table 4: Dominant Narratives Per Stakeholder Group 
Type of Actor Narrative Type of Interaction described Information on history of conflict 
provided 








CSOs in Ethiopia are important to 
check and balance state power 
and they have an important 
function to fulfil within the 
developmental state programme. 
Membership-based CSOs are 
important for democracy 
promotion, NGOs should focus on 
socioeconomic development 
issues only. International 
influence on Ethiopian politics 
through CSO finance must be 
avoided to guarantee the 
country’s autonomy. 
Civil servants focused on 
cooperation and joint activities. 
They emphasized the independence 
of CSOs (negating co-optation) and 
stated that conflict between CSOs 
and government was not frequent. 
Even in cases where EPRDF 
documentation suggested 
infiltration of CSOs, e.g. in the case 
of mass associations, interviewees 
did not acknowledge the facts. 
Conflicts were often downplayed 
when I brought up specific 
examples. Focusing on examples 
regarding the oversight function of 
the state over CSOs could deliver 
clues with respect to conflict and co-
optation. 
There was little willingness to 
provide information on conflict with 
CSOs, especially on the unions and 
the chambers of commerce. Conflict 
was presented in terms of past 
events that were long solved. The 
current relationship was described 
as harmonious. Regarding 
charities/societies, internationally 
financed NGOs were blamed for 
being belligerent. “Rent-seekers” 
and “neo-liberalists” were terms 
used to describe the “foreign 
agents”. The protestors in 2015/18 
were labelled anti-peace elements, 
not civil society. 
No information on control 
mechanisms was provided directly as 
co-optation was denied and 
independence of CSOs stressed. 
However, I could triangulate 
information obtained from CSOs if 
questions targeted specific 
mechanisms, e.g. the existence of a 
dedicated state or party oversight 
body for CSOs or intervention of 
state organisations in CSO internal 
activities. In more informal settings, 
outside of the office, and off-record, 
some state officials provided more 
critical reflection and evidence with 
respect to state control over CSOs. In 
contrast to the federal level, at the 
local level many state officials 
described CSOs as gap fillers working 





The discourse of EPRDF affiliated 
CSOs mirrored the official 
government discourse: the 
government is very cooperative 
and listens to civil society 
organisations. CSOs are 
independent and not controlled. 
There is little conflict and the 
Interviewees focused on 
cooperative and joint activities and 
emphasized the impact they had on 
policy making and how they 
influenced the EPRDF government. 
Interviewees listed the regular 
meetings with officials as proof of 
their influence and held that 
There was little willingness to 
provide information about conflict. 
However, it was stated that CSOs 
criticised the government where 
policies were not good and that the 
government then (mostly) listened. 
Co-optation was generally denied, 
although some CSOs openly 
Little information was provided and 
usually only by certain individuals in 
informal conversations. Focus was 
both on formal control mechanisms, 
laws and regulations and informal 
mechanisms such as disciplinary 
mechanisms to ensure alignment of 
employees with government policies. 
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Type of Actor Narrative Type of Interaction described Information on history of conflict 
provided 
Mechanisms of control described 
government tries its best to work 
together with CSOs. Sometimes 
interests can be conflicting, still 
the government is obliged to 
listen. 
conflicts of interests between CSOs 
and the government were solved in 
these forums. Interviewees also 
stressed that the government 
supported them. 
admitted their link to the EPRDF, still 
holding that they could and did 
question state policies. 
However, as for civil servants, I could 
triangulate information obtained 
from other interviews, if questions 




The EPRDF government keeps civil 
society from functioning. There is 
no space for civic action and any 
independent action will be 
reprimanded. No open 
contestation is feasible. Close 
mechanisms of control have been 
established over key actors. Most 
CSOs have been co-opted and 
those that have not still cannot 
work. 
They provided details about co-
optation of EPRDF organised CSOs. 
Co-operation was presented as sole 
means of survival, as co-existence 
was difficult to establish because of 
the EPRDF government suspecting 
independent action. Contestation 
had to be reduced to criticising 
policies and should be neither too 
vocal, nor too public or outspoken. 
Detailed information about past and 
ongoing conflicts was provided. 
Interviewees shared both their own 
experiences with such conflict, as 
well as described conflicts they had 
seen or heard about. 
Information about control 
mechanisms that ensured CSO 
alignment with government policies 
was provided. This included formal 
as well as informal mechanisms. 
Detailed information on means of 
co-optation of government 
organised CSOs was also shared. 
Donors and 
experts 
The discourse of donors and 
experts mirrored the one of more 
independent CSOs: the Ethiopian 
government keeps civil society 
from functioning. There is no 
space for civic action and any 
independent action will be 
reprimanded. Close mechanisms 
of control have been established 
over key actors. Trade Unions and 
Chambers of Commerce are not 
civil society, only a few human 
rights NGOs still represent civil 
society in Ethiopia.  
They provided information about 
whom they thought was co-opted. 
They emphasized that co-operation 
was the sole means to survival and 
denied any form of meaningful 
contestation of either policies or the 
polity as such.  
Information about publicly known 
past and ongoing conflicts 
Although the existence of 
government control over CSOs was 
emphasised, little information on 
actual mechanisms of control was 
provided.  
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My Amharic was not sufficiently good to conduct interviews by myself, although 
I could follow basic conversations. This was helpful for scheduling interviews, carrying 
out participant observations and on the few occasions I worked with translators. In 
Addis Ababa, I conducted most of my interviews in English. Although many of my 
informants felt their English was not sufficiently good, they understood and 
answered my questions32. At the trade unions, a few interviewees preferred that my 
research assistant was present for translation. Most of them understood my 
questions, but preferred not to speak English. Moreover, for them, the presence of 
my research assistant who worked at CETU conveyed the legitimacy of my research. 
Only few of the charities and societies interviewed in Addis had no English speaking 
staff, but where this was the case I brought my research assistant from the university. 
Although, I did not get the impression that conducting my research in English was a 
large obstacle to the success of the research project, I believe that my observations 
would have been richer had I conducted the interviews in Amharic. 
During my fieldwork in more rural areas, I needed to work more with translators, 
both in CSOs and state organisations. I was able to organise translations through 
contacts at Addis Ababa University. I only once attempted carrying out a focus group 
in Amharic, because my translator for the day called in sick. I met a group of female 
members of a local CSO and wanted to talk to them about their work on trafficking 
of girls, a joint project with the local Bureau of Women and Children. I was not able 
to formulate the questions clearly and created a misunderstanding, which led to me 
being informed about traffic accidents, the absence of traffic signs and the need for 
more traffic policing, not trafficking of girls. I realised quickly the limits of my Amharic 
language skills and instead we spent the morning in the CSOs garden, discussing the 
vegetables the organisation was growing, a conversation I could master in Amharic. 
                                                        
32 In the chamber of commerce and charities and societies sector the level of English was much better 
than in the trade unions and state organisations. However, in the trade unions and chamber system 
there were interesting variations with those organisations closer to the EPRDF usually featuring less 
educated and qualified staff than those who were more independent. 
 89 
Fieldwork Practices and Research Ethics 
(C)overt Research? 
My research was neither entirely overt nor primarily covert in nature. Like other 
scholars carrying out research on sensitive topics have noted, the degree of overtness 
or covertness was situational and depended on the interview partner and the specific 
setting (Sehgal, 2009: 336). I followed the official visa procedure for research, 
applying for research permission and a business visa, which the French Embassy in 
Addis Ababa facilitated. I assumed the position of the researcher in front of all my 
interview partners. My institutional partner in Addis Ababa advised me to choose 
neutral vocabulary and wording when preparing the description of my research 
project to be submitted to the Bureau of Immigration as part of my application for a 
residence permit. 
The research support letter I got from the university only stated:  
“PELLERIN, Camille is a French PhD Student at London School of 
Economics. She is affiliated to Addis Ababa University. We kindly 
request all concerned Ethiopian government institutions to support 
this student wherever she looks for data collection”.  
Despite the vague phrasing, I was never asked for further clarification, but I 
needed the letter to get access to all state organisations and EPRDF affiliated CSOs I 
visited. I realised quickly that interviewees asking for the research support letter 
implicitly revealed their association to the EPRDF and that the function of the letter 
was not to inform about the content of my research, but to prove that I was officially 
allowed to collect data. More independent CSOs, experts and donors never asked me 
for the letter as they were less concerned about sharing contentious information. In 
discussion with other researchers I learned that those working on politically sensitive 
topics (e.g. land rights, resettlement programmes and ethnicity) also needed 
research support letters to access state offices. However, several researchers 
working on industrial policy or the developmental state more broadly, especially 
those whose visit was supported through high level EPRDF cadres, often did not need 
such documents, as they were referred through EPRDF channels. 
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Studying the relationship between the Ethiopian state and different types of civil 
society actors in the country, I often had to interview people who perceived each 
other to be in opposing camps. Although being an outsider had advantages, since I 
was not directly affiliated to pro- or anti-EPRDF camps, similar to observations made 
by other scholars working in politically tense environments, assuming the role of the 
“scientifically detached observer” (Fredriksson, 2009: 148) was not a feasible 
research strategy for my project (Huggins and Glebbeek, 2009b: 22f; Schwander-
Sievers, 2009: 177f). Whether I wanted it or not, interviewees placed me according 
to what they thought were my political affiliations. Neutrality was not an accepted 
concept in the climate of political conflict, mistrust and fear. 
It was important that interviewees did not associate me with their opponents in 
order for me to obtain the information necessary for my research. This meant 
adapting the framing of the project, presenting an acceptable and meaningful 
description while trying to be as concrete as possible about it. Thus, I used vocabulary 
and perspective that made sense for my interviewees depending upon whether I was 
with state representatives and EPRDF affiliated CSOs, more independent CSOs or 
international/national experts. 
When I met state organisations and EPRDF affiliated CSOs, I framed my research 
in terms of the operationalisation of the EPRDF’s developmental state programme, 
asking about the role of CSOs in the implementation of developmental policies, the 
patterns of interactions they could identify and the achievements as well as problems 
with respect to state-CSO cooperation. Acknowledging the EPRDF’s developmental 
effort and refraining from asking direct questions about state control of CSOs, 
avoided putting interviewees in a defensive position and ensured collaboration. This 
allowed me to get the EPRDF’s perspective on the relationship between state and 
CSOs beyond the attempt of ensuring control. To reveal control mechanisms, I asked 
questions about specific party and state oversight bodies or the use of CSOs in terms 
of implementing state policies. 
In the beginning of my research, many of my interviewees who worked for more 
independent CSOs or were experts in the field, informed me that my search for civil 
society was futile, as CSOs were extinct. I was told on several occasions that 
operational CSOs were EPRDF affiliated, “civil society doesn’t exist in Ethiopia” and 
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“the state controls all civil society”. I realised I had to show both more knowledge 
about the political situation to get relevant answers, as well as demonstrate more 
empathy for the cause of civil society activists. Hence, I started framing my research 
more clearly in terms of the study of (un)available spaces for civil society, political 
repression and resistance. 
To avoid abstract discussion and allow for a deeper understanding of the three 
sectors, I also framed my research of civil society - state relations thematically for the 
different sectors under study. With the chambers of commerce, I approached my 
topic linked to the participation of business membership organisations in private 
sector development and their interactions with the state and EPRDF structures. For 
the trade unions, I presented my subject through the lens of labour relations, 
industrial conflicts, workers’ rights and their relationship with the relevant state and 
EPRDF structures. In the charities and societies sector, I framed my research as a 
study of the 2009 charities proclamation and the impact on state - civil society 
relations. 
Due to the tense political climate, during my interviews I had to prove my 
alliances to obtain the information I needed, which, as others have noted, meant not 
always being honest about my own opinion (Goldstein, 2009: 268). This did not 
involve direct deception, but could for example mean not questioning/criticising 
interviewees’ positions or at least being careful when doing so. Proving alliances, 
often meant demonstrating understanding of the interviewees’ positions, but could 
also mean criticising the opposite camp or showing my knowledge of secrets kept by 
a group of interviewees (without violating confidentiality). How people understood 
my role and the research project was important for their cooperation and I 
negotiated my field-identities on a continuous basis (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2009: 35; 
Subramaniam, 2009: 221). 
My fieldwork identities were multi-layered and I had multiple - and at times, 
conflicting - actual and perceived roles in the field; part of them I chose, many of 
them my interviewees attributed. Concurring other findings, field identities, of me 
and my interviewees were constantly negotiated and changed also over the course 
of the project (Bickham Mendez, 2009: 84f; Sultana, 2007: 383). “Researcher” was 
the primary and unifying trait of all my many field personas. However, in two 
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successive interviews, I might be placed by my interviewees as being on the side of 
the EPRDF government in the first and then, on the side of an EPRDF critical civil 
society organisation in the second. Framing my research for different 
groups/interviewees to ensure their participation in the project posed obvious 
ethical questions, as it possibly limited their ability to provide informed consent. 
However, it also enabled me to get different perspectives on civil society - state 
relations, ensuring that the voices of many different groups were heard. 
Anonymity, Confidentiality and Data Protection 
The LSE provided me with a tailored one day training course on data security in 
October 2015, setting up safe data storing devices, a professional VPN and separate 
internet accounts for my research to avoid any cross contamination and data leaks. I 
stored no data on my laptop and cleared my browsing history at least once every day. 
Handwritten field notes and physical documents were stored in the offices of the 
French Centre for Ethiopian studies and were never out of my control, being brought 
back to the UK in my hand luggage at the end of each trip. When I felt that physical 
material could be too easily traced back to its source, I destroyed it. I developed codes 
to avoid writing down sensitive information in my interview notes and I never 
included names, contact details or other personal information. I did not record 
interviews, primarily because people did not feel comfortable and secondly because 
it would have posed additional questions for data protection. This meant that I had 
to transcribe my interviews every day, and usually directly after the interview to 
reconstruct the conversations from my notes. I numbered my interviewees and only 
one protected file linked numbers to names and interview transcriptions. During the 
state of emergency, I avoided places where other researchers had been searched, 
like the campus and the university library. Data and informant protection had to be 
ensured beyond the field, which in some instances impacted on how I could use and 
present specific pieces of information in my research. Where information was 
particularly sensitive and could potentially be traced back to one or very few persons, 
informant safety took precedence over absolute research transparency. 
As with other scholars working in policed environments, I decided that written 
consent would have posed too big of a risk for informant anonymity and data 
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protection, as it would have provided written proof linking informants to my research 
project (Wood, 2006: 380). Instead, explaining the research project and the use of 
the data prior to the interviews, I opted for oral consent. Obtaining informed consent 
from my interviewees was not self-evident, as for many the concept of PhD research 
and international scientific publications was difficult to comprehend. While this was 
particularly true of low educated and illiterate interviewees, many of those with a 
university degree also found the concept of research and publications remained 
abstract. While the consent procedure was approved by the LSE, the adherence to 
research ethics guidelines was not sufficient to guarantee ethical research. Applying 
a “do-no-harm” approach not only during the fieldwork, but also in the writing up 
process, meant that I carefully had to make judgement calls regarding what 
information I could use without exposing my interviewees’ identities. 
I let my interviewees decide where and when they wanted to meet, to choose 
settings and timings they considered safe. Many of them suggested their offices or 
cafes and hotels close to their offices, although some people felt that being seen with 
me by their colleagues and superiors could potentially have negative consequences. 
In a few cases, where I felt that it was too easy to overhear the conversation, I 
suggested changes to the venue for a second meeting. As also described by other 
researchers, “hiding in the open” (Skidmore, 2009: 319) – carrying out interviews in 
crowded public places – was an efficient way to reduce the risk of being identified 
and listened in on. Reaching absolute confidentiality was not always possible. When 
I carried out interviews at offices, colleagues and superiors knew whom I interviewed. 
In several instances, I was allocated “dedicated translators” in EPRDF affiliated CSOs, 
who followed me around and even sat in on interviews. In these cases, I kept the 
interviews short and focused on uncontentious and widely available facts to avoid 
putting my interview partners in potentially difficult positions. 
Ethiopians and international residents and experts were often concerned about 
the EPRDF government intercepting electronic communication channels. Whether 
the EPRDF government monitored email and telephone conversations on a large 
scale was hard to judge, but the behaviour of my informants suggested the 
possibility. I therefore acted as if any digital conversation could be intercepted and 
made sure not to include any confidential information. 
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Beyond the data collection and storage, informant safety had to be guaranteed 
in the use and communication of the research outputs. My interviewees invested 
resources and some took personal risks to provide me with information, as they 
wanted the findings of my research to be communicated to a larger audience. I had 
a responsibility to disseminate the findings without violating confidentiality, which 
was not always easy as specific pieces of information, often very valuable ones, could 
only have been known and communicated by a limited number of people. Hence, I 
invested considerable time to decide on framing and phrasing of the findings and 
communicated with interviewees and other scholars where I was unsure. 
Comparable to findings of scholars working in restricted spaces, communicating back 
the findings from my research project was particularly important, as information was 
scarce and sharing of information hindered through (self)censorship, (Scheyvens and 
Leslie, 2000: 127). I tried to follow up with most civil society organisations I had 
interviewed, communicating findings verbally and answering their questions, without 
violating confidentiality. Although I did not exclude the EPRDF government as 
potential beneficiaries of the research, I did not feedback information which could be 
used to enhance control over CSOs or which could expose strategies adopted by CSOs 
to operate in the repressive environment. 
Research Assistants 
During the course of my fieldwork, I recruited two research assistants.  
I recruited the first research assistant, an affiliated researcher at the Addis Ababa 
University, in November 2015. She was recommended to me by a friend and senior 
fellow at the University who had supervised her thesis and worked with her. She did 
research on women’s organisations and gender questions in labour relations and I 
provided support to her thesis writing before she started on my research project. She 
helped me with locating and translating official government documents, as well 
getting contact details for interviewees. In two instances, she carried out interviews 
on my behalf. Thanks to her, I was able to map out the EPRDF discourse on civil 
society from the original party documents. We became close friends and in our many 
informal meetings she provided invaluable information and reflections with respect 
to my research, the political environment in the country and fieldwork logistics. While 
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I remunerated her financially for part of the time spent on translations, the money 
covered only a fraction of the work she did over the course of my research. Instead, 
I compensated for this by providing support for her academic and professional work. 
My second research assistant was an employee of the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Trade Unions (CETU) and he recruited me, not vice versa. Initially, he was asked by 
his supervisor to support me with contact and data access at CETU and the 
federations. He was interested in my research and offered to assist me. He had 
worked with other researchers previously and advised me on how to approach my 
research topic and interviewees, to ensure the participation of trade unionists. His 
superiors knew about our collaboration but not the exact terms of it. My research 
assistant helped me with locating documents, setting up interviews and translating 
interviews where necessary. He also became an important informant and provided 
in depth reflection on the data we collected and important insights on the 
interactions that he observed between me and the interviewees. Over time we built 
a relationship of mutual trust and friendship and in exchange for his help, I supported 
him in his (successful) applications for research Master Programmes in Europe. 
Without him, I would probably not have been able to access information to the 
degree that I did and his reflections on my analysis and conclusions were invaluable 
for my research. 
Although my second research assistant in some way functioned as a gatekeeper, 
neither of my assistants had a large influence on the interview sample. Although I 
discussed ideas of possible interview partners with both my assistants, apart from 
very few instances, neither of them directly suggested someone specific to meet. 
However, both helped me to establish contact with organisations that I had heard or 
read about and tried to access. Both also offered important reflections on my analysis 
and read parts of the dissertation, thus accompanying the research project from the 
beginning to its end. 
Race, Class, Gender and Positionality in Interviews 
As a white European researcher from the London School of Economics, I was in a 
privileged position compared to most of my interviewees, both male and female, elite 
and non-elite, which sometimes facilitated, and sometimes hampered, my research. 
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Being an outsider in a politically polarised environment meant that I could move 
between state and civil society actors without major problems, as people did not 
usually suspect me to act as a spy for the opposite camp. However, because of my 
outsider status people often did not trust my understanding of the political context 
and were hence reluctant to share politically sensitive information. 
With respect to economic and political elites, my positioning as a privileged 
outsider often facilitated access. I could for example get documentation and schedule 
interviews that many of my Ethiopian colleagues at the Addis Ababa University 
reported they had difficulty to obtain. Elites often wanted to share their perspective 
on the country’s political and economic environment and many treated me as a 
student of Ethiopian politics and economy with whom they shared their knowledge. 
As an outsider, I was seldom perceived as a threat, despite the political nature of my 
research, and was not taken seriously by most informants. Almost no one expected 
me to understand the politics of civil society - state relations or the hidden political 
tensions and ethnic cleavages and competition within the political regime and the 
society at large. I was able to ask political questions, which people usually assumed I 
asked because of ignorance, rather than genuine interest. On quite a few occasions 
people lied to me, assuming that I did not know the actual answer to my question. 
Non-elites in civil society and the state often remained suspicious of me because 
of my visible “outsider” status. While many agreed to meet me, often they wrongly 
assumed that as a foreigner, I lived in hotels, had a driver and was not able to 
understand or relate to the lives of normal Ethiopians. They doubted my capacity to 
understand the country’s politics, which made them reluctant to share sensitive 
information. Interestingly, to overcome the image of the clueless outsider, it was 
often already helpful for them to know that I lived in a flat-share with mostly 
Ethiopians in an Ethiopian neighbourhood and used public transport. However, in 
some instances, especially with civil society activists, I had to become what Monique 
Skidmore has termed an “activist by proxy”. For people to trust me with their 
“dangerous knowledge”33, I had to prove that I could share the burden of protecting 
                                                        
33 I label pieces of information dangerous that could have a negative impact on the informant if they 
fell into the hands of a third party. 
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such pieces of information from the state. Until I was trusted, many of my interview 
partners withheld such knowledge (Skidmore, 2009: 321). Many tested my 
knowledge of Ethiopian politics, asking for answers to questions about the regime’s 
ethnic foundations or about the history of conflicts between CSOs and the state 
before sharing sensitive information. 
Despite purposefully including women in my research plan, most of my 
interviewees were men due to women’s relative under-representation in public life, 
and this structured the interview relations. Like other female researchers, I 
experienced both advantages and disadvantages related to my sex and gender 
(Scheyvens and Leslie 2000, 124; Huggins and Glebbeek 2009, Li 2008). Eventually, 
however, I was able to build research strategies, using gender stereotypes to create 
field personas that allowed better and safer access to the field. For many of my male 
informants, being a woman made me appear approachable, although I was thought 
to be somewhat naïve. I was able to use the perceived naivety to obtain information 
on issues of a political nature that often, I was not able to ask about directly. My 
interview partners usually asked me about my upbringing, my family, my civil status 
and I reciprocated their questions, collecting information on their place of birth, their 
schooling and work, their family, their ethnicity, their different employments and 
their political connections. While this information is not cited directly in my thesis, it 
has informed the analysis, helping me to place interviewees beyond the function in 
which they were recruited and helping me to map power relations - ethnic, political 
and economic. 
The fact that I was a white woman meant that I could to a larger degree than my 
Ethiopian counterparts enter “male dominated spaces” like politics and business, sit 
in on meetings and workshops and participate in discussions. My white identity was 
a more important characteristic in these instances than my gender identity. However, 
in contrast to my white and Ethiopian male colleagues, I had a privileged access to 
female spaces, both within the household and at workplaces, but also in terms of 
women’s associations and workshops/meetings of female entrepreneurs and 
scholars. In these cases, my gender was more important than my race. While my race 
made me a visible outsider, my “insider-outsider” status was not static and changed 
between encounters as well as over time. While I remained a “farenj” (a foreigner), 
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especially as relationships with friends, interviewees and neighbours evolved, race 
was often not the most important characteristic when it came to my positionality. I 
realised that Ethiopians often defined my “insiderness” not necessarily by my race, 
but things we had in common - educational background, knowledge, experiences, 
gender and attititudes. 
Risks 
Before every fieldtrip, I submitted a risk assessment form, which was signed by me, 
my supervisor, the head of department and the LSE’s Health and Safety Department. 
While the LSE risk assessment captured some risks well, and offered an adequate 
format to deal with them, I discovered that several risks fell outside of the school’s 
risk assessment and mitigation framework. Also, what made sense from a UK 
perspective, sometimes was not the best advice in Ethiopia. Moreover, given budget 
restraints and the nature of my research, it was neither feasible, nor advisable to live 
in international housing, to employ a driver or to avoid risks at all costs. The success 
of my research project relied on my ability to bridge the gap between me and my 
informants as much as possible, to go beyond the perspective of an outsider, to study 
the grey-zones of Ethiopian politics and civil society - state relations. Hence, instead 
of generic risk mitigation, strategies had to be tailored specifically to my research 
project and the context of the field work. For example, while possibly more prone to 
traffic accidents, from a personal safety point of view, it was much safer to travel by 
minibus where I was surrounded by many people, than to take a taxi whose driver I 
did not know. Living in an Ethiopian neighbourhood, even though I lived without 
guards, generator or water tank, meant I was better informed about the political 
situation during the state of emergency than most foreigners and was able to make 
informed choices about travel and work. Moreover, I was well looked after. For 
example, a cab driver friend called me several times when he saw the federal police 
setting up road controls in Addis and, to ensure I got home safely, arranged to meet 
me. 
Although some risks could be identified objectively and mitigated, the perception 
and mitigation of risks in the field was partly subjective. The evaluation of risks and 
strategies to adopt had to involve my interview partners and was thus a dynamic 
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process, as has been noted by others (Demovic, 2009: 97; Huggins and Glebbeek, 
2009b: 3). Carrying out research in a climate of increasing political violence 
influenced the perception of risk of both my informants and myself (Sanford, 2009: 
137; Skidmore, 2009: 304). Contrary to that of many of my informants, my personal 
security did not decrease proportionate to the worsening of the political situation, as 
I did not fall into any target category for either the EPRDF government or the 
protestors. The lack of reliable information on the actual development of the political 
situation in Ethiopia made “field diplomacy” (Schwander-Sievers, 2009: 173f) - the 
creation of trusted networks and safe-spaces - a crucial tool to mitigate risks. I relied 
heavily on my interview partners and Ethiopian friends and flatmates to identify and 
mitigate risks. 
Some risks for my interviewees emerged due to the content of the research 
project. Our discussions had the potential to bring up difficult or even traumatic 
memories, inflicting emotional pain on the interviewees. Many of those who worked 
or had worked in more independent CSOs, had experienced negative personal 
consequences because of their work. People’s experiences ranged from torture to 
threats of denying public services and blocking career development. Although it did 
not happen frequently, some informants experienced strong emotional reactions 
when talking about their experiences with state repression. In these cases, I tried to 
stop the interviews, but some people wanted to talk about their experiences. Many 
people who decided to share their personal stories wanted their voices to be heard, 
but I left it up to my informants to decide what they wanted to share and also what 
information was or was not to be shared publicly. 
The public protests led to rapidly decreasing political stability and on the 2017 
Fragile State Index published by the Fund for Peace, Ethiopia ranked 15th out of 178 
countries, classified in the category “high alert”, together with countries such as 
Zimbabwe, Haiti and Chad (Fund for Peace, 2017). A large increase in public protests 
was noted, as well as a growing number of conflict related fatalities, according to the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP)34 and the Armed Conflict Location & Event 
                                                        
34 http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
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Data Project (ACLED)35. A US researcher was killed in the protests south of Addis in 
2016. However, her death was an accident, as the protesters were targeting the 
vehicle in which she was travelling and not her directly (Whitcomb, 2016). 
While posing challenges for the research, the political situation also had its 
advantages. For example, it uncovered the weaknesses of the EPRDF and the 
Ethiopian state, and revealed factions within them, thus questioning their monolithic 
character. The conflict made alliances and divisions between civil society and state 
actors more visible and with the increasing erosion of central state power and the 
growing cracks in the ruling coalition, interviewees became more open to talk about 
politics and civil society - state relations in Ethiopia. 
The repression of civic activism by the EPRDF government that I witnessed first-
hand during my research, influenced my personal perception of state - civil society 
relations in Ethiopia. To avoid bias and ensure that I captured the perspectives of 
state and state aligned CSOs and more independent CSOs, I practised “reflexive 
introspection” (Huggins and Glebbeek, 2009b: 370f) and continuously questioned my 
impartiality. To contextualise the findings, I aimed at including the largest number 
possible of perspectives on the topic. While this allowed me to practise what 
Fredriksson (2009: 169) termed “dispassionate and rigorous science”, already the 
choice of the research topic, that reflected progressive social and political values, 
questioned the neutrality of the research project. Given that the stated objectivity of 
much social science work has been called into question and its political nature 
exposed (Fredriksson, 2009: 165; Sanford, 2009: 137; Subramaniam, 2009: 203), 
rather than claiming detachment, I opted for creating full transparency in the 
research practice and analysis of my data, to allow the informed reader to judge the 
research. 
Conclusion 
As detailed in this chapter, reflexivity was a key to practice scientific and ethically 
sound research. Reflexivity helped me analyse the impact of my own research 
persona on the research process and outcomes and it allowed me to contextualise 
                                                        
35 https://www.acleddata.com/tag/ethiopia/ (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
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my findings and interpret them in relation to the existing political, economic and 
social power relationships. Given the research topic and context, assuming the 
“detached observer” position was not an option, as I had to get close and earn the 
trust of my interviewees to collect the data needed for my analysis. However, I did 
not become an activist, nor did I abandon the scientific approach during my fieldwork 
and, to avoid partiality, I made a large effort to listen to all possible voices on my 
topic. While introducing reflexivity led me to abandon the search for absolute 
objectivity, acknowledging the importance of my research persona ensured greater 
transparency in the research process and outcomes. Through reflexivity I was able to 
gain objective distance in the analysis of my data, taking into account the impact of 
myself and my methodological and ethical choices on the data collection process. 
The chosen research design and ethnographic approach to data collection 
allowed me to answer my research question. Using thick description (Gerring, 2012), 
I moved from documenting the type of relationship I was observing between state 
and civil society organisations, to explaining the details of the different interactions 
and to identifying the factors driving/influencing the patterns of interaction and 
reflecting on how they affected regime stability (Katz, 2001; Mahoney and Goertz, 
2006). The small-N design I chose was well suited to produce internally valid theories, 
but the representativeness of the findings was limited, even for out-of-sample 
organisations in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, given that the research design and 
methodology, as well as the analytical framework build on existing empirical and 
theoretical work, they provide valuable contributions to research on civil society - 
state relations in authoritarian settings and can inform methodological and analytical 
approaches for similar studies on other cases. 
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Chapter 4: State and Society under the (Un-)‘Democratic 
Developmental State’ Model 
Introduction 
Addis Ababa, 27th of May 2016 [Ginbot 19 2008] 
A participant from Somali in a workshop on federalism raises his 
hand - Ethiopia is like the United Nations. 
Moderator - Yes? Why? 
Participant – “Kilil and” [Region One, Tigray] is the United states. 
They control everything and everyone. They can choose who 
governs other countries and how other heads of states should 
manage their internal political affairs. “Kilil and” dictates the world 
order, they decide how things are done. “Kilil hulet” [Region Two, 
Affar] is like Colombia. There is no rule of law. People disappear and 
get killed. Anarchy rules and no one really wants to travel there. 
“Kilil sost” [Region Three, Amhara] is France. The French don’t like 
the United States, but they don’t openly contest its rule. They forge 
alliances with Africa and Latin America in the form of French 
speaking, but they follow the global directives. They would like to 
be bigger, but they know that they are not the US. “Kilil arat” 
[Region Four, Oromia] is China. China is big. It has a big population 
and resources. China is rising, it wants influence and it wants to get 
where the United States are, but they are not there yet. China is 
known for bold moves and is closely watched by the US. “Kilil amst” 
[Region Five, Somali] is like North Korea. The United States are 
unsure how to handle it. After all, North Korea may have nuclear 
weapons. Its rulers don’t act like politicians but terrorists. 
Sometimes the US go with the military, sometimes they try to 
negotiate. Harari is like Taiwan, squeezed between China and North 
Korea but with extremely strong ties to the United States. They 
wheel their power through connection to “Kilil and”. Whenever 
China threatens them, they call for the US. Deboub [the South] is 
like the Soviet Union. So many nations and nationalities and many 
who are not happy to live with each other. The United States don’t 
really know what to do with it. Too many different ethnicities and 
systems of government. The South is large and chaotic, it doesn’t fit 
the United States’ system of governance. Gambella and 
Benishangul Gumuz are Africa. The United States talk about 
capacity building and support, but Africa has no influence and no 
one is really interested in it. Africa is poor, underdeveloped. 
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* * * 
This chapter reviews the literature on state and society in Ethiopia under the EPRDF 
regime, and addresses the following questions: What are the political foundations of 
the EPRDF regime? What are the key features of the contemporary Ethiopian state? 
How are modern-day society-state relations structured in Ethiopia? And, how has the 
developmental state model (pursued by the EPRDF) influenced the country’s 
socioeconomic and political development? In addressing these questions, this 
chapter sets the foundational background for the subsequent analysis of civil society 
- state relations in Ethiopia and reflects on the nature of the state, its autonomous 
power from society (both in terms of infrastructural and despotic power) and its 
relationships to other spheres in society (the market, the family and civil society). 
Scholarship on state and society in Ethiopia under the EPRDF regime is not 
unified. Recent literature often either studied the EPRDF’s development model, the 
self-proclaimed “democratic developmental state”, focusing on the country’s 
structural transformation over the past two decades (Arkebe, 2015; Brautigam et al., 
2016; Hauge, 2017; Mulu, 2013), or explored the political nature of the EPRDF 
regime, revealing its increasingly undemocratic character (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009b; 
Abbink and Hagmann, 2016; Pausewang et al., 2002). While the former drew 
attention to the country’s impressive achievements with respect to socioeconomic 
development and growth, the latter shed light on the mechanisms of state control 
over society and the authoritarian traits of the EPRDF regime. The former often did 
not sufficiently unpack the politics of the operationalisation of the developmental 
state, failing to study effects produced by the regime’s ethnic bias and party politics, 
while the latter did not take the EPRDF’s commitment to development seriously 
enough, sometimes dismissing the developmental state narrative as a pretext for 
authoritarian rule (Lefort, 2013; de Waal, 2013b, 2013a). 
A slowly growing body of research focused on the political realities produced by 
the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state and shed light on its double objective - 
promoting economic development and ensuring regime survival (Di Nunzio, 2015; 
Smit et al., 2017). Evidence indicated that the twin objectives were sometimes 
mutually exclusive, as the focus on control and increased use of despotic power 
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reduced the EPRDF’s infrastructural power necessary to implement its 
developmental programme within society (Kassahun and Colin, 2014; Planel, 2014). 
The literature also suggested, that the fragility of the EPRDF’s political settlement led 
to a focus on control, at times at the expense of developmental objectives 
(Emmenegger, 2016; Lefort, 2013). 
While this thesis is centred around the exploration of state - civil society relations, 
it reflects on the interplay between the EPRDF’s economic development model and 
its relation to different civil society organisations. As the EPRDF has presented its 
understanding and handling of civil society organisations studied for this PhD as part 
of its developmental state project, this has invited reflections on the theory and 
practices of the developmental state in this specific subject area. 
The State under the EPRDF rule 
The Political Settlement 
After the overthrow of emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 by a popular movement that 
brought together students, teachers, workers and eventually even the armed forces 
(Lefort, 1981: 81ff; Markakis, 2011: 164f), the Derg36, a military dictatorship, took 
over power. Due to its unwillingness to transition to civilian rule, its failure to respond 
to claims of the country’s different nationalities37 (ethnic groups) for self-rule, and 
the terror it unleashed on (suspected) regime opponents, the Derg encountered 
opposition from the beginning of its rule (Lefort, 1981: 104ff; Young, 2006: 16). After 
sixteen years of armed struggle, the Derg was ousted in 1991 by a coalition of ethnic-
based regional insurgent movements, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 
                                                        
36 Derg means “council” in Amharic. While initially the military councils jointly ruled Ethiopia, Mengistu 
Hailemariam led the Derg regime from 1978 onwards. 
37 Adhering to Stalin’s terminology (Markakis, 2011: 234f), rather than referring to Ethiopia’s different 
groups as “ethnicities”, they have been called “nations, nationalities and people” (Proclamation No. 
1, 1995: Preamble). Nearly following Stalin’s definition in verbatim (Stalin, 1953: 307), the 1995 
constitution defined a "Nation, Nationality or People" […] (as) a group of people who have or share 
large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a 
common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, 
predominantly contiguous territory” (Proclamation No. 1, 1995: Art. 39.5). 
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Source: CIA World Fact Book January 201838 
Before the EPRDF came into power in 1991, political rule and economic resources 
in Ethiopia had been monopolised by Shewa Amhara for centuries39. Over time this 
inequality between the country’s different ethnic groups created grievances40 and 
already, during the time of Haile Selassie, armed movements in Tigray, Bale and 
Gojjam contested centralised state rule and Amhara domination (Aregawi, 2009: 4). 
Later on, the politicisation of ethnicity and the call for the liberation of oppressed 
ethnicities became an efficient tool for mobilisation during the struggle against the 
Derg (Aregawi, 2009: 24). However, the principle of organisation of liberation 
movements, transnational (multi-ethnic) or national (ethnic-based), was not 
uncontested. Instead, it became a bone of contention between the numerous and 
diverse opposition movements that fought the Derg, leading to fighting between 
them (Aregawi, 2009: 40; Markakis, 2011: 189). Consequently, the struggle against 
the Derg also involved a fight over the design of the new political settlement, that 
                                                        
38 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html (last accessed 
13.12.2018) 
39 During the Ethiopian Empire, Shewa Amhara controlled large parts of the country’s political and 
economic resources and even during the Derg regime many elites were of Amhara origin. Autonomous 
rights were granted to five regions under the Derg constitution, however decentralisation was never 
implemented. The Derg also established the Institute for Ethiopian Nationalities that provided the first 
anthropological study of ethnic groups and led to the establishment of a classification (Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples) that has been used since (Abbink, 2015). 






































































Figure 3: Ethnic Distribution in Ethiopian Society 
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was won by the TPLF/EPRDF advocating for ethnic-federalism and devolution of 
powers rather than a pan-Ethiopian solution under centralised state rule. 
The TPLF was founded in 1975 by Tigrayan students, who launched an armed 
opposition against the Derg in the name of the national liberation of Tigray from 
Amhara rule. The TPLF was inspired by Marxist political thought (Tadesse and Young, 
2003: 389), but it adopted what Aregawi called a “hybrid ideology”, in which ethnicity 
not class became the main organising principle (Aregawi, 2009: 5). The TPLF’s call for 
“solving the national question”, guaranteeing equality and the right to self-rule to the 
country’s different ethnic groups, was grounded in Stalin’s writings (Stalin, 1953: 
300ff). However, Stalin had cautioned that a focus on nationality over class - 
 “[…] favours the destruction of the unity of the labour movement, 
fosters the segregation of the workers according to nationality and 
intensifies friction among them” (Stalin, 1953: 343f). For Stalin 
(1953: 381), “[…] the principle of international solidarity of the 
workers is an essential element in the solution of the national 
question”.  
Nevertheless, the TPLF rejected the idea of “transnational” (multi-ethnic 
organisation), both during the armed struggle and later during the institutionalisation 
of the EPRDF regime (Tadesse and Young, 2003: 394). The reason for the TPLF’s 
position was grounded in two practical needs: first, it was necessary to address 
existing grievances among the country’s numerous ethnic groups that had emerged 
due to the Amhara domination. Second, centralised state rule under Tigrayan 
leadership was impracticable, as Tigrayans constituted a small ethnic minority (see 
Figure 3) and hence guaranteeing the right to self-rule to the country’s different 
ethnic groups was seen as the better option. 
Following Leninist traditions, the TPLF constructed itself as a vanguard party 
representing peasants. Its military success lay in its ability to mobilise the peasantry 
in Tigray for the revolutionary struggle (Markakis, 2011: 248), using a mixture of 
persuasion, political indoctrination and direct and indirect coercion (Aregawi, 2009: 
226ff). It built administrations in the liberated territories effectively merging 
structures of the state and the front, and while peasants formally administered 
themselves through baitos (local councils), the TPLF controlled those. (Aregawi, 2009: 
250ff; Tadesse and Young, 2003: 396). In 1989, the TPLF took over power in Tigray, 
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having defeated the Derg forces and competing liberation movements, e.g. the 
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP)41 (Aregawi, 2009: 225; Markakis, 2011: 190). To expand its reach beyond 
Tigray and liberate the other parts of the country from the Derg rule, the TPLF called 
for other ethnic-based liberation groups, e.g. the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) in 
Oromia and the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) in the Somali region, to join 
the struggle under the TPLF’s lead. However existing groups did not want to 
subordinate themselves to the TPLF and questioned both the TPLF’s intention to, and 
mandate for, liberating Ethiopia’s other ethnic groups (Markakis, 2011: 192f). 
Due to the lack of allies, the TPLF supported the founding of coalition partners. A 
splinter group from the EPRP in Amhara regional state established the EPDM 
(Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement) with the support of the TPLF, and 
together they formed the EPRDF (Aregawi, 2009: 187ff; Young, 1996: 535). 
Progressively liberating Ethiopia from the Derg, the EPRDF used Derg soldiers 
captured during the war to found PDOs (People’s Democratic Organisations), 
following the principle of regional ethnic representation. Those prisoners of war who 
were willing to join the EPRDF received training in the nationalities question, 
formation of political parties and mobilisation of the citizenry in EPRDF political 
schools and were sent back to their homelands to set up the new administrations 
(Markakis, 2011: 193; Milkias, 2003). For example, the OPDO (Oromo Peoples' 
Democratic Organisation) was formed by former Derg soldiers of Oromo origin in 
1991 (Markakis, 2011: 193) and 14 different factions established by former Derg 
soldiers in the South became merged in the SEPDM (Southern Ethiopian People's 
Democratic Movement) in 1992 (Markakis, 2011: 245). The OPDO and SEPDM42 
joined the TPLF and ANDM (former EPDM43), turning the EPRDF into a coalition of 
                                                        
41 Both the EDU and the EPRDF promoted a pan-Ethiopian agenda, however while the first one was an 
association of conservative forces advocating for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, the 
second one adhered to communist ideas and promoted the founding of a democratic republic. 
42 In contrast to the EPRDF’s other members the SEPDM represented an ethnically heterogeneous 
region. 
43 The EPDM was the precursor of the ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement). While active 
in the Amhara region and constituted of ethnic Amhara, the EPDM officially pursued a pan-Ethiopian 
agenda. It changed its name in 1994 when it transitioned from an aspiring pan-Ethiopian movement 
to a party representing the interests of ethnic Amhara, on the demand of the TPLF. 
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four member parties representing the country’s central regions. While formally 
independent, the PDOs in the country’s other five regions were de-facto satellite 
parties of the ruling coalition (Clapham, 2009: 185; Yeshtila et al., 2016: 8). Through 
its setup, the EPRDF incorporated the political settlement it advocated country wide, 
indicating a close link between the design of coalition and state structures. 
To staff the new administrations, the PDOs targeted rural elites - primary school 
teachers, nurses, health and agricultural extension workers. The higher educated 
urban elites, e.g. lawyers, secondary school teachers, businessmen etc., were not 
included in the recruitment on EPRDF orders, who held that “the upper stratum of 
the intelligentsia is vacillator and could align itself with enemy forces. Members of 
this sector do not stand for the rights of the people” (EPRDF document on the 
revolutionary democratic goals and the next steps from June 1996, cited in Markakis 
(2011: 233)). Former Amhara elites in regional and local administrations were 
replaced by natives from the regions and although many of the new leaders were 
young and inexperienced, they were loyal to the EPRDF (Aalen and Muriaas, 2017: 
Chapter 4). While rural elites bought into the concept of ethnic federalism, as it 
redressed the monopolisation of economic and political power by ethnic Amharas, 
many representatives of the urban elite favoured the concept of pan-Ethiopianism. 
Most major cities in Ethiopia were multi-ethnic in character, partly because the state 
administration and military had been dominated by Amharic speaking highlanders, 
but also because businessmen and merchants from all over the country had settled 
in urban areas (Milkessa, 2015, 2017: 280). While the urban elites contested the idea 
of an ethnic-based political settlement and portrayed ethno-nationalism as 
backwards and dangerous for political unity, the EPRDF questioned the concept of 
pan-Ethiopianism and civic-nationalism on the grounds of historical Amhara 
domination (Yeshtila et al., 2016: 7f). 
The Ethiopian constitution from 1995 fixed the federal state structure and 
created nine regions based on ethnic criteria44 (Proclamation No. 1, 1995: Art. 45-
48). All regions were in reality multi-ethnic in composition, even if most featured one 
                                                        
44 The design of the federal state preceded the adoption of the new constitution (Markakis, 2011: 
234ff). The exercise was carried out in a hasty manner and lacked a solid empirical base. 
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ethnic majority (Berouk, 2017: 169). Linking ethnicity to claims for defined territories 
created conflicts, and, according to Markakis (2011: 234ff), 550 out of 660 
established woredas had minorities inhabiting them. The constitution guaranteed 
extensive rights to the regional states, including the right to secession (Art. 39) and 
the right of any Nation, Nationalities and Peoples to form their own state (Art. 47.2). 
All member states according to the constitution had equal rights and powers, but the 
political practice suggested otherwise. First, local government officials, even if chiefly 
natives from the regions, were actually representatives of the TPLF/EPRDF rather 
than the people. Moreover, at the federal level Amhara remained dominant, 
occupying over half of the government posts, as the choice of Amharic as the official 
state language guaranteed them preferential access to federal state organisations 
(see Table 5). Compared to the actual percentage living in Ethiopia (see Figure 3), 
Oromo were especially under-represented in federal state organisations (Milkessa, 
2015, 2017). Tigrayans controlled key positions in the EPRDF and the state 
apparatus45 (Aregawi, 2009: 303) and most importantly, they monopolised state 
organs representing the despotic power of the state, e.g. the military, the police and 
the security (van Veen, 2016). 
                                                        
45 During my fieldwork, I regularly observed that Tigrayans controlled decision-making both in state 
organisations and civil society organisations affiliated to the EPRDF. An interviewee explained that 
Tigrayans held the power in state organisations, irrespective of their actual role in the state - “There 
is always a Tigrayan pulling the strings. They hold the power even if their official position suggests 
otherwise. This is because the TPLF holds more power than all the other coalition partners” 
(Interviewee Nr. 1, 2018). Moreover, Tigrayans were overrepresented in communications 
departments in the public offices (Interviewee Nr. 31, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 45, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
79, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 148, 2018). These positions involved the interface with the national and 
foreign public, effectively controlling the official political discourse and information. I learned that a 
reform of the government communication structure in 2009 centralised public relations under the 
newly established Communication Affairs Bureau (CAB). Public relations officers were trained for other 
ministries and state offices, but worked for the CAB to “connect the dots” and centralise 
communication (Yamamoto, 2009a). 
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Table 5: Federal Government Permanent Employees by Ethnic Group (in %) 46  
Ethnic groups 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 
Amhara 52.65 54.44 46.85 50.15 50.29 
Oromo 17.9 18.88 17.42 17.75 18.3 
Tigrayan 7.52 6.43 6.69 8.7 7.79 
Gurage 4.75 4.56 4.21 4.26 4.27 
Wolaita 1.02 1.15 1.3 1.37 1.45 
Sidama 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.41 
Somali 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.12 
Not stated 11.73 9.95 19.22 13.52 13.05 
Others 3.96 4.07 3.83 3.77 4.33 
Source: (Milkessa, 2015: 20) 
A clear problem of the EPRDF was the weak political legitimacy of the youngest 
EPRDF members and other PDOs, as they lacked a political base and were perceived 
as puppets of the TPLF (Clapham, 2009: 185; Young, 1996: 539). Liberation 
movements from the Derg era, e.g. the OLF and ONLF, denounced the 
monopolisation of political power in the hands of the TPLF/EPRDF and remobilised 
on several occasions, engaging in armed fighting with the EPRDF regime (Markakis, 
2011: 244). While the TPLF indeed dominated the EPRDF, this did not prevent conflict 
within the EPRDF from emerging, nor did it hinder coalition partners from pushing 
for a more equitable distribution of power within the EPRDF (Milkias, 2003: 26ff). On 
several occasions, the TPLF had to initiate changes in the coalition partners’ and the 
PDOs’ leadership to prevent them from becoming independent, ensure loyalty and 
discard opposition (Tadesse and Young, 2003: 389ff). While TPLF involvement was 
necessary to ensure its dominance, such interventions further foreclosed the ability 
of EPRDF member parties and PDOs to be perceived as legitimate political leaders by 
the population, inevitably weakening the EPRDF regime. Ethnic federalism did not 
result in local representation and self-rule, as the EPRDF only recognised and 
cooperated with PDOs it controlled. Any attempt at local representation outside of 
the EPRDF-sanctioned structures was countered with violence, indicating the fragility 
of the political settlement and the EPRDF itself (Clapham, 2009: 187f). 
                                                        
46 For the years 2003, 2004 and 2008, the cumulative percentages add up to 100.03, 99.98 and 100.01 
percent respectively likely due to rounding errors and for 2005 no data was available. 
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Mengist47: State, Government and the Party 
Ethiopia has a history of a strong central state, dating back to the time of the empire 
under Haile Selassie, a tradition which the EPRDF inherited when it came to power in 
1991 (Bach, 2011: 653; de Waal, 2013b: 150). Similar to the rule of its predecessors 
(Aregawi, 2009: 252), the EPRDF progressively took over state structures, merging 
the state and the ruling coalition (Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Lefort, 2013: 461; van 
Veen, 2016). The term “mengist”, that translates into state, government or party, 
reflects the blurring of the distinction between the three concepts in Ethiopian 
politics (Vaughan, 2011: 624), and rendered the differentiation of their empirical 
manifestations challenging. However, disaggregation in the analysis remained 
important, as both the state and the EPRDF were heterogeneous organisations - the 
former containing organisations with different mandates/objectives and the latter 
uniting four different parties with at times diverging interests. There existed different 
agendas within the EPRDF and the state, and EPRDF priorities did not simply map on 
priorities of different state organisations, even if the latter were staffed with EPRDF 
cadres48. 
The TPLF had a strong influence on the EPRDF’s and its members’ organisational 
and ideological orientation (Aregawi, 2009: 187f), and under the TPLF’s lead, the 
EPRDF also embraced the Leninist concept of the “vanguard party”. The EPRDF 
understood its mandate, as ruling on behalf of the masses to implement 
revolutionary politics necessary to free Ethiopia’s different ethnic groups from 
previous repression and promote social and economic transformation (Aregawi, 
2009: 308). Instead of liberal democracy, the EPRDF claimed to adopt the concept of 
“revolutionary democracy”, in which the EPRDF as the vanguard monopolised 
political decision-making (Aregawi, 2009: 190f). An interviewee explained “The 
problem with the EPRDF is the vanguard aspect of the government. They think they 
know better” (Interviewee Nr. 85, 2016). Decision-making in the EPRDF followed the 
Leninist principle of democratic centralism and consensus was forged through 
discussion by the vanguard. Similar to experiences of other regimes following Leninist 
                                                        
47 Mengist means state, government or party in Amharic. 
48 See chapters 5-7. 
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prescriptions (Szajkowski, 1981), once a decision had been taken by the EPRDF 
central committee, it had to be executed and factionalism was not permitted 
(Aregawi, 2009: 252f; Milkias, 2003: 13). Until a TPLF internal conflict in 2001, 
leadership both in the TPLF and the EPRDF was a collegiate affair. However, collegial 
leadership was abandoned and the centre of power moved to the office of the late 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi after the resolution of the conflict (Markakis, 2011: 245; 
Tadesse and Young, 2003: 392). 
To enforce democratic centralism, regular evaluation of EPRDF cadres, and later 
the whole civil service, was undertaken on the basis of “gimgema”, a tool adapted 
from the Maoist principle of “criticism and self-criticism”. Initially gimgema was used 
by the TPLF during the armed struggle to evaluate fighters, peasants and party 
members (Berouk, 2017: 178). However, later on it helped to monitor the activity of 
cadres and civil servants, by forcing them to admit their mistakes publicly and identify 
and remove those who did not behave in line with EPRDF priorities (Asnake, 2011: 
157; Vaughan, 2011: 628). Gimgema was said to ensure the detection of corruption 
and underperformance of cadres and civil servants, however there existed evidence 
that it was also used to eliminate critical voices rather than just evaluating 
performance (Milkias, 2003: 20). 
From 1991, the EPRDF controlled political office at all levels, either through its 
member parties (TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, SEPDM) or satellite parties (the regional PDOs) 
(Abbink, 2017a: 304). Although the EPRDF held key positions in state organisations, 
party membership was not a requirement for entering the civil service. The 
establishment of a comprehensive civil service reform programme in 2001 and the 
launching of BPR (Business Process Reengineering) to improve state institutions, 
testified to the EPRDF’s commitment to build an efficient bureaucratic apparatus. 
Apart from training civil servants and updating legislative and bureaucratic 
procedures, it also included the introduction of modern management techniques and 
digital technology. While implemented large-scale at the federal level, the degree to 
which the programme reached lower administrative levels has been questioned 
(Brautigam et al., 2016: 160; Mulu, 2013: 21). Moreover, there existed some 
indications that the civil service reform also had a political component and was used 
to discard cadres that had proven too critical (Tadesse and Young, 2003: 391f). 
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The push for a technocratic civil service somewhat declined after the 2005 
elections49, as party membership in the EPRDF member parties became a quasi-
requirement for employment in the public sector. Bureaucrats had become 
increasingly critical of the EPRDF because of the primacy that the ruling coalition was 
giving to structures of party over state, and politicians over technocrats (Tadesse and 
Young, 2003: 402). Moreover, the EPRDF wanted to address the defection of civil 
servants that had joined the post-election protests in 2005 or supported them 
indirectly through passive endorsement. Former civil servants referred to the party 
recruitment in the civil service as “cadrisation” and recounted the pressure that was 
exercised to coerce them to join the EPRDF50. Some evidence indicated that the BPR 
processes in the civil service were used for party recruitment after 2005, questioning 
their technocratic character (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2018). Only very few people managed 
to circumvent party membership, but those who did remained in technical positions 
(Fana, 2014: 70f). An interviewee stated that “If you are not ambitious, you can work 
in the civil service without being in the party” (Interviewee Nr. 17, 2016), meaning 
that as a technocrat without membership in EPRDF member parties, individuals were 
excluded from promotion and unable to reach positions with decision-making power. 
Recruitment to the EPRDF member parties through EPRDF affiliated mass based 
societies (women, youth, disabled etc.), also contributed to a dramatic increase in 
the EPRDF’s membership base51 (Arriola and Lyons, 2016). 
Although the EPRDF officially established a process for recruiting and training 
new leaders that favoured skills development (EPRDF, 2009; Meles, 2007), in practice 
the promotion structures in the coalition and the civil service often favoured party 
                                                        
49 The 2005 elections were the freest elections to take place under the EPRDF regime. The ruling 
coalition was sure about its political stronghold and opened the political space around the 2005 
national elections. Opposition parties campaigned relatively unhindered and many CSOs engaged in 
voters’ education and election monitoring. However, the EPRDF closed the political space soon after 
the elections and even increased its control, as it lost many seats in the federal parliament and almost 
all in the Addis Ababa City Council, testifying to its lack of popularity especially among the urban 
constituency (Abbink, 2006; Smith, 2007). 
50 An interviewee explained that – “In 2005 the government realised that not only did it not control the 
civic space, but also it didn’t control the civil service. Civil servants didn’t show up to work. This was 
when the process of cadrisation began. In our Ministry, a new minister was appointed and mandated 
with the EPRDFisation or "cadrisation". We were told join the party or leave the ministry. We were 
pressured more and more. In the end we were told on a daily basis” (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2015a). 
51 According to the 2013 EPRDF Congress Report, the membership reached 6.16 million (EPRDF, 2013a: 
14). 
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loyalty over technocratic competence. A study conducted by the Federal Policy Study 
and Research Centre, a state organisation, found that recruitment and appointment 
of leadership was not primarily based on qualification and merit but loyalty and 
political connections (PSRC, 2017). Research on agricultural extension programmes 
in Ethiopia discovered that “political allegiance and loyalty” were criteria considered 
in the recruitment process, resulting in several cases of underqualified people filling 
important positions in the state (Kassahun and Colin, 2014: 206; Planel, 2014: 426). 
In the state apparatus, bureaucrats were controlled by party officials (Dejen, 2015: 
483), and rank in the EPRDF, not position in the state, defined people’s decision-
making power52. Especially at the local level, the fusion of EPRDF and state structures 
was evident, as local EPRDF structures were often headed by the same people that 
populated the local state administration. Hence, it became impossible for citizens to 
distinguish between state and EPRDF structure and studies revealed that even for the 
local state/EPRDF officials their mandates were not perceived as distinct 
(Emmenegger, 2016: 278f; Emmenegger et al., 2011: 742). The primacy of EPRDF 
structures over state structures was ultimately expressed through the fact that the 
executive was accountable to the EPRDF, not the parliament (Tadesse and Young, 
2003: 396). 
Evidence indicated that the fusion of state and EPRDF structures and the 
extension of the EPRDF into the market, civil society and the family posed problems 
on numerous levels. It resulted in reduced perception of legitimacy in the eyes of 
many citizens, who criticised the corruption, favouritism and authoritarianism which 
resulted from this (PSRC, 2017). Obligatory recruitment into the EPRDF member 
parties among civil servants and exchange of party membership for services meant 
that party membership did not necessarily translate into ideological support, but in 
many cases did signify self-interest (Lefort, 2013: 467). Several party members used 
                                                        
52 According to an interviewee “There are two kinds of public officers Technocrats: they are interested 
in a dialogue and listen, and appreciate the information but they have very little say in political 
decisions. Those who are in power because they have participated in the armed struggle and those 
who call the shots, they echo the party line and do not really communicate” (Interviewee Nr. 16, 2015). 
Another interviewee remembered an instance where an adviser to a Minister controlled his political 
boss – “I am not sure why the minister’s hands were tied. There was a legal adviser at that time. He 
was an embassy. He tried to please his political bosses. He didn’t read or analyse, he was just against 
it” (Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016). 
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their position to accumulate economic and political resources (Emmenegger et al., 
2011: 745). Despite its strict hierarchical structure, the fact that it prioritised loyalty 
to the regime, meant that the EPRDF lost some of its ability to discipline those using 
party structures to their own benefit and to fill positions in the state with the most 
qualified personnel53. The EPRDF formally admitted that there existed a vast “good 
governance” problem in the ruling coalition and that corruption remained a problem 
despite two rounds of “Renewal Movements” - trainings to instil discipline and EPRDF 
ideology to reform the civil service54 (EPRDF, 2013a; PSRC, 2017). Corruption 
perception indices revealed that although corruption in Ethiopia was below the Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) average, the problem was growing55 (Lefort, 2013: 467). 
Regular news reports on corruption scandals supported the perception of Ethiopian 
citizens that their government was corrupt (Samuel, 2017). 
The Ethiopian Democratic Developmental State Model 
From the early 2000s and onwards, the EPRDF pursued the self-proclaimed 
“democratic developmental state model”. Based on the Asian developmental state 
experience, the EPRDF emulated development strategies used by these states and 
adjusted them to the Ethiopian context. The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was 
the architect, and his writings analysed commonalities and differences between the 
original Asian model and the Ethiopian model. According to Meles, as was the case in 
Asia, “The motive and source of legitimacy of developmental states is the single-
minded pursuit of accelerated development” (Meles, 2011: 169). However, he also 
noted that “In Africa, the external circumstances are such that a developmentalist 
state will also have to be a democratic one” (Meles, 2006), contrary to the Asian 
experience. While scholars found that Ethiopia was one of the clearest examples of 
                                                        
53 An interviewee explained, “For Meles most important factor for getting an appointment in the civil 
service was loyalty, not competence of people. He said competence you can learn. Now the civil service 
is filled with loyal but incompetent people. This is difficult for the current Prime Minister” (Interviewee 
Nr. 89, 2016). 
54 An interviewee, after having missed the first scheduled meeting, explained the following upon our 
encounter. “You know, yesterday I had to go and meet a public servant. They are all in trainings you 
know. The deep renewal. It’s all about good governance and anti-corruption. I had to meet him at the 
training and he came out to see me. I had to pay him for my land certification. Can you imagine? He 
took the money and went back to his training (Fieldnotes, 2016b).” 
55 https://www.transparency.org/country/ETH (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
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an aspiring developmental state in Africa, there was a large consensus that like its 
Asian role models it was based on authoritarian, not democratic, politics (Clapham, 
2018: 1151ff; Fesseha Mulu and Abtewold, 2017: 24f). Similar to the developmental 
states in Asia, the EPRDF focused on promoting industrialisation through state led 
development and a high degree of state intervention in the country’s economy 
(Hauge, 2017: 21f; de Waal, 2013b: 152; Weis, 2016: 21). The ruling coalition adopted 
five-year development plans (MoFED, 2002, 2006, 2010; NPC, 2016) and state 
organisations at all administrative levels were given individual targets to contribute 
towards the achievement of the country’s development programme (Abbink, 2017a: 
306). 
The design and operationalisation of the Ethiopian developmental state 
coincided with a split in the TPLF in 2001, that was among others due to a 
disagreement about the military strategy in the Ethio-Eritrean war (Weis, 2016: 
220ff). To counter accusations from his adversaries in the party that held that Meles 
denied the seriousness of the threat that Eritrea posed, Meles argued that the main 
security threat Ethiopia was facing was not external (Eritrea), but internal 
(underdevelopment). Consequently, accelerated economic growth was presented as 
a priority for national security and EPRDF documents stated for example that “Rapid 
development is therefore not merely an economic necessity but also a matter of 
national security and indeed, survival” (EPRDF, 6th Congress, 2006: 2). Military terms 
were integrated into the EPRDF’s developmental state discourse, such as the 
“development armies” (lemat serawit), the “anti-poverty struggle” (tsere-dehenet 
tegel) and the “development patriots” (ye lemat arbegna) (Fana, 2014: 70). According 
to Segers et al. (2009: 101), the EPRDF tapped into the collective memory of the 
armed struggle against the Derg and the vocabulary used to mobilise peasants, 
arguing that “today's struggle for development, […] is equivalent to yesterday's 
struggle for liberation”. 
The operationalisation of the Ethiopian developmental state project was tightly 
linked to the EPRDF, whose centralised power structures provided the frame for its 
implementation in the absence of a strong and professionalised bureaucracy (Weis, 
2016: 87ff). As the self-proclaimed vanguard, the EPRDF focused on the mobilisation 
of the population behind the project. However, many citizens felt that the 
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developmental state project did not equally benefit the population and favoured 
Tigrayans, especially their political and economic elites (Interviewee Nr. 53, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 147, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 157, 2015; Lefort, 2016). The Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO), i.e. the Prime Minister and senior policy advisers, was in 
charge both of the project’s design and implementation. The setup of specialised 
agencies and training institutes to promote industrialisation and agricultural 
transformation, as well as the reorganisation of ministries to create for example a 
separate Ministry of Industry, indicated the EPRDF’s commitment to operationalising 
development policies. The PMO coordinated the work of diverse state organisations 
to realise the country’s development strategy plans and the party structure was used 
to communicate decisions down to local state levels and ensure their implementation 
(Brautigam et al., 2016: 160; de Waal, 2013a; Weis, 2016: 252). However, the fact 
that the developmental state was led by a small intellectual elite, mainly constituted 
of TPLF cadres, posed problems for rendering the developmental state discourse 
hegemonic in the EPRDF and for the project’s perceived legitimacy. 
The EPRDF’s commitment to the developmental ideology and its capacity to 
design sound industrial policies and development programmes have repeatedly been 
cited as reasons for optimism. Data confirmed that the country’s GDP growth rates 
were positive at around 10% and sustained for over a decade, meaning that Ethiopia 
outperformed other LDCs (Least Developed Countries) in terms of growth. Although 
the GDP per capita in Ethiopia remained below the LDC average, its growth rates have 
been higher than the LDC-average for the past decade, indicating that the EPRDF’s 
commitment to accelerated development showed positive results (see Table 6). 
Although the share of manufacturing in the GDP remained below the LDC-average 
(5.6% in Ethiopia compared to 12.8% LDC average), annual growth in the sector was 
consistently higher amounting to 18.4% in 2016 compared to the LDC-average of 
8.3%. Services surpassed agriculture in terms of contributions to the GDP (39.55% 
compared to 36.06% in 2016) and the share of industry in the GDP grew from 9.66% 
in 2011 to 22.10% in 2016, indicating a change in the structure of the economy. 
However, construction, not manufacturing, accounted for the large majority of the 
growth in industrial sector (68.5 % during the GDP I period), mainly thanks to the 
EPRDF’s flagship projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 
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(Mesfin et al., 2018: 3; Wakiaga and Haile, 2017: 15). Despite the EPRDF’s promotion 
of light manufacturing in Ethiopia, the share of textiles and clothing in manufacturing 
stagnated at around 10% without sign of significant growth. Due to low export 
performance and large imports of manufacturing inputs and capital goods, the 
external trade deficit posed foreign exchange problems (Geiger and Moller, 2015; 
The World Bank, 2017). Although data testified to the partial success of the EPRDF 
developmental state programme, structural transformation of the economy 
remained slow and the developmental performance remained mixed (UNECA, 2016: 
102f). For more details on disaggregated figures of economic growth as well as other 
socio-economic development indicators, see table 6 and Annex II. 
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Table 6: Data on Economic Growth and Development in Ethiopia56 
                                                        
56 The Data presented in the table below was compiled using the following sources (last accessed 13.12.2018): 
World Development Indicators, downloaded from https://knoema.com/WBWDI2018Jul/world-development-indicators-wdi and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Human Development Indicators, downloaded from http://hdr.undp.org/ 
Open Data for Africa, downloaded from http://ethiopia.opendataforafrica.org/ 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
GDP Growth in Ethiopia and Other LDCs 
GDP growth at factor costs 
in Ethiopia (annual %)  
11.5 
 11.8  11.2  10.0  10.6  11.4  8.7  9.8  10.3  10.4  8.0 
GDP growth at factor costs 
in LDCs (annual %)  8.4 9.5 7.5 4.8 5.9 4.2 5.6 5.9 5.4 3.8 3.6 
GDP per capita growth in 
Ethiopia (annual %) 
   7.88 5.96 9.62 8.28 5.83 7.73 7.45 7.62 4.90 
GDP per capita growth LDCs 
(annual %) 
   4.96 2.39 3.46 1.74 3.12 3.39 2.94 1.34 1.20 
GDP per capita in Ethiopia 
in current USD    
325.38 379.76 341.31 354.85 468.51 502.15 571.16 645.47 712.88 
GDP per capita in LDCs in 
current USD    
705.75 703.2 779.38 871.92 904.20 958.90 1011.21 970.42 949.24 
Growth of Manufacturing Sector in Ethiopia and other LDCs 
Manufacturing value added 
in Ethiopia (% of GDP)    4.1 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.4 5.6 
Manufacturing value added 
in LDCs (% of GDP)    10.9 11.2 10.9 11.1 11.6 11.5 11.5 11.9 12.8 
Manufacturing value added 
in Ethiopia (annual % 
growth) 
   9.3 8.6 9.2 9.2 11.8 16.9 16.6 18.2 18.4 
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57 During the GDP I period, construction accounted for 68.5 % of the growth in the industrial sector and 17.7% in the overall GDP growth (Wakiaga and Haile, 2017: 15). 
58 Adapted from Mesfin et al.(2018: 3). 
Manufacturing value added 
LDCs (annual % growth)    6.1 5.2 10.1 8.1 7.4 8.0 7.5 7.9 8.3 
Desegregated Data on Growth in Ethiopia 
Industry value added 
annual percentage growth57 9.43 10.16 9.52 10.13 9.67 10.82 15.01 19.64 24.10 17.04 19.85 20.56 
Industry, value added (% of 
GDP) 11.79 11.60 11.59 10.21 9.68 9.44 9.66 9.48 10.94 13.47 16.30 22.10 
Share of construction in 
real GDP growth58       14.94 19.19 14.56 21.15 26.25 32.11 
Services value added 
annual % growth 12.32 12.84 15.76 16.4 14.68 16.74 13.00 9.91 9.05 12.87 11.11 8.59 
Services, value added (% of 
GDP) 39.14 38.57 39.11 37.90 38.77 41.76 41.43 38.58 39.67 39.89 39.55 36.48 
Agriculture value added 
annual % growth 13.54 10.91 9.45 7.50 6.36 5.13 9.01 4.92 7.10 5.45 6.38 2.33 
Agriculture value added as 
% of GDP 41.17 42.52 42.27 45.18 45.88 41.45 41.25 44.33 41.24 38.52 36.06 34.84 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco % value added in 
manufacturing 
48.4 46.6 41.2 46 45.4 46.4 59.5 35.2 38.1 36.6   
Chemicals % value added in 
manufacturing 5.2 4.4 4.9 5.8 8 8.1 8.9 8.5 11 10.6   
Industry % value added in 
manufacturing 12.8 12.5 12.5 10.9 10.3 10.2 10.5 10.3 11.9 14.7 17.7 21.3 
Machinery and transport 
equipment % value added 
in manufacturing 
1.1 2.4 4.7 1.9 1.4 2.8 1.5 2.9 5.7 5.5   
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Textiles and clothing % 
value added in 
manufacturing 
10 8.8 9.2 7.4 8 10.3 10.7 8.4 10.4 10   
Data on Imports and Exports in Ethiopia 
Exports of goods and 
services as % of GDP 
      16.7 13.8 12.5 11.6 9.4 7.9 
Imports of goods and 
services as % of GDP 
      31.5 31.6 29.0 29.1 30.3 27.6 
Agricultural raw materials 
exports (% of merchandise 
exports) 
15.3 17.3 20.4 14.1 11.9 9.0 8.6 8.0 15.9 16.3 18.9 1.8 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
4.6 5.4 13.8 9.0 8.7 8.9 10.4 8.8 8.6 6.8 7.3 12.5 
Food exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
78.7 76.5 62.1 75.3 77.5 78.5 78.4 80.3 66.9 74.0 71.7 83.8 
Current account balance in 
% 
-12.64 -11.69 -4.20 -6.67 -6.75 -1.42 -2.45 -6.89 -6.29 -10.30 -11.65 -11.33 
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According to the EPRDF, the developmental coalition in charge of 
operationalising the developmental state consisted of the different wings - the party 
wing (derjetawi kinf), the government wing (ye mengist kinf) and the people’s wing 
(ye hizib kinf). The party wing, as suggested by its name, grouped EPRDF members 
together, whereas the government wing was composed of all civil servants and 
organised them by state organisation for which they worked. The people’s wing 
grouped different types of associations together, but mass-based and professional 
associations constituted the majority of its members. The wings were supposed to 
participate in the operationalisation of the developmental state and to disseminate 
the developmental ideology among the larger population of the country. Together 
the wings acted as social control mechanisms of the population and increased the 
state’s infrastructural power by reinforcing the state’s penetration of society down 
to the household level (Yeshtila et al., 2016: 9). The three wings overlapped, as nearly 
every individual in these wings was a party member and several were active in two 
or even all three wings. 
Society under the EPRDF rule 
Every-day encounters with the Ethiopian State 
Recent studies of state-society relations in Ethiopia found that the EPRDF managed 
to penetrate much deeper into society than its predecessors, enabling it to mobilise 
the population for the implementation of its development programmes 
(Emmenegger, 2016; Planel, 2014). The state became more present in people’s lives, 
both as a physical structure, through local state offices and their staff, and a political 
reality, through the increased interaction with and penetration by the local state 
(Aalen and Muriaas, 2017: Chapter 4). While the extension of the state apparatus was 
used for developmental purposes, it also effected a recentralisation of power in the 
hands of the EPRDF. Local structures were key for operationalising the EPRDF’s 
agricultural transformation policies, but decentralisation measures also became tools 
for ensuring regime survival, co-opting citizens into the state and preventing 
opposition from emerging. 
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When the EPRDF came to power, it designed a federal structure consisting of five 
levels, the federal state, regional states, zonal/provincial administrations, 
woreda/district administrations and kebeles/neighbourhood or peasant 
associations59. While the woreda level was officially in charge of provision of public 
services to citizens, the kebele carried out the everyday administration. The kebele 
administration consisted of a legislative (council), executive (cabinet) and judiciary 
(social court) and was staffed with elected local peasants. The cabinet members, 
representatives of the EPRDF, oversaw the work of local civil servants (teachers, 
health workers etc.), meaning that often low educated political representatives 
controlled more technocratic state employees (Emmenegger et al., 2011: 737f; 
Lefort, 2010: 443). The kebele was among others in charge of collecting local taxes, 
distributing land, issuing ID-cards and holding official registers about the population 
in its administration. Each kebele had its own militia, court and prison and it was in 
charge of distributing state-subsidised food items, food aid and resources under the 
food for work programme (Markakis, 2011: 247). Together, these functions provided 
the kebele with significant power over citizens. 
More decentralisation reforms were conducted later. The district level 
decentralisation programme in 2001 promoted devolution in favour of the woreda 
administrations. The last round of decentralisation was conducted around 200560 and 
targeted the kebele, introducing sub-kebele organisations and bringing the state even 
closer to the citizens (Aalen and Muriaas, 2017: Chapter 4). While the naming and 
setup of the sub-kebele structures differed slightly between and even within different 
regions in Ethiopia61 (Emmenegger, 2016: 270; Yeshtila et al., 2016: 9f), essentially 
they constituted structures to organise households into development teams 
(“development armies”) in order to mobilise resources for the developmental state 
                                                        
59 The EPRDF inherited the kebele structure from the Derg regime (Harbeson, 2005: 147), but it was 
reformed over time to break the state down into even smaller administrative units. 
60 There exists some doubt regarding the exact dating of the process. While some scholars found that 
the process started before the 2005 political crisis and was sped up as a result of it (Emmenegger, 
2016: 269), others understood it as a result of the 2005 political crisis and an attempt of the EPRDF to 
strengthen its control in rural areas (Aalen and Muriaas, 2017: Chapter 4). 
61 The imposition of the sub-kebele structures was also meant to undermine traditional local 
governance structures, like the Gada system in Oromia, and was modelled on existing structures from 
Tigray (Schaefer, 2011: 206). 
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project (see Table 7). Organised in “garee misoma” (development teams), citizens 
provided manual labour, e.g. for building roads or other forms of infrastructure 
(Emmenegger et al., 2011: 739f). A third decentralisation reform consisted in the 
increase of seats on the local kebele councils in 2008. In the name of “good 
governance” and “participatory democracy” it was used to staff the councils with 
party members and model farmers62, as no opposition party was able to present 
sufficient candidates to control the councils (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009a: 116). 
Table 7:Local Government Structures in Ethiopia 

























led by one party 
member, they 







Members of one 
family  
Source: (Emmenegger, 2016: 270; Yeshtila et al., 2016: 10) 
In parallel to the official decentralisation and devolution, the EPRDF established 
mechanisms to recentralise power and ensure that federal policies were 
implemented at the local level. After the 2005 political crisis, salaried kebele 
managers appointed by the woredas, were put in charge of the secretarial tasks of 
the local administration. The kebele managers participated in all meetings of the 
kebele councils and cabinets, but they also promoted the local development groups 
(gotes), prepared the kebele plans setting development targets and signed reports 
addressed to the woreda administration. De facto, the appointment of kebele 
managers meant that the EPRDF directly controlled the peasant associations, 
ensuring that party orders were heeded (Emmenegger et al., 2011: 738; Lefort, 2010: 
                                                        
62 Model farmers were nominated by the government on the basis of their adoption of the agricultural 
extension programmes (Emmenegger et al., 2011: 737). They held party cards and were used to lead 
farmers in their development groups (Segers et al., 2009: 106). 
63 Actual number of households and individuals grouped in the cells, gotes and garees differed 
between kebeles, depending on their actual number of inhabitants and its topography (Emmenegger, 
2016: 269; Yeshtila et al., 2016: 10). 
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446f). Power was recentralised, as representatives of the federal state had more 
decision-making power than local state representatives (Lavers, 2016: 1092). The 
development agents64 (DAs), officials under the Ministry of Agriculture, who were 
sent to the kebeles to implement the EPRDF’s agricultural extension packages, were 
another example of the domination of the federal state over local state organisations 
(Kassahun and Colin, 2014; Planel, 2014). Development agents were often tasked 
with the management of the sub-kebele (development) groups (Markakis, 2011: 
247). As the developmental state required strong and centralised state structures, 
there was an inherent contradiction between the state design - defined in the 
constitution (federalism) - and the precondition for a successful developmental state 
(Fana, 2014: 72; Lefort, 2013: 463). Evidence indicated that federalism was sacrificed 
to advance a more centralised state system, dominated and controlled by the EPRDF, 
to facilitate the implementation of the EPRDF’s development programme (Smit et al., 
2017: 231). 
The penetration of society in the name of developmentalism had many 
authoritarian traits, like the and-ena-amst (one-to-five) system that grouped five 
households led by one party member. Its leader regularly called for meetings to 
ensure compliance with EPRDF directives and to collect information on potential 
political dissidents (Interviewee Nr. 4, 2016). Such practices/structures bore many 
resemblances with other Marxist/Leninist inspired systems, e.g. ex-Yugoslavia (Dyker 
and Vejvoda, 2014; Szajkowski, 1981) and China (Howell, 2016), and following the 
idea of the vanguard party, the EPRDF focused on mobilisation not participation65. 
Membership in the sub-kebele structures was obligatory and non-involvement was 
punished with withdrawal of public services, fines and brief periods of imprisonment 
in some cases. Studies found that local security officers were involved in the 
                                                        
64 DAs were chosen by woredas and sent for biannual postings – however many stayed for shorter 
periods of time. Many did not speak the local language and the idea was that their external positioning 
avoided potential influence from the local population (Planel, 2014: 424). This was an indication that 
the EPRDF was well aware of the dualist character of infrastructural power, understanding that 
increased exposure of state officials to society ensured policy implementation but also increased the 
influence of society over the state. 
65 For the purpose of this research, I define mobilisation as the process of persuading people to support 
a cause or programme. This can be done by force or be based on voluntary commitment. Mobilisation, 
in contrast to genuine participation does not allow for influencing the cause or programme and is 
limited to mobilising resources (human, financial or political) to achieve it. 
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mobilisation of people in the development teams, increasing the threat of 
punishment in case of non-compliance. The use of actual violence was rare, but the 
presence of security officers posed a constant threat that was enough to enforce 
compliance. People refusing to participate in public works programmes were often 
labelled as anti-developmental and anti-government and accused of supporting 
armed opposition groups (Di Nunzio, 2014: 420f; Emmenegger, 2016: 271f; Planel, 
2014: 426ff). 
Since citizens depended on services provided by the state, some feared that 
contestation could lead to withdrawal of public services (Abbink, 2017a: 305). 
Nevertheless, several scholars reported that, in interviews, citizens criticised forced 
mobilisation for community development, even if they did not revert to open 
contestation. Participation in the “developmental armies” and public endorsement 
of EPRDF policies could not be equated with approval, especially since citizens 
sometimes secretly resisted state power. Examples of such resistance included 
complying with some but not all EPRDF directives, subverting power structures and 
using the proximity to state officials to exercise influence over them, secretly voting 
for the opposition and in some cases even hiding from the state (Di Nunzio, 2014; 
Emmenegger, 2016; Emmenegger et al., 2011; Hagberg et al., 2010; Lefort, 2013; 
Planel, 2014). Hidden contestation was used to avoid repression by the state, making 
it necessary to distinguish between what Scott (1990) terms public transcript66 – 
compliance with EPRDF directives – and hidden transcript67 – subversion of power 
structures and hidden non-compliance. According to Lefort (2013: 464) “resigned 
acceptance” rather than “active endorsement” characterised the support to the 
EPRDF rule. 
Studies found that several interventions in the name of the developmental state 
failed to promote development and in some cases even had adverse effects (Dereje, 
2011a; Planel, 2014; Smit et al., 2017). The twin targets of interventions in the name 
of the developmental state, economic growth and political control, were not always 
                                                        
66 According to Scott public transcript describes “[…] the open interaction between subordinates and 
those who dominate. The public transcript, where it is not positively misleading, is unlikely to tell the 
whole story about power relations” (Scott, 1990: 2). 
67 According to Scott, “Every subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a "hidden transcript" that 
represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant” (Scott, 1990: xii). 
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compatible, and at times, the establishment of political control mechanisms 
prevented the emergence of flexible and more demand driven initiatives for 
development (Kassahun and Colin, 2014: 209). The allocation of state resources in a 
political manner - to reward allies and discipline dissidents – decreased the possible 
developmental impact of EPRDF policies (Segers et al., 2008: 178f, 2009: 100). Land 
certificates were for example exchanged against party membership, favouring loyalty 
over developmental impact (Chinigò and Fantini, 2015: 182f). Moreover, as 
mentioned above, recruitment to the civil service was often driven by party politics 
rather than primarily qualification, which also affected the operationalisation of 
policies (Kassahun and Colin, 2014; PSRC, 2017). To fulfil their personal development 
targets, local civil servants were in several cases found to force development 
packages on the population, e.g. fertiliser and seed packages in rural areas, 
irrespective of the packages’ suitability in specific local conditions. Moreover, given 
the EPRDF’s practice of democratic centralism, there existed little possibility for civil 
servants to question centrally designed development interventions, instead they had 
incentives to over-report achievements to receive promotions, rendering it nearly 
impossible to follow up on actual progress attained (Emmenegger, 2016; Planel, 
2014; Smit et al., 2017). 
The expansion of the state apparatus down to the kebele level increased the 
state’s infrastructural power, improving its capacity to mobilise the population 
behind the EPRDF’s developmental project. However, as many of the developmental 
interventions were enforced through threat of the use of despotic power and by 
representatives of despotic power (local security officers) in the sub-kebele 
structures, this counteracted the expansion of infrastructural power. Moreover, 
while it averted large-scale contestation, it also increased grievances among the 
population that felt pressured into participating in the “developmental armies”. 
Despite impressive growth rates sustained over the previous decade (Hauge, 2017), 
the EPRDF failed to translate developmental achievements into legitimacy 
(Emmenegger, 2016: 264; Lefort, 2013: 463). 
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State, Private Sector and the Politics of Developmentalism 
The country’s development plans and the EPRDF documents suggested that the 
ruling coalition had clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the private sector in 
the developmental state project (EPRDF, 2013a: 64ff; NPC, 2016: 18ff). According to 
the EPRDF, and in line with the experience of Asian developmental states:  
“One of the defining characteristics of a developmental state is that 
it must be autonomous from the private sector. It must have the 
ability and will to reward and punish the private sector actors 
depending on whether their activities are developmental or rent 
seeking68” (Meles, 2006). 
 Consequently, the EPRDF invested in the promotion of manufacturing, establishing 
specialised agencies delivering training programmes and credits to manufacturers 
and passing policies to limit the export of raw materials, to promote production of 
manufactured products (Brautigam et al., 2016: 166f; Mulu, 2013: 29ff). Despite such 
visible commitment, studies concluded that the private sector in Ethiopia remained 
underdeveloped, posing limits to the operationalisation of the EPRDF’s 
developmental state project. Instead of enabling and guiding the private sector, the 
EPRDF was in many cases found to focus on control rather than mobilisation, 
reducing the effectiveness of its policies (Clapham, 2018; Lefort, 2013). While 
constituting an under-researched area, it seemed that party and ethnic politics often 
guided the EPRDF’s approach to the private sector and reduced the ruling coalition’s 
capacity to choose and support competitive private sector actors (Mulu, 2013: 25; 
Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011: 28f). 
As noted earlier, the EPRDF built its political settlement on an integration of rural 
elites and exclusion of urban elites, including the existing business class. In the 2000 
and 2005 national elections, the business class in urban areas challenged the EPRDF 
regime, supporting opposition parties that represented more free market policies 
instead of the EPRDF’s state led development model (Clapham, 2018: 1159f; Weis, 
2016: 260f). The EPRDF often labelled established private sector businesses as “rent-
                                                        
68 The term “rent seekers” has been employed by the EPRDF to describe anti-developmental political 
and economic activities, instead of following technical definitions of the term. Accusations of “rent-
seeking” have been used to get rid of regime critics in the state, the EPRDF, civil society and the private 
sector. 
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seeking” and “unproductive”69. The reasons were twofold, first the EPRDF wanted to 
discredit regime critics and secondly, the existing private sector was dominated by 
trade and services, not manufacturing. Many businessmen were traders specialising 
in import and export, and became the EPRDF’s prime target, due to their “un-
developmental” activities (Interviewee Nr. 39, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 103, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016). But even those working in manufacturing, a sector clearly 
prioritised in the developmental state project, were attacked in case they were 
perceived as too independent by the EPRDF regime (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016a). 
Studies found that the EPRDF’s negative attitude to the local private sector, especially 
traders, posed problems (Brautigam et al., 2016: 167), and that “erratic regulations 
alleging to curb the ‘rent-seeking’ and discipline the ‘rouge’ private sector” (Mulu, 
2013: 21) actually worsened the investment climate. In 2018, Ethiopia’s “Doing 
Business Ranking” was still below the sub-Saharan average and had actually declined 
over the previous years. Successful investment still depended very much on personal 
contacts rather than primarily qualification and sound business plans (World Bank 
Group, 2018). 
To prevent opposition to its policies among businessmen, the EPRDF focused on 
creating a party aligned private sector. According to Weis, the fight against corruption 
in the early 2000s was among others used to get rid of powerful regime critics in the 
private sector and establish state dominance in key sectors, e.g. in the sugar industry, 
fertiliser sector and banking. Strong private businesses were targeted under false 
allegations of corruption and/or malpractice (Weis, 2016: 245ff). While officially 
privatisation of public companies was pushed, there existed qualified doubts 
regarding the nature of the privatisation that was found in many cases to prioritise 
EPRDF affiliated investors (Berhanu and Vogel, 2009; Young, 1996: 539). Many 
denationalised companies were bought by endowment funds owned by the EPRDF’s 
coalition members, particularly EFFORT held by the TPLF (Markakis, 2011: 263). An 
EPRDF document from 1993 cited by Markakis (2011: 256) stated:  
                                                        
69 According to an interviewee, “Today all those working in the service sector are seen as rent seekers. 
Only the producers are seen as good. In the end everyone becomes a rent seeker” (Interviewee Nr. 89, 
2016). 
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“Key industrial and agricultural enterprises could still be controlled 
by the state, while other important sectors could be taken over by 
various revolutionary democratic associations, organisations and 
individuals who can be involved in investment”. 
Moreover, studies also found, that the EPRDF-supported creation of small and 
micro-enterprises in the manufacturing sector, favoured loyalty to the ruling coalition 
among business owners. Most of the successful medium-sized and big businesses 
were closely linked to the EPRDF and state owned enterprises, party endowment 
funds and party-affiliated businesses dominated the market (Berhanu, 2013; Lefort, 
2013; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011; Weis, 2014). The private sector’s party 
loyalty was fostered through the creation of business dependence on public services, 
e.g. in terms of capital and other resources and licensing and legal matters 
(Altenburg, 2010: 10). Business membership organisations that represented the old 
economic elite were co-opted, forcefully restructured or closed, denying the business 
community independent representation (Weis, 2016: 261). The EPRDF’s fear of an 
independent private sector meant that in several cases it chose loyalty over 
performance and lacked the capacity to discipline party-affiliated businessmen. 
Corruption scandals in party owned endowment companies and party-affiliated 
enterprises testified to this (Kebour, 2017; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011), 
questioning the EPRDF discourse accusing the private sector of rent seeking and 
leading Lefort (2013: 467) to conclude, “[…] today one of the most promising tracks 
to becoming a rent seeker is to join the party and climb the ladder within it”. 
It is important to note that among the EPRDF cadres some attempted to push a 
more technocratic approach to the operationalisation of the developmental state 
programme. In the TPLF for example, a split emerged between technocrats in Addis 
assembled around Arkebe Oqubay and the old guard in Mekele. Some attempts were 
made to decouple party politics and private sector development and to push more 
strategically for FDI, such as the reform of the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) 
in 2016. Thanks to its direct link to the PMO, the EIC was able to bypass traditional 
EPRDF and state decision-making structures. The employment of, at least officially, 
non-party cadres as deputy commissioners of the EIC and the hire of highly-educated 
graduates instead of cadres, indicated a focus on technocratic decision-making. 
However, the EIC reported problems in its interactions with other state organisations, 
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e.g. the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Trade, which did not appreciate the 
power acquired by technocrats at the commission. Moreover, staff at the EIC also 
reported that it struggled with the party and ethnic politics in the private sector 
among Ethiopian investors. While some Ethiopian investors accused the EIC of 
favouring party-affiliated investors, the commission also received many applications 
specifically referring to investors’ political affiliation and contacts, as well as their 
ethnic origin, as investors believed that, as it did in most cases, this would help to 
receive permits and credits (Interviewee Nr. 153, 2018). 
While the focus on FDI in the manufacturing sector made sense from the point 
of view of developmental state policies, it also testified to the fact that the EPRDF 
had an ambiguous relationship to the domestic private sector. International 
businesses were perceived as less threatening for regime survival, as FDI companies 
were unlikely to challenge the EPRDF’s internal policies as the independent Ethiopian 
business community had done in the early 2000s (Clapham, 2018: 1159f). The PMO 
was involved in recruiting international investors, testifying to the importance given 
to FDI in the Ethiopian developmental state strategy. International investors held that 
the investment conditions in Ethiopia were lucrative due to various tax exemptions 
and trade schemes although infrastructural issues posed problems for production 
and transport (Fieldnotes, 2016c). Ethiopia’s industrial parks attracted foreign 
investors from Asia, Europe and North America. Despite a significant growth in 
number, local manufacturers, unlike FDI firms, were struggling to produce 
competitive products. Despite continuous state support, performance remained 
significantly below targets, posing limits to the country’s industrial take-off (Mulu, 
2013). While contributing to the country’s economic growth, large-scale FDI projects 
sometimes led to resettlement and displacement of the population (Dessalegen, 
2014) and FDI firms were targeted in the 2016 riots, as the local population 
denounced these practices. 
The Role of Civil Society Organisations in the EPRDF’s Developmental State Project 
The EPRDF regime encountered several major conflicts with civil society actors that 
involved both disagreements with the EPRDF’s economic policies as well as its 
political practices. The first civil society organisations to challenge the EPRDF’s regime 
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and its economic policies were the trade unions in the 1990s, protesting against the 
application of structural adjustment packages due to their detrimental impact on 
public sector workers (Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8). The second major conflict involved 
the EPRDF government and the chambers of commerce and other business 
associations in the early 2000s, because the latter criticised the EPRDF’s state led 
development programme and its undemocratic political practices, demanding both 
political and economic liberalisation (Weis, 2016: 260). The last major conflict with 
organised civil society arose around the 2005 national elections, during which NGOs, 
think tanks and some professional associations engaged in voters’ education, election 
monitoring and some functioned as platforms for opposition parties. Pushing for 
regime change and democratic transition, civil society organisations threatened the 
EPRDF rule (Yitayehu, 2010: 206ff). While slightly differing in approaches, the EPRDF 
reacted to challenges from organised civil society in a similar manner: organisations 
were temporarily closed, their licenses were cancelled, their bank accounts blocked 
and their leaders imprisoned or sent into exile. In some cases, organisations were 
forcefully restructured and staffed with EPRDF affiliates (Interviewee Nr. 36, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016). 
According to the EPRDF, its relationship with civil society organisations was 
guided by developmental concerns and policy documents suggested a clear 
understanding of the role of different civil society organisations in the developmental 
state (MoCB, 2004; MoFED, 2002, 2006, 2010; NPC, 2016). The EPRDF increasingly 
distinguished between membership-based organisations, supposed to participate in 
the country’s social and political development, and non-membership-based 
organisations, supposed to mobilise funding and implement socioeconomic 
development projects (EPRDF, 2008a). As a result of the 2005 election crisis, the 
ruling coalition also increasingly focused on mobilising the population in the name of 
“participatory” governance and democracy, which further emphasised the role of 
mass-based associations in comparison to NGOs and think tanks (EPRDF, 2006, 
2008b). 
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Membership-based organisations like mass associations70 and professional 
associations, according to the EPRDF, were said to promote both democracy 
(revolutionary, not liberal) and development in cooperation with the state (EPRDF, 
2008b). While the EPRDF officially promoted the independence of mass organisations 
and professional associations, similar to practices in other countries following 
Marxist/Leninist traditions (Howell, 2003, 2008; Szajkowski, 1981: 618f), EPRDF 
documents revealed that these CSOs were tightly linked to the ruling coalition 
(EPRDF, 2011a). There existed even a conscious strategy which encouraged members 
of party leagues to take on leadership positions in mass-based associations (EPRDF, 
2008c). Interestingly, the Federal Policy Studies and Research Centre (a state 
organisation) found that this strategy led to a “[…] mix-up of roles, for example 
between youth associations, youth league and youth federation” and that the 
organisations lacked capacity to represent their member’s interests. Moreover, the 
state executive was said to exert pressure on mass organisations, to influence 
leadership selection and to exert control through threats and labelling independent 
individuals within the organisations as anti-peace elements or opposition 
supporters71 (PSRC, 2017). As mass organisations were used to tie citizens to the 
EPRDF and guarantee support, they were perceived as controlled by the EPRDF, both 
by non-members and members (Di Nunzio, 2014: 420ff; Interviewee Nr. 19, 2015). 
Many members also admitted that thanks to their membership they got preferential 
access to state services, confirming the close link between EPRDF structures and mass 
organisations and suggesting a political distribution of resources (PSRC, 2017). 
Members of the Women’s Associations in Addis Ababa reported for example that 
                                                        
70 Mass based associations were CSOs organised by common markers (women, youth, disabled etc.). 
Many dated back to the time of the armed struggle during which these associations had been used to 
mobilise the population behind the rebels fighting the Derg regime (Vaughan, 2011: 625). 
71 “The executive uses different forms of pressure to ensure that the mass based and professional 
organizations do their bidding only which cripples them from fulfilling their role in implementing good 
governance. […] (In) mass based and professional associations those individuals who raise strong ideas 
and fight unlawful practices face threats, shaming and labelling from the executive. Those individuals 
who speak against unfair practices are forced out of participation and retaliated against. The youth 
who participate and raise strong ideas are labelled as representing the opposition or as anti-
democratic and anti-peace. […] The leadership of mass based and professional associations are also 
individuals who do not understand the purpose of the organizations they are leading and even have 
less knowledge of the country’s policies and strategies than the members they represent. This makes 
them unable to be the voice for the public’s concerns” (PSRC, 2017). 
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they had been granted preferential access to public housing schemes and that their 
membership card could be used to obtain Kebele services such as receipt of 
subsidised cooking oil and food items, meaning that the membership card effectively 
replaced the state Kebele ID (Ghetenet, 2015: 51f). 
While development plans recognised the importance of NGOs for mobilising 
funding for socioeconomic development, the EPRDF discourse suggested that the 
focus lay on control rather than support of NGOs’ work. The relationship between 
the EPRDF and NGOs had already been tense before the 2005 elections, but the 
mutual suspicion and dislike increased as a result of NGO engagement in the election 
process and the ensuing repression (Yitayehu, 2010). Among the EPRDF cadres, there 
existed a clear sense that NGOs were corrupt, posed dangers for the state and 
needed to be controlled rather than enabled. Civil servants interviewed held for 
example that “Most of the NGOs were very corrupt. There were even NGO leaders 
who had cars registered in their own names but purchased by the NGOs money” 
(Interviewee Nr. 106, 2016). 
Given the importance of ethnic politics in Ethiopia, civil society organisations 
were not immune to their influence. On EPRDF demand, the majority of mass 
associations followed the principle of ethnic federalism, copying the ruling coalition’s 
model of ethnic-based representation (Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 83, 
2016). Each national mass association had offices in the country’s different regions, 
including professional associations such as the Ethiopian Teachers and the Ethiopian 
Women Entrepreneurs Associations, and ethnic representation trumped issue based 
interest representation in the organisational set-up. There existed few exceptions, 
like the trade unions, that did not follow the prescribed model and opted for a pan-
Ethiopian issue based interest representation (Interviewee Nr 61, 2016). Apart from 
the structures of civil society organisations, especially for those operating at the 
federal level, ethnicity often played a role in their daily operations. They regularly 
used ethnic networks to influence actors working within the federal administration 
and, where possible, addressed state officials from the same ethnicity (Interviewee 
Nr. 1, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 17, 2018). 
Formally, civil society was part of the developmental coalition, represented 
through the people’s wing (hizib kinf), but given the wing’s link to the EPRDF, it 
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included primarily regime affiliated CSOs. Through the people’s wing, civil society 
organisations were supposed to get access to state structures, to input into policies 
and development plans (EPRDF, 2008b, 2011a) and to participate in monitoring of 
government performance (MoFED, 2002: 151, 2006: 219). Interviewees working at 
EPRDF affiliated CSOs held that these structures provided for meaningful 
consultation (Interviewee Nr. 137, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 138, 2017), while the few 
CSOs that were independent but that received invitations to the meetings felt that 
the meetings were primarily used by state offices to communicate state policies and 
programmes and collect information (Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 75, 
2016a). The EPRDF also set up GO-NGO (Government-NGO) forums at federal, 
regional, zonal and woreda level, that facilitated meetings between specialised state 
organisations and NGOs, e.g. regarding environmental protection, health or 
education (Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 146, 2017). The establishment 
of consultative structures after the 2005 election crisis indicated the EPRDF’s 
understanding that it lacked information from society and that it had failed to 
mobilise the population behind its rule (Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016a). However, a study 
carried out by the Federal Policy Study and Research Centre indicated that public 
participation structures were mostly not operational, that civil servants had a 
negative attitude towards civil society organisations and failed to consider their input 
(PSRC, 2017). 
Due to the history of conflict between formal CSOs and the EPRDF regime, 
security concerns often guided the ruling coalition’s approach to civil society. The 
focus on control of CSOs reduced the regime’s ability to mobilise them as part of the 
developmental state programme, both because it failed to promote strong and 
capable organisations and because the permanent threat of use of despotic power 
reduced the state’s infrastructural power (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 
111, 2016). As the EPRDF forcefully aligned nearly all formal civil society organisations 
with its rule, this reduced their perceived legitimacy among large segments of the 
population. Moreover, the regime’s undemocratic political practices created 
grievances among large segments of the population and led to another round of 
confrontation with civil society as large-scale protests erupted in several regions at 
the end of 2015. Despite extensive military interventions, the EPRDF was not able to 
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control the protests, indicating that the unorganised part of civil society was more 
difficult to control than formal organisations. 
International Donors and the EPRDF 
The relationship between the EPRDF government and international organisations 
working in Ethiopia did not resemble the typical recipient-donor model in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The EPRDF government, while relying on international finance for the 
implementation of its developmental state project, fended off international attempts 
to influence internal politics in Ethiopia (Dereje, 2011b). Documents from the 
American Embassy in Addis Ababa revealed that the EPRDF government pursued 
political decisions even where they encountered strong international opposition, e.g. 
in the case of the Charities and Societies Proclamation and expelled international 
organisations it considered hostile to its rule (Yamamoto, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). In 
private meetings (Yamamoto, 2008d, 2008e), but also publicly, the EPRDF criticised 
international attempts to influence Ethiopian politics through support of civil society 
and opposition parties. For example, former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in an 
interview with the Financial Times in 2007, stated “I think it would be wrong for 
people in the west to assume that they can buy good governance in Africa. Good 
governance can only come from inside” (Meles, 2007). 
Despite evidence that the EPRDF rule became more authoritarian over the past 
two decades, international support to Ethiopia increased (OECD, 2017). International 
actors were reluctant to criticise the regime for its undemocratic political practices, 
possibly because of the EPRDF’s strong rejection of foreign influence in these 
matters. President Obama for example stated in a joint press conference with 
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in 2015, that the Ethiopian 
government had been democratically elected (Obama, 2015) and World Bank 
documents referred to Ethiopia as a “relatively new democracy” (The World Bank, 
2017: 5). One substantial reason for the international backing of the EPRDF regime 
was its commitment to socioeconomic development in Ethiopia. The EPRDF’s ability 
to sustain high economic growth rates, raised the regime’s reputation internationally 
despite its undemocratic practices (Tadesse and Young, 2003: 400). Ethiopia’s 
geopolitical importance also worked in its favour, as the country played a stabilising 
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role in the unstable region that is the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia participated in 
international peace keeping operations and the war on terror, which led many 
international organisations to see the EPRDF as reliable partners and allies (Clapham, 
2018: 1156f). 
International donors continuously tried to encourage the regime to transition 
towards a more democratic government and to adopt more liberal economic policies, 
but with little success. For example, they financed civil society support programmes 
hoping that the strengthening of CSOs would lead to democratisation in Ethiopia. The 
establishment of programmes for public private partnership dialogue was an 
international attempt to give more voice to the private sector. While the EPRDF 
allowed donors to push their agendas for democratisation and private sector 
development to a certain degree, the ruling coalition kept close control over such 
programmes. Civil society support programmes were directed towards financing of 
social service provision, rather than towards promoting democracy and human 
rights, and private sector development programmes targeted EPRDF priority sectors 
(Dereje, 2011b; Jalale and Wolff, 2017). By directing donor programmes to EPRDF 
sanctioned activities, these programmes often targeted regime affiliated CSOs, often 
without the donors’ knowledge. Moreover, state organisations often hampered the 
implementation of such initiatives although they had officially been approved. The 
cooperation with donors and investors from the East, such as China and India, 
reduced the effectiveness of aid conditionality linked to democracy and human rights 
from Western donors, as the EPRDF regularly threatened to turn further to China 
(Brechenmacher, 2017: 83ff; Meles, 2007, 2009). 
The 2015/18 political crisis: Mengist yellem72? 
When former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died in 2012, observers were initially 
impressed by the subsequent smooth political succession and understood it as a 
positive sign for the country’s political development. The new Prime Minister 
Hailemariam Dessalegn, a politician from SNNPR, represented a change from 
Tigrayan dominated politics under the EPRDF regime. His lack of “fighter credentials” 
                                                        
72 Mengist yellem translates into authority (state/government/party) has disappeared. 
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(participation in the armed struggle against the Derg) was perceived as a transition 
towards technocratic selection criteria for political office, rather than primarily party 
loyalty (Clapham, 2018: 1160f). According to Weis, “[…] the relative stability of post-
Meles Ethiopia also implied that the ruling party had been more effective at building 
institutions than many had given it credit for” (Weis, 2016: 329f). However, it quickly 
became clear that the new Prime Minister did not command the same power as 
Meles, revealing cracks in the ruling coalition whose cohesion had depended on 
Meles’ authority. Given that the EPRDF had progressively taken over state structures, 
problems within the EPRDF affected the functioning of the state. 
Public protests broke out in October 2015 and continued, resurging despite 
military interventions. Several activists in Ethiopia and the diaspora provided 
international visibility for the local events through their activity on social media73. 
Lasting public mobilisation indicated that the EPRDF’s attempt to build its rule on 
“performance legitimacy” lacked credibility among large parts of the country’s 
population. Protests started in Ethiopia’s largest region, Oromia, and spread to other 
regions in 2016, with Oromia and Amhara becoming the hotspots of the conflict. 
While the protests were initially triggered by the Addis Ababa Master Plan for the 
extension of the capital further into the Oromia region, their persistence and spread 
to other regions revealed deep grievances about the EPRDF’s authoritarian rule and 
its excessive control of citizens, the Tigrayan dominance in politics, the absence of 
federalism in political practice and the operationalisation of the developmental state 
that had centralised political and economic power and resources in the hands of a 
small Tigrayan elite (Lefort, 2016; Samson, 2017a; Staff Reporter, 2017a). Protesters 
in Oromia and Amhara also questioned the legitimacy and political 
representativeness of the OPDO and ANDM, denouncing the TPLF’s involvement in 
and control of party internal affairs in the two organisations. 
On the protestors side, the protests remained largely peaceful initially, although 
significant financial damage was caused (Abbink, 2017b: 5). Government property 
(cars, buildings, investment etc.), property of Tigrayan and international investors74 
                                                        
73 https://twitter.com/hashtag/oromoprotests?lang=en (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
74 Numerous international companies that operated in Ethiopia set up their business on land 
expropriated from the local population (Dessalegen, 2014; Tsegaye, 2017). 
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and regime affiliates were destroyed and roadblocks were used to interrupt travel 
and to cut provision of goods to Addis. The Prime Minister Hailemariam Desselegn 
declared a state of emergency (SOE) in October 2016, which was extended later, 
lasting eventually for 10 months. It became clear to the public that the Prime Minister 
was not in charge, as decisions taken by the command post were controlled by 
military representatives (Proclamation No. 984, 2016). His rare appearances on 
public broadcast media led citizens to conclude “Now we know that the prime 
minister doesn’t decide” (Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016). While the late Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi had commanded the EPRDF, the EPRDF was commanding Hailemariam 
Desselegn. Despite the heavy military intervention, the duration of the protests 
indicated that the EPRDF lost its control over parts of society. Although military 
interventions cleared the streets of protesters, people responded by staging stay-at-
home strikes to express their dissent. During later stages of the protests, the Querro 
(youth movement in Oromia), enforced stay at home protests in Oromia, threatening 
businessmen and torching businesses of those who continued to work (Yonas, 2016). 
According to government sources, over 20,000 people were arrested and put into 
“retraining camps” (AFP TV, 2017). The silencing of the protests gave a false sense of 
order, as conversations and interviews revealed that the military intervention and 
the lack of addressing people’s grievances led to increasing criticism among the 
population75. 
The protests rendered the growing split in the EPRDF more visible, indicating the 
end of the acceptance of TPLF rule within the coalition. Challenged by the citizens in 
their regions, the OPDO and ANDM began questioning the TPLF dominance, trying to 
use the protest movements to advance political demands within the coalition and to 
gain political legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. The presidents of the 
regions and other high-ranking officials made statements on the regional news 
                                                        
75 An interviewee stated for example “We get negative peace. Security is high and there are no 
protests. But the resentment remains and it will take time to work on it. The government has to work 
with the grassroots level. There is a danger for large-scale violence later on. People will start taking 
measures if their grievances are not addressed. The emergency for a temporary period is a deterrent. 
Parents tell their children not to protest and it calms the situation for a bit. But we are worried that 
there are no actual things happening. At the moment only security forces are deployed. But there are 
not enough security forces to check everyone” (Interviewee Nr. 116, 2016). 
 140 
broadcasts, print media and social media, contradicting and questioning the 
authority of the federal government. Even at the federal level, high level politicians 
from Oromia and Amhara regional states questioned the crack-down on the protests 
(Fasika, 2017; Staff Reporter, 2017b), de-facto starting to function as political 
opposition within the EPRDF. Especially the OPDO emerged as a major player, 
managing to gain trust from the population and eventually even the diaspora and 
opposition politicians. The TPLF split between its power base in Mekele and 
technocrats around Arkebe in Addis Ababa. Its party congress in November 2017 led 
to the suspension of Azeb Mesfin (Meles Zenawi’s widow) and the election of a new 
chairperson, in an attempt to deal with the rising pressure on its rule (Daniel, 2017, 
2018a, 2018b). 
In the beginning, it looked like the EPRDF was not willing to deal with the protests 
further than reshuffling some government positions (Staff Reporter, 2016). In 
interviews, civil servants downplayed the severity of the situation, stating that the 
protests were a reaction to the lack of good governance among some public offices 
and had already been brought under control (Interviewee Nr. 52, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 93, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 120, 2016)76. The “deep renewal” announced by the 
EPRDF to address corruption and misconduct in public office, was perceived by many 
as an attempt to get rid of political dissidents. A former president of the chambers 
summarised the feelings of many Ethiopians, stating: 
“Meanwhile, the government launches its customary crackdowns 
on corrupt officials to divert the public’s attention. As of this writing, 
the recent crackdown boasts the arrest of some fifty plus ‘high’ level 
officials and business operators. We doubt this newest move can 
impress the public, who still want to see big name politicians fall. 
We doubt this will have an impact on the fight against corruption. 
We doubt our government serves us well” (Kebour, 2017). 
However, over time, the EPRDF began to deal with some of the criticisms 
expressed in the protests. While not signifying a turn towards democratic 
                                                        
76 An interviewee stated for example that - “Addis is safe. Also the problems in the regions are much 
less than the media make you think. Staying in Bole is good then because it is safe. The problems aren’t 
big. In good governance a lot is happening, but much is still at planning stage. The draft bill for a good 
governance council will be voted next month. The council will bring together the government, media, 
the opposition and civil society” (Interviewee Nr. 105, 2016). 
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government, the EPRDF initiated a dialogue with opposition parties and debated 
some of the legal provisions perceived as hindering fair political competition and civic 
activism. The EPRDF was criticised for its tight control over potential reform 
processes and its unwillingness to engage meaningfully with the protest movements, 
but in February 2018 political events started accelerating. In a surprise move, the 
acting Prime Minister Hailemariam announced the release of opposition politicians, 
and resigned from his post only one week later (Schemm, 2018a). A new state of 
emergency was declared and while formally voted upon in parliament, it 
encountered a record number of no votes and abstentions. The TPLF’s dominance 
over the security and military indicated its de-facto rule under the state of 
emergency, but its repressive actions were publicly criticised especially in Oromia and 
Amhara regional states. Within the EPRDF the struggle among the member parties 
but also the old guard and the young generation of leaders seemed to escalate and 
it took over a month to decide on a replacement for Hailemariam Dessalegen 
(Schemm, 2018b). Some of the released prisoners were rearrested, the SOE reversed 
the political opening, spurring new rounds of strikes even reaching the peripheral 
regions of the country. The election of Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo politician as the new 
chair of the EPRDF indicated a possible change of political course, however the 
political situation remained volatile. The political crisis revealed the fragility of the 
political settlement, which was both questioned from within the ruling coalition and 
by the population (Planel and Lefort, 2018). 
Conclusion 
Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the political settlement built by the 
EPRDF fundamentally changed power structures underpinning Ethiopia’s previous 
regimes (van Veen, 2016: 13ff). Dominance of rural instead of urban elites and ethnic 
regionalism rather than pan-Ethiopianism provided the foundations for state building 
(Yeshtila et al., 2016: 7f). The TPLF controlled the state building process and carried 
out a recentralisation of power, despite the constitutionally ensured principle of 
ethnic federalism, both through consolidating its power within the ruling coalition 
and through extending the reach of the state apparatus in rural areas (Dejen, 2015: 
483). TPLF officials monopolised political power in the EPRDF and state organisations, 
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particularly those representing despotic power (police, security and military) (van 
Veen, 2016). 
To legitimise its rule and compensate for its lack of political representativeness, 
the EPRDF embarked on the self-proclaimed “democratic developmental state” 
project, seeking to gain “performance legitimacy” through the provision of 
accelerated and sustained economic growth (Clapham, 2018: 1154). While Ethiopia 
was said to be one of the clearest examples of an aspiring developmental state in 
sub-Saharan Africa, its developmental record remained mixed (Hauge, 2017: 4; Weis, 
2016: 4 and 5). Although development strategies and policies testified to the EPRDF’s 
capacity to design sound industrial policies, their implementation was negatively 
influenced and slowed down by both party and ethnic politics and according to 
Clapham (2018: 1162), the possible success of the developmental state in Ethiopia 
hinged on the EPRDF’s ability to become “[…] liable to a level of accountability that 
no Ethiopian regime has yet been able to tolerate”. 
The priority given to control of civil society organisations, while preventing public 
contestation, foreclosed the possibility to mobilise them as part of the EPRDF’s 
developmental state agenda. Moreover, the extension of the state and party 
apparatus down to the household level was widely perceived as a means of control 
rather than a “developmental” measure by the population, leading to resigned 
acceptance in the absence of an alternative rather than political endorsement 
(Emmenegger, 2016; Planel, 2014). The excessive use of control and coercion in the 
implementation of the developmental state project and the ethnic favouritism the 
regime displayed towards Tigrayans posed severe limitations on the EPRDF’s ability 
to engender legitimacy through development. The eruption of public protests in 
different regional states in 2015/16, the EPRDF’s supposed core constituency, 
revealed the fragility of the political settlement that had favoured a monopolisation 
of economic and political resources by the TPLF and its collaborators. 
For a detailed description of the different phases of the EPRDF rule and 
developments in Ethiopian society please see Annex III.
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Chapter 5: The Politics of State – Trade Union Relations in 
Contemporary Ethiopia 
Addis Ababa, 23.02.2016 [Yekatit 15 2008] 
“The industry grows and there are now more workers. We see road 
construction and building. But the paradox is that this is growth, it 
is not development. We are now roughly 94 million people with only 
1 million having a good life. There is food scarcity, inflation and 
water shortage. Eighty percent of the population lives in rural areas 
and many still live on subsistence farming. The Chinese and other 
investors and those with relations live a good life. Ethiopia is not 
highly developed. You have to look at how the masses live. In 
foreign firms there is high resistivity. Indians, Turkey and the 
Chinese run investments, they are not interested in trade unions. 
The government won’t finger at them. It says they create 
employment. But the workers’ rights have to be respected. CETU 
intervenes with higher officials, but things are not good. The mass 
media of the government do not comment. We need researchers 
who comment, people like you who ask questions. The problem in 
Ethiopia is that we don’t say a spoon is a spoon, but a spoon is a 
shovel. People say it’s a democracy but they aren’t democrats. Most 
[public] officials are from the war front and their attitude is 
militaristic. If they say one plus one is three, it’s three ” (Interviewee 
Nr. 51, 2016). 
* * * 
Introduction 
“We were the first bad experience of the new regime. The first 
unexpected incident of resistance. It was we who first indicated 
shortcomings with the current government. Less than a year after 
they had come into power we already understood their motive. 
They wanted to divide the employees and the congress members 
into their ethnic politics. They wanted to bring their ethnic politics 
into us. They were ready, they harassed us and brought the military 
forces” (Interviewee Nr. 127, 2016). 
This chapter investigates the relationships and patterns of interaction between the 
state and trade unions in Ethiopia since 1991. It studies the functioning of trade 
unions under the EPRDF regime and investigates how the operationalisation of the 
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EPRDF’s developmental state project since the early 2000s has influenced the 
development of trade unions and shaped their role within the state. To contextualise 
the analysis, a brief historical overview of the labour movement in Ethiopia is 
provided in the first part of the chapter. The second part explores the mechanisms 
used by the EPRDF to establish control over trade unions, while the last part of the 
chapter looks at the patterns of interaction between state organisations and trade 
unions during the period of my fieldwork. 
Given the tradition of state-led development since the reign of Haile Selassie, the 
organisation of workers in Ethiopia was predominantly marked by the relationship 
between labour and the state rather than labour and private capital. The formal 
Ethiopian economy was dominated by public sector enterprises and enterprises 
owned by or affiliated to the political elite and the existing private sector was closely 
associated with and overseen by the regimes in power. Many trade unions were 
established in public enterprises but civil servants had yet to gain the right to 
unionise. State control over unions was a common feature of the past three regimes 
in power and although unions often linked labour to the state, at times unions also 
moved away from the orbit of the state and pitted workers against the regimes in 
power. 
There exists little contemporary literature on labour in Ethiopia and even less on 
trade unionism. Given that the EPRDF’s developmental state programme rested on 
the promotion of labour intensive sectors like agroindustry and light manufacturing, 
the scarcity of academic research is all the more surprising. Existing literature often 
focused on industrial employment and the structures of the labour market, rather 
than studying the organisation of workers. Research explored for example how 
Ethiopian and Chinese workers influenced and were influenced by labour structures 
and processes in Chinese FDI firms (Fei et al., 2017), studied workers’ choices with 
respect to different employment types (industrial labour or entrepreneurship) 
(Blattman and Dercon, 2016), investigated labour market structures and recruitment 
procedures in industrial sectors (Girum et al., 2017; Mano et al., 2011) and shed light 
on TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training) programmes and 
employment in Ethiopia (Yamada et al., 2018). References to trade unions were made 
in passing, noting that unions were weak and lacked organisational capacity and that 
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employers often either opposed unionisation or co-opted unions (Fei et al., 2017: 
O469; Hauge, 2017: 195). 
My research revealed that, in the 1990s, the EPRDF already had institutionalised 
control over unions to prevent them from pursuing an independent agenda. 
However, going beyond just control, from the early 2000s onwards, as part of the 
operationalisation of the EPRDF’s developmental state programme and the 
expanding industrialisation, the EPRDF increasingly used unions to deal with 
emerging labour issues. To prevent the development of an independent labour 
movement and to deal with growing industrial conflicts, the EPRDF encouraged 
unionisation under EPRDF affiliated unions. 
Trade-unions were to a large extent controlled by the EPRDF, but they were also 
membership-based organisations receiving pressure from their constituents. In many 
cases, unions were wedged between the interests of the state and those of workers 
and while unions often had to give into pressures from the EPRDF and state 
organisations, they also negotiated on behalf of their members. Unions’ political 
capital and ability to assert themselves vis-à-vis state organisations depended on 
their ability to mobilise their members and hence they could not simply ignore 
pressures received from workers. The interactions between state organisations, 
especially the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and the Bureaus of 
Labour and Social Affairs (BoLSAs), were marked by constant negotiation rather than 
just co-optation of trade unions. 
Brief History of the Ethiopian Labour Movement – 1960s to 1990s 
Formally registered Ethiopian trade unions only emerged during the second half of 
the 20th century77, partly because of the country’s tardy industrialisation process, but 
also because of the absence of a legal framework for unionisation until the 1960s. 
However, already during the first half of the 20th century, employees in the newly 
emerging industrial sectors assembled in traditional self-help groups, such as iddir 
and equb, that evolved from funerary and credit associations to provide support for 
                                                        
77 Some of the international employees of foreign enterprises like the Franco-Ethiopian railway were 
members in European and international trade unions (Killion, 1985: Chapter 5). 
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work related problems (Killion, 1985: 145; Lefort, 1981: 45; Syoam, 1969: 56). 
Because of the precarious working conditions, wildcat strikes became more frequent 
and demands for labour rights and protection of workers were addressed to the 
emperor on an increasing scale during the 1940s and 50s (Killion, 1985: Chapter 8). 
The first workers to try and form a formal trade union were the Franco-Ethiopian 
railway workers in the 1940s78, but in the absence of a labour law they could not get 
official recognition (Lefort, 1981: 44). The pressure on the government to deal with 
labour related issues intensified during the 1950s and the formation of the first 
underground unions coincided with the elaboration and promulgation of the labour 
law in 1963 (Beyene, 2009: 9 & 10; Syoam, 1969: 2 & 4). The emperor involved 
international advisors in the drafting of the law (Paradis, 1969) and the creation of a 
labour department in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs in 
1962, facilitated its implementation (Syoam, 1969: 86f). 
After the official registration of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions 
(CELU) in 1963, it became the motor for the emerging Ethiopian labour movement. 
Supported by some state bureaucrats, CELU organised basic trade unions (BTUs) at 
enterprise level and provided training for the new labour leaders with the help of the 
African American Labour Congress (AALC), the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (Killion, 1985: 
Chapter 9; Souchy, 1964; Syoam, 1969: 51–67). Despite the legal recognition of the 
right to unionisation, resistance of the management in public and private enterprises 
was high and caused numerous conflicts between employees and employers. CELU 
used its connection to the imperial bureaucracy to facilitate meetings with senior 
politicians - such as the Prime Minister Aklilu Habtewold - to garner state support for 
its unionisation campaign and effectively implement the workers’ rights stipulated in 
the labour proclamation (Interviewee Nr. 99, 2016). 
While beneficial when it came to ensuring political support, CELU’s close links to 
the imperial bureaucracy meant that it favoured “cooperation over confrontation and 
dialogue over unilateral action” (Beyene, 2009: 118). As the anti-imperial movement 
                                                        
78 Initially workers’ organisation on the Franco-Ethiopian railway was driven by the European workers. 
Especially French workers who were organised in the National Confederation of Workers in France, 
drove the process, including for example a strike in 1919 (Killion, 1985: Chapter 5). 
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in the 1960s and early 1970s grew, several members of the union council questioned 
CELU’s cooperative approach (Admasie, 2018a: 94ff). The white collar unions in 
public enterprises like Ethiopian Airlines, the Commercial Bank and the Ethiopian 
Electric Light and Power Authority were among the most politicised and radical79 
(Killion 1985, chaps. 8 & 9), but blue colour unions in public enterprises as well as 
various unions in private enterprises also joined the struggle (Admasie, 2018a: 99). 
Pressured by critical voices within CELU, the confederation progressively called for 
work stoppage where negotiation with management did not lead to results (Beyene, 
2009: 108ff; Interviewee Nr. 99, 2016). On the 7th of March 1974, CELU called a 
national work stoppage which brought the country’s economy to a standstill, until 
the government agreed to modifications of the Labour Relations Decree (Mulatu, 
1991: 160; Taffara, 2006: 8). Although CELU officially reached 73,000 members in 
1973, it remained a loose assembly of basic trade unions. The conflict between state-
loyalist and more radical trade unionists hampered CELU’s operations, reducing its 
role in the anti-imperial struggle. Moreover, election fraud, corruption, 
embezzlement and mismanagement also prevented CELU from becoming more 
important (Beyene, 2009: 76f; Kiflu, 1998: 14ff; Syoam, 1969: 66–7) 
Several radicalised labour leaders expressed support for the programme of the 
EPRP (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party) that called for the removal of the 
monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic80. As the monarchy did not 
allow the establishment of political parties, the EPRP operated underground between 
April 1972 and August 1975 (Mamo and Bayou, 1976). After the fall of the Emperor, 
the EPRP became the main opposition to the Derg regime, promoting a civil 
government and criticising the military reign of Mengistu (Beyene, 2009: 271; Kiflu, 
1998: Chapter 1). Although there did not exist an official agreement, the EPRP and 
                                                        
79 While comparatively well-educated and paid, their privileged position made them more, not less 
radical. Given the relative scarcity of skilled workers, white-collar workers were de-facto in a better 
bargaining position, as industrial workers could easily be replaced by individuals in the large and 
growing pool of unskilled urban labour. Nevertheless, the dominance of white colour unions among 
radicalised labour has subsequently been questioned on the basis of new available data (Admasie, 
2018a: 99f). 
80 In the literature there exists a disagreement between those that denounce the infiltration of CELU 
by the EPRP (Beyene, 2009: 271) and portray CELU as one of the party’s organisations (Kiflu, 1998: 
Chapter 1) and those that stress that CELU remained an actor in its own right despite the affinity some 
of its leaders expressed for the EPRP programme (Admasie, 2018a: 130ff). 
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CELU established a cooperation and unions joined the EPRP in the civil war against 
the Derg (Admasie, 2018a: 109). The confederation called strikes and the EPRP used 
its widely distributed newspaper Democracia81 and Labader to disseminate 
information about the Derg’s rule and mobilise the population against the regime 
(Mamo and Bayou, 1976). The Derg retaliated, killing and imprisoning a significant 
number of labour leaders, forcing CELU and its members to go underground (Kiflu, 
1998: Chapters 1 & 4; Lefort, 1981: 188ff). ELAMA – the Ethiopian Workers 
Revolutionary Union – was formed by key leaders of the EPRP and CELU. Closely 
affiliated to the EPRP, ELAMA participated in the armed struggle against the Derg 
(Admasie, 2018a: 113ff; Kiflu, 1998: 22ff, 145ff). Although both opposing the military 
regime, the EPRP and the TPLF eventually fought against each other. They disagreed 
on principles of political organisation, the TPLF called for national (ethnicity based) 
rebellions of Ethiopia’s different nationalities, while the EPRP demanded a pan-
Ethiopian organisation of the rebellion (Kiflu, 1998: Chapter 9). 
To replace CELU, the Derg established AETU (All Ethiopian Trade Union), staffing 
it with political affiliates and making sure no independent labour movement could 
evolve (Mulatu, 1991: 160f; Turner, 1991: 113). The Derg successfully co-opted trade 
unions, controlling all levels, from the national confederation to the basic trade 
unions in enterprises and making sure unions reflected the Derg’s ideology and 
political interests (Beyene, 2009: 147ff; Killion, 1985: Chapter 10; Mulatu, 1991: 161, 
229). Due to the nationalisation under the command economy, existing unions were 
de-facto public-sector-unions. Ties were cut with international labour organisations 
representing the West, such as the AALC and the ICFTU, and new ones were forged 
with those representing the Soviet front such as WFTU (Interviewee Nr. 112, 2016). 
When the EPRDF came into power in 1991 after it had overthrown the Derg, 
restructuring labour relations was a priority. Given AETU’s close link to the Derg, 
existing trade unions were perceived as a potential danger for the new regime (Praeg, 
2006: Chapter 8). Moreover, the link forged between trade unions and the EPRP 
during the anti-imperial and then anti-Derg struggle, also troubled the EPRDF’s 
                                                        
81 The newspaper Democracia reached a large audience, and was said to cover more households than 
the government owned newspapers at the time (Kiflu, 1998: 34ff). 
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leaders (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016; Kiflu, 1998: Chapter 
1). Another issue for the EPRDF was that trade unions did not fit the principle of 
ethnic federalism promoted by the ruling coalition both for the organisation of the 
state as well as civil society (Markakis, 2011: 232). Trade unions were based on a pan-
Ethiopian organisation of workers and favoured issue-based over ethnic-based 
representation82. Finally, during the very early days of the EPRDF regime, some 
veteran public-sector labour unions from the pre-Derg era re-opened and demanded, 
among other things, job security, salary increase and improvement of working 
conditions (Assefa, 2003: 20; Interviewee Nr. 112, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016). 
The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) union, for example, went on strike in 1991 
for twelve days, demanding a salary increase and in doing so, unknowingly started 
what became a three-year long feud between the EPRDF and the union. Given CBE’s 
importance for the Ethiopian economy, the new government became painfully aware 
of the potential force of independent labour unions. Former trade unionists shared:  
“The strike was a consensus of all employees. We knew we were a 
critical sector and that they would respond soon if we went on 
strike. We could paralyse all financial transactions. There were no 
private banks at that time” (Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016). “All CBE 
offices at the time, 55 or 60 closed” (Interviewee Nr. 127, 2016). 
“The prime minister gave a message to the employees and asked 
them to come back. The employees refused. Then they [public 
officials] started arresting employees. The police and the military 
came to their houses. They were brought to underground arrest 
places. People feared that their children and family would be killed. 
Special forces broke the vaults” (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a). 
The union was accused of destabilising peace and security as well as the national 
economy and false allegations were used to persecute union leaders and members 
(CBE Labour Union, 1992). Initially all 4,800 employees on strike were dismissed by 
the Prime Minister of the transitional government. The union asked the OATUU and 
other international trade unions for support in their struggle (Etana Geleta, 1991a, 
1991b) and tried to directly negotiate with the Prime Minister (Etana Geleta, 1991c). 
After unsuccessful attempts to recruit 4,800 new employees, the government 
                                                        
82 In the Democratic and Peaceful Transition Conference of Ethiopia in July 1991, the trade unions 
together with the University of Addis Ababa were the only pan-Ethiopian organisations participating 
(Markakis, 2011: 232). 
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resorted to only dismissing the union council and the executive committee of the 
union. The CBE union president Etana Geleta had to go into exile, his vice president 
was imprisoned and the union dissolved (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 
123, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 127, 2016). 
Although the government froze the accounts of the CBE union, harassed and 
imprisoned leaders, raided their offices and occupied the union building with security 
personnel, the labour union continued its fight. Members of the union provided cash 
contributions, financing council and executive members (98 persons) for 27 months 
after the end of the official strike (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 123, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 127, 2016). Only in 1994, could the 
EPRDF government and the union settle their disagreement. Despite several 
attempts, the EPRDF failed to take over the control of the union because the union 
council refused to elect the union leaders the party had chosen for the executive 
committee. Although the EPRDF successfully prevented any of the old executive 
committee leaders who had called the strike to become re-elected, they were not 
able to introduce their appointees (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 123, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 127, 2016). After the dispute had 
been settled, all but six former union employees were allowed back to work at the 
CBE and with the help of the CBE union president of the time, all got employment at 
private banks instead (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 127, 2016). 
This incident and other parallel strikes in the early 1990s (Assefa, 2003: 20) made 
the EPRDF aware of the potential danger that unions could pose to its political rule. 
It intervened to prevent other unions, like the Ethiopian Electricity Cooperation, the 
National Telecom and Ethiopian Airlines, from joining the ongoing strikes 
(Interviewee Nr. 123, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016). 
Realigning EPRDF and Labour Union Priorities 
To avoid any similar challenges, the EPRDF made sure it appropriated and then 
monopolised trade unions and trade union activism. It did so through several 
interlinked mechanisms: restructuring of labour unions and including them in the 
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EPRDF apparatus and reducing the space for independent trade union activism 
through criminalisation, threat and repression. 
EPRDF Supervised Restructuring of Trade Unions 
Through its labour wing83, the EPRDF influenced the constitutive elections of the new 
CETU. It mobilised its political supporters in the confederation council and exerted 
pressure on trade unionists to vote for the party-proposed candidates. Dawi Ibrahim, 
a member of the forum 8484 that sided with the new regime in 1991, was elected the 
first president of the new CETU. However, contrary to the EPRDF’s hopes, Dawi 
quickly opposed the EPRDF, because of their approval of the World Bank’s structural 
adjustment package (Praeg, 2006: 186). 
Dawi overtly opposed the SAPs because of their negative effect on public sector 
workers who constituted the large majority of CETU’s members. He also questioned 
the foundations of the EPRDF proclaimed aboyotawi (revolutionary) democracy, that 
he considered too prescriptive and not open enough to independent voices. To 
silence Dawi, the EPRDF used its influence to create an internal conflict between 
CETU leaders to weaken the organisation (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; Interviewee 
Nr. 112, 2016; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8). Eventually six of the eight industrial 
federations composing CETU were turned by the EPRDF and opposed Dawi. Some 
federation presidents were allegedly bribed with false promises of study and working 
visas to the US, which they never received (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016b; Interviewee 
Nr. 112, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 123, 2016). CETU was closed by order of the MoLSA, 
its offices sealed off, its property confiscated and accounts frozen (Organisation of 
African Trade Union Unity, 1994a, 1994b). 
The two remaining loyal federations – the Federation of Commerce, Technical 
and Printing Industry Trade Unions and the Federation of Banking and Insurance – 
were harassed by the police and military officials, their offices were occupied by 
                                                        
83 The labour wing had been formed during the armed struggle to mobilise workers to join and support 
the front. 
84 The Forum 84 was a splinter group from the EPRP, that joined forces with the new regime in 1991 
and was integrated into the new leadership structure, among others in the trade union apparatus 
(Praeg, 2006: 186). 
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security personnel and their leaders physically assaulted (International Labour Office, 
1997b, 1997a, 1999). The EPRDF tried to force restructuring of the federations 
through appointing EPRDF chosen individuals to form new executive committees. A 
former trade unionist recounted: 
“On the fourth of November two police officers and the three 
allegedly elected people came to my office. They had a letter from 
the MoLSA stating that the new leadership had been elected. I took 
the letter and told them: We will challenge this. The police kicked 
and boxed me. They beat me. They acted like robbers in the 
building. They told me not to get back into the compound. I took 
papers to the police. I knew they wouldn’t listen. But I lodged my 
complaints. No one here reacted but others took my case to the ILO. 
Most people from this time left the country” (Interviewee Nr. 112, 
2016). 
Despite the attempt to intimidate the labour leaders loyal to Dawi, the CBE 
labour union accommodated Dawi and also paid the salaries of CETU staff affected 
by the government action (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 112, 2016). 
This caused the union significant trouble:  
“The CBE union office was closed but then opened by the workers 
by force. It was Dawi’s temporary office. We paid some of the CETU 
employees. As a result, we were targeted by the government. We 
were told that we were sheltering the opposition. My salary was 




Figure 4: Photograph, Meeting of Trade Unionists, 1994 
Photo: left to right: Hailu Orgessa, President Federation of Commerce, Technique and 
Printing Trade unions, Abyi Meles, President Federation of Banking and Insurance, Dawi 
Ibrahim, President of CETU, Getachew Mengiste, Secretary General of CETU, Ahmedin 
Hussein, President CBE Trade Union, Nasser Hassen, Vice President of CBE 
Source: CBE trade union 
Dawi turned towards international labour organisations for support, 
documenting how the EPRDF government had instigated a split in CETU leadership 
and taken this as a reason to close the confederation. The ILO, ICFTU and OATUU 
took on CETU’s case, asking the Ethiopian government to refrain from interfering in 
CETU affairs, reverse CETU’s closure and open an investigation into the harassment 
and assault of union leaders (ICFTU, 1997; International Labour Office, 1997b; 
Organisation of African Trade Union Unity, 1994a). However, over the course of the 
conflict, the international organisations sided with the EPRDF government, accepting 
the new CETU and withdrawing support to the former leaders, even if the ICFTU and 
OATTUU did so at a later stage than the AALC (Admasie, 2018a: 158ff; Interviewee 
Nr. 123, 2016). The American Federation of Labour85 even actively supported the 
                                                        
85 Two interviewees held that the AFL-CIO was used by the US government to get involved in Ethiopia’s 
internal affairs and strengthen the new regime after 1991 (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016c). “We didn’t 
know their intention. Many thought they were the labour wing of the CIA. They supported us but then 
they were involved in the dismantling of CETU” (Interviewee Nr. 123, 2016). 
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government during the restructuring of CETU, to tame the political conflict 
(Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 123, 2016). In 1997, a new CETU was 
set up by the EPRDF led federations. In the end only the Banking and Insurance 
Federation contested the new CETU, but eventually it was also forcefully reorganised 
by the EPRDF (Praeg 2006, 188ff; Human Rights Watch 1998; Interviewee Nr. 100 
2016b). 
The restructuring of trade unions included also BTUs at enterprise level, as they 
formed the federation and through the federation the confederation (Interviewee 
Nr. 95, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 127, 2016). An interviewee 
explained: 
“The reorganisation process in the unions was backed by the 
labader committee. The government. You couldn’t see them but 
they would give instructions. The labader had someone in all 
enterprises. They were at the back everywhere when the unions 
were established” (Interviewee Nr. 112, 2016). 
The EPRDF Labader Committee as Tool for Continuous Control 
The body in charge of controlling the trade unions was called the labader86 
committee and was part of the EPRDF’s labour wing87. This wing had been formed by 
the TPLF during the armed struggle against the Derg and was part of the EPRDF, 
though not the official state structure (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016b). Moreover, 
contrary to other party wings, like the women’s or youth wings, the labour wing did 
not appear in official communications or documents of the EPRDF, which made it 
difficult to detect (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016). An internal EPRDF document from 
1993 cited in Markakis hinted at the labour wing, stating that “We [the EPRDF] should 
encourage trade unions, but without compromising their organisation, we should try 
to control and lead them through indirect organisational links” (Markakis, 2011: 251). 
However, only high party officials and long term labour activists could uncover the 
                                                        
86 The literal translation of labader is “proletarian”, however most interviewees used the English word 
“labour” rather than proletarian calling it the “labour committee”. 
87 Some interviewees referred to the labour wing, while others called it the labour league. However, 
as their description of the leadership was congruent it is safe to assume that wing and league were 
used to describe the same organisation. Moreover, the equation of the words league and wing also 




labader committee’s existence and interviewees independently confirmed the 
location of the office and its staffing88 (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 
100, 2016c; Interviewee Nr. 105, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 112, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
130, 2016). The labour wing was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and hence 
directly linked to the PMO. For a long time the committee was led by former TPLF 
fighter Tagay89 Berhani and his deputy Tagay Guosh. While leadership changed, 
control over the labader committee remained in the hands of the TPLF (Interviewee 
Nr. 95, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 100, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). The TPLF’s 
control over the trade unions in Ethiopia, was an indicator for the regime’s ethnic 
politics and showed the importance accorded to the control over trade unions by the 
regime. 
The labader committee oversaw and controlled unions from enterprise level to 
the national confederation. It influenced and policed election processes of trade 
unions, especially at CETU and the nine industrial federations, and controlled trade 
union activities. While trade unionists active in the 1990s stated that the labader 
committee had been involved in killings and torturing of trade unionists, after the 
restructuring of CETU it reverted to threatenining labour leaders (Interviewee Nr. 95, 
2016a; Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016d; Interviewee Nr. 112, 2016). While in theory, the 
MoLSA and BoLSAs were the regulatory bodies of trade unions, in practice the 
labader committee provided instructions regarding oversight over unions 
                                                        
88 Given the labader committee’s unofficial character and its repressive nature, I was told by several 
of my interviewees working at the trade unions that it was not safe to approach them. To avoid 
exposing my contacts and avert raising suspicion by paying an unannounced visit to an officially non-
existent organisation, I tried to use my contacts working for the state to put me in touch. Most 
interviewees either held they had not heard about the committee or told me that this was not relevant 
for my research. Surprisingly, one of my TPLF contacts during one of our meetings suggested he might 
help me in the matter. 
Excerpts of an interview conducted on the 14th of July 2016 (Interviewee Nr. 105, 2016): 
- Can you tell me something about the labour committee? I wanted to talk to them regarding 
the trade unions’ role in the developmental state. 
- You mean the labader? They have their office around Meskel Square. You mean them? 
- Exactly. I thought they would be very relevant to meet for my research. 
- Sure. The deputy prime minister oversees their work. And their chairman is a good friend of 
mine. I know him very well. I will ask him. 
However, the interviewee backtracked on the promise during our next meeting and went as far as 
stating that he did not know of the committee’s existence. 
89 Tagay translates into “fighter” and interviewees used the prefix to underline Ato Berhani’s and Ato 
Guosh’s past as former TPLF fighters. 
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(Interviewee Nr. 95, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 100, 2018). A former trade unionist 
explained: 
“The instruction come directly from the labour committee, not the 
MoLSA. The MoLSA registers those organisations it is told to register 
and denies registration of those that it is told to deny. Having a 
MoLSA is an ILO requirement. No one understands its role. It is in 
fact useless” (Interviewee Nr. 112, 2016). 
The labader committee organised an annual gimgema90 for the executive 
committee members of CETU. This performance evaluation was used to ensure 
discipline and alignment of CETU leaders to EPRDF directives (Interviewee Nr. 79, 
2016a). Given that this tool was developed and owned by the TPLF/EPRDF and 
officially reserved to civil servants and party cadres, its use within CETU testified to 
the degree of penetration of the ruling coalition into the confederation. 
Contrary to women’s and youth associations (EPRDF, 2008c), the EPRDF did not 
officially acknowledge that unions were led by party members and integrated into 
the extended party apparatus. Such control mechanisms of labour unions constituted 
hidden transcripts of the EPRDF. In fact, state officials rejected any allegations of 
control (Interviewee Nr. 93, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 105, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 107, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 118, 2016). Moreover, most CETU leaders and employees 
during interviews emphasized CETU’s independence from the EPRDF government 
and its politics (Interviewee Nr. 31, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 64, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
67, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 73, 2016). One interviewee went as far as stating:  
“All department heads are elected by the general council and 
approved by congress. Me included. You can contact everyone here 
at CETU. We are not the government. We are democratic. 
Everything is open here. We have no secrets” (Interviewee Nr 61, 
2016). 
Infiltration of Trade Unions Through Control Over Election of Union Leaders 
An important tool for controlling trade unions in Ethiopia consisted in the labader 
committee’s influence on the selection process of trade union leaders. At CETU, the 
                                                        
90 For a description of gimgema see page 113. 
 
157 
appropriation of the election process involved three consecutive steps (Interviewee 
Nr. 98, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 99, 2016): 
First, the EPRDF labour committee selected the candidates for the CETU 
executive committee positions, the prerequisites were party membership and loyalty 
to the EPRDF line. Trade unionists claimed: 
“The labour wing from the party determines the election” 
(Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016a). “The government nominates the 
executive committee and the President at CETU” (Interviewee Nr. 
100, 2016a). “Especially in the confederation, elections are 
predetermined. You have to be from the party” (Interviewee Nr. 
101, 2016). “Today all leaders at CETU are members of the EPRDF. 
There is no civil society these days” (Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016). 
Second, state officials from the labader committee, the MoLSA and the BoLSA 
visited basic trade unions and federations to tell them for whom to vote. They 
threatened and pressured union leaders to vote as they were told. Closer to the 
elections, the labader committee called the CETU congress and instructed the 
federations about the vote. The results of the elections were disseminated to CETU 
staff in the morning of the election day, prior to the elections themselves. Trade 
unionists explained:  
“Someone will come to the union office, or your workplace or even 
your home. He will tell you, ‘This person is good. He has good 
connections to the government and can influence. You should vote 
for him’. It’s government representatives who come to us. It’s 
difficult to say no to this. They can block your promotion at work or 
make sure you won’t get any services at government offices” 
(Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). “The federations are called by the 
EPRDF labour committee. They are told whom to vote for. Then all 
federations are called together in the main assembly. The same 
directions are given again” (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a). “The day 
before the congress held its [2015] election, they [the congress 
members] stayed until midnight. In the morning we knew who 
would become head of which department” (Interviewee Nr. 79, 
2016a). 
Third, the elections confirmed the nominations of the labader committee. Direct 
control during the elections was exercised to make sure congress members voted as 
they are told. Trade unionists revealed: 
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“[…] The vote is not anonymous. It’s no secret ballot so they know 
who you vote for. You can’t deviate, they’ll know” (Interviewee Nr. 
79, 2016a: 79). “I was there during the last election. They came over 
and asked us to vote for Kassahun” (Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). 
“We were directly asked to raise our hands for Kassahun” 
(Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016). “The [labader] committee chairman is 
always invited to CETU elections. It is compulsory that he should be 
there” (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a). “Last time it was the lady, not 
the guy” (Interviewee Nr. 79, 2016a). “They are two people. One of 
them is always there” (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016). 
The elections at federation level happened in the same way as the elections at 
confederation level (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016), which 
made sense since the federations constituted the CETU council from which the 
executive committee for the confederation was elected. Representatives from the 
labader committee and the CETU executive committee controlled the nomination 
and election process, and, while there existed anecdotal accounts of federation 
members refusing to obey directions, by and large federation councils voted as 
instructed. Pressure was exercised to ensure that only EPRDF supporters were voted 
into federation councils and the few exceptions of EPRDF-independent trade 
unionists confirmed the rule rather than to question it (Interviewee Nr. 79, 2018; 
Interviewee Nr. 95, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). 
Interviewees claimed that union leaders in public and private enterprises were 
often chosen by the management (Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). As the management 
was linked to the EPRDF, especially in public enterprises, they often ensured party 
affiliation of union leaders. Management controlled “unionisation” happened for 
example at the Dashen bank – one of the private commercial banks in Ethiopia. 
Interviewees shared: 
“At Dashen bank employees started a union. When the 
management heard about this, it transferred the involved 
employees to remote areas. Then the management set up a union” 
(Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). “The management hijacked the 
movement and put in its own puppets” (Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016). 
“What we do here in Ethiopia is we dissolve and then we set up a 
new organisation with ‘fresh and energetic people’” (Interviewee 
Nr. 110, 2016).  
The EPRDF government backed the management of public and private 
enterprises and it was difficult for unions to fight such practices, as courts were 
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biased in favour of the management (Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 130, 
2016). 
None of the control exercised by the labader committee and state organisations 
was publicly visible or reported on, but it explained why trade unions seldom took an 
openly confrontative approach to the EPRDF and the state. 
Repression and Threat as Tools to Prevent Contestation 
The EPRDF government in collaboration with CETU and the management of 
enterprises used a range of tools to discourage trade union leaders from becoming 
independent and giving into workers’ demands. Moreover, workers and aspiring 
leaders were prevented from forming and running independent unions. 
Although almost all trade union leaders from the 1990s reported torture by the 
police or the security apparatus (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016d; Interviewee Nr. 112, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 123, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 127, 
2016), none of the current ones did. However, the current generation of union 
leaders stated that they believed that the EPRDF would use torture if unions became 
too vocal and confrontational (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016b; 
Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). The memories and the threat of torture were an effective 
enough tool to keep union activism at bay. Some union leaders that had pushed too 
strongly for workers’ rights and questioned EPRDF policies, reported that visits by the 
police and short periods of detention on unclear grounds were used to make them 
back down on claims and actions (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016). Threats both to trade 
unionists as well as their families were commonly used to force them to obey 
instructions by the labader committee, the MoLSA or BoLSA and the enterprise 
management (Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
130, 2016). 
Labelling trade union leaders as terrorists and members of unlawful opposition 
groups had been used since the 1990s to proceed with repression both at 
organisational and at individual level. Documentation from international labour 
organisations provided ample examples for this tactic (ICFTU, 1997; International 
Labour Office, 2007, 2009). Even within CETU, executive committee members and 
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representatives from the labader committee used this approach to prevent critical 
voices from emerging within the organisation. An interviewee explained: 
“If you are Oromo they say you are OLF. If you are Amhara they say 
you are Ginbot 7. If you are Tigrayan they say you are TPDM. This is 
unwanted and people keep quiet. You might be in chains in the 
morning” (Interviewee Nr. 51, 2016). 
The important strikes that happened in the 1990s during the constitutive phase 
of the EPRDF regime were met with violence. This left an important institutional 
memory in many unions, keeping them from striking even now (Interviewee Nr. 98, 
2016a; Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). Moreover, the 1993 
labour proclamation interdicted striking to those sectors that had been crucially 
involved in the initial wave of strikes, like the banking sector (Proclamation No. 42, 
1993). Although there was a considerable number of wildcat strikes during the past 
two decades, these actions were precisely characterised by the absence of official 
union leadership approval and authorisation. Moreover, they were concentrated in 
the private sector, as nearly all public enterprises were unionised and unions 
discouraged work stoppage (Interviewee Nr. 79, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 102, 2016). 
Despite the existence of wild cat strikes, most union leaders interviewed were 
persuaded that formal striking was impossible in today’s Ethiopia (Interviewee Nr. 
95, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016a) and an interviewee held that “It’s almost 
impossible to strike today. If they heard anything they will kill you. There is no prison 
anymore, you will be killed directly” (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a). 
Trade Unions and the EPRDF’s Aspiring Developmental State 
The control established over trade unions predated the EPRDF’s adoption of its 
“developmental state programme” and initially it was aimed at managing the unions’ 
opposition to the adoption of SAPs and privatisation in the public sector. In the 
beginning, the EPRDF’s aim was controlling trade unions to prevent opposition to its 
rule. However, with the operationalisation of the developmental state programme, 
the ruling coalition increasingly tried to mobilise trade unions to deal with labour 
issues on behalf of the EPRDF. One of the EPRDF’s senior cadres stated: 
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“With industrialisation this [the relative weakness of labour] will 
change. Labour will become stronger. Labour will start to negotiate. 
We have to prepare for the political activity that will come from 
that. We have seen this in other developmental states” (Interviewee 
Nr. 93, 2016).  
Similar to strategies deployed by the Asian developmental states (Deyo, 1989), 
the EPRDF aimed at using unions to contain claims from workers, rather than 
accommodating them (Deyo, 1987b: 182ff). 
In its quest to achieve rapid industrialisation, and with practices resembling those 
of the Asian developmental states, the EPRDF often ranked workers’ rights, decent 
working conditions and workplace health and safety as secondary, and instead 
focused on creating attractive investment conditions. Alongside a variety of 
favourable tax and credit schemes, the EPRDF used cheap labour costs in Ethiopia to 
attract FDI and to promote local investment (Hauge, 2017: 167). Studies found that 
industrial employment negatively affected workers’ health status, in many cases 
failed to pay living wages and that workers preferred self-employment 
(entrepreneurship) as an alternative to industrial jobs (Blattman and Dercon, 2016; 
Girum et al., 2017). Moreover, Admasie (2018: Chapter 6) found that real wages have 
effectively declined during the EPRDF rule. The precarious working conditions posed 
problems for industrial peace, leading to an increasing number of wildcat strikes, and 
employers faced challenges with respect to retaining their workforce (Admasie, 
2018b). 
To deal with the increasing demands from labour and the emergence of informal 
workers’ organisation, the EPRDF sometimes used CETU and the industrial 
federations to solve industrial conflicts and to unionise workers in EPRDF affiliated 
unions. Although the EPRDF demanded that CETU contained the claims of workers 
when intervening in industrial conflicts on behalf of the ruling coalition, unionisation 
by definition also lay in CETU’s corporate interest. Moreover, CETU used the 
existence of wildcat strikes to advocate for a unionisation campaign and convinced 
the MoLSA about the benefits of unionisation for industrial peace (Interviewee Nr 61, 
2018; Interviewee Nr. 79, 2018). The MoLSA and Addis BoLSA supported CETU in 
unionising workers in private sector enterprises, primarily in Ethiopian ones, in 2015. 
While unions at public sector enterprise still constituted the majority of CETU’s 
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members, the unionisation campaign resulted in a 59.2% increase of unionised 
workers in private sector enterprises (Interviewee Nr. 80, 2016) (see Table 9).
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Table 8: Number of Trade Union Members per Sector and Percentage Growth of Membership per year, 2009-2016 
 
**National level data was only available for 2013 indicating 42,403,879 as the total national employment. 
Source: adapted from Biniyam (2017)
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of union members 320,142 351,846 376,459 391,246 408,018 415,515 450,929 473,626 
Growth of membership in % per year  9.9% 7% 3.93% 4.29% 1.84% 8.52% 5.03% 
 
Union members by sex  
Male 185,849 200,949 223,029 259,148 269,672 274,093 294,948 305,203 
Female 134,293 150,897 153,430 132,098 138,346 141,422 155,981 168,423 
 
Union members by sector  
Public 295,642 325,681 346,146 358,070 369,257 374,575 385,747 398,416 
Private 24,500 26,165 30,313 33,176 38,761 40,940 65,182 75,210 
Growth of public sector unionisation in % 
per year 
 10.16 6.28 3.44 3,12 1.44 2.98 3.28 
Growth of private sector unionization in % 
per year 
 6.8 15.85 9.44 16.83 5.62 59.21 15.38 
 
Total number of urban wage workers** 2,338,650 2,438,402 2,544,615 2,867,785 2,872,884 3,277,085 3,442,585 3,645,896 
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CETU became increasingly wedged between its members and the EPRDF, as 
industrialisation led to growing demands from labour. However, the EPRDF 
demanded full compliance of unions with developmental state policies and criticised 
CETU for being too vocal. The former Prime Minister Hailemariam and his minister of 
industry Ahmed Abtew held that “the premises of organised labour had to be 
redefined” and the mind-set of unions had to change to increase productivity and 
profitability (Tamrat, 2014). Civil servants working on labour issues felt that unions 
remained too confrontational (Interviewee Nr. 122, 2016). An interviewee explained 
for example:  
“Some federations and CETU fuel disputes and don’t solve them. 
They are not pushing for a solution but they take extreme positions 
where you cannot negotiate. CETU and the federations have to 
show more diplomacy. They have to show support and contribution. 
They challenge the management all the time and they seek 
confrontation” (Interviewee Nr. 107, 2016). 
 Although such statements presented an exaggerated picture of union activism 
in Ethiopia, evidence suggested that union leaders were not immune to the pressure 
exercised by workers, nor simply the handmaidens of the EPRDF regime. 
To reduce accountability of union leaders to workers and prevent them from 
giving into workers’ demands, the management often handpicked individuals lacking 
previous experience within the union (Interviewee Nr. 108, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
128, 2016). Indeed, interviews with many BTU leaders revealed the alignment of 
union and management interests. Trade union leaders explained for example: 
“We [the union and the management] have the same objective. We 
want to increase the company’s profit and progress. This also 
benefits the workers” (Interviewee Nr. 108, 2016). “There is no 
difference between the management and the union in terms of our 
goals. We want profit and growth for the company and happy 
employees” (Interviewee Nr. 128, 2016).  
Nevertheless, as union members pushed unions to represent their interests, 
several union leaders eventually responded to at least parts of the demands. 
Consequently, the management regularly replaced union leaders to ensure control 
over them (Interviewee Nr. 53, 2016; Interviewee Nr 61, 2016). 
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Although industrial conflicts grew in number over the past decade, the EPRDF 
disregarded labour concerns and pushed for investment friendly labour regulations. 
The ruling coalition argued, that revisions of the labour proclamation were necessary 
to align the country’s law with its development policies, encourage FDI, increase 
productivity and profitability and prevent industrial conflict. Suggested revisions 
included the extension of probation periods for workers, the possibility of 
terminating without notice workers who arrive late, the increase of notice for 
workers, the cancellation of severance pay, the reduction of annual leave and the 
increase of legal overtime. The MoLSA justified the suggested legal changes referring 
to labour regulations in the Asian developmental states (MoLSA, 2016; Staff 
Reporter, 2017c). 
Taking everyone by surprise, CETU reacted to the latest draft revisions by 
threatening a general strike for the first time since the 1970s (Addis Fortune, 2017; 
Dawit, 2017a, 2017b). It stated that the proposed revisions did not reflect the 
outcomes of the extensive consultation process undertaken, nor did they honour the 
agreements made within the labour advisory board. Moreover, CETU questioned the 
suitability of taking the Asian developmental states as blueprints for Ethiopian 
policies and accused the EPRDF of violating workers’ rights and of breaching 
international labour conventions (CETU, 2017; Dawit, 2017c; Samson, 2017b). Prior 
to this decision, CETU had sent its executive committee members to its regional 
offices and organised consultation meetings with its member unions to seek their 
approval for calling a general strike (Interviewee Nr. 79, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 147, 
2018). The threat was taken seriously and CETU was able to stall the passing of the 
proclamation and forced re-negotiations (Interviewee Nr 61, 2018). This episode 
demonstrated that the EPRDF had miscalculated its ability to control CETU and 
underestimated the pressures unions were receiving from their members and due to 
the increasing number of wildcat strikes (Admasie, 2018b). Interviews at CETU 
suggested that confederation still saw its main role in guaranteeing industrial peace 
and supported EPRDF affiliation among its member unions, all the while opposing the 
changes in the labour proclamation that would negatively affect workers’ rights 
(Interviewee Nr 61, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 98, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). 
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While the content of the proposed revisions provided one piece of explanation 
for CETU’s move, another one was to be found in the regime’s ethnic politics and the 
prevailing political climate. Although the confederation was not organised according 
to the principle of ethnic federalism91 and its representatives held that only interest-
based, not ethnic-based representation could ensure the strength of organised 
labour (Interviewee Nr 61, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 79, 2016b), the overlap between 
EPRDF and union structures suggested that ethnic politics influenced decision-
making. The TPLF’s control over unions was ensured through the labader committee 
and the strategic appointment of TPLF members as executive committee members. 
For example, in the external relations department at CETU, the TPLF controlled the 
federation’s official communication and thereby its discourse. However, according to 
data on union leadership (CETU, 2016), the majority of the executive committee 
members at the confederation and the federations were Amhara (51%), while only 
twenty-one percent were Oromo and fourteen percent were Tigrayan. Fourteen 
percent came from other ethnic groups: Gurage (10%), Kaffa, Kambatta, Gamo and 
Hadiya (1% each). As of March 2018, the CETU executive committee was composed 
of four Amhara, three Oromo, two Tigrayans and one Kambatta, meaning that the 
ANDM and OPDO together were able to outweigh the TPLF members by far. As the 
TPLF hegemony in the EPRDF became increasingly questioned in the 2015/18 political 
crisis, the power of the labader committee diminished. Particularly the OPDO 
members in CETU got involved in the renegotiations of power in the EPRDF, pushing 
for a larger role for labour in the ruling coalition. 
From Co-optation to Contestation – The EPRDF Government and Trade Unions 
The above analysis confirms that trade unions have been strictly controlled by the 
EPRDF from the early 1990s onwards. However, it also shows that the ruling coalition 
                                                        
91 CETUs branch offices were located in Hawassa, Diredawa, Adama, Jimma, Kolbolcha, Bahir Dar, 
Mekelle to represent and cover the country’s most industrialised zones. In many cases branch offices 
covered unions in more than one region. The Jimma office (Oromia) covered unions in Gambella and 
Benishangul, while the Kombolcha office (Amhara) also covered unions in Affar, the Diredawa office 
unions in Oromia and Somali and the Hawassa (SNNP) office unions in Oromia. Trade unions clearly 
differed from other mass based organisation, in the fact that they did not follow the structure of ethnic 
federalism and promoted a pan-Ethiopian organisation of workers. 
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increasingly tried to use unions to deal with labour issues emerging due to the 
country’s industrialisation process rather than simply focusing on repression of 
labour. However, as unions received pressure from their members to represent 
workers’ interests, unions’ loyalty to the EPRDF was not infinite. Hence there was a 
need to disaggregate the patterns of interactions between trade unions, state 
organisations and party structures, to account for the fact that interactions reached 
from co-optation to contestation over various forms of cooperation and coexistence, 
changed over time and depended on the respective interlocutors. 
Co-optation 
Co-optation took different forms, but was expressed through the fact that the EPRDF 
government through the labader committee, the MoLSA and the BoLSAs controlled 
agenda setting at CETU and other unions, ensuring their compliance with 
developmental state policies. The EPRDF used both infrastructural power – its direct 
links to the trade unions – as well as threat of use of despotic power, to demand trade 
unions to carry out activities in the name of the developmental state, that benefited 
public- and private investors rather than workers. 
The participation of trade unions in government affiliated civil society structures 
discredited the unions in the eyes of many people, who felt that unions were a 
handmaiden of the EPRDF, unable to represent the interests of workers. CETU for 
example participated in the Ethiopian civil society coalition that was strategically 
deployed by the EPRDF to provide legitimacy to its rule (Interviewee Nr. 2, 2015a; 
Interviewee Nr 12, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 20, 2015). For example, the coalition was 
mobilised to monitor the federal elections and despite the EPRDF taking every single 
seat in parliament in 2015, the acting CETU president commended the elections as 
100% democratic (Leulseged, 2015; Staff Reporter, 2015). Unions were also part of 
the EPRDF established people’s wing (hzb knf), which grouped civil society 
organisations considered crucial by the EPRDF for the success of its developmental 
state project (EPRDF, 2011a: 9–10). 
Unions played an important role in mobilising funds from their members for 
projects carried out under the EPRDF’s developmental state programme, often at the 
expense of workers and without being able to unionise workers on the projects. For 
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example, regarding the GERD (Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam), workers in public 
enterprises were asked to “contribute two salaries to the dam” (Interviewee Nr. 147, 
2018) and unions were tasked with mobilising their members behind the campaign. 
As contributions were automatically deducted from the salary, workers stated they 
had no choice but to contribute and felt that unions tried to legitimise the actions of 
the EPRDF government rather than representing workers’ interests. BTUs and 
industrial federations also bought bonds to finance the GERD (Interviewee Nr. 95, 
2018; Interviewee Nr. 98, 2018) and according to government media reports, the 
support from CETU and its members was crucial for the project’s success (Mehari, 
2016). Some trade unionists held that unions had to, rather than want to, participate 
in resource mobilisation for the GERD (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 
147, 2018). Moreover, the EPRDF government resisted the attempts of the 
Federation of Construction, Wood, Metal, Cement, to unionise workers on the dam 
and failed to address concerns regarding the working conditions on site (Interviewee 
Nr. 102, 2016). 
The EPRDF government used CETU and the federations to deal with industrial 
conflict on its behalf, unionise the workers in concerned enterprises and negotiate 
an agreement between workers and the management (Interviewee Nr. 107, 2016). 
The MoLSA and BoLSAs asked CETU to unionise unruly workers where conflict had 
broken out. Through assembling workers in EPRDF aligned unions, the EPRDF tried to 
prevent an independent labour movement from emerging and to contain workers’ 
demands to the highest degree possible (Interviewee Nr 61, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
102, 2016). Where large international and national enterprises were concerned, the 
President of CETU often went in person to mediate between the workers and 
employers, even where this involved travel to other regions (Interviewee Nr 61, 2018; 
Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). A well-known example concerned unionisation at Ayka 
Addis, a Turkish textile firm. An interviewee shared: 
“Two years ago there was no union at Ayka Addis. Workers striked 
to get higher salaries. Representatives of the MoLSA and the 
Ministry of Industry came to us and asked us to go with them to 
Ayka and solve the problem” (Interviewee Nr. 53, 2016). 
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 However, there was no guarantee that unions would persist beyond the 
immediate conflict resolution and the MoLSA and BoLSAs did not intervene where 
management illegally fired union leaders and dissolved unions (Interviewee Nr. 102, 
2016). While unionisation lay in CETU’s corporate interest, the fact that it was 
perceived by workers as being ordered by the EPRDF government and failed to 
adequately address workers’ concerns, reduced its legitimacy in the eyes of many 
(Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). 
At international enterprises, the EPRDF only supported unionisation as a means 
to solve industrial conflict, not to pre-empt such incidences (Interviewee Nr. 87, 
2016). Leaders of the confederation and the federations stated that they were 
interdicted to push for unionisation at international enterprises and that 
disobedience would be punished, as the EPRDF feared a reduction in FDI if 
unionisation was to become a requirement. Interviewees explained: 
“In foreign firms there is high resistivity. Indians, Turkey and the 
Chinese run investments, they are not interested in trade unions. 
The government won’t finger at them” (Interviewee Nr. 51, 2016). 
“If we kick them [the international firms], the government kicks us” 
(Interviewee Nr. 53, 2016).  
Further than refraining from organising workers at international enterprises, 
CETU was also accused of preventing unionisation in international enterprises where 
workers organised themselves. A former trade unionist at an international enterprise 
in Addis reported: 
“We had had bad experience before with all stakeholder, CETU, the 
federation and the government. The federation leaked the 
information about union formation to the government once before. 
It was a senior employee who at that time tried to organise the 
workers. They fired him” (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016). 
Many interviewees at the confederation and the federations expressed support 
for the EPRDF’s developmental state policies, stressing the benefits for employment 
creation that an investment friendly climate created (Interviewee Nr. 41, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr 61, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 96, 2016). A federation employee stated:  
“The government wants workers to compromise for technological 
transfer. It sees the bigger picture. Workers just want everything. 
But this is not because the government hates its citizens. The 
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government wants to strike a balance. It wants to attract 
investment and respect the workers’ rights. Investors, local and 
international, are profit oriented and the government understands 
that” (Interviewee Nr. 96, 2016). 
 Rather than expressing support for the workers’ cause, many trade union leaders 
at confederation and federation level blamed workers for being greedy, unwilling to 
work and confrontational. Moreover, CETU staff explained that the workers needed 
to be educated, stating for example: 
“There is an awareness problem of labour union leaders. This 
discourages the management to get the workers organised. They 
establish a union and then without considering the company’s 
capacity they ask for an annual increment and boni” (Interviewee 
Nr. 108, 2016). “We help our workers to be good and productive 
workers. We train them and we advise them and after that the 
workers will be good” (Interviewee Nr. 53, 2016). 
Indications exist that EPRDF members within CETU collected information on 
union members on behalf of the EPRDF (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). For example, 
details on the members’ political affiliation and known political activities were 
assembled and the Addis Rye - the EPRDF’s publication for its members - was 
disseminated within CETU by a senior executive committee member (Interviewee Nr. 
79, 2016a). Moreover, the CETU newspaper was used to disseminate political 
messages to workers, requesting them to contribute to the country’s development. 
The confederation’s internal editing board censored articles written by junior staff 
that were considered too critical (“anti-EPRDF”) (Interviewee Nr. 79, 2016a; 
Interviewee Nr. 147, 2018). 
Cooperation 
Cooperation between trade unions and state organisations emerged where agendas 
between the two overlapped. Given the large influence the EPRDF and different state 
organisations such as the MoLSA had on the agenda of trade unions, cooperation was 
not always easy to distinguish from co-optation. One possible way of distinguishing 
cooperation from co-optation was to see how far trade unions served workers 
interests rather than primarily executing EPRDF orders. 
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The tri-partite labour advisory board is an example of a formal mechanism of co-
operation (Interviewee Nr 61, 2016; Negarit Gazeta, 2004: 10). The board provided a 
forum for CETU to discuss unsolved industrial conflicts with representatives of the 
MoLSA and BoLSAs and the representatives of employers, as well as to provide input 
into labour related legislation (Interviewee Nr. 31, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 67, 2016; 
MoLSA, 2016). In 2016, discussions focused more generally on the new labour law 
and particularly on illegal termination of union leaders, working hours and holidays 
(Interviewee Nr. 41, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 53, 2016; Interviewee Nr 61, 2016). This 
forum allowed CETU to voice concerns of workers and CETU management held that 
they had been able to improve legislation to reflect workers’ interests. For example, 
CETU used the forum to lobby for the obligatory social and health insurance bill 
(Hilina, 2009; Interviewee Nr. 31, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 65, 2016; Neamin, 2015) and 
the amendment of the tax bill, which increased the amount of income exempt from 
taxation to benefit low income earners (Interviewee Nr. 67, 2016; Proclamation No. 
979, 2016). Apart from the tripartite forum, CETU and the Prime Minister established 
a bi-annual forum, which allowed CETU to bring up pressing issues and discuss 
problems encountered regarding labour questions (Interviewee Nr. 51, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr 61, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 63, 2016). While not taking place as 
regularly as initially proposed, the meetings received large media attention and CETU 
used the opportunity to voice concerns publicly about labour issues in Ethiopia 
(Tamrat, 2014). 
Being aware of how industrialisation is usually accompanied by the emergence 
of a labour movement, the EPRDF decided to prepare for this eventuality. One 
strategy was to support a unionisation campaign under CETU in 2015 (Misak, 2016; 
Yosef, 2018), to make sure that it took the form of EPRDF aligned unions. The MoLSA 
and BoLSAs used labour inspection visits to inform employers about the benefits of 
unions, encouraging them to get their workers organised and formalise collective 
bargaining (Interviewee Nr. 67, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 107, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 122, 
2016). Civil servants explained: 
“The regional bureaus support CETU branches in their unionisation 
campaign. If enterprises say no to unionisation, the regional 
bureaus follow up” (Interviewee Nr. 107, 2016). “We tell them (the 
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employers) about the use and advantage of labour unions. We talk 
to enterprises and clear misunderstandings about social dialogue 
and collective bargaining” (Interviewee Nr. 122, 2016).  
While the EPRDF’s intention was to promote EPRDF affiliated unionisation to 
control workers, CETU significantly increased its membership and thereby leverage 
for negotiation in the future (Abiy, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 31, 2015: 31; Interviewee 
Nr 61, 2016; Misak, 2016). 
Although unionisation was usually carried out with the consent of the employers, 
in cases of resistance at Ethiopian private sector enterprises, often CETU and the 
federations still unionised workers. They obtained the registration certificate for the 
BTU from the BoLSAs and sent it to the management to inform it about the process 
(Interviewee Nr. 67, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 96, 2016). Civil servants explained:  
“Sometimes they [the workers] may face resistance from the 
companies. We still give registration to unions” (Interviewee Nr. 
107, 2016). “We don’t ask employers for their agreement as long as 
unions follow the right procedures for unionisation. We certify the 
unions and the certification is also sent to the employers” 
(Interviewee Nr. 122, 2016).  
Despite providing certification against the employers interests, the MoLSA and 
BoLSAs did not provide support when unions were forcefully dissolved by the 
management. Moreover, there existed evidence that in a few cases they stalled 
registration procedures or denied registration for reasons that were not clear 
(Interviewee Nr. 96, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 102, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). 
The unions received also technical support from government bodies. The BoLSAs 
for example provided trainings to unions (Interviewee Nr. 122, 2016) and the MoLSA 
offered advice on legal questions, such as drafting of model bylaws for unions to 
facilitate their set-up (Interviewee Nr. 107, 2016). CETU also engaged in technical 
collaborations with government offices and its gender department for example 
jointly carried out consultations among female workers with the Ministry for Women, 
Children and Youth Affairs (MoWCYA). As part of this cooperation CETU was allocated 





The control exercised by the labader committee, the MoLSA and the BoLSAs forced 
unions to operate within the EPRDF set parameters and rendered coexistence nearly 
impossible. However, some union leaders tried to keep their independence by 
subverting power structures, disobeying orders without publicly contesting EPRDF 
directives and policies. I only met one basic trade union that managed to adopt co-
existence as a survival strategy for an extended period of time, thanks to the capacity 
of its leaders and its historical role in the Ethiopian labour movement. 
Despite several attempts to co-opt the labour union in question the council of 
the union did not give in to the pressure from management and high EPRDF officials. 
Trade unionists explained that the majority council members did not vote for party 
members: 
“From the very beginning the sons of our employees were the same. 
Of course some come from the TPLF and the EPRDF, they are also 
there. Our employees don’t elect them. They identify them through 
the name and through their behaviour. No one nominates them or 
votes for them. This is a true labour union. It’s not for the 
government” (Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a). “The union is strong 
because of its history and the culture in the company. In Addis 
Ababa people elect rationally [no EPRDF members]. In the council, 
the representatives from Addis dominate92” (Interviewee Nr. 101, 
2016). “The [union] council has the upper hand when it comes to 
election. The management pushes to elect these people [EPRDF 
members]. But the council members know who is who and they 
don’t give them any chances” (Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016a). “Our 
employees are strong and educated. They don’t vote for party 
members” (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016b). 
In 2013, the union in question got into conflict with the company’s management 
over a disagreement about working hours in the new collective agreement 
(Interviewee Nr. 113, 2016). The union refused to sign the collective agreement, 
stating that the management’s demands to increase working hours without 
compensation were against the law. The union did not go to court, fearing that the 
                                                        
92 The union in question was a white collar union. As described in chapter four, the EPRDF had less 
political support in urban areas, due to the fact that it excluded the urban elites and middle class from 




EPRDF cadres in the enterprise management would manipulate the court ruling to 
the company’s advantage. A public media campaign or striking were also excluded as 
viable solutions, because of the expected repression such actions would trigger 
(Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; 
Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). Although the union and the management met on a 
regular basis to discuss the new collective agreement, a form of co-existence without 
agreement marked these occasions (Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 101, 
2016). The enterprise management considered bringing the case to the tri-partite 
meetings, to expedite an agreement, stating:  
“We have been negotiating the last collective agreement for two 
years. This time it’s the first time it has taken such a long time. There 
were extraordinary demands from the union and some major 
changes. We try to manage within ourselves. But if this isn’t 
possible we will have a tri-partite mediation with the MoLSA” 
(Interviewee Nr. 114, 2016).  
In the end, the union and the management agreed on re-signing the old collective 
agreement due to the inability to find a compromise (Interviewee Nr. 98, 2018). 
Representatives from the basic trade union in question that worked at federation 
level were perceived as more vocal than other union leaders and a CETU employee 
noted:  
“You can see that in their interventions in the council meetings. 
When they speak, they speak their mind freely” (Interviewee Nr. 79, 
2016a).  
However, the union representatives felt: 
“Today we cannot differ from other federations. We try to give our 
opinion freely but we are dominated by the others. We cannot do 
nothing. We are sitting here as a symbol. But CETU and the other 
unions know that we are independent” (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016a).  
Coexistence did not increase the union’s ability to influence decision-making at 
confederation level, as its resistance to EPRDF infiltration led to it being frozen out 
(Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 100, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016). 
Moreover, the labader committee and CETU repeatedly tried to influence elections 
at enterprise and federation level to ensure that party members were elected into 
executive committee positions. Although they often failed to achieve their goal, in 
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2017 a union leader from the BTU in question traded party support for federation 
presidency (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 98, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 100, 
2018), indicating that the strategy of coexistence could be undermined. 
Resisting pressure without publicly questioning EPRDF directions was in a few 
cases used by trade union leaders to subvert power structures. Some trade union 
leaders for example left the CETU election in 2015, after being asked during the 
election to vote for Kassahun Follo as president (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016). Union 
representatives reported that “Then they [CETU employees] came over and asked us 
to vote for Kassahun. Not one of us voted. We all left the elections” (Interviewee Nr. 
101, 2016). While voting against the instruction was not perceived as a viable 
strategy, leaving the election before the vote was a way to avoid the EPRDF 
directives. Moreover, one of the industrial federations blocked the admission of a 
union set up collectively by the management and a BoLSA at a private company 
(Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 98, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016). A 
trade unionist explained:  
“The federation rejected the union because of the transfer of the 
executive members to the countryside. There was no independence. 
The federation was worried about the impact on other 
management if we would have allowed the union in” (Interviewee 
Nr. 101, 2016). 
Contestation 
Contestation in the case of trade unions was often limited to verbal criticism and was 
delivered in person and behind closed doors rather than in public. However, 
organised and unorganised labour became increasingly vocal in 2017/18. A major 
point of conflict revolved around the operationalisation of the EPRDF’s development 
programme and the negative impact of industrialisation on workers. While 
supporting the EPRDF’s push for industrialisation, labour leaders held that the EPRDF 
favoured employers over employees with detrimental effects for workers’ wellbeing. 
CETU publicly criticised the EPRDF government for failing to prioritise the respect of 
workers’ rights, which was picked up by broadcast and print media. 
A major point of disagreement revolved around the EPRDF’s approach to FDI. 
Union leaders stated in interviews that the EPRDF government failed to force 
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international investors to abide by the Ethiopian labour law and denounced the fact 
that state organisations forbade unions to organise workers at international 
enterprises (Interviewee Nr. 41, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 51, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 53, 
2016). A federation employee explained: 
“The government likes the Chinese. The Chinese bring money. So, 
we cannot organise workers in Chinese companies. The Ethiopian 
road authority gives projects to foreign companies. The companies 
sign a contract to respect the constitution and the law. And then 
they don’t. They are autonomous the government tells us” 
(Interviewee Nr. 102, 2016). 
Another critique addressed to the EPRDF government concerned its failure to 
intervene in the firing and harassment of labour leaders by the management (Giorgis, 
2014; Interviewee Nr. 41, 2016; Interviewee Nr 61, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 102, 2016). 
Rather than protecting union leaders from illegal contract termination, the EPRDF 
proposed changes to the labour proclamation which would allow companies to 
compensate financially illegally terminated union leaders rather than re-employing 
them (CETU, 2017; Interviewee Nr 61, 2018). CETU and federation employees 
claimed: 
“Illegal firing and transfer of BTU leaders is another problem” 
(Interviewee Nr. 97, 2016). “There are problems such as illegal 
contract termination even in government enterprises. It is a 
paradox that the government who makes the rules doesn’t want to 
adhere to them” (Interviewee Nr. 51, 2016). 
The question of the unionisation of the civil service marked a visible 
disagreement between CETU and the EPRDF, and CETU had implicated the ILO in this 
matter to increase the pressure on the government. CETU employees explained the 
following:  
“Government enterprises are well organised but the public sector is 
not. We pledged to the government to amend the local law to be 
able to unionise public servants. The government answers always 
‘after I finish the civil service reform’. The government tells us ‘the 
idea is a good idea but I am not ready now. I have to change the 
attitude of the civil servants first’. I think it’s the fear of strike which 
puts them off” (Interviewee Nr. 67, 2016). “According to the labour 
law workers have the right to unionise except for civil servants. At 
the moment, it’s on the ILO table. Two years ago, we asked the 
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government why and said that according to the constitution it was 
a right. The government said that according to the constitution yes, 
but not to the labour law” (Interviewee Nr 61, 2016). 
Although attempts at independent unionisation in Ethiopia were usually quickly 
co-opted and hence seldom became known to a larger public, in a few cases labour 
leaders continued fighting for trade union rights despite attempted intimidation. The 
case of the workers at the Sheraton Hotel in Addis Ababa got pushed to the IUF 
(International Union of Food, Agriculture, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and 
Allied Workers’ Associations) in 2016, necessitating an intervention of the US 
National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (USNCP, 
2016). The union needed two attempts to set up, as the first union was dissolved and 
leaders let go. The second attempt at unionisation was made completely clandestine 
and in the wake of the 2010 national elections. CETU was informed only when the 
executive committee of the BTU was already elected. Despite official registration of 
the union, the management failed to engage in collective bargaining, pushing the 
union leaders to go to court. While being made redundant for this move, the union 
leaders went as far as the federal court level to fight their case, contesting the 
decisions of two lower courts that had ruled in favour of the management. The IUF 
lobbied internationally93, which put pressure on the EPRDF government and the 
Sheraton’s management. Although the settlement which was reached in the end did 
not lead to the reinstatement of the trade unionists, some continued fighting their 
case as a union in exile together with the IUF (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2016). The IUF 
pressured CETU to support the unions case, however the confederation remained 
reluctant (Interviewee Nr 61, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). 
Over the course of my research both unorganised and organised labour became 
more vocal. Wildcat strikes accompanied the political protests, making “for the 
greatest wave of labour unrest in Ethiopia since the mid-1970s” (Admasie, 2018b: 
432). Both Ethiopian private and public sector enterprises were affected, as were 
international companies, such as the Dutch owned Sher Ethiopia horticulture farm, 
the French owned Castell winery and companies at the Bole Lemi Industrial Park 
                                                        
93 http://www.iuf.org/w/?q=node/3992 (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
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(Admasie, 2018b: 431f). Increasingly, wildcat strikes also concerned unionised 
enterprises and although trade unions did not officially call the strikes, they 
expressed support to the workers and negotiated with the employers on behalf of 
the workers. For example, workers of the light railway in Addis Ababa (Yonas, 2018) 
and workers of the Ethiopian Aviation Authority (Etenesh, 2018) called strikes, 
blocking traffic in the capital and at Bole International Airport, until agreements could 
be reached with the respective management. The increasing number of wildcat 
strikes put pressure on CETU, as workers denounced the unacceptable working 
conditions and salaries in Ethiopia. CETU reacted to the latest draft revisions of the 
labour proclamation threatening a general strike (Addis Fortune, 2017; Dawit, 2017a, 
2017b) and CETU’s executive committee members also vocally advocated for 
example for minimum salaries and unionisation in industrial parks (Addis Fortune, 
2018; Birhanu, 2018). 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the EPRDF government established an elaborate system of 
control over trade unions already in the 1990s, to prevent them from adopting an 
independent agenda. However, the analysis also demonstrated that the EPRDF’s 
approach to trade unions shifted as a result of the ruling coalition’s attempt to pursue 
the developmental state model. Instead of solely focusing on control, the EPRDF tried 
to selectively use trade unions to deal with labour issues emerging as part of the 
country’s recent industrialisation process and to prevent an independent labour 
movement from emerging. 
The majority of interactions between trade unions and state organisations fell 
into the categories co-optation and cooperation, as the EPRDF had established a high 
level of control over trade unions and their agenda. While interactions testifying to 
co-optation often negatively affected workers and decreased the legitimacy of trade 
unions in the eyes of their members, cooperation yielded mutual benefits. Few 
interactions testified to coexistence, as the direct oversight exercised by the EPRDF 
over trade unions forced the latter to operate within the parameters set by the ruling 
coalition. However, subversion of power structures and secret disobedience were 
used in a few cases to create distance to the state and operate in parallel. 
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Contestation for a long time took the form of verbal and written contestation of 
EPRDF policies negatively affecting labour. While public contestation was often 
refrained from to avoid repression, trade unionists used their direct connections to 
state and party structures to negotiate on behalf of labour. Negotiations often took 
place behind closed doors rather in public forums, concealing a lot of the existing 
conflict and bargaining between trade unionists and state officials. Moreover, as 
much of the control exercised by the EPRDF over trade unions was also hidden from 
the public eye, the focus on formal interactions often provided a misleading picture 
regarding state - trade union relations. 
While trade unions, especially the confederation and the federations, in many 
cases legitimised the EPRDF regime and mobilised workers to support the ruling 
coalition’s development programme, their loyalty was neither infinite nor 
unconditional. With growing industrialisation, employees increasingly posed 
demands for better working conditions, leading to a multiplication of wildcat strikes 
both in enterprises with and without unions. High unemployment rates, especially 
among the youth, and decreasing real wages fuelled contention among workers and 
put pressure on unions to address workers’ grievances (Admasie, 2018b; Interviewee 
Nr. 88, 2016). The EPRDF ignored the growing pressure on trade unions and 
continued promoting investment at the expense of workers, which eventually led 
unions to oppose the EPRDF’s attempt to formally align the labour proclamation with 
its developmental state programme (CETU, 2017). Coinciding with the political crisis 
and the growing conflict within the ruling coalition, some executive committee 
members in CETU from OPDO and ANDM opposed directions given by the TPLF led 
labader committee. Although the confederation and the federations continued to 
check labour on behalf of the EPRDF, they also used their growing membership to 
assert their power, indicating a potential shift in the patterns of interactions. 
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Chapter 6: Chambers of Commerce and State-Led Development 
in Ethiopia – From Contestation to Political Alignment? 
Addis Ababa, 5th and 6th of October 2016 (Meskerem 25 and 26 2009) 
I went to the Prime Minister’s First International Agro-Industry Investment Forum held 
at the UNECA compound. No one talked about the ongoing protests; instead 
participants praised the EPRDF’s achievements with respect to promoting business 
and development. On the second day of the forum, the organisers brought us to the 
Eastern Industrial Zone, the country’s first industrial park. The fact that we went in a 
convoy protected by the federal police and the presence of armed security at the park 
betrayed information about the actual political situation in the country. However, the 
Chinese owner of the park who greeted us reiterated that the investment conditions 
in Ethiopia were outstanding and glorified political stability. Walking around the park, 
I met Tesfaye94, employee at a regional chamber of commerce, but who, according to 
his name badge, participated in the forum on behalf of the Ministry of Trade. He told 
me he worked at the chamber and the ministry. 
The Addis Chamber held its annual meeting in parallel to the Prime Minister’s 
forum, some 300 meters from the UNECA compound. Everyone was surprised by how 
many members came and they had to open a second room to accomodate everyone. 
People were queuing outside of the building to get in. Several thousand members 
attended and all people wanted to talk about, were the protests. The meeting took 
several hours. I learned that a lot of businesses had been destroyed, including attacks 
on banks and ATMs. People were talking about big financial losses and the problems 
they encountered due to the general internet shutdown. The outgoing chamber 
president didn’t seem to know how to react. He didn’t respond to the members’ 
demands for more active chamber involvement to solve the political crisis; instead he 
advocated for cooperation and against creating conflict with the government. 
The general secretary of the Ethiopian chamber gave a talk at the Prime 
Minister’s forum, but his English was incomprehensible. The representative of the 
                                                        
94 The name was changed to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality. 
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business association formally mandated to represent the Ethiopian private sector 
lacked the language skills to promote the association’s members in front of 
international investors. The sectoral associations attended the forum as well, 
exhibiting their products in the main hall. I didn’t meet anyone from the Addis 
Chamber at the forum and when I asked people at the chambers’ annual meeting, no 
one I talked to was informed about the event at the UNECA. Going back and forth 
between the meetings, the picture of who stood where became clearer and clearer. 
* * * 
Introduction 
“Chambers were an exception in terms of independence and people 
looked towards them for inspiration. Now in the chamber 
leadership, there are party affiliates. The Addis Chamber is not in 
the opposition and not in the camp. But it is docile. They have to 
watch what they are doing” (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a). 
This chapter studies the relationships between state organisations and chambers of 
commerce in Ethiopia under the EPRDF’s developmental state model and explores 
how the existing economic and political framework structured their interactions. In 
the first part of the chapter, I provide a brief historical overview of the development 
of the chamber system in Ethiopia, to contextualise the analysis. The second part of 
the chapter explores how organisations in the state and organisations in the 
chambers system relate to each other and identifies the mechanisms used by 
different public offices to establish and maintain control over the chambers. Lastly, I 
analyse the patterns of interaction between state representatives and 
representatives of the chambers system at the timing of my fieldwork. 
During the formative period of the EPRDF regime, the chambers of commerce in 
Ethiopia commanded “[…] respect and projected considerable influence in the 
economic and political life of the country. […] chambers in Ethiopia were seen as 
formidable members of the civil society and a strong lobbying group for the private 
sector” (Asrat, 2016). The chambers became increasingly active during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, questioning the EPRDF’s state-led development agenda and pushing 
for democratisation. After failed attempts to realign the chambers with the EPRDF’s 
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agenda, the government forcefully restructured the chamber system in 2003. Since 
then, chambers of commerce in Ethiopia have largely been perceived as co-opted 
and integrated into state structures (Interviewee Nr. 17, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 77, 
2016). 
Although very little academic work referred to the chamber system in Ethiopia, 
scholars confirmed the hypothesis of weak and co-opted chambers (Altenburg, 2010: 
14; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011: 23; Weis, 2016: 261f). According to Altenburg, 
“the Chamber is mainly seen as an instrument to disseminate government policies 
and mobilise support for them, rather than a politically neutral representation of 
business interests” (Altenburg, 2010: 8). While co-optation has been assumed, little 
is known about the process of establishing and sustaining state control over the 
chambers and about the EPRDF’s rationale behind this move. Moreover, virtually no 
one has looked into state - chamber relations to analyse the chambers’ ability and 
willingness to represent the interest of the private sector vis-à-vis the Ethiopian state. 
This chapter aims at filling this gap and explores the relationship and patterns of 
interaction between the EPRDF government and chambers of commerce in Ethiopia 
since 1991. While evidence presented in this chapter confirms that the restructuring 
of the chamber system in 2003 was used to curb the power of the chambers of 
commerce, it also shows that the EPRDF tried to mobilise the chambers as part of its 
state-led economic development project. The EPRDF’s inability to enforce its political 
decisions among the business community in a coherent manner meant it failed, 
especially with the urban business elite which was devoted to liberal economic and 
political values as opposed to the ruling coalition’s state-led development agenda. 
While the threat of the use of despotic power prevented independent chamber 
activism, the EPRDF was unable consistently to mobilise the urban business elite 
behind the developmental state project. Although the EPRDF created state-affiliated 
chamber organisations, many of those new and loyal entities lacked capacity, 
foreclosing the possibility of making them effective participants in the EPRDF’s 
developmental state project. 
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A Brief History of Chambers of Commerce in Ethiopia: 1947 - 2003 
Business associations - like chambers of commerce, employers’ federations and other 
business membership organisations - are civil society organisations representing the 
interests of actors in the private sector. The emergence of business associations 
worldwide was linked to the global development of markets and in many countries 
these associations were part of the first modern civil society organisations (Chen, 
2011: 1; Glass and Kark, 2018: 270f). While the main role of business associations has 
been to protect the interests of their members, they have, in several cases, played 
important roles in political transition processes, using their economic weight to 
mobilise resources and exert political pressure (Kim, 1993; McMenamin, 2002; 
Mikamo, 2013; Rhee, 2002). 
In Ethiopia, Chambers of Commerce were among the first modern civil society 
organisations that emerged in the 1940s, alongside professional associations and 
trade unions (Clark, 2000: 4; Dessalegn, 2002: 101f). The first chamber, the Chamber 
of Commerce of Addis Ababa, was given legal personality through the promulgation 
of the General Notice 90/47. The law stipulated the functions of the chamber, as well 
as its administrative structure (General Notice 90, 1947: Art. 4 & 7). While the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry was granted an oversight function to ensure the 
chamber’s adherence to the law, the general notice granted the chamber the right to 
provide input into regulations affecting commercial practices, and to suggest political 
measures to promote commerce (General Notice 90, 1947: Art. 13 &14). The law 
established a tax on business permits in favour of the chamber (General Notice 90, 
1947: Art. 16) and the money from the tax was later used to construct the chamber’s 
headquarters (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
94, 2016). 
In line with the rights outlined in the General Notice 90 (1947: Art. 14b), the Addis 
Chamber progressively opened branch offices in other urban areas, to expand its 
services to the business community nationwide95. While representing the business 
                                                        
95 Given its national mandate, the Addis Chamber changed its name to Ethiopian chamber during the 
1960s, however this change was never officially recorded and both names were used interchangeably, 
even in its own publications (Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1965; Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1966b; Ethiopian 
Trade Journal, 1967c; Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1968a). 
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community in Addis Ababa, the Addis Chamber also functioned as an apex 
organisation, coordinating the work of other city chambers. It provided diverse 
services to its members, e.g. support in dealing with government agencies, issuing 
certificates of origin and of inspection, holding business luncheons, organising 
trainings, as well as providing arbitration services (Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1966a: 
9ff; Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1967a: 9ff; Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1969: 7ff). The 
chamber also received international business delegations and organised and 
participated in international trade fairs (Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1967b: 9ff; 
Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1968b: 7ff). 
During the reign of Haile Selassie, cooperation with the private sector was 
promoted (Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1969: 24; Taffara, 2006: 242) and the growing 
business class was closely connected to Imperial circles (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 
2011: 17). The relationship between the chambers and the Imperial government 
remained mostly cordial and high public officials regularly joined the chamber’s 
events (Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1965: 10; Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1968a: 8f; 
Minutes of the Annual General Meeting, 1974; Taffara, 2006: 242f). While being close 
to the emperor, chambers lobbied for improvements of the investment climate and 
the existing legal and fiscal framework (Ethiopian Trade Journal, 1970: 7ff; Minutes 
of the Annual General Meeting, February 17, 1972). 
Figure 5: Cover and First Page, Ethiopian Trade Journal Vol. IV No. 2 January 1966 






After the toppling of Selassie, the Derg restructured the chamber system in 1978, 
to align it to socialist central planning policies (Proclamation No. 148, 1978). The 
office building and the exhibition centre of the former Addis Chamber were 
confiscated. The relationship between the business community and the Derg regime 
was tense, business people were portrayed as counter-revolutionaries and many 
endured defamation, physical violence and even death (‘Addis Business Vol X. No 1’, 
2007: 3f; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011: 18). 
The chamber proclamation from 1978 established the Ethiopian Chamber of 
Commerce, which, in cooperation with the Minister of Commerce and Tourism, set 
up municipal chambers in other urban centres (‘Nigdina Limat No. 53’, 1988; 
Proclamation No. 148, 1978: Art. 5 & 6). The operation of the Ethiopian chamber was 
overseen by the Minister of Commerce and Tourism, who had representatives in the 
chamber’s council and on the board (Private Sector Development Hub, 2013: 15ff; 
Proclamation No. 148, 1978: Art. 8-11, 18). Government subsidies were granted to 
the Ethiopian chamber for its operation (Proclamation No. 148, 1978: Art. 25). 
Progressively, thanks to the establishment of mandatory membership, the Derg-
controlled chambers ensured the alignment of the business community to the 
economic policy of the regime (‘Nigdina Limat No. 61’, 1989: 8; ‘Nigdina Limat No. 
65’, 1989: 5–18; Proclamation No. 148, 1978). The politburo even used the chambers 
to mobilise resources from the business community for the Revolutionary Army that 
fought the rebel movements during the late 1980s (‘Nigdina Limat No. 53’, 1988: 8; 
‘Nigdina Limat No. 55’, 1988: 8). 
The Addis Chamber lost most of its former influence to the newly established 
Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce (Yusuf et al., 2009: 52f). In the early Derg period, it 
tried to keep its independence through adapting to the Derg’s private sector policies. 
Although the Addis Chamber focused on the few areas reserved for the private sector 
in the Derg’s development plans, its proactive work quickly created suspicion among 
government officials leading to accusations of counter revolutionary activity (Taffara, 
2006: 457f). Over the course of the Derg rule, the Addis Chamber became 
progressively integrated into the state structures and the Nigdina Limat, the Addis 
Chamber’s official newspaper, helped to disseminate messages about the regime’s 
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political and economic success (‘Nigdina Limat’, 1990; ‘Nigdina Limat’, 1991; ‘Nigdina 
Limat No. 59’, 1989; ‘Nigdina Limat No. 54’, 1988). 
Figure 6: Excerpts from Nigdina Limat November 1988 (left) and Nigdina Limat June 1988 (right) 
Source: Archive Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce 
Despite the oppression during the Derg era, the business community was quick 
to reorganise after the EPRDF’s victory over the Derg in 1991. Many businessmen felt 
excluded from the EPRDF regime, that, contrary to prior political settlements based 
on urban elites and central rule led by ethnic Amhara (see Chapter 4), promoted a 
political settlement based on rural elites and ethnic-federalism (Vaughan, 2011: 
631f). Moreover, the business community questioned the EPRDF’s state-led 
development agenda, that contradicted its desire for economic liberalisation. 
Through the chamber system, old economic elites and the growing business class that 
benefitted from the relative economic liberalisation in the post-Derg era, expressed 
their interests both in terms of the country’s economic and political organisation. 
Businessmen working in the service sector and on import/export made up the 
majority of the chambers’ members and thanks to their highly-educated leaders and 
financial capital, chambers became powerful interest organisations. 
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The Addis Chamber regained its role as prime representative organ of the private 
sector and its presidents often simultaneously headed the Ethiopian Chamber, the 
apex organ representing the country’s different municipal chambers. During the 
transition period, the chambers of commerce tried to influence the reorganisation of 
the country’s administrative and political structure (‘Nigdina Limat’, 1993a: 7; 
‘Nigdina Limat’, 1994a: 6–8; ‘Nigdina Limat’, 1994b: 6ff). They arranged seminars and 
workshops to discuss and provide feedback on the policies proposed by the 
transitional government that affected the private sector (‘Nigdina Limat’, 1992a: 7; 
‘Nigdina Limat’, 1992b: 8; ‘Nigdina Limat’, 1993b: 8f; ‘Nigdina Limat’, 1993c: 6f). 
Moreover, chambers also discussed national politics beyond immediate private 
sector interests, for example famine relief (‘Nigdina Limat’, 1994c: 7f), media and 
freedom of expression (‘Nigdina Limat Vol. XVII No. 5’, 1996: 12), corruption in public 
offices (‘Addis Business Vol. 1 No. 1’, 1997: 4) and the Ethio-Eritrean war in 1998 
(‘Addis Business Vol. 1 No. 5’, 1998: 1). Given the relative resistance of the EPRDF 
government to take into account the chambers’ inputs, the Addis Chamber arranged 
work stoppage and peaceful demonstrations to exert pressure (‘Nigdina Limat Vol 
XVII No. 8’, 1996: 12; Young, 1996: 538). 
 
Figure 7: Excerpts from Nigdina Limat December 1996 (left) and March 19997 (right) 
Source: Archive Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce 
The 1990s were described by several interviewees as the “honeymoon period” 
of the private sector (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016). Although 
few of the chambers’ attempts to influence politics led to actual changes, they were 
relatively free in their activism. This changed when the private sector in Ethiopia 
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stood behind the more liberal opposition parties during the 2000 and 2005 elections 
(Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011: 20 & 51). The EPRDF government increasingly 
suspected the chambers of conspiring with political opposition parties (Interviewee 
Nr. 62, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 120, 2016). Around the 2000 national elections, the 
Addis Chamber organised a campaign called “Addis vote”, telling the business 
community that their vote “can and will make a difference”, urging people to “vote 
or forget liberty”. Despite the non-partisan character of the campaign, rumours 
spread about the then Addis Chamber president running for office (‘Addis Business 
Vol. 2 No. 12’, 1999: 1f; ‘Addis Business Vol. 3 No. 2’, 2000: 2; ‘Addis Business Vol. 3 
No. 11’, 2000: 9). The Addis chamber organised platforms for candidates from 
different parties to discuss business issues, held discussion forums for business 
people on the election and published numerous articles on the election (‘Addis 
Business Vol. 2 No. 11’, 1999; ‘Addis Business Vol. 3 No. 1’, 2000: 2; ‘Addis Business 
Vol. 3 No. 4’, 2000: 1f). While focusing on private sector issues, the chambers’ 
increasing political activism led to confrontation with state organisations. 
 
Figure 8: Excerpts from Addis Business January (left) and April 2000 (right) 
Source: Archive Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce 
Realigning the Chambers to the EPRDF’s Developmental Agenda 
The antipathy that the EPRDF government showed towards the chambers of 
commerce had historical roots - the EPRDF mistrusted the chambers due to their 
engagement in national politics beyond private sector development (Interviewee Nr. 
62, 2016b) – as well as ideological roots. Ideologically, the development trajectory 
chosen by the EPRDF contradicted free market principles and unregulated private 
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sector development that the chambers were striving for (Meles, 2011). Moreover, 
the chambers primarily represented businessmen in trade and services, while the 
EPRDF aimed at supporting manufacturing for industrialisation. 
Following the example of the Asian Tigers (Meles, 2006), the EPRDF established 
control over the private sector to re-orientate it towards industry rather than trade 
and services. However, studies found that the EPRDF often failed to enable and guide 
the private sector to mobilise it effectively behind the developmental state 
operation. Instead of promoting Ethiopian private sector development, the EPRDF 
built its development operations on state owned enterprises, party endowment 
funds and party-affiliated businesses, as well as the attraction of foreign direct 
investment (Clapham, 2018: 1158f; Lefort, 2013; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011). 
The close connection between politics and business led to the perception that 
party loyalty and ethnic origin were key determinants for people’s ability to set up 
and operate businesses. This in turn led to frustration among large parts of the 
country’s urban economic elites that did not identify with the regime and felt left out 
(Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016). The chambers, as 
representatives of the urban economic elites in general and of those in commerce 
and trade particularly, became targets of the EPRDF regime and were restructured to 
align them with the ruling coalition’s economic and political priorities and prevent 
them from contesting the regime. 
Proclamation No. 341/2003: Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association 
Establishment Proclamation 
Given the chambers’ increasing activism in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EPRDF 
government tried to silence them through intervening in the chambers’ internal 
affairs. An attempt that became publicly known was the initiative in 1998/99 to get 
rid of the president of the Addis and the Ethiopian chambers of commerce at the time 
(‘Addis Business Vol. 1 No. 6’, 1998: 2). First, Kebur Ghenna, the chamber president 
in office was removed from the presidency of the Ethiopian Chamber under 
unsubstantiated allegations of corruption (Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 121, 2016; Staff Reporter, 1999). Then the EPRDF tried to influence the Addis 
Chamber elections through party affiliates in the chamber council, who proposed 
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alternative candidates for the board and the presidency. Although the outgoing 
president did not want to run for office again, given the conflicts with different public 
offices during his first term, he was elected by a large majority (‘Addis Business Vol. 
2 No. 4’, 1999: 11; Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016). An interviewee who had participated 
in the 1999 Addis chamber election explained:  
“The government didn’t want him [Kebur Ghenna], they wanted to 
put their own people. He changed and innovated the chamber and 
they didn’t like it. The self-initiated committee that was set up and 
contained government supporters, we stopped them. The house 
was to burn. We voted our people, took them and went” 
(Interviewee Nr. 121, 2016). 
Newspapers praised the elections as democratic, lauding the chamber leaders as 
exemplary (‘Addis Business Vol. 2 No. 4’, 1999: 11; Yemisrach, 1999). The 
government’s attempt to influence the outcome of the chamber elections was futile 
and reflected badly on it, as details of the failed coup became publicly known. 
Moreover, Kebur Ghenna’s successor, Berhane Mewa, was even more outspoken, 
pushing the EPRDF to listen to the chambers and their members. Given its inability to 
take control over the chambers through infiltration, the EPRDF government finally 
imprisoned and then exiled Berhane Mewa in 2003 (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016b; 
Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016), and passed the proclamation 
341/2003 to restructure the chamber system from the ground-up. 
Concerning this proclamation, it is important to note that the chambers had 
lobbied for a new legal framework since 1992. Although the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry started an official drafting process for the new chamber law in 1992, it took 
eleven years for the law to materialise (‘Nigdina Limat’, 1992c: 7; Proclamation No. 
341, 2003). In the meantime, the chambers operated in a legal vacuum, as the Derg 
Proclamation had been invalidated by the country’s new constitution (ECCSA, 2014; 
Interviewee Nr. 103, 2016; Private Sector Development Hub, 2013: 17). The 
chambers prepared drafts for a new chamber law, trying to expedite and influence 
the process (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016a; ‘Nigdina Limat’, 1994a: 6), but they did not 




Despite the eleven years of consultative drafting, the final chamber proclamation 
did not take into account the position of the chambers. The chambers worked closely 
with the state ministers96 and technical personnel in the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to influence the drafting process, however the final decision on the 2003 
proclamation was taken by the council of ministers. The Minister of Trade and 
Industry at that time, was one of the architects of the law (Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016b; 
Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a), and together with the council of Ministers he took the 
decision to align the chambers to the system of ethnic federalism and to introduce 
sectoral associations representing the manufacturing sector to reflect developmental 
state priorities97. The fact that the draft was altered by the council of ministers 
suggests that broader political concerns, not only technocratic deliberations, 
influenced the outcome of the drafting process (Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 132, 2017). An interviewee at the chambers shared:  
“The draft proclamation was totally different. It was a brilliant 
document. The chambers worked with some technical people at the 
ministry. They submitted the draft to the council of ministers. But 
the government enacted its own proclamation. The mischief was 
done at the council of ministers” 98 (Interviewee Nr. 151, 2018). 
The official justification provided by state officials for passing the proclamation 
341/2003 was technical: aligning the chambers with the new administrative 
structures of ethnic federalism and making it reflect the importance given to the 
manufacturing sector within the developmental state project. Politicians and public 
servants explained: 
“The chambers’ structural administration should follow the new 
structure. Regions should have regional chambers and sectoral 
associations. So we needed a new chamber proclamation” 
(Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016a). “Before it was only the chambers. Why 
did we insert the sectoral associations? The chamber only focused 
on trade. Since the direction in Ethiopia is the developmental state 
                                                        
96 Each Ministry is headed by a minister who has state ministers working under him, responsible for 
the technical management of the ministry (Proclamation No. 916, 2015: Art. 12). 
97 Although the Ministry of Trade and Industry was formally entrusted with the responsibility to 
oversee the chambers, many other state and party structures became involved in the process which 
contributed to its delay (Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a). 
98 Unfortunately, I haven’t been able to get hold of the draft prepared by the chamber and was 
therefore not able to compare the two versions. 
 
192 
strategy it is important to improve the role of manufacturing. We 
therefore changed the chambers” (Interviewee Nr. 120, 2016). 
My findings suggest that, besides the technical concerns, regime survival 
concerns also influenced the 2003 proclamation. Given the chambers’ political 
activism in the 1990s and early 2000s, interviews revealed that the EPRDF 
government wanted to prevent chambers from challenging its rule. A former civil 
servant remembered for example: 
“I heard the corridor talks in the Bureau of Trade. They said that the 
chamber system was captured by chauvinists. The government was 
concerned that the chambers were anti-government and wanted to 
clean them. The Ministry of Trade was assigned the role to keep the 
house in order. Together with others it came up with a complex 
proclamation to undercut the chamber system” (Interviewee Nr. 81, 
2016a).  
And an adviser to one of the then state Ministers recalled being told:  
“We [the government] have to increase the heat in the private 
sector to melt it down completely. We are not interested in 
cooperating with the chambers. We want to eliminate existing 
structures and build the sector to fit our priorities” (Interviewee Nr. 
132, 2017). 
On the Creation of a Dysfunctional Chamber System 
The main changes introduced by the Proclamation 341/2003 were the integration of 
sectoral associations to the chamber system and its alignment to federal structures, 
creating new chambers of commerce and sectoral associations at regional and 
woreda levels (See Figure 9) (Directive to Proclamation 341, 2004: Art. 3). Existing 
municipal chambers were restructured to fit the new law and had to integrate 
sectoral associations, becoming Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Associations. 
Sectoral associations were business associations representing the manufacturing 
sector, rather than the service sector and traders that had traditionally made up most 
of the chambers’ members. Examples of important sectoral associations established 
through the 2003 proclamation were the Ethiopian Chamber of Sectoral Associations, 
the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer and Exporters Association, the Ethiopian Textile 
and Garment Manufacturer’s Association, the Ethiopian Meat Producer-Exporters 
Association, the Ethiopian Pulses Oil Seeds and Spices Processors Association, the 
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Ethiopian Leather Industries Associations and the Ethiopian Sugar and Suits 
Producers Association99. The majority of sectoral associations were newly 
established, rather than restructured organisations and there existed some evidence 
that the EPRDF influenced their set-up and staffing to guarantee loyalty to the ruling 
coalition (Interviewee Nr. 78, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 129, 
2016). 
  
                                                        




Figure 9: Structure of the Chamber System in Ethiopia100 
  
                                                        




Evidence revealed that many of the newly created sectoral associations, 
especially those operating at lower administrative levels, and regional chambers 
lacked the capacity to recruit members and collect membership fees, were 
understaffed and had ill-equipped offices. Presidents of sectoral associations 
reported that they lacked support staff and had to run the associations in parallel to 
their own business activities, while several regional chambers of commerce and 
sectoral associations had to use office space in public trade bureaus due to lack of 
financial capital to pay rent (ECCSA, 2014: 42; Interviewee Nr. 55, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 75, 2016a). There existed a clear mismatch between 
the new organisations’ mandates and their organisational capacities, which was 
partly due to their young age and partly due to their lack of resources (Bewket, 2013; 
Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016c; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016). 
Apart from the technical restructuring, the new chamber proclamation was also 
used to weaken and eliminate regime critical business associations. The Ethiopian 
Manufacturing Industries Association, whose structure did not correspond to the 
sectoral classification stipulated by the new law and its directive, was forcefully 
restructured (Altenburg, 2010: 8; Directive to Proclamation 341, 2004; Schleberger, 
2011). An interviewee shared: 
“The Ethiopian manufacturing association for example was shut 
down because it didn’t fit the proclamation. The government felt 
that the manufacturers association didn’t play a positive role. They 
had their own agenda and offices and they tried to influence 
elections” (Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016b).  
Closing of regime critical organisations and replacing them with regime affiliated 
organisations was a strategy used to ensure alignment between business associations 
and the EPRDF regime. 
The process of restructuring met high resistance among the existing chambers of 
commerce, but eventually between 2005 and 2007 it was implemented (‘Addis 
Business Vol. 7 No 20’, 2005: 1ff; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016). The most visible outcome 
of the restructuring was the disintegration of the once strong chamber system, as it 
tried to absorb the sectoral associations and adapt to the federal structures. New 
organisations had to be founded and old ones restructured, and instead of serving 
the business community, chamber and sectoral association leaders fought for control 
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over the chamber system (Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 104, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 129, 2016). Subsequently, many 
reputable businessmen and former chamber leaders left to avoid damage to their 
reputation and escape the increasing state control exercised over the chambers 
(Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016; Schleberger, 2011). 
The struggle for the mandate of national representation 
The publicly most visible struggle developed between the Addis Ababa Chamber 
of Commerce and Sectoral Associations (AACCSA), and the Ethiopian Chamber of 
Commerce and Sectoral Associations (ECCSA), around the question of which one was 
the rightful representative of the private sector in Ethiopia. The AACCSA was 
constituted of the original Addis Chamber and newly formed sectoral associations, 
while the ECCSA was a newly created organisation. It was composed of 
representatives from the regional chambers of commerce and sectoral associations, 
seven sectoral associations, the AACCSA and the Dire Dawa Chamber of Commerce 
and Sectoral Associations. The conflict between the AACCSA and the ECCSA was 
reported on by national media and contributed to the chamber system discrediting 
itself (Addis Fortune, 2009; Birhanu, 2016). Rather than cooperating, the two 
chambers competed for the representation of the private sector and the ECCSA often 
presented work done or services provided by the AACCSA as its own, further fuelling 
the conflict (Interviewee Nr. 47, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 103, 
2016). 
While the AACCSA undeniably had the larger capacity, the ECCSA had been 
bestowed with the representative mandate through the 2003 proclamation 
(Proclamation No. 341, 2003). The government partnered with the ECCSA, rather 
than with the AACCSA101, as it had designed the voting procedures in the 2003 
proclamation to guarantee over-representation of EPRDF affiliated associations at 
national level (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
                                                        
101 As mentioned above, the urban economic elite, had historically kept a distance from the EPRDF 
regime and this included the constituency of the former Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce. Many 
chamber leaders and business men expressed criticism towards the ethnic identity politics of the 
EPRDF and criticised its state-led development programme. 
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132, 2017; Private Sector Development Hub, 2013). The AACCSA remained associated 
to the urban business elite that did not support the EPRDF. After the restructuring of 
the chamber system, international donors were told by government representatives 
to redirect their support aimed at national level private sector development from the 
AACCSA to the ECCSA, exacerbating the conflict even further (Addis Fortune, 2009; 
Interviewee Nr. 56, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 66, 2016). 
A core discord between the two chambers emerged over which chamber, the 
AACCSA or the ECCSA, was the original chamber. All evidence indicated that the 
AACCSA was the successor of the first chamber inaugurated in 1948 (General Notice 
90, 1947), however this fact remained contested by some high-ranking state officials 
and representatives from the ECCSA (Interviewee Nr. 47, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 55, 
2016). Linked to this dispute, lay the question of the rightful ownership of the 
chamber building. Despite evidence that it had been constructed by the Addis Ababa 
Chamber of Commerce during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie, it had been handed 
to the ECCSA by the Ministry of Trade after the restructuring (Interviewee Nr. 104 
2016; Addis Fortune 2009; Interviewee Nr. 92 2016 ). 
Ethnic federalism and struggle in the chamber system 
The alignment of the chamber system with the administrative structures of ethnic 
federalism led to its fractionalisation and the creation of numerous weak chambers. 
Especially in regions characterised by high shares of agrarian rather than 
industrial production and low levels of trade and commerce, like Benishangul-Gumuz, 
Gambella, Somali and Afar, regional chambers lacked financial and human capital, 
due to their low number of paying members and shortage of qualified staff. To 
support manufacturing, sectoral associations were established all the way down to 
the woreda level, however the decentralised structure led to a multiplication of 
sectoral associations representing a very small number of manufacturing businesses 
and lacking the capacity to represent the interests of their members in an effective 
manner (Interviewee Nr. 46, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 55, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 57, 
2016). Many of the newly created chambers and sectoral associations remained 
much weaker than city chambers like the AACCSA and the Dire Dawa Chamber of 
Commerce and Sectoral Association, whose original constituency was still made up 
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of wealthy urban economic elites and whose history and institutional memory dated 
back to the first half of the 20th century (Interviewee Nr. 75, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 
151, 2018). 
The establishment of chambers according to the principle of ethnic federalism 
contradicted the chambers’ original mandate, which was to represent the interests 
of the business community, not ethnic interests102. Moreover, it led to campaigning 
and voting according to ethnic lines in the ECCSA elections (Addis Fortune, 2009; 
Bewket, 2013; Mikiyas, 2016; Teshome, 2014). Rather than revolving around the 
representation of different business interests, interviewees recounted the following 
about chamber elections: 
“People support where they come from, not capacity” (Interviewee 
Nr. 57, 2016). “The election process in the chamber is manipulated. 
People’s background counts a lot. Associations and regions push 
certain candidates” (Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016b).  
In some cases, interviewees also expressed negative views about representatives 
from other ethnicities, leading for example an interviewee to state “They tried to do 
all possible stupid things in the Tigray chamber. Because they are Tigrayans they think 
you are afraid of them” (Interviewee Nr. 121, 2016). Moreover, ethnicization of 
conflicts even played out at regional level, pitting different ethnicities within one 
region against each other. During a meeting of two city chambers in Adama, I was 
told:  
“The last elections for the regional chamber [in Oromia], they were 
wrong. The ballot was open, you just had to raise the hand. He [the 
current vice-president] won. We all saw he had won. But then the 
elders in the election committee asked him to be just vice president. 
They nominated someone from the biggest ethnic group [an 
Oromo] in the region as President” (Fieldnotes, 2016d). 
                                                        
102 While it could be argued that, since ethnic Amhara were over-represented among the urban 
business elite, the previous system had represented interests of Amharas, urban business men often 
came from mixed ethnic backgrounds and interest representation had been framed in terms of 
business, not ethnic interests. 
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Struggle among the traders and manufacturers 
While the conflicts between chambers were more visible for the public, the conflicts 
within the chamber system were at the core of its disintegration. The proclamation 
and its directive favoured the representation of the sectoral associations – the 
manufacturers – over the representation of businessmen working in trade and 
services – who had originally constituted the core of the chambers. The proclamation 
created double membership for sectoral associations, as their members were 
represented both individually and as associations. This led to voting disadvantages 
for the traders (Proclamation No. 341, 2003: Art. 7(1), 16(1), 24(1)). Moreover, a 
directive issued to detail the implementation of the new chamber proclamation 
granted direct membership in the ECCSA to one national and six sectoral associations 
organised at national level (Directive to Proclamation 341, 2004: Art. 5), to ensure 
the representation of prioritised manufacturing sectors in the chamber system. 
While sectoral associations complained about the traders’ dominance in the 
chambers (Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 129, 
2016), evidence suggested that members from sectoral associations outweighed 
members from the traditional chamber structures working in trade and services 
(Fieldnotes, 2016a, 2016c; Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016d; Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a). A 
journalist observing elections at the Addis Chamber in 2013 reported: 
“Unlike the individual members of the metropolitan Chamber, the 
sectoral associations are entities created by thousands of micro and 
small-scale businesses in the craft and services industries. The 
difference between the two surfaced at the meeting. Their numbers 
far outweigh the individual members of the Chamber, thus they 
have the power to be kingmakers” (Bewket, 2013). 
 However, despite the high number of manufacturers in the chamber system, 
they often lacked the capacity to compete with representatives from trade and 
services for leadership positions in the chambers, and the percentage of leadership 
positions occupied by representatives from sectoral associations remained lower 
compared to representatives from trade and services (Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 151, 2018). 
Leaders from sectoral association held that their interests differed substantially 
from those of the traders in the chambers system, creating problems for advancing a 
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coherent agenda (Interviewee Nr. 129, 2016). Moreover, they claimed that the 
interests of the manufacturers were not represented by the chambers (Interviewee 
Nr. 126, 2016) although chambers provided a lot of services targeted at 
manufacturers (Interviewee Nr. 103, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 104, 2016). Sectoral 
associations and chamber structures representing trade and services, were linked to 
different state organisations and, since 2010, at ministerial level, the former were 
linked to the Ministry of Industry and the latter to the Ministry of Trade103. The 
Ministry of Industry had specialised development institutes providing training and 
support in six different areas in manufacturing that members of sectoral associations 
could access (Leather Industry, Textile Industry, Metal Industry, Chemical & 
Construction input Industry, Food, Beverage & Pharmaceuticals Industry, Meat and 
Dairy Industry104). The Ministry of Trade did not offer similar services to the chamber 
structures representing trade and services (Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016b; Interviewee 
Nr. 120, 2016). 
The split between sectoral associations and the chamber structures representing 
trade and services became for example visible in 2016/17 over the re-drafting of 
chamber proclamation, where the Ministry of Industry sided with the former and the 
Ministry of Trade sided with the latter (Interviewee Nr. 151, 2018). While sectoral 
associations reported good access to state structures, they emphasised that apart 
from the Ministry of Industry, most other state organisations lacked technical 
capacity and understanding of their sectors and industry more generally (Interviewee 
Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 129, 2016). 
Rather than taking over the chamber system, the introduction of sectoral 
associations caused its disintegration. As described above, interviews revealed that 
sectoral associations benefitted from direct connections to state representatives 
tasked with promoting manufacturing and industrialisation more broadly, and did not 
need the chamber structures as intermediaries for negotiation. Hence, rather than 
                                                        
103 In 2010, the Ministry of Trade and Industry was split into two. While the Ministry of Industry was 
put in charge of encouraging “the establishment of sectoral and professional associations, and 
strengthen those already established”, the Ministry of trade was responsible for “the establishment of 
chambers of commerce and sectoral associations, including, consumers’ associations, and strengthen 
those already established” (Proclamation No. 691, 2010: Art. 20,21). 
104 http://www.moin.gov.et/- (last accessed 13.12.2018) 
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using the chambers and strengthening their negotiation position, sectoral 
associations directly interacted and negotiated with relevant state organisations, 
including the PMO (Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 129, 2016). An interviewee even reported that – “The Minister of Industry, Ato 
Ahmed, I call him every day. I can meet him whenever I want to” (Interviewee Nr. 126, 
2016). While the statement portrayed an exaggerated picture, field observations 
confirmed high level politicians calling sectoral associations and vice-versa, 
confirming the close working relationship. The overlap between sectoral associations 
and state structures was most clearly expressed by an interviewee who stated – 
“There is an invisible hand which links the government and us. We have the same 
interest” (Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016). 
As a result of the disintegration of the chamber system, it became marred with 
corruption scandals. Rather than businessmen, the chamber system attracted people 
interested in advancing personal careers (Birhanu, 2016). A typical problem was 
chamber presidents disregarding limitation of terms, or moving back and forth 
between the presidencies of different chambers (municipal, regional, national) 
(Dawit, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 91, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
121, 2016; Samson, 2017c). Given the exacerbating scandals in the chamber system, 
its public perception changed. The newspaper Addis Fortune commented for example 
that, “These days, whenever chambers are in limelight it appears that controversy 
and intense bickering follows” (Asrat, 2016). In 2016, the Ministry of Trade needed to 
investigate several complaints from city chambers about irregularities at regional 
chamber elections (Dawit, 2016; Samson, 2017c). 
Pre-empting Contestation – State Control and Obsolete Chambers 
To avoid contestation from members of the business community, the EPRDF did not 
only restructure their associational system, but established a system of domination 
over the private sector, “[…] making it dependent on, or at least supportive of, the 
incumbent regime” (Weis, 2014: 270). The private sector remained weak, as primarily 
the growth of regime-loyal businesses was supported and chambers became 
obsolete as personal connections were perceived as more useful by businessmen 
than using chambers as intermediaries to represent their interests. The EPRDF 
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government established mechanisms to foster party affiliation among all levels of 
private sector actors. 
Micro and small enterprises working in manufacturing were, particularly, linked 
to the EPRDF through the provision of inputs for their operations. State organisations 
like the small and micro-enterprises agency, the TVET (Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training) agency and the cooperatives agency provided trainings, 
material inputs and finance for small-scale entrepreneurs (Interviewee Nr. 132, 
2017). Alternative private service providers had been crowded out, leaving the 
monopoly to the state (Berhanu, 2013: 1481; Spielman, 2008: 2008). This favoured 
the emergence of an EPRDF-loyal SME sector and, according to an article in Addis 
Business, “Under the camouflage of the enterprises the government went on utilizing 
its members as significant input to build political muscle of the ruling party […]” 
(Shitahun, 2015: 7). The identification between business and party structures went 
as far as the establishment of the Forum for EPRDF Business Supporters, that in 
contrast to the chambers was officially affiliated to the EPRDF (Interviewee Nr. 81, 
2016a; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016). 
To be able to operate successfully in Ethiopia, medium and large-sized 
enterprises reported the need for party patrons. Without such a patron, it was 
difficult, if not impossible to renew licenses, acquire permits for operation or receive 
support for credits and access foreign currency. Direct personal connections to the 
ruling elite were key, reducing the need of businessmen to use business associations 
as intermediaries and thereby making organisations like the chambers somewhat 
redundant (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 132, 2017). An interviewee 
explained: 
“Here in Ethiopia you have to rub shoulders if you work in business. 
You don’t have to be a party member but you need a Godfather to 
bring up your issues and mentor you. The higher you go in business, 
the closer you have to be to the political machinery” (Interviewee 
Nr. 81, 2016b). 
As the goodwill and support of public offices and civil servants was of key 
importance for businessmen, they made sure to attend meetings and other 
gatherings whenever they were called. For the chambers, this meant that 
businessmen prioritised government meetings over chamber meetings, whenever 
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these coincided (Fieldnotes, 2016d). Given their previous history of conflict with the 
EPRDF government, some interviewees even held that affiliation to the chambers 
could be detrimental for businessmen. Interviewees shared:  
“People laugh at the chambers. They go directly to the corridors of 
power and bypass the chambers. Only those with connections get 
things done. Going via the chamber could even be a disadvantage 
depending on whom you want to meet” (Interviewee Nr. 132, 
2017). “The big businesses are not part of the chamber. They don’t 
want to be affiliated. For them the doors to government are open 
anyway” (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a). 
Lasting Impact of the Chambers’ Political Activism: Mistrust and Control 
The chambers’ political activism in the 1990s and early 2000s led to mistrust, 
although the chambers invested substantial energy and resources in proving that 
they were not involved in political campaigning on behalf of the opposition 
(Interviewee Nr. 20, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 56, 2016). Even after the restructuring, 
many interviewees felt that politicians and civil servants remained suspicious and 
interviewees thought that “The government expects the chambers to be in the 
opposition” (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016b). “There is a lot of mistrust because the 
government thinks that the private sector has a political agenda” (Interviewee Nr. 75, 
2016a). State representatives explained that the relationship with the chambers was 
good and that chambers were no longer engaged in political activism (Interviewee 
Nr. 62, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 107, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 120, 2016). However, the 
interactions between the chambers and the state confirmed that the latter still 
feared the chambers’ potential power and tried to keep them in place. 
For example, this became visible around the naming of the first public private 
partnership forum. Although, from the outside, the disagreement about the naming 
of the forum looked like quibbling, it testified to the mistrust that the EPRDF 
government still exhibited towards the chambers. While the ECCSA wanted to name 
the forum ‘dialogue forum,’ state representatives insisted on ‘consultation forum’ 




“I wanted the forum to be called dialogue, not consultative forum. 
Consultation means you consult but that’s it. The Minister of Trade 
and the State Minister were open about this suggestion. But the 
Ministers’ hands were tied. There was a legal adviser at that time. 
He tried to please his political bosses. He said no” (Interviewee Nr. 
89, 2016).  
In an interview with the former legal adviser, he explained: 
“Dialogue means that one party wants to snatch something 
forcefully. Dialogue doesn’t correspond to the normal procedure. 
People talk without permission of the chairman” (Interviewee Nr. 
62, 2016b).  
While not directly confirming the allegations made by the former ECCSA 
president, the wording chosen by the legal adviser indicated his fear that the 
chambers could try to dominate the forum and impose their vision of private sector 
development. 
Although interviewees felt that since the restructuring the EPRDF government 
reverted to indirect means of control rather than open repression, imprisonment and 
exiling as in the early 2000s, they did not doubt that state representatives would 
intervene if the chambers became too independent. This underlying threat 
discouraged chamber activism (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016d; Interviewee Nr. 81, 
2016a). The mechanisms with which the state controlled the chambers’ internal 
affairs were informal and difficult to trace. According to interviewees, interventions 
consisted of direct orders from relevant state officials to specific people in the 
chambers. Interviewees shared:  
“No one wants to talk about the government influence. But it 
happens usually through a phone call. Then no one wants to admit 
to have received such a call and even less that they acted upon it” 
(Interviewee Nr. 132, 2017). “The chambers today are practically a 
branch of government. They [the government] just give the 
chambers a phone call to make sure the chambers work in the 
interest of the government. They are regulated through direct 
order” (Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016). 
Sectoral associations, according to their leaders, were not eyed with suspicion by 
the EPRDF government (Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 129, 2016). Partly this was because most were new organisations 
that had no history of conflict with state organisations. Another reason was that their 
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core constituency was composed of manufacturers, whom the EPRDF supported as 
part of its strive for industrialisation (Interviewee Nr. 120, 2016). The relationship 
between manufacturers and the EPRDF was strong, in contrast to its relationship to 
traders and business men working in services, who were regularly portrayed as rent 
seekers and in need of being checked (Brautigam et al., 2016: 167; Interviewee Nr. 
62, 2016b). While the EPRDF exerted control over sectoral associations, the focus 
remained on mobilisation as part of the developmental state programme. However, 
their relative organisational weakness posed limits to their contribution to 
development policies. 
From Co-optation to Contestation – The EPRDF and Chambers of Commerce 
and Sectoral Associations 
The above analysis portrays a complex picture of state – chamber relations, 
characterised both by the wish of the EPRDF to mobilise the chambers for its 
developmental state project and its attempt to prevent chambers from contesting 
EPRDF policies. Moreover, it suggests that the restructuring failed to create a 
coherent chamber system leading to discord, not unity, and a split between 
organisations representing the interests of manufacturers and those representing 
the interests of traders and businessmen working in services. While the former 
benefitted from closer ties and better relationships with state organisations than the 
latter, their relative low capacity – with the exception of some sectoral associations 
operating at national level – somewhat reduced their ability to influence policy 
making. The parts of the chamber system pre-dating the 2003 proclamation and 
representing the interests of businessmen working in trade and services, while still 
comparatively strong, were often side-lined by the EPRDF regime and had limited 
access to political decision-making structures. These insights suggest a need to shift 
the level of analysis from an organisational level down to individual interactions, to 
shed light on how different parts of the state related to different parts of the chamber 
system and to investigate in how far chambers of commerce and sectoral associations 
were able to operate as representatives for the private sector, rather than solely 




Co-optation manifested itself through the fact that large parts of the chamber system 
became supporters of the regime, providing services for the state rather than 
representing the interests of their members. However, contrary to the common 
perception, co-optation was not a uniform phenomenon, but it represented a 
strategic choice where business associations played an important role for the 
realisation of the developmental state project. The ECCSA and the sectoral 
associations for example were key in organising the manufacturing sector and were 
closely linked to the Ministry of Industry. 
In public, the chambers of commerce and sectoral associations, particularly the 
ECCSA and sectoral associations, often appeared as supporters of the EPRDF 
government. Public display of support to the EPRDF government went as far as the 
ECCSA appointing Ethiopia’s president as its patron in 2016105. An interviewee at the 
ECCSA explained: 
“The President of the country oversees the chamber. We have a 
permanent forum with the President Mulatu Teshome. The 
government wants to work closely with the private sector and the 
private sector wants to work with the government” (Interviewee Nr. 
103, 2016).  
The close collaboration between the ECCSA and the EPRDF government harmed 
the chamber system, as several citizens and businessmen felt that the chambers were 
working for the state, rather than their members. Interviewees shared: 
“Nowadays there is almost a complete merger between the 
government and the chambers” (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016b). “They 
made the Ethiopian President the patron of the chamber. I mean 
now they prove that they are not different from the government. 
They are the government, not the private sector” (Fieldnotes, 
2016d). 
Chamber leaders and employees explained that they could not freely decide 
which topics to bring up in their communication with government representatives, 
as it risked eliciting repression. Examples of topics that were named as taboo include: 
land rights, political ideology of the EPRDF, the party endowment funds and 
                                                        
105 http://www.fanabc.com/english/index.php/component/k2/item/4131 (accessed 12.07.2018) 
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corruption in public procurement (Interviewee Nr. 57, 2016). Moreover, chambers 
were told to stay clear of politics and not engage in issues labelled as political by the 
EPRDF. Interviewees shared: 
“There are issues that you don’t touch upon, they just never change. 
For example land policy, democracy, liberalism and their [the 
EPRDF’s] ideology” (Interviewee Nr. 38, 2016). “We focus on 
feasible issues. We avoid contentious policy issues. We know the red 
line and we don’t cross it. We shouldn’t engage in politics, it’s not 
our mandate” (Interviewee Nr. 75, 2016a).  
A senior civil servant confirmed, that there existed “red issues” banned from 
discussions:  
“There are red areas. I say red areas, not grey areas; they are red. 
According to the Ethiopian constitution land is not like other 
properties. It is owned collectively by the people and the 
government. Those who want to use land, lease it. The private 
sector wants land privatisation. We will not allow discussion on the 
issue” (Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016a). 
The state monopoly over broadcasting media further reduced the chambers’ 
ability to push their own agendas. Censorship was exercised by the public 
broadcasting agencies, preventing chambers from pushing an agenda critical of 
EPRDF policies. The attempt of the AACCSA to set up their own TV and radio channel 
had not been granted, as it would have given the chamber a public outlet to air its 
grievances. Interviewees claimed: 
“They censor us in our programmes. When we are too critical they 
tell us we need to be more balanced and even if we present it in a 
more balanced way they still reject it” (Interviewee Nr. 38, 2016). 
“We planned to have our own FM channel. But the government 
doesn’t agree. They want us to use their channels so they can 
control what we say” (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016b).  
Consequently, rather than pushing an agenda separate from the state, chambers 
of commerce and sectoral associations often gave primacy to EPRDF prioritised 
sectors. This meant serving the interests of small and micro enterprises and focusing 
on manufacturing and agro-industry (Interviewee Nr. 55, 2016) and leading to a 
neglect of the interests of the chambers’ members working in trade and services 
(Interviewee Nr. 39, 2016). State representatives did not give in to chamber 
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demands, where the respective agendas deviated (Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016b; 
Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016) and ordered the chambers to express support to EPRDF 
policies, even where this harmed the relationship between the chambers and parts 
of their members (Interviewee Nr. 121, 2016). 
The inability of the chambers to clearly push the agenda of the private sector 
beyond the sectors prioritised by the government was perceived as weakness by 
several of their members working in trade and services. Moreover, at the AACCSA’s 
annual meeting in 2016, members questioned the chamber’s capacity to improve the 
political and institutional framework for private sector development in Ethiopia and 
also challenged the chamber’s lack of engagement regarding the then ongoing 
political protests (Fieldnotes, 2016e). In the public discussion, members stated for 
example: 
“The government situation in the country causes problems. The 
chamber should set up a committee to review what has happened. 
Then it should discuss with the government”. “The issue of unrests 
should be at the attention of the government and individuals. 
Investors are destroyed. Cars, shops, workshops and premises are 
destroyed. Chambers should talk to the government”. 
It was not uncommon that former public servants got employed by the chambers 
and sectoral associations after they left the civil service. Many came from relevant 
state ministries, agencies and bureaus, for example the Bureau of Trade and Industry, 
the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs 
Authority (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016d; Interviewee Nr. 60, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 81, 
2016a; Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016). In a few cases, chamber staff were simultaneously 
employed at the chambers and state offices (Fieldnotes, 2016d, 2016c, 2016a). These 
practices created a climate of surveillance and insecurity and multiple interviewees 
expressed the feeling that some of the (former) civil servants working at the 
chambers had strategically been placed there to oversee the chambers’ work and 
report to the EPRDF government (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016e; Interviewee Nr. 81, 
2016a; Interviewee Nr. 132, 2017). Staff with a long employment history in the public 
sector or a double employment often did not clearly distinguish between the agenda 
of the chambers and the agenda of the EPRDF, but saw their role in organising the 
business community according to state policies. Interviewees stated for example:  
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“I have been working at the ministry [of trade] for ten years. But I 
also work at the chamber” (Interviewee Nr. 91, 2016). “I worked in 
government offices before for many years. I still have to get used to 
the chamber system. No one wants to come when you call them to 
activities. I am not used to that. They don’t participate. We have to 
organise them. They are not good” (Fieldnotes, 2016a). 
Co-optation testified to the state’s infrastructural power, as it aligned large parts 
of the chamber system to the developmental state policies. The threat of using 
despotic power was used to bring in line those parts of the chamber system that 
represented trade and services and were less closely linked to the EPRDF. Co-
optation led to a tension between chambers of commerce and sectoral associations 
and parts of the business community, especially businessmen working in trade and 
services, who demanded that the chambers pushed for the interests of the private 
sector beyond the EPRDF sanctioned policies. 
Cooperation 
For a long time, cooperation between chambers and sectoral associations and state 
organisations remained informal and took place on an ad-hoc, issue specific basis. 
After long negotiations, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the ECCSA signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding for the establishment of public private consultative 
forums at the country's different administrative levels in 2010 (Interviewee Nr. 62, 
2016b; Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016). Sectoral meetings took 
place four times a year, while general public private consultative forums took place 
twice a year, testifying to the prioritisation of the manufacturing sectors and sectoral 
associations over services and trade and chambers of commerce. Topics as well as 
participants for the meetings were jointly chosen by relevant bureaus/ministries and 
the chambers of commerce and sectoral associations, rendering participation in the 
forums partly dependent on good political connections and allowing state offices to 
control agenda setting (Interviewee Nr. 89 2016; Interviewee Nr. 62 2016b; 
Interviewee Nr. 76 2016a; MoT and ECCSA 2010). Nevertheless, businessmen 
attending pushed for improved conditions for private sector development and good 
political connections allowed them to speak up critically without being mistaken for 
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anti-government activists (Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 103, 2016). 
Many interviewees at the ECCSA and the sectoral associations held that the 
cooperation with the EPRDF government was positive and had continuously 
improved over the past decade (Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 129, 2016). Interviewees reported that many of the forums led to 
agreements between state representatives and chamber/sectoral association 
representatives regarding private sector development issues. Although the 
implementation of agreed action points often lagged behind, interviewees from the 
chambers and sectoral associations as well as state representatives felt that this 
depended on the relative lack of capacity of state bureaus/ministries, rather than 
their lack of willingness (Interviewee Nr. 56, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016a). 
Interviewees explained:  
“The government agrees with 60 or 70% of the issues we present, 
but implementation is difficult. Our success rate is only 40%” 
(Interviewee Nr. 57, 2016). They held that this was because “Even 
simple recommendations are not easy to implement. One issue 
brought up in the tax forum was that if there is a dispute on tax, to 
be able to appeal you have to pay 50% of the tax upfront, a penalty 
and interest before accessing the court. The government agreed to 
reduce the 50% and to remove the penalty and the interest. But this 
requires the revision of the tax law. This takes time despite the good 
will from the government” (Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016b).  
While interviewees suggested that state agencies participating in the PPCFs were 
willing to listen to the private sector, they were not able to efficiently respond to 
claims made by business community, meaning that grievances were not addressed 
systematically. 
Apart from the public private consultation forums, the chambers of commerce 
and sectoral associations also co-organised workshops and meetings with relevant 
public offices. They presented themselves as a “bridge” (ECCSA, 2014: 79; 
Interviewee Nr. 59, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 94, 2016) between the state and the 
private sector. While state representatives often wanted to set up such meetings to 
disseminate information about new policies or administrative procedures, the 
chambers used them to communicate the position of the private sector regarding the 
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information presented. Chambers also invited state officials to discuss problems 
encountered in the private sector and to suggest potential solutions to the problems 
they had identified (Interviewee Nr. 39, 2016). Interviewees explained: 
“We collect topics from our members, for example this can be tax 
issues, policies and bureaucratic issues. We invite government 
officials to discuss” (Interviewee Nr. 38, 2016). “We jointly organise 
workshops. For example, with the revenue authority on taxes. In 
this way, we can settle some issues amicably. They count on us 
because they want their taxes paid and we want their support and 
them to listen to our concerns” (Interviewee Nr. 40, 2016). 
Given the relative inefficiency of formal channels to yield concrete outputs, 
chambers of commerce and sectoral associations used informal channels to directly 
influence state representatives (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016c; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016). 
Interviewees reported using their personal connections to state officials to push the 
agenda of the private sector, and, while not the sole channel, ethnic-based networks 
were used on many occasions106. Issues brought up by chamber and sectoral 
association representatives included, for example, suggestions for policy change and 
input into EPRDF government plans, but also requests for technical and/or material 
support and reporting of market failures and misconduct in public offices (Fieldnotes, 
2016a; Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016). While interviewees 
expressed that their input into laws and other public documents was integrated, they 
also acknowledged that state representatives primarily integrated recommendations 
that were in line with EPRDF strategies (Interviewee Nr. 47, 2016). A chamber 
employee reported: 
“We also submitted a 60 pages document for the GTP [Growth and 
Transformation Plan]. We submitted our report to the planning 
commission. On agribusiness, our recommendations were broadly 
taken on board, in the other sectors less. Whether the changes were 
made due to our contribution or because of our earlier lobbying or 
because of other factors, we don’t know” (Interviewee Nr. 46, 
2016).  
                                                        
106 Where possible chamber officials would contact a state representative from the same ethnicity, 
stating that chances for collaboration and likelihood of problem solving were higher than if they 
contacted someone from a different ethnicity. 
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As the interests of sectoral associations and state organisations were more 
aligned due to their mutual focus on manufacturing, chambers of commerce 
structures reported more problems pushing the interests of traders and businessmen 
working in services than sectoral associations reported (Interviewee Nr. 104, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 126, 2016). 
Sectoral associations operating at national level, more than even the ECCSA, 
claimed that they received support from state organisations such as the Ministry of 
Industry and cooperated closely. Examples included consultations around relevant 
policies or revision of existing legal documents, as well as joint activities for the 
promotion of Ethiopian manufactured goods and training for manufacturers. Given 
their low capacity sectoral associations at lower administrative levels were less 
engaged in such activities (Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 120, 2016). 
Cooperation between state organisations and chambers of commerce was 
promoted and supported by international donors. The public private consultation 
forums were for example financed by the World Bank and the Swedish Development 
Cooperation107 (Interviewee Nr. 56, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 75, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 
76, 2016a). While allowing international donors to support the chambers, the EPRDF 
made sure that funds primarily targeted government-prioritised sectors, 
organisations and actors. Although state organisations particularly partnered with 
the ECCSA, the AACCSA used their international partners as leverage to induce 
cooperation. An interviewee at the AACCSA explained: 
“They [state officials] have to work with us. We are an international 
brand and sometimes donor agencies even force them to work with 
us. They make their loans and projects dependent on the 
government working with us. So the government approaches us” 
(Interviewee Nr. 38, 2016). “We [the AACCSA] have power also 
because often international delegates want to see the chamber. 
Therefore, we have good relations with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. It sends delegates to the Addis Chamber to request it to 
organise business to business meetings with foreign delegates” 
(Interviewee Nr. 20, 2015). 
                                                        
107 The dependence on international support for the initiative posed questions regarding its local 
ownership and its sustainability, particularly because the EPRDF government held that the chambers 
should bear the costs for organisation and logistics after the project closure (Interviewee Nr. 46, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 57, 2016). 
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While the EPRDF government benefitted from a large degree of autonomous 
power vis-à-vis the chambers of commerce and sectoral associations, the close link 
between chamber and state structures, e.g. between the Ministry of Industry to 
sectoral associations and the Ministry of Trade to the chambers, allowed parts of the 
chambers system to influence state organisations and actors through formal and 
informal channels (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 39, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 40, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 60, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016). While framing 
demands and suggestions within the EPRDF plans and policies, chambers of 
commerce and sectoral associations communicated the interests of their members 
to the state and at times managed to influence state officials in favour of their 
members. Consequently, this exemplifies the reciprocal nature of infrastructural 
power, testifying to the fact that increased presence of the state in the chamber 
system and the creation of close links on the one hand facilitated state control, on 
the other hand also exposed the state to influences from the chambers and sectoral 
associations and their members. 
Coexistence 
Rather than primarily being a chosen strategy of organisations in the chambers 
system, coexistence was a result of its dismantling. The EPRDF government excluded 
parts of the chamber system representing trade and services from structures of 
political decision-making, to prevent them from influencing policy makers. While the 
AACCSA was the clearest case of an organisation being forced into coexistence, other 
city and regional chambers also complained of a lack of access to state structures 
(Fieldnotes, 2016f; Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016d; Interviewee Nr. 40, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the ECCSA and sectoral associations often posed an exception to the 
rule (Interviewee Nr. 103, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 121, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 126, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 129, 2016). Chambers were not able to use their forced 
“independence”, as coexistence meant carrying out activities without directly 
interacting with state structures, but keeping the state informed. 
Co-existence often took the form of service provision to members (Interviewee 
Nr. 42, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 55, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 92, 2016), including for 
example publishing the trade directory; organising networking and businesses in 
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business events; issuing certificates of origin and authentication of documents; 
providing capacity building; running the arbitration institute and organising trade 
fairs and bazars. The AACCSA, particularly, provided a large number of services to 
promote private sector development in Ethiopia. It extended its work beyond the 
capital city, cooperating with city chambers in other regions (Fieldnotes, 2016d), 
although this was formally the mandate of the ECCSA. Access to services for members 
was mainly free of charge and non-members could access the services against 
payment. Some activities, like the trade fairs and the advocacy of the chambers, 
benefitted not only the members but the private sector at large (Interviewee Nr. 39, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 42, 2016). 
Given the reluctance of some state representatives to cooperate with the 
chambers, several chambers started piloting initiatives for private sector 
development. Such initiatives were wide ranging and included, for example, the 
establishment of the Ethiopian Institute of Corporate Governance108 by the AACCSA 
and the promotion of a Code of Ethics for businesses by the ECCSA. The aim was to 
anticipate new developments in the private sector, to influence their implementation 
and to convince state representatives of the usefulness of certain activities. While 
the chambers were able to carry out the above described activities independently, 
the disadvantage was that they were not able to work directly with the relevant 
EPRDF campaigns, e.g. on good governance, and felt that they were left out 
(Fieldnotes, 2016f; Interviewee Nr. 20, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 40, 2016). Interviewees 
shared for example: 
“Good corporate governance became a global issue during the 2008 
economic crisis. We felt that it was better to embrace it at a 
voluntary basis, rather than having it imposed by the government. 
We developed an Ethiopian code of corporate governance and 
organised a grand meeting with prominent entrepreneurs. They 
voted on a resolution to embrace the code and set up the institute” 
(Interviewee Nr. 40, 2016). “There was no code of conduct before. I 
told everyone that before we can ask the government to behave 
ethically we had to work on ourselves. So we published a code of 
ethics and conduct for businesses in Ethiopia” (Interviewee Nr. 121, 
2016). 
                                                        
108 http://eicg.addischamber.com/ (accessed 08.03.2017) 
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The presence of forced coexistence exemplified the limits of the state’s 
infrastructural power and testified to the fact that co-optation required significant 
resources. Co-optation of chamber organisations representing trade and services was 
considered too costly, instead the threat of use of despotic power was used to 
prevent public contestation. However, this meant that the EPRDF was unable to 
enforce its policies throughout the whole chamber system and isolation was used to 
prevent regime critical actors in the chambers from influencing state policies. 
Contestation 
Since their reorganisation in 2003, and given the repressive political climate, 
chambers have not engaged in public protests. Instead of publicly contesting the 
regime or supporting opposition parties, the chambers and sectoral associations 
contested policies and government strategies that negatively influenced private 
sector development (Interviewee Nr. 56, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 75, 2016a; 
Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016a). Interviewees stressed that the chambers were non-
partisan organisations that did not engage in politics and many criticised the 
chambers’ previous engagement in politics (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016b; Interviewee 
Nr. 94, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 104, 2016). Most interviewees held that as long as they 
focused on private sector issues, they did not have to fear negative repercussions 
from their criticism (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016c; Interviewee Nr. 103, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 104, 2016). However, field observations indicated reluctance of the 
chambers to criticise the EPRDF’s private sector development policies and revealed 
defensiveness on the side of state representatives when such criticism was brought 
up in public forums (Fieldnotes, 2016f, 2016g, 2016a). 
Contestation primarily took the form of verbal or written criticism, rather than 
campaigns, petitions or even strikes and it was often delivered behind closed doors 
rather than in public. The AACCSA was more vocal than any other chambers or 
sectoral associations, using media to make its criticism public. While state control 
over the media posed limits to this strategy, the chamber newspaper, available online 
and distributed in print to the AACCSA’s members, was an important tool to sustain 
it. An interviewee claimed: 
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“We have more freedom in our newspaper than on radio or TV. 
Some printing houses, especially the big ones that are government 
controlled, refuse to print critical things. But we don’t use them” 
(Interviewee Nr. 38, 2016).  
As contestation on an individual level was more tolerated than contestation from 
organisations, some employees at the AACCSA published in private journals in their 
own names (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2015). Policies described as particularly harmful for 
private sector development were the land lease legislation, taxation policies and the 
registration of businesses (ECCSA, 2014: 35ff; Mesfin, 2015a; Private Sector 
Development Hub, 2013: 10). The chambers also exposed the state’s practical 
shortcomings, naming corruption and the failure to operate according to the existing 
legal framework as key issues (Interviewee Nr. 40, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 59, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 132, 2017). 
While remaining moderate, criticism went beyond questioning legislation and 
policy practice and included concrete actions to address problems in the private 
sector. An example was the AACCSA contesting the decision of the Charities and 
Societies Agency (ChSA) to revoke and refuse renewal of licenses to business 
membership organisations that it had previously licensed. The AACCSA put pressure 
on the Ministry of Trade to solve the problem, visited the Ministry of Federal Affairs 
responsible for overseeing the ChSA to contest the decision and published 
information about the issue to raise public awareness (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016d; 
Interviewee Nr. 39, 2016; Yohannes, 2013a, 2014). Chamber staff also brought the 
issue up in meetings attended by government representatives, publicly accusing 
them of misconduct and anti-constitutional activities (Fieldnotes, 2016f). The 
AACCSA reported on the fact that state organisations used the legal limbo of business 
associations to reorganise those that were not sufficiently regime-conform. While 
the Ethiopian coffee exporter association109, thanks to the support from the Ministry 
of Trade, was able to operate when it had no official license (Fieldnotes, 2016f; 
Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016b), organising for example the World Coffee Conference 
2016, at which the Ethiopian Prime Minister held a speech (Hailemariam, 2016), 
                                                        
109 Coffee export has long been one of the country’s largest sources of foreign currency, rendering it 
key for the national economy (Interviewee Nr. 60, 2016). 
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many business associations faced serious problems. Citing members from the 
transitors associations, the AACCSA stated in its newspaper: 
“The claim that transitors requested the Authority [ERCA] to 
organize them is not accurate.[…] They lost their legal personality 
under questionable circumstances” (Mesfin, 2015b). 
The existence of contestation indicated that state control over the chamber 
system was not absolute and that organisations tried to represent the interests of 
their members. Especially in the case of the AACCSA, the EPRDF government was not 
able to control all its activities. Receiving pressure from its members, the AACCSA, 
but also other chambers and sectoral associations at times went against the state 
agenda. However, rather than contesting the EPRDF regime in general, chambers and 
sectoral associations often sought allies within the state, to solve problems 
encountered with specific civil servants or state offices. The AACCSA together with 
the Ministry of Trade ensured for example that the new Commercial Registration and 
Licensing Proclamation from 2016 provided for the registration of business 
associations at the Ministry of Trade, solving the registration issues created by the 
ChSA (Proclamation No. 980, 2016). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the EPRDF government passed the chamber 
proclamation in 2003 to prevent chambers from challenging its rule, all the while 
trying to align them to the EPRDF’s development policies and the country’s 
administrative structures of ethnic federalism. While it achieved the first objective, 
the focus on controlling the chambers negatively affected the EPRDF’s ability to 
mobilise them as part of the operationalisation of its developmental state project. 
The fact that many of the new chamber structures represented manufacturing 
sectors, testified to the EPRDF’s commitment to building a developmental state. 
However, many of the new organisations were weak, especially those operating at 
lower administrative levels, which posed limits to their ability to mobilise the 
business community behind the EPRDF’s developmental state project and to 
contribute to the EPRDF’s efforts to stimulate industrialisation. While their close 
connections to the EPRDF and the priority given to manufacturing in the ruling 
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coalition’s policy put them in a favourable position to advocate on behalf of their 
members, they were not fully able to use these advantages. 
Co-optation and cooperation were dominant features of state–chamber 
relations among the chamber organisations created through the 2003 proclamation. 
However, co-existence marked the relationship between the state and chamber 
organisations that predated the 2003 proclamation. Contrary to the common 
perception, co-optation of chambers of commerce by state organisations was not a 
uniform phenomenon, but it represented a strategic choice where chambers and 
sectoral associations played an important role in the realisation of the EPRDF’s 
developmental state project. Where co-optation was costly and did not come with 
direct benefits, e.g. in the case of the AACCSA, the EPRDF was more likely to isolate 
the association rather than co-opt it. Following the reciprocal logic of infrastructural 
power meant that the parts of the chamber system that were closely linked to state 
structures were also those potentially yielding the biggest influence on politics, 
whereas those kept in a relation of co-existence were not able to push the agenda of 
the private sector effectively. 
Despite existing trends in interactions, all chambers recounted examples of 
interactions testifying to co-optation, cooperation, coexistence and contestation. 
Interactions depended on the interlocutor - the specific state organisation in question 
- the topic and the timing. Hence state - chamber relations were characterised by all 
fours types of interactions at the same time, despite differences in their frequency – 
organisations differed regarding the prevalence of a certain type of interaction - and 
timing – the types of interactions changed over time. 
Although the 2003 chamber proclamation ended the chambers’ political activism 
and prevented challenges to the EPRDF regime and its developmental state project, 
it created problems for the state. Weakening of the chamber system and the fighting 
between old and newly created organisations did not only discredit the chamber 
system, but it required state intervention. Courts and the Ministry of Trade needed 
to deal with complaints of corruption and intervene on several occasions as scandals 
became publicly known (Dawit, 2016; Mikiyas, 2016; Samson, 2017c). An attempt to 
draft a new chamber proclamation in 2016/17 to improve its structure and address 
internal conflicts led to a split between the Ministry of Industry and Sectoral 
 
219 
Associations on the one hand, and the Ministry of Trade and Chambers of Commerce 
on the other hand (Interviewee Nr. 151, 2018). This revealed that the discord 
between manufacturers and businessmen working in services and trade was also 
present in the state, and questioned the hegemony of the developmental state 
discourse within the Ethiopian state apparatus. It also showed that state 
organisations differed in their (in)dependence from specific chamber organisations, 
revealing that neither the state nor the chambers were unitary actors. 
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Chapter 7: Charities and Societies and the Securitisation of Civic 
Activism 
Addis Ababa, 1st of March 2016 (Yekatit 22 2008) 
The meeting was held at the Kaleb Hotel, a four-star hotel close to the airport: 
“Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum – Resource Challenge Workshop”. An ironic 
title given the location. The workshop was attended by civil society organisations and 
international donor representatives and the whole discussion consisted of accusations 
and counter-accusations: CSO representatives complained that donors had reduced 
funding as a result of the 2009 Charities Proclamation, while donors countered that 
funding to the sector had actually increased. 
The director of the Federal Charities and Societies Agency attended as well: Ato 
Meseret Gebremariam, former head the Regional Security and Administration Bureau 
in Tigray. Before the meeting was adjourned, he addressed the floor in Amharic. The 
entire meeting had been held in English to ensure donors’ participation, but Ato 
Meseret didn’t seem interested in communicating. His tone was aggressive when he 
told the attendants that a) donors had to orient their funding towards governments 
prioritised sectors so they wouldn’t encounter any problems with the 2009 
proclamation and b) that CSOs had to be accountable not corrupt and rent-seeking. 
He finished with the sentence “We don’t accept neoliberal agents in Ethiopia, no 
external influence on our politics. Donors can fund development not rights”. 
I had heard much about Ato Meseret before, but not met him in person until 
today. Donor representatives had described him as intimidating and unwilling to 
cooperate. CSOs had stated that there were no limits to his power and that he did 
everything to hinder their work. 
Hawassa, 15th of March 2017 (Mekawit 6 2009) 
We were sitting on the ground below the trees in the backyard. Azeb110 [the director 
of a local NGO] got up and left, so I could talk to the organisation’s members alone. 
                                                        
110 The name was changed to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
221 
Miheret [my translator] looked at me to start. I asked the women to share reflections 
on how the NGO worked with state offices to fight violence in their community: 
“If there is any case of rape or abuse, the community reports here 
[to the NGO]. Azeb links to the women's and children's office and 
other legal sectors. Nothing happens if you go there directly. If Azeb 
handles it, no one can stop her. Until the end result, she fights for 
the rights of women and children”. 
We listened to this and similar stories for two hours. They confirmed what we had 
heard from Azeb and representatives at the women’s and children and the justice 
bureaus. The NGO was working on women’s and children’s rights and had become a 
pillar in the local community. Azeb had worked at the women’s bureau before she 
founded the NGO and used her contacts at various state offices to facilitate her work. 
The fact that the NGO got international funding and therefore wasn’t allowed to work 
on rights based issues didn’t seem to hinder Azeb to do so anyway. 
* * * 
Introduction 
“The [charities and societies] agency is filled with party people who 
are hostile towards civil society. The director is a core TPLF member. 
This is telling. Even ordinary employees have a negative attitude 
towards civil society. Look, even to dispose property like an old 
chair, you need the approval of the agency. The level of intrusion 
and interference is immense. The agency is there to control and 
cripple civil society” (Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016). 
This chapter studies the relationships and interactions between state organisations 
and charities and societies in Ethiopia. It explores the roots of the 2009 Charities and 
Societies Proclamation (ChSP) as well as its application, to analyse how it structured 
the relationship between the state and charities and societies in Ethiopia. To 
contextualise the ChSP, the first part of the chapter briefly outlines the development 
of the relationship between the EPRDF government and charities and societies since 
1991. The second part explores the legal provisions of the ChSP, its drafting process, 
application and impact. The third part of the chapter maps and analyses interactions 




Since the adoption of the ChSP in 2009, the EPRDF has categorised civil society 
organisations falling under the proclamation into charities (third party-serving 
organisations) and societies (membership-based organisations). The first category 
includes NGOs and think tanks, for example, while the second comprises, among 
others, professional associations and mass organisations. To discuss developments 
after the passing of the ChSP, I will adhere to the EPRDF terminology to avoid 
imprecisions that can derive from using the term civil society organisation, as it 
includes both categories. Given the relatively recent history of conflict between 
charities, societies and the EPRDF regime and ensuing problems for anonymity and 
confidentiality, this chapter contains few references to specific organisations. After 
discussions with colleagues at Addis Ababa University, I decided to structure the 
analysis around the different categories of civil society organisations falling under the 
ChSP, rather than individual stories. 
In 2009, the Ethiopian government passed the ChSP restructuring large parts of 
organised civil society in Ethiopia. The proclamation prohibited the use of 
international donor funding for activities related to democracy promotion and other 
rights-based activities and redirected the operations of charities and societies 
towards development and relief activities. Research portrayed the law as a reaction 
to the involvement of a few NGOs in the 2005 election111 and an attempt to close the 
associational space for civil society to prevent organisations from promoting 
democracy (Asnake, 2011: 689f; Burgess, 2012: 166f; Sisay, 2012: 380). Dupuy et al. 
(2015: 426) went as far as to state that “The ERPDF’s real intention, after all, was to 
shut down political opposition, rather than to create a more vibrant civil society”. 
While echoing the views of many charities and societies and donor representatives 
in Ethiopia, most research failed to study the design of the ChSP and its long-term 
effects beyond the immediate political crisis of 2005 (Yitayehu, 2010: 234ff). 
My findings revealed that the definition of civil society organisations enshrined 
in the ChSP testified to years of conceptualising civil society as part of the EPRDF’s 
developmental state project. Judging by its content, the ChSP provided a legal 
                                                        
111 Around the 2005 national elections, several donor-financed NGOs were involved in voters’ 




framework that coerced charities and societies to align themselves with the EPRDF 
developmental state agenda, hence expressing the infrastructural power of the state. 
In practice, however, the ChSP was used to restrict the operations of charities and 
societies. The state body put in charge of implementing the law was, through its staff 
and ministerial association, directly linked to the Ethiopian security apparatus, and, 
therefore, the despotic power of the state. It exercised repression, prioritising the 
prevention of contestation over the mobilisation of charities and societies for the 
developmental state project. This created conflict between the regulatory body of 
charities and societies and different state organisations who wanted to cooperate 
with these organisations to implement the state’s development plans. Moreover, 
differences existed between the application of the ChSP at the national and local 
levels, providing interesting insights into the reach of the Ethiopian state, its ability 
to penetrate civil society at different administrative levels and the divergence in 
power relations between state organisations and specific charities and societies. 
A Brief History of Charities and Societies under the EPRDF Regime 
While Ethiopia has a long history of traditional community-based organisations (iddir, 
equb, debo112 etc.), formal civil society organisations primarily emerged from the 
1930s onwards. The country’s late industrialisation process and the absence of an 
enabling legal framework for setting up associations until the 1960s, explain this 
relatively late development (Clark, 2000: 4f; Proclamation No. 165, 1960: Book 1, Title 
III). The small progress made with respect to the development of civil society 
organisations during the last years of Haile Selassie’s reign was reversed by the 
military regime that overthrew the emperor in 1974. Only the initial period of the 
EPRDF’s rule was marked by a significant growth of formal civil society organisations, 
as the 1995 constitution guaranteed extensive citizens’ rights, such as the Right of 
Assembly, Demonstration and Petition (Art. 30), Freedom of Association (Art. 31), 
and the Right of Thought, Opinion and Expression (Art. 29) (Proclamation No. 1, 
1995). Reports on civil society in Ethiopia recorded this positive development, 
                                                        
112 In Ethiopia there exist different types of community-based organisations that each fulfil specific 
functions and have their particular institutional set-up. Iddirs are funerary associations, equb are credit 
groups and debo are agricultural labour groups (Pankhurst, 2008: 147). 
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predicting further improvements in the sector (Campbell, 1996: 14ff; Clark et al., 
2000; CRDA, 2006: 41f). The number of formal civil society organisations, particularly 
NGOs, grew, and their activities progressively broadened from humanitarian work to 
also encompass economic and political development agendas (Clark, 2000; Dupuy et 
al., 2015; Sisay, 2012). It is important to note that the growth of CSOs primarily took 
place in urban areas, representing the urban middle class and urban intellectual elites 
(Yitayehu, 2010: 208). As the EPRDF built its rule primarily on its rural constituency, 
this indicated the potential for conflict between state actors and CSO 
representatives. 
International donors increasingly funded civil society support programmes113, 
primarily targeting NGOs in urban areas, which had the capacity to fulfil donors’ 
administrative requirements. Instead of supporting different types of civil society 
organisations, such programmes actually stimulated a boom in the NGO sector. NGOs 
were set up as a response to the increasing volume of available funding, posing valid 
questions regarding their accountability and legitimacy (Dessalegn, 2002: 103–9). 
CSO support programmes created attractive employment opportunities, as salaries 
were high compared to other sectors, and numerous cases of corruption and 
nepotism became known, negatively affecting the image of civil society organisations 
(Butler, 1995: 68; Interviewee Nr. 7, 2015). The 1990s also saw the rise of a small 
number of human rights NGOs in Ethiopia that gained considerable capacity to lobby 
and influence policy-making (CRDA 2006, 6f; Interviewee Nr. 27 2015; Interviewee 
Nr. 29 2015). Their increasing activism led the Ministry of Justice in several instances 
to deny or cancel their licences (Brechenmacher, 2017: 67; Interviewee Nr. 115, 
2016). Interestingly, many human rights NGOs were set up by lawyers working in the 
civil service, who felt that the EPRDF was compromising the independence of the 
justice system and failing to enforce the rights of citizens114. 
                                                        
113 While the programmes were formally called “civil society support”, the more appropriate name 
would have been “NGO support” programmes, as NGOs constituted the prime beneficiary group of 
such initiatives. 
114 Although key positions in the ministry and courts from the beginning of the EPRDF rule were staffed 
with party affiliates, many civil servants working in the justice sector did not follow the EPRDF’s 
ideological agenda in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
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The relationship between the EPRDF and civil society organisations, especially 
NGOs, became increasingly strained. On the one hand, NGOs mobilised growing 
amounts of money for socioeconomic development projects, and the EPRDF 
approved of this trend as it contributed to the ruling coalition’s development 
objectives. On the other hand, the fact that some NGOs tried to influence political 
decision-making and questioned the EPRDF’s democratic character was eyed with 
suspicion. In its government plans, the EPRDF started defining NGOs as externally 
financed development agents that should not be involved in politics, whereas mass-
based and professional associations, because of their membership base, were 
portrayed as bearers of democracy and public participation (MoCB, 2004; MoFED, 
2002, 2006). While the distinction made sense on a conceptual level, it is important 
to note that many membership-based associations were closely tied to EPRDF 
structures, hence suggesting also a political reason for the categorisation. 
Given the growth and diversification of civil society organisations, state 
representatives and civil society actors judged the provisions of the civil code of 1960 
as outdated and agreed on the need for a new legal framework (Clark et al., 2000: 
18; Interviewee Nr 72, 2016; MoCB, 2004: 177). Discussions about a new civil society 
law officially started in 2000, and the Ministry of Justice set up a joint working group, 
primarily with NGOs, to discuss the new legal framework. At least three different 
draft laws were produced, including one proposed by civil society organisations, but 
the mutual mistrust foreclosed a consensus115 (Interviewee Nr. 8, 2015; Interviewee 
Nr. 32, 2015; Yitayehu, 2010: 205). State representatives felt that civil society 
organisations were unwilling to accept regulations of their operations, and civil 
society organisations in turn, feared that the EPRDF government wanted to use the 
new law to gain more control over civil society (Interviewee Nr. 23, 2015; MoCB, 
2004: 17). 
                                                        
115 I was not able to access earlier drafts for a new civil society proclamation and could thus not 
compare the earlier versions with the 2009 charities and societies proclamation. 
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The conflict between the EPRDF government and donor financed civil society 
organisations culminated in the 2005 election crisis116. Several civil society 
organisations, especially human rights NGOs but also professional associations 
representing lawyers, provided training for opposition politicians, ran voter 
education programmes, and observed the elections.117 Many of these activities were 
financed through international donors (Interviewee Nr. 30, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 36, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 158, 2015). Moreover, several NGO leaders ran as political 
candidates for the opposition and used NGOs as platforms for their election 
campaigns (Interviewee Nr. 16, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 19, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 26, 
2015). Berhanu Nega118, former chairman of the Ethiopian Economics Association 
(EEA), was one of the founders of the Movement for Democracy and Social Justice 
and Deputy Chairman of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)119. He was 
elected mayor of Addis Ababa in 2005. Berhanu’s co-chair at EEA, Befekadu Degefe, 
and Professor Mesfin Woldemariam, founder and chairman of the Ethiopian Human 
Rights Council (EHRCO), also ran for office under CUD. They were imprisoned 
together with other opposition members, NGO leaders, civil society and human rights 
activists and journalists, as part of the post-2005 election allegations and were later 
released and pardoned (Asnake, 2011: 696; Stremlau, 2011). 
The EPRDF publicly accused the opposition of trying to remove the EPRDF 
through inciting a revolution and using NGOs for their political campaigns. The former 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated on several occasions that NGOs were neoliberal 
                                                        
116 The 2005 elections are widely considered the most democratic elections held by the EPRDF. 
Contrary to the EPRDF’s expectation, it lost many votes, especially in urban areas, but even among its 
rural constituency considered the bedrock of the regime. The opposition won the majority of seats in 
Addis Ababa. The opposition and national and international election observers contested the counting 
of votes and the EPRDF government clamped down on the opposition, imprisoning numerous 
politicians, journalists and civil society activists under alleged anti-terrorism charges (Schmidt, 2005). 
117 The majority were human rights NGOs, however some professional associations participated as 
well. 
118 Berhanu Nega left Ethiopia after the 2005 election crisis and co-founded Ginbot 7, an armed 
opposition movement to the EPRDF. In 2015, he took the post as a commander in chief and led the 
fight against the EPRDF government from Eritrea (Hammer, 2016). 
119 Founded in 2004, the CUD was a coalition of four opposition parties, the All Ethiopia Unity Party, 
the Ethiopian Democratic League, the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party-Medhin, and the Rainbow 
Alliance/Movement for Democracy and Social Justice. The CUD represented the country’s urban 
middle class and some of its key differences with the EPRDF included the rejection of ethnic federalism 
on the grounds of its divisive character, the promotion of economic liberalism and the criticism of the 
EPRDF’s undemocratic rule (Berhanu, 2007). 
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agents and that his government would no longer tolerate international involvement 
in Ethiopian national politics (EPRDF, 2008b: 23; Meles, 2007; Tilahun, 2007: 24). 
According to one of the EPRDF’s official publications: 
“From the beginning, the leaders of the CUD have decreed that the 
election will follow the path of the Orange Revolution120 whereby 
they will overthrow EPRDF if possible through election and if that is 
not possible through popular revolutions on the streets. […] To 
achieve this goal, the international actors have provided material 
and technical support for the CUD leaders and created a conducive 
environment by putting a lot pressure on the government […]” 
(Tadesse, 2006). 
Realigning Charities and Societies to EPRDF Politics: A New Legal Framework 
To understand the character of the ChSP, it is important to note that it was developed 
during the period starting the operationalisation of the EPRDF’s self-proclaimed 
“democratic developmental state” programme that followed the legitimacy crisis 
revealed in the 2005 elections. Rather than on representation, the EPRDF aimed to 
build legitimacy over developmental achievements (Meles, 2006). Within the 
developmental state, NGOs, according to the EPRDF, should mobilise capital for 
development interventions (Meles, 2007), whereas mass-based associations were 
supposed to mobilise the population for economic and political development (EPRDF, 
2008c, 2008b). 
The Provisions of the Charities and Societies Proclamation 
The ChSP was passed in 2009 (Proclamation No. 621, 2009) and replaced provisions 
from the 1960 legal code that had regulated licensing and operation of civil society 
organisations since the reign of Haile Selassie (Proclamation No. 165 1960). The ChSP 
excluded only CSOs regulated by other laws (e.g. trade unions and chambers of 
commerce), religious associations and community-based associations (e.g. iddirs) 
and international/foreign organisations operating under specific bilateral 
agreements with the Ethiopian government (Proclamation No. 621, 2009: Art. 3.2.). 
                                                        
120 The EPRDF referred to the 2004/5 political protests in Ukraine, which erupted as a result of 
corruption and electoral fraud during the presidential elections. 
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Complying with the definition of civil society put forward in the EPRDF’s 
development plans (MoCB, 2004; MoFED, 2002, 2006), the ChSP categorised and 
regulated CSOs according to their (1) source of funding (foreign or local) and (2) their 
organisational structure (membership-based or not) (EPRDF, 2008a). CSOs were 
divided into charities – organisations that benefit the community/public as a whole 
(Proclamation No. 621, 2009: Art. 14) – and societies – membership-based 
organisations that work for the benefit of their members (Proclamation No. 621, 
2009: Art. 55). Furthermore, the proclamation differentiated between “Ethiopian” – 
charities and societies, whose members were Ethiopian nationals and who did not 
receive more than 10% of funds from foreign sources; “Resident” – charities and 
societies, whose members were Ethiopian nationals and received more than 10% of 
funds from foreign sources; and “Foreign” – charities, whose members were foreign 
nationals and who received funding from foreign sources (Proclamation No. 621, 
2009: Art. 2). 
According to the ChSP, the source of funding determined the type of activities 
that charities and societies could engage in. Only Ethiopian charities and societies 
were allowed to work on rights-related issues, such as:  
“The advancement of human and democratic rights, the promotion 
of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender 
and religion, the promotion of the rights of the disabled and 
children’s rights, the promotion of conflict resolution or 
reconciliation and the promotion and the efficiency of justice and 
law enforcement service” (Proclamation No. 621, 2009: Art. 14.2 j-
n).  
Resident and foreign charities and societies were limited to work on 
socioeconomic development issues, such as:  
“Poverty alleviation, disaster prevention, economic and social 
development, environmental protection, animal welfare, 
education, health, arts, culture heritage and science, sport and 
welfare of youth, relief work and capacity building” (Proclamation 
No. 621, 2009: Art. 14.2 a-i). 




“[…] If it is an organization whose leaders and members are 
Ethiopian but run by foreign finance, it will still be controlled by 
foreign forces. […] The proclamation is drafted in a way that the 
organizations that have an important role in our political activities 
are free from rent-seeking networks and requires that their source 
of income should be only their members and other Ethiopians and 
their internal organization should be democratic. […] (EPRDF, 
2008a).”  
The former Prime Minister explained that civic activism did not require funds, but 
primarily commitment, and that external finance posed a danger to locally driven 
political agendas (Meles, 2007). 
While the source of funding was the prime criterion for regulating the activities 
of charities and societies, even their organisational status had some impact. Contrary 
to Ethiopian charities, Ethiopian mass societies, such as professional and women’s 
and youth associations, were mandated to participate in the “process of 
strengthening democratisation and election[s]” (Proclamation No. 621, 2009: Art. 
57.7), including educating voters and election monitoring. Moreover, administrative 
requirements for mass societies were lower than for all other types of organisations 
regulated under the ChSP to facilitate their operations. The official reasoning for 
enabling mass societies to take on the responsibility of democracy promotion was 
that they represented their members’ interests. However, given that they were 
formally tied to EPRDF structures, there existed a political motive for this decision 
(EPRDF, 2008c, 2008a, 2011a, 2015). 
Contradicting the provisions of the Ethiopian constitution, that stipulated that 
“every person has the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose” 
(Proclamation No. 1, 1995: Art. 31), the ChSP understood freedom of association as 
a right reserved for citizens. All charities and societies (Ethiopian, resident and 
foreign) could appeal to the agency’s board regarding a decision taken by the agency, 
but only Ethiopian charities and societies “aggrieved by a decision of the board” could 
appeal to the Federal High Court (Proclamation No. 621, 2009: Art. 104). The measure 
was justified by the EPRDF in the following way: 
 “On the occasion that the association is dissolved, they cannot sue 
the government in court for a violation of their right. This is because 
these foreign organizations have an opportunity to associate given 
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by the government rather than a constitutionally provided freedom 
of association” (EPRDF, 2008a). 
Apart from the 90/10 directive (described above), another directive steering the 
operations of charities and societies was the 70/30 directive (Proclamation No. 621, 
2009: Art. 88), which regulated the ratio of administrative cost to overall budget. 
Charities and societies were not allowed to allocate more than 30% of their overall 
funds for administrative costs, to make sure that 70% of the funds were transferred 
to the community. While the official reasoning was that the provision prevented rent 
seeking (EPRDF 2008c; Interviewee Nr. 45 2016; Interviewee Nr. 44 2016b; 
Interviewee Nr. 18 2015), it posed an obstacle to the operations of charities and 
societies. Rather than enabling them to participate in the country’s development and 
work with hard to reach populations, as foreseen in the EPRDF development plans, 
the accounting discouraged such work. Expenses related to working in remote areas 
(vehicles, staff relocation etc.) were counted as administrative costs not operational 
costs, as were training, monitoring of activities and project infrastructure121. 
The Drafting Process of the Proclamation 
The drafting process for a new CSO law was launched anew in 2007 and it was 
integrated into the business process reengineering (BPR)122 at the Ministry of Justice 
(MoJ)123. While the whole process seemingly started out technocratic, in reality the 
former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was not only the “architect of the EPRDF’s civil 
society discourse” (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2015a) that differentiated between different 
types of civil society organisations and their respective roles and responsibilities in 
the developmental state project, but also the “mastermind behind the law” 
(Interviewee Nr. 8, 2016). 
As part of the BPR, a group of three lawyers was appointed to review the CSO 
registration process and to provide recommendations regarding how to improve the 
law. A lawyer representing CSOs was also allocated, but without substantially being 
                                                        
121 A resident charity reported for example not being able to remodel its office to ensure accessibility 
for handicapped persons, as the financial costs would have exceeded 30% of administrative costs in 
the budget. 
122 BPR was ongoing on a large scale in the Ethiopian civil service (Tesfaye and Atkilt, 2011). 
123 The MoJ was in charge of registering CSOs between 1991 and 2010. 
 
231 
able to influence the outcome of the drafting process. The working group was 
assigned two advisors from the civil service university, indicating that the EPRDF 
wanted to keep control over the process124, as well as several senior lawyers and 
young civil service graduates as support. Staff turnover was high because of tensions 
in the working group (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 8, 2015; Interviewee 
Nr. 10, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 23, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 50, 2016). 
The ChSP was not based on earlier drafts for a new CSO regulation and the initial 
idea according to the BPR was to revise existing legislation based on international 
best practices. The team undertook several country visits in 2007, to study CSO 
legislation in, among others, Singapore, France and Canada125. Officially, the 
Singaporean law provided the blueprint for the ChSP (Mihret, 2010: 2) and a high 
level state representative stated that “the fundamentals of the law are solid, based 
on the NGO law of Singapore” (Yamamoto, 2008f). A review of the Singaporean 
Charities Act and Societies Act suggested that, although the ChSP provided for a 
country specific approach to civil society, the Singaporean laws had inspired some 
provisions. For example, the terminology “Charities and Societies”, the stipulation of 
penalties such as fines and imprisonment for failure to comply with the law, large 
discretionary state powers with respect to licencing, as well as the confinement of 
membership in political associations to citizens, were borrowed from the 
Singaporean laws (Singapore Charities Act (Chapter 37), 1995; Singapore Societies 
Act (Chapter 311), 1966). Moreover, the travel to Singapore and the official reference 
to the country’s CSO laws indicated that the EPRDF government looked towards the 
Asian developmental states in the initial phase of operationalising its own. 
The drafting process itself was controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office. The 
head of the working group together with another group member and the Minister of 
Justice, Aseffa Kessito, had to present the drafts regularly at the Prime Minister’s 
office. The Prime Minister and his chief of staff, Berhanu Adelo, were directly involved 
in the drafting process, providing instructions for revisions and adding provisions like 
                                                        
124 The civil service university was through its leadership closely linked to the EPRDF (Interviewee Nr. 
156, 2015). In 2017, the civil service university was headed by a professor in biology, brother of the 
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desselegn. 
125 Both France and Canada were involved in the reform process at the Ministry of Justice and were 
therefore chosen as locations (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2016; Yamamoto, 2008d). 
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the 70/30 and 90/10 directive to the drafts submitted. Some of the excessive 
provisions with respect to oversight and penalties were added by the PM’s chief of 
staff, and documentation from the US embassy confirmed that the original draft of 
the ChSP did not include “the definition and restriction of NGOs receiving foreign 
funding”, nor the excessive penalties added in later drafts (Yamamoto, 2008f). While 
officially in charge of the drafting process, the working group and the Minister lacked 
clear instructions with respect to their task and had not enough political weight to 
influence the outcome of the drafting. 
The late Prime Minister did not only control the internal processes of the drafting, 
but also the external communications both with charities and societies and 
international actors. Meles Zenawi summoned representatives from charities and 
societies on several occasions to discuss the draft law, but these meetings increased 
animosity between state officials and representatives from civil society instead of 
fostering dialogue (Yamamoto, 2008d, 2008f, 2008b). According to an interviewee 
present at the meeting, “They [the CSOs] didn’t ask legal questions. They just wanted 
to remove the 70/30 and 90/10” (Interviewee Nr. 149, 2018). International actors 
tried to influence the drafting process through bilateral and multilateral meetings 
with the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and other high level state officials. The US, UK 
and French ambassadors for example met Meles on four occasions in May, June, July 
and October 2008 to discuss the drafts of the ChSP (Yamamoto, 2008b, 2008c). The 
international community tried to “kill or delay the bill”, but they also attempted to 
influence its technicalities to make it less prohibitive (Yamamoto, 2008g). While 
delaying the passing of the proclamation, international actors did not manage to 
fundamentally influence the proclamation’s content (for a timeline of the drafting 
process see Table 9) (Yamamoto, 2008d, 2008e). 
Civil society organisations had little influence on the drafting process, but the few 
exceptions provided interesting insights into the power relationships between civil 
society and the state under the EPRDF regime. The EPRDF avoided conflicts with 
organisations and actors that had the capacity to mobilise large numbers of people 
and played an important role in ensuring peace and stability in the country. Although 
the EPRDF had firmly established itself as the dominant ruler in Ethiopia, alternative 
power centres like churches and customary organisations existed. While they had 
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often been weakened and closely tied to the ruling coalition, they remained 
potentially influential (Aregawi, 2009; Markakis, 2011). 
Religious organisations were initially supposed to fall under the proclamation but 
they opposed this provision vehemently, and the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
himself decided to exclude religious organisations from the ChSP (Proclamation No. 
621, 2009: Art. 3.2 a)). As religion played an important role in the lives of most 
Ethiopians, unsettling religious organisations had the potential to vex the citizenry 
(Interviewee Nr. 1 2015a; Interviewee Nr. 8 2015; Interviewee Nr. 19 2015; 
Interviewee Nr. 10 2015)126. Moreover, a clause providing for individual exemptions 
was introduced, sometimes referred to as the “Pastor Daniel exemption”. The 
rumour was that Pastor Daniel Gebreselassie, director of the NGO Prison Fellowship, 
had obtained it thanks to his personal connections to Meles and his political weight 
as a member of the council of elders127 (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2015b). Given the 
importance of elders (shimagles) in promoting social peace and their influence on 
local communities, the EPRDF, while often trying to side-line these alternative power 
centres, avoided direct conflict with them (Gebreyesus, 2014; Getachew, 1998). 
Documents from the US embassy indicated moreover, that Meles referred to the 
exemption clause in his meeting with international representatives to resolve their 
opposition to the ChSP. He stated that INGOS could work on political issues,  
“if there is a contract between the foreign NGO and a government 
entity for a specific time period and […] the NGO would not become 
a permanent fixture or part of the political reform or advocacy 
issue” (Yamamoto, 2008d). 
                                                        
126 Although the TPLF had tried to deprive the Ethiopian Orthodox Church of power during the armed 
struggle, it realised later that such a strategy risked “upsetting religious-minded peasants” (Young, 
1997: 97). Instead it forged close bonds with churches and religious organisations to prevent 
contestation and ensure their support. During the 2015/17 political crisis, the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church played an important role in discouraging political protests. In public prayers, it disseminated 
messages condemning protesters as sinners and praised socioeconomic development successes of the 
EPRDF government. 
127 The councils of elders (shimaglewoch) in Ethiopia are customary institutions that act as mediators 
between two parties in conflict and their decisions are recognised by formal courts. They exist in 
different regions and have significant social and political influence on communities (Gebreyesus, 2014; 
Getachew, 1998). Despite the centralisation of state power under the EPRDF rule, elders have 
remained important political figures, especially in rural areas, and their support to the regime has 
proven crucial (Aregawi, 2009: 227). After the 2005 political crisis, a council of elders, including 
personalities like the former Harvard scholar Ephraim Isaac and Pastor Daniel, mediated between the 
imprisoned opposition politicians and the EPRDF (Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016; Yonas, 2014: 36). 
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Despite repeated attempts of the international donor community and charities 
and societies in Ethiopia to influence the provisions of the proclamation, the 
Ethiopian parliament (House of Federation) passed the bill in January 2009 
(Yamamoto, 2008h, 2009b; Yitayehu, 2010: 223f). According to documentation from 
the US embassy in Addis Ababa, the EPRDF government exercised pressure to ensure 
the passing of the bill. Documents stated: 
“The ruling party has recently convened its parliamentarians to 
indoctrinate them on the party’s version of reality in which civil 
society groups are ‘neo-liberal rent seekers’ doing the bidding of the 
west to undermine the ruling party’s democratic and development 
agenda. […] Speaker of Parliament Teshome Toga asserted that 
‘there is no doubt that the law will pass because there is already 
consensus within the ruling party’” (Yamamoto, 2008i). 
Table 9: Timeline of the Drafting Process of the ChSP 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
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The Establishment and Operation of the Charities and Societies Agency 
The state body put in charge of implementing the ChSP was called the Charities and 
Societies Agency (ChSA) and was established in 2009. The ChSA was bestowed with 
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substantial powers, including a quasi-judicial status deriving from its mandate to 
charge penalties. The agency acted as an investigator and prosecutor at the same 
time and, apart from the courts, it was the only state organisation allowed to freeze 
financial assets (Fieldnotes, 2016h; Interviewee Nr. 106, 2016). The ChSA had the 
power to interfere in charities’ and societies’ internal affairs, for example through 
participation in their general assembly meetings (Regulation No. 168, 2009: 3, Art. 
24). Moreover, charities and societies were not allowed to dispose of any property 
or asset, and the ChSA could at any time demand them to submit written 
documentation on their work (Directive No. 6, 2011). 
The PMO oversaw the establishment of the agency and validated directives and 
regulations produced as part of the operationalisation of the ChSP (Directive No. 3, 
2011; Directive No. 4, 2011; Directive No. 5, 2011; Directive No. 6, 2011; Directive 
No. 7, 2011; Directive No. 8, 2011; Proclamation No. 621, 2009). The ChSA’s first 
director Ali Siraj and his deputy Atkilt Gidey, together with other high officials, were 
responsible for the staffing of the agency. The core team members left the working 
group between June and August 2009 and eventually also the civil service. Primarily, 
the junior team members helped with the set-up of the agency, the preparation of 
documentation, directives and regulations and the training of agency staff. They also 
supervised the initial re-registration process (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2018; Interviewee 
Nr. 8, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 50, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 149, 2018). 
Several interviewees held that the agency was affiliated to the Ethiopian security 
apparatus (Interviewee Nr. 32, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 58, 2016). While difficult to 
corroborate with certainty, some of the interviewees who had been or were working 
at the ChSA held that after its establishment, the ChSA was partly staffed with recruits 
from the police, the national security service and the EPRDF politburo (Interviewee 
Nr. 106, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 149, 2018). The affiliation of the ChSA was transferred 
from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Federal Affairs in 2010 (Proclamation 
No. 691, 2010), also indicating a link to the Ethiopian security apparatus128 
(Interviewee Nr. 10, 2015; Yohannes, 2013a, 2013b). Since 2012 it was led by Meseret 
                                                        
128 The Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Affairs was responsible for internal security questions, 
overseeing the police and prisons and being tightly linked to the security agency. 
 
236 
Gebremariam, a former TPLF and EPRDF council member, former head of the 
Regional Security and Administration Bureau in Tigray and board member of the 
Tigrayan veterans association (Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016). The change of ChSA 
directors was a clear indication that the handling of civil society was considered a 
security issue and a move away from addressing civil society concerns as part of the 
developmental state project. While Ali Siraj was said to have operationalised the 
ChSP and executed Meles’ instructions regarding human rights NGOs and others 
active during the 2005 elections, Meseret Gebremariam went much further targeting 
charities and societies irrespective of their history, mandate and political activity 
(Interviewee Nr. 1, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 149, 2018). 
Given the increasing securitisation of civil society, research on the topic was 
perceived as very sensitive. Three out of four interviewees working at the ChSA in 
2015/16 preferred not to be interviewed at the office. They held that research on the 
proclamation and the agency was seen as political and that their participation in 
interviews could potentially pose problems for them. A ChSA board member abruptly 
ended an interview asking not to be quoted on any information shared. During the 
only interview carried out at the agency, the interviewee asked his two assistants to 
join, who took notes on the conversation. The interviewee stated false facts and was 
unwilling to provide the documentation I requested (Interviewee Nr. 45 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 44 2016d; Interviewee Nr. 18 2015; Interviewee Nr. 106 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 152 2018). 
According to civil servants working at and with the ChSA, the agency provided 
reliable services to charities and societies. Registration was said to be quick and 
regular services like monitoring of organisations’ activities were provided to help 
them improve their operations. All ChSA employees stated that no charity or society 
was discriminated against and that they interpreted the law in favour of them, not 
against them. While the interviewees stated that the law had improved the 
operations of charities and societies, their attitudes, especially towards foreign and 
resident charities, were very negative and they expressed a need for control over 
organisations’ operations. Interviewees held that most foreign and resident charities 
were rent seekers and many tried to illegally work on political issues with 
international donor finance. They recited the EPRDF discourse on “neoliberal and 
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rent seeking” organisations (EPRDF, 2008a; Meles, 2007), rather than reflecting on 
the role of charities and societies in the developmental state project that was 
detailed in development plans and the ChSP. Some suggested the need for even 
stricter legislation and higher punishments. None of the employees interviewed had 
a background in law and they lacked knowledge and understanding about the law, all 
providing differing interpretations of its provisions (Interviewee Nr. 44 2016d, 2016c, 
2016b, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 45 2016; Interviewee Nr. 18 2015; Interviewee Nr. 106 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 50 2016). 
According to most charities and societies interviewed, the agency did not apply 
the law but ruled by exception. Granting of licences and accepting charities’ and 
societies’ annual reporting depended on personal connections and organisations’ 
history rather than on the organisations’ adherence to the law (Interviewee Nr. 5, 
2015; Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016). Staff at the agency lacked 
competence and high staff turnover meant that charities and societies needed to deal 
with different officers on a regular basis (Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 
58, 2016). Desk officers interpreted the ChSP in different ways, rendering reporting 
cumbersome129 (Interviewee Nr. 69, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 71, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
86, 2016). Although a history of political activism in many cases explained difficulties 
in obtaining and renewing licences, with the exception of Ethiopian societies, most 
charities and societies reported problems in their dealings with the agency. 
While the agency’s vice-director was perceived as more open towards civil 
society than the director, she lacked influence on the organisation’s decision-making 
process (Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017). In 2016, the agency 
ranked charities and societies according to their performance from A to C and out of 
2191 organisations only 191 charities and societies scored A, 673 scored B, and the 
rest 1327 scored C (Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum, 2016a). No information 
about the criteria used for the ranking was shared with the charities and societies 
and many expressed their concern that the agency could use the ranking to take 
actions against them whenever it felt fit (Fieldnotes, 2016h; Interviewee Nr. 25, 2016; 
                                                        
129 For example, some desk officers calculated the 70/30 directives over the lifetime of a project, 
others per year and they differed regarding the accounting of costs under operational and 
administrative budget lines. 
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Interviewee Nr. 109, 2016). Some charities and societies made attempts to improve 
the relationship with the agency, by inviting officers to visit their projects, but without 
resulting in tangible improvements. An interviewee working at a resident charity 
explained:  
“We are demonstrating the contribution of CSOs to the agency. We 
took the agency to the field to see them what is happening. Nothing 
is changing although the middle management see the positive 
times. We initiated the parliamentarians to go and see. The 
parliamentarians say a lot. The politics is handling them. They 
cannot do much” (Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017). 
Observations and interviews corroborated the narrative provided by charities 
and societies. The federal auditor general's report 2010/2013 on the ChSA provided 
further insights into the administrative capacity of the agency. The report stated that 
the agency did not coherently apply the law and that high staff turnover led to lack 
of skills among agency staff. It further revealed that roughly fifty percent of the staff 
at the agency had never undergone university training, and only 2.8% of the 
employees had obtained a Master's Degree and 47.7% a first degree. Contrary to its 
duties, the agency did not provide regular feedback to charities and societies on their 
reporting, nor did it offer adequate training in these matters. It failed to communicate 
with other state organisations in charge of overseeing the work of charities and 
societies. Documentation and knowledge management were found to be insufficient 
and in many instances the ChSA did not enforce the law (Federal Auditor General, 
2014). 
According to the ChSP, charities and societies could appeal the decisions of 
employees at the ChSA through contacting its board. However, few of such cases 
were known and, according to the interviews conducted, none had led to the reversal 
of a decision taken by the agency staff (Interviewee Nr. 25, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 48, 
2016a; Interviewee Nr. 58, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 116, 2016). Only two of the seven 
board members were from charities and societies (Proclamation No. 621, 2009: Art. 
8) and the directors of the organisations were closely affiliated to the EPRDF. One 
was a former civil servant in a high-level position in a regional state, the other one 
used to be a board member of a key national public organisation and a regional 
development association. The second of the civil society representatives seldom 
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attended board meetings, however on request of the ChSA director the charities and 
societies representatives were re-appointed after their first term (Interviewee Nr. 43, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 69, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 109, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 152, 
2018). 
The Impact of the Proclamation on Civil Society, Donors and the State 
The most visible impact of the ChSP was the sharp decline in the number of 
organisations in the category of Ethiopian charities, primarily human rights NGOs. 
Unable to substitute international funding with local funding, some closed down their 
activities, others changed their mandate to development activities and registered as 
resident charities in order to apply for international grants (Interviewee Nr. 24, 2015; 
Interviewee Nr 29, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 154, 2015). 
Ethiopian societies, were somewhat better able to deal with the ChSP, than 
Ethiopian charities. However, within the category there existed differences, 
especially between Ethiopian societies and Ethiopian mass societies. The latter 
benefitted from preferential treatment by the ChSA due to their direct link to state 
and EPRDF structures (EPRDF, 2008c). However, the capacity of many mass societies 
remained very low due to lack of financial and human resources and most were 
unable to use their extensive mandate granted by the ChSP and detailed in the EPRDF 
documents. Ethiopian mass societies were sometimes able to negotiate exemptions 
for foreign funding of parts of their activities, but such practices were not 
institutionalised, meaning that they depended on a case-by-case negotiation and that 
privileges could easily be revoked (Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 137, 
2017). 
The large majority of organisations in the agency’s register in 2016 were resident 
charities, followed by foreign charities, primarily constituted of NGOs and some think 
tanks focused on socioeconomic development activities (Interviewee Nr. 69, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 155, 2015). While foreign and resident charities were working in 
areas of the developmental state project sanctioned by the EPRDF, they reported 
significant problems regarding their operation due to mistrust from state offices 
(Interviewee Nr. 68, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 133, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 152, 2018). 
This suggested that security concerns took primacy over developmental concerns. 
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Activities of several human rights NGOs and professional associations engaged in the 
2005 elections, the impact of the ChSP on them and their strategies adopted to deal 
with the 2009 proclamation are outlined in Table 10 below. 
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Table 10: Organisations Particularly Affected by the Implementation of the ChSP 
 Work before 2009 Activities/role during the 2005 elections and the 
post-election crisis 






 EWLA was founded by a former High Court 
judge as part of a project financed by the 
Swedish Development Cooperation. As a 
women’s rights organisation it provided legal 
aid services and counselling to women. EWLA 
became known for its influence on the revision 
of the Ethiopian family code and its women’s 
rights activism. The Ministry of Justice in the 
early 2000s tried to close EWLA, however the 
decision was annulled by a court ruling. EWLA 
used to have branch offices in eight regions. 
EWLA promoted women’s political participation in 
the elections. It provided trainings to female 
politicians, lobbied parties to increase the number 
of female candidates, carried out voters’ education 
for women and organised debates with political 
candidates to discuss women’s rights. Its former 
executive director went into exile in 2009, fearing 
repercussions for her activism. 
EWLA registered as an Ethiopian charity and 
has been carrying out the same functions as 
before the proclamation, although at reduced 
capacity. Its work has focused on provision of 
legal aid rather than women’s rights activism. 
EWLA had to close several of its branch offices 
and reduce staff drastically. It had its accounts 
frozen and international donor money 
confiscated in the course of the enforcement of 






APAP was formed and driven by lawyers, many 
of whom were (former) civil servants. It used to 
provide legal aid, human rights education, 
conduct research and carry out trainings in 
rights related matters.  
During the 2005 elections, APAP together with ERIS 
(Electoral Reform International Services)131, ran the 
federal secretariat for voter education. Its 
members were engaged in providing training and 
awareness raising and APAP disseminated 
information about the elections country-wide. 
APAP also participated in the complaint tracking 
from the opposition party after the elections.  
APAP registered as a resident charity working 
on education and health issues. Given its 
resident status it has not been allowed to work 
on rights related issues anymore. APAP has 
struggled financially and also in terms of human 




OSJE was founded by lawyers, many of whom 
were (former) civil servants, and used to work 
on civic and legal empowerment, human rights 
OSJE carried out election observation during the 
2005 elections and released reports in the 
aftermath of the elections on election fraud and 
When OSJE heard about the freezing of EWLA’s 
and HRCO’s funds, it decided to register as a 
resident charity to guarantee its income. It 
                                                        
130 The freezing of EWLA’s funds testified to a retroactive application of the ChSP, as the international donor funds in question had been obtained before the enforcement of 
the proclamation. EWLA was allowed to withdraw money from the frozen account, as long as it did not exceed 10% of its overall budget. The high level of inflation contributed 
to a continuing decrease of real value of the funds. 





advocacy, capacity building and research in 
rights related areas.  
post-election violence. OSJE, in collaboration with 
other NGOs, filed a complaint against the national 
election board (NEBE) at the Ethiopian High Court, 
against NEBE’s banning of NGOs as election 
observers. The high court decided in the NGOs' 
favour. The former director was imprisoned for 2 
years and left Ethiopia upon his release. 
 
consequently had to change its name, as the 
word “justice” referred to rights related 
activities. OSJE was called OSD (Organisation 
for Social Development) and has since 2009 
been working on private sector related matters 





EHRCO was founded to report on and monitor 
the human rights situation in Ethiopia. Apart 
from monitoring and conducting studies, 
EHRCO also provided trainings on human rights 
related issues both to the citizenry as well as 
government employees.  
During the 2005 elections, EHRCO deployed several 
hundred election observers all over the country. Its 
former chairman ran for an opposition party and 
was imprisoned as part of the post-2005 election 
crack-down. 
EHRCO had to change its name to HRCO 
(Human Rights Council) due to the ChSP 
provision stipulating that only organisations 
operating in five of the country’s 9 regions 
were allowed to use “Ethiopian” in their name. 
It registered as an Ethiopian charity and 
continued its human rights advocacy post-ChSP 
and published reports on human rights 
violations in Ethiopia. Like EWLA it had funds 
frozen that it had received from international 
donors before the passing of the ChSP. HRCO’s 
capacity was reduced and it had to close branch 
offices and let staff go. The government 
attempted several times to infiltrate the 
organisation to align it to the state agenda, 




The EBA was a professional association, 
established to represent the interests of 
lawyers in Ethiopia. Progressively it also 
provided free legal aid to people in need and 
engaged in advocacy on rights related 
questions. 
Several of EBA’s members worked as election 
observers and represented the opposition leaders 
that were imprisoned in the aftermath of the 2005 
elections.  
EBA had to change its name to ELA (Ethiopian 
Lawyers Association) post-2009. It was 
informed that another organisation – EPRDF 
affiliated lawyers – had already claimed the 
name bar association. It is registered as an 
Ethiopian society and continued to function 
both as a representative for lawyers and as a 
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CSO engaged in legal aid and the promotion of 







The CCRDA was established as an NGO 
umbrella organisation. Initially coordinating 
humanitarian relief work during the famines, 
CCRDA acquired a pivotal role in the Ethiopian 
civil society landscape, actively engaging for the 
rights of its members and on political issues.  
CRDA organised a NGO taskforce to monitor the 
elections. The former chairman of CCRDA ran for 
the CUD and was imprisoned as part of the post-
2005 election crack-down.  
Since its change in leadership after the 
elections, CCRDA has been closely affiliated to 
the EPRDF. It was elected as member of the 
ChSA board and has still been playing a pivotal 
role in coordinating the NGO landscape, 
however in a way that aligned CSO activities 
with EPRDF priorities. The organisation has 
grown considerably and has focused on 
development related issues given its status as a 






EEA was founded to represent the profession of 
economists in Ethiopia. It used to produce 
independent research on socioeconomic 
development issues in Ethiopia and was known 
for its critical analysis of EPRDF policies. It 
organised televised debates discussing 
government plans, reaching a large audience in 
urban areas.  
During the 2005 elections, EEA as an organisation 
was not active. However, EEA’s chairman and vice-
chairman ran for political office. Its chairman 
became mayor of Addis Ababa, but was 
imprisoned as part of the post-2005 election crack-
down. After his release, the former chairman 
became professor at Bucknell University in the US. 
He was cofounder of Ginbot 7, an armed rebel 
movement operating from Eritrea, and became its 
head in 2015.  
EEA registered as a resident society still 
producing research on socioeconomic 
development in Ethiopia. However, EEA’s work 
became less outspokenly critical of the EPRDF. 
Despite its focus on socioeconomic 
development and clear distance from political 
activism, EEA has been struggling to operate 
due to problems obtaining its licence.  
 
Sources: (Interviewee Nr. 23, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 30, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 35, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 36, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 37, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
48, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 117, 2016)
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The ability of international donors to fund democracy promotion and human 
rights advocacy for charities and societies diminished significantly because of the 
ChSP (Interviewee Nr. 21, 2015), but according to donor representatives, the total 
amount of aid channelled through charities and societies continued increasing 
(Fieldnotes, 2016i). Moreover, the EU and the World Bank managed to negotiate 
exemptions from the ChSP and were allowed to finance Ethiopian charities and 
societies working on democracy promotion and other rights based activities132 
(Brechenmacher, 2017: 84f; Gebre, 2016). While funding exemptions saved 
organisations like EWLA (Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association), ELA (Ethiopian 
Lawyers Association) and HRCO (Human Rights Council), the ChSA and other state 
organisations were involved in overseeing the implementation of the programmes, 
limiting the donors ability to work on issues or with organisations perceived as 
sensitive and/or political by the EPRDF (Interviewee Nr. 2, 2015a; Interviewee Nr. 10, 
2015). 
The human rights NGOs and professional associations active during the 2005 
elections were hit particularly hard by the ChSP. However, despite Meles’ suggestion, 
that “[…] over 90 percent of NGOs will not be affected, only those NGOs/CSOs involved 
in domestic political activities” (Yamamoto, 2008c), my research revealed that the 
operational environment became difficult for most charities and societies, with the 
exception of Ethiopian mass societies (see Table 11). The majority of resident, 
Ethiopian and foreign charities reported problems regarding the ChSP and its 
directives (Interviewee Nr. 69, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 146, 
2017). In the eyes of ChSA, most resident and foreign charities and societies became 
potential suspects of illegally working on rights related issues and the use of words 
like “advocacy” or “empowerment” by these organisations sufficed to raise suspicion 
and trigger reprimand (Interviewee Nr. 36, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 134, 2017; 
Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017). Moreover, the ChSA suspected Ethiopian charities of 
illegally using international funding (Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 90, 
                                                        
132 Officially the EU’s civil society fund, the CSF II, was granted an exemption on the grounds of the 
Cotonou agreement, according to which EU funded projects were considered 3rd country money 
(hence local money not international funding). However, it seemed that, rather than technical 
justifications, the amount of financial support provided by the World Bank and the European Union, 
equipped them with a leverage during the negotiations for the exemption of their civil society funds. 
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2016). Instead of effectively reducing financial mismanagement, the interpretation 
of the 70/30 directive meant that most charities and societies found it difficult, for 
example, to invest in construction of accessible office spaces, in training of staff and 
monitoring of their activities. Moreover, it restricted their ability to work in remote 
areas, because most costs associated with travel, communication and project 
infrastructure had to be accounted for on the 30% operational budget. 
Table 11: Mandate and funding sources of charities and societies according to the ChSP and 
relationship to ChSA 
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Some resident and some foreign charities managed to negotiate an exemption 
from the ChSP (Interviewee Nr. 11, 2015). While the exemption allowed these 
organisations to work on rights related topics with foreign funding, in exchange they 
had to renounce from publicly criticising the EPRDF. This meant that an organisation 
could for example work on conflict resolution and justice issues, but without 
questioning the EPRDF’s rule (Interviewee Nr. 19, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 26, 2015; 
Interviewee Nr. 131, 2016). Resident and foreign charities that had received an 
exemption tried to use their contacts to influence state organisations, but many 
people held that the organisations in question were in fact co-opted by the EPRDF 
(Interviewee Nr. 9 2015; Interviewee Nr. 29 2015). To receive an exemption, resident 
and foreign charities needed to sign an agreement with a state organisation, which 
in practice meant the Ministries of Federal Affairs and of Foreign Affairs and the 
Prime Minister’s office. The process of receiving an exemption differed between 
organisations and involved long negotiations. Several resident charities working on 
questions related to peace and justice obtained an exemption because their board 
members were also members of councils of elders and therefore respected 
traditional leaders133. Foreign charities relied on high level EPRDF contacts for this 
matter (Interviewee Nr. 6, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 19, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 116, 
2016). The agency was not mandated to oversee the work of organisations that had 
received an exemption, meaning that they were operating in a legal vacuum, in which 
privileges could be revoked and organisations had no legal means to contest such 
decisions (Interviewee Nr. 124, 2016). 
The fact that the ChSA used the proclamation and its directive to restrict the work 
of charities and societies, with the exception of mass societies, rather than mobilising 
them for developmental efforts, caused conflict with other state organisations that 
relied on charities and societies in their operations (Interviewee Nr. 13, 2015). 
However, given the head’s position in the EPRDF and the agency’s link to the security 
apparatus, it exercised more power than many ministries134 (Interviewee Nr. 48, 
                                                        
133 For a discussion on council of elders see footnote 128. 
134 The power of public officials, and related to that of the state organisations they were leading, 
depended on an individual’s position within the EPRDF. The higher the ranking in the EPRDF hierarchy, 
the larger the power it could exercise vis-à-vis other public organisations. 
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2016a; Interviewee Nr. 68, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 109, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 111, 
2016). Many civil servants in ministerial positions and advisers to the Prime Minister 
were not able to force the agency to change its decisions (Fieldnotes, 2016h; 
Interviewee Nr. 28, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 71, 2016). Two interviewees working at 
resident charities explained: 
“No one dares to touch Meseret, he can do whatever he wants. You 
need to look at the party hierarchy, this is what determines who 
decides, not your position in the government. You see, someone like 
Meseret, even a minister cannot tell him what to do” (Interviewee 
Nr. 111, 2016). “Two of our senior members are advisers to the 
prime minister. They are trying their best to help us, but they 
cannot. They got our accounts reopened when the agency blocked 
them. But Meseret doesn’t give us our licence and they can’t help 
with that” (Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016a). 
Multiple cases existed where the agency restricted the operations of resident and 
foreign charities, but also Ethiopian societies that worked jointly with state 
organisations. A well-known example concerned a key partner of the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) and the Ministry for Finance and Economic Cooperation 
(MoFEC). The agency wanted to force the organisation to switch its status from 
resident charity (foreign funded and third party serving) to Ethiopian society (locally 
funded and membership serving), although the organisation was working on 
development research, not rights related/political issues. Even high level government 
officials were unable to solve the problem in favour of the resident charity in question 
(Interviewee Nr. 48 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 72 2016; Interviewee Nr. 35 2016). A 
foreign charity partnering with the MoFEC and providing substantial funds for 
development projects had to leave the country as the agency revoked its licence and 
despite attempts, the MoFEC was not able to reverse the agency's decision 
(Interviewee Nr. 28, 2015). The Ministry of Health (MoH) was told off for channelling 
foreign funds to an Ethiopian society in an attempt to circumvent the 90/10 provision 
and had to withdraw the funds it had transferred to the organisation in question 
(Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016a). Moreover, another of the MoH’s partners, a consortium 
of resident and foreign charities, was unable to receive its project funding from a 
foreign charity, as the ChSA prohibited sub-granting between charities/societies 
(Interviewee Nr. 152, 2018). The Ministry of Justice struggled to provide legal aid to 
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poor people, as many of its key civil society partners in this work had been heavily 
affected by the ChSP. Those that were registered as Ethiopian charities and societies 
lacked financial resources and many had registered as resident charities and were 
not allowed to work on the issue any longer (Interviewee Nr. 30, 2015; Interviewee 
Nr. 37, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016). 
The agency exercised much power at the federal level, ensuring that state 
organisations did not help charities and societies to circumvent the ChSP. It 
prohibited federal state bureaus for example to work on rights related issues 
together with resident charities and societies, even where state offices were 
interested in such cooperation (Interviewee Nr. 74, 2016). An interviewee working 
for a resident charity explained: 
“During the first years we designed projects with human rights 
components and collaborated with government bodies to 
implement the projects. They did the human rights components, for 
example human rights trainings. Now the government bureaus 
don’t want to do that anymore. The bureaus said that they have 
been given a warning by the agency. They are not allowed to do 
human rights activities with NGO money” (Interviewee Nr. 36, 
2016). 
Given its limited capacity to oversee the work of the over 3000 organisations 
registered by it, the agency had less influence on the work of charities and societies 
at the local level. Many state organisations at the local level depended on charities 
and societies for meeting their development targets assigned as part of the 
operationalisation of the developmental state135. They cooperated particularly with 
resident charities in the provision of public services, but also in addressing selected 
rights based issues, such as domestic violence and female genital mutilation that 
were officially reserved for Ethiopian charities and societies only (Interviewee Nr. 
141, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 142, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 143, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 
155, 2015). The ability of resident charities and societies to bring in international 
                                                        
135 A problem of decentralisation in Ethiopia was that although the provision of public services such as 
health and education had been delegated to the woreda level, the majority of the domestic revenue, 
foreign aid and FDI was collected and spent at the federal level (Markakis, 2011: 241). This created a 
mismatch between obligations and financial capacity of local state organisations, leading them to turn 
to civil society organisations for support in the implementation of development plans. 
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donor money provided them with negotiation power vis-à-vis state officials and led 
to a more flexible interpretation of the 70/30 and 90/10 directive at the local level, 
to ensure that they could operate and jointly address development challenges with 
state organisations (Interviewee Nr. 138, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017; 
Interviewee Nr. 146, 2017). Conflicts among state organisations indicated the 
existence of disagreements over the role of charities and societies in the 
operationalisation of the developmental state programme. While almost all state 
officials held that charities and societies should not work on political issues with 
donor money, many agreed on the need to work jointly with these organisations in 
the implementation of development initiatives. 
From Co-optation to Contestation – The EPRDF and Charities and Societies 
As described above, the EPRDF government established tight control over charities 
and societies licensed through the ChSP. While Ethiopian charities were most heavily 
affected, most resident and foreign charities and societies encountered problems in 
their operations and only Ethiopian societies, particularly Ethiopian mass societies, 
operated relatively unaffected but still at low capacity. Security concerns took 
precedence over development concerns and rather than mobilising charities and 
societies effectively as part of the developmental state project, most organisations 
were struggling with the new legal provisions. However, despite the general 
perception that civil society had been entirely silenced by the ChSP, interactions 
between charities and societies and state organisations reached from co-optation to 
contestation over various forms of cooperation and coexistence. Bargaining and 
conflict between representatives from civil society and state organisations often took 
place in the grey zone of politics and were thus not easily observable. 
Co-optation 
Interviews revealed, that co-optation was assumed by default and many charities and 
societies were said to help the EPRDF government control the citizens of Ethiopia. 
This had negative consequences for the perceived legitimacy and credibility of these 
 
250 
organisations, leading to weakened linkages with their constituents (Gebre, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 116, 2016). An interviewee claimed: 
“The government supports only civil society organisation that are in 
line with government policies. Moreover, it creates parallel civil 
society organisations. Youth and women’s organisations, the one to 
five and many more. These organisations are not voluntary 
organised. They are created by the government for the government. 
They respond to party interests. Some are detrimental for the social 
fabric of society. They are used as means of control” (Interviewee 
Nr. 85, 2016). 
Evidence confirmed that state organisations had in many cases infiltrated existing 
charities and societies - sometimes through forceful restructuring - as well as set up 
EPRDF controlled associations. This was particularly true for Ethiopian societies, but 
also resident charities and societies and to a lesser degree Ethiopian and foreign 
charities (Interviewee Nr. 30, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 117, 2016). EPRDF documents 
detailed how the leadership of women and youth organisations was controlled by 
representatives from the EPRDF women and youth leagues and acknowledged that 
these mass organisations were used for party recruitment (EPRDF, 2006, 2008b, 
2011b, 2013b). A document stated: 
“In the same manner that EPRDF uses leagues as schools for 
recruiting members and future leadership for the party, mass 
organizations are stages which leagues use for recruiting members 
and prepare them for membership. […] they [members of the 
leagues] will be the ones who lead the mass organisations” (EPRDF, 
2008c). 
Oftentimes leadership positions of charities and societies were filled with 
individuals affiliated to the EPRDF and/or former civil servants136. Moreover, several 
organisations also had acting state and EPRDF officials on their boards and steering 
committees137 (Interviewee Nr. 133, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 135, 2017; Interviewee 
                                                        
136 Some well-known examples were the ECSF (Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum), UEWCA 
(Union of Ethiopian Women Charitable Associations), CCRDA (Consortium of Christian Relief & 
Development Associations), NEWA (Network of Ethiopian Women's Associations), AEMFI (Association 
of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions) and PHE-Ethiopia (Ethiopia Population, Health, and 
Environment Consortium). 
137 Azeb Mesfin (widow of Meles Zenawi and TPLF central committee member) and Aster Mamo 
(former deputy Prime Minister and OPDO central committee member) sat on the board of the National 
Coalition for Women Against HIV/Aids. 
 
251 
Nr. 138, 2017). Citizens repeatedly expressed doubts regarding the independence of 
charities and societies and provided detailed information on the political background 
of organisations’ leaders (Interviewee Nr. 43, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 116, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016). Although an open secret to 
many Ethiopians, interviewees working in charities and societies often denied their 
connection to EPRDF structures and/or state organisations. 
The overlap of state and civil society structures favoured an alignment of the 
agendas of charities and societies to the EPRDF agenda. Organisations often acted as 
gap-fillers in service provision where government resources were not sufficient 
(Interviewee Nr. 30, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016) and, 
in several cases, state offices used charities and societies to control the population. 
For example, one of the resident charities interviewed provided information about 
their members to state offices and linked them to EPRDF controlled societies like the 
scouts or other mass associations (Interviewee Nr. 134, 2017). During the 2015/18 
protests, some state offices mobilised resident charities and Ethiopian mass societies 
for diffusing political tension and to calm the protests (Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017). 
Especially at the local level, many resident charities interviewed expressed support 
for the EPRDF agenda, instead of questioning their mobilisation for EPRDF purposes 
(Fieldnotes, 2016i; Interviewee Nr. 133, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 135, 2017; Interviewee 
Nr. 136, 2017). 
Several resident charities interviewed reported that the state organisations had 
the power to influence their internal decisions (Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016) and 
demand services that benefitted the state rather than the organisations’ constituents 
(Fieldnotes, 2017). Refusing demands from state offices was not an option given the 
potential negative repercussions from such actions. Examples ranged from financing 
government meetings (Interviewee Nr. 136, 2017) and disseminating messages for 
the government (Interviewee Nr. 144, 2017) to participating in government events 
(Interviewee Nr. 34, 2015). In some cases - through their participation in beneficiary 
selection - state officials diverted the resources of charities to target certain social 
groups for political purposes (Fieldnotes 2017; Interviewee Nr. 142 2017; Interviewee 
Nr. 138 2017) or demanded organisations to help raise resources from their 
constituents for state projects (Ghetenet, 2015). Ethiopian societies that were tied 
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into EPRDF structures negated allegations of state influence, participating in 
concealing the EPRDF’s hidden transcripts of control. While most state officials 
working at federal level denied control over charities and societies (Interviewee Nr. 
50, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 84, 2016), local civil servants were more open to 
acknowledging such practices (Interviewee Nr. 142, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 144, 2017). 
One interviewee even stated “[…] we consider CSOs as a department of our office” 
(Interviewee Nr. 143, 2017). 
After the 2005 elections that revealed the existence of grievances among 
citizens, the EPRDF government established official consultation structures with 
charities and societies it considered important for the realisation of the 
developmental state programme, the so-called people’s wing (ye hizib kinf). 
Participation was not public, instead state offices chose the organisations that would 
be included. According to civil servants, the “peoples’ wings” allowed charities and 
societies to participate in monitoring of government performance, to provide input 
into policies and strategic documents and to get access to decision-making structures 
and processes (Interviewee Nr 18 2015; Interviewee Nr. 105 2016; EPRDF 2006b). 
While Ethiopian mass societies held that such meetings granted them influence on 
policy making, many resident and some Ethiopian charities reported that the 
meetings were used to disseminate political messages and enforce EPRDF directives. 
Instead of constituting safety valves through which demands in society could be 
expressed, the people’s wings meetings served to exercise control (Interviewee Nr. 
54, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 137, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 138, 2017). 
While interactions testifying to co-optation were more frequent for those 
organisations directly controlled through the EPRDF, especially Ethiopian mass 
societies and EPRDF-affiliated resident charities and societies, even more 
independent Ethiopian and resident charities and societies often had to give in to 
state demands. Thanks to the exercise of infrastructural power, the EPRDF was able 
to influence the activities of charities and societies affiliated to the ruling coalition, 
whereas it relied on the threat to use despotic power to force more independent 
organisations to obey. While allowing state actors to control actions of charities and 
societies, the increased presence of the state in civil society led to a blurring of 
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boundaries between the two spheres and rendered state structures accessible for 
charities/societies. 
Cooperation 
Interactions testifying to cooperation took diverse forms. While often the state had 
more power to influence the terms of interactions than charities and societies, this 
did not mean that organisations had to consent with terms set by the state. Instead 
they often identified areas of common interest, or “created” areas of shared interest 
- phrasing their work as part of the EPRDF developmental state discourse – to 
negotiate with state actors. The mutually beneficial character of cooperation did not 
mean that both parties had to benefit to the same degree, or at the same time. Often 
charities and societies agreed to terms for cooperation set by the state, to foster trust 
that would eventually allow them to operate more freely. 
While cooperation with state officials was described as difficult by many charities 
and societies operating at the federal level, especially resident and foreign ones 
(Interviewee Nr. 68, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 86, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016), 
cooperation was often perceived as mutually beneficial at woreda and kebele level 
(Interviewee Nr. 124, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 138, 2017). Local state officials often 
appreciated the work of charities and societies (Interviewee Nr. 141, 2017; 
Interviewee Nr. 142, 2017) whereas federal state officials were more likely to express 
criticism towards the work of such organisations (Interviewee Nr. 50, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 84, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 105, 2016). Especially at kebele level, state 
organisations lacked resources for providing public services and often relied on 
charities and societies, particularly resident ones, in these matters. Consequently, 
many kebele officials interviewed wanted to see charities and societies more active 
(Interviewee Nr. 143, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 144, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 145, 2017) 
and organisations used the state’s need for funds to negotiate more space for their 
work (Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 146, 2017). 
Although many charities and societies operating at the local level were led by 
former civil servants, their members did not perceive them as part of the state 
machinery, but as organisations representing their members (‘Focus Group, 9 adults, 
Asella’, 2017). According to interviews and focus group discussions conducted with 
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members of Ethiopian and resident charities and societies, organisations successfully 
worked with state offices to address the citizens’ concerns. Thanks to associations 
facilitating meetings between state officials and communities, state officials had 
become more responsive to their constituents and the provision of public services 
had improved due to the involvement of charities and societies (‘Focus Group, 9 
adults, Asella’, 2017; ‘Focus Group, 14 adults, Wonji’, 2017). Interviewees reported 
for example: 
“In one of the training against HTPs [harmful traditional practices], 
police was trained together with us, we got access to them and they 
got improved knowledge about HTPs and help fighting against it 
now” (‘Focus Group, 7 adults, Sheshemane’, 2017). “People report 
here [at the CSO], not at state offices. Only when they [the CSO] 
follow up with the government the cases are handled. Otherwise 
there is corruption and perpetrators don’t get punished” (‘Focus 
Group, 9 adults, Hawassa’, 2017). 
Almost all charities and societies interviewed participated in GO-NGO forums 
(government – NGO forums), meetings organised with charities and societies working 
in thematic areas, e.g. environmental protection, reproductive health, universal 
education etc. (Interviewee Nr. 34, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 35, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 
43, 2016). Many charities and societies interviewed, held that the forums provided 
them with access to state structures and were useful public venues to discuss with 
the government and share concerns. As many of the forums were attended by the 
media, issues discussed became public knowledge. The problem was that agenda 
setting was controlled by state offices and that the forums seldom led to concrete 
legal or political change (Interviewee Nr. 133, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 146, 2017). 
Leaders from two resident charities claimed: 
“We engage in different forums. At least the engagement means 
they listen to us even if not much changes” (Interviewee Nr. 140, 
2017). “We share ideas and report to the government at the 
forums. They use it differently. They tell us what they want us to do” 
(Interviewee Nr. 136, 2017).  
Therefore, similar to the hizib kinf meetings, the GO-NGO forums did not 
constitute effective channels to communicate demands of citizens and nor did they 
produce satisfactory state response. 
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Given the relative inefficiency of formal structures to bring about concrete 
results, many charities and societies used personal contacts with state officials to 
influence political decision-making (Interviewee Nr. 2, 2015a; Interviewee Nr. 22, 
2015; Interviewee Nr. 26, 2015). The fact that many of their leaders had previously 
worked in state offices (Interviewee Nr. 117 2016; Interviewee Nr. 133 2017; 
Interviewee Nr. 82 2016) and the close cooperation between state officials and 
charities and societies favoured such practices. Especially at the federal level, ethnic-
based networks were used by charities and societies to influence political decision-
making, singling out entry points by contacting state officials from the same 
ethnicity138. In many instances, organisations were able to obtain land and offices for 
their work, help constituents access state services, and demand state officials to 
enforce the law (Interviewee Nr. 37, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
133, 2017). In some cases, charities and societies were able to negotiate accounting 
under the 70/30 and 90/10 directives (Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum, 
2016b; Fieldnotes, 2017). At the local level, for example, many resident charities 
worked on prevention of harmful traditional practices (HTPs)139, female genital 
mutilation (FGM) and gender based violence (GBV), although these topics officially 
fell into the category of activities reserved for Ethiopian charities and societies. Local 
state offices often cooperated with resident charities in these areas to meet goals set 
out in their development plans. While such work contributed towards the EPRDF 
development targets, resident charities helped their members and constituents to 
put pressure on state offices for improved performance (Interviewee Nr. 34, 2015; 
Interviewee Nr. 138, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 141, 2017). 
While more difficult, even at the federal level there existed examples where 
cooperation between state actors and charities and societies led to concrete 
improvements for organisations and their members. After extensive lobbying from 
                                                        
138 According to the principle of ethnic federalism, contrary to the federal level, regional, woreda and 
kebele administration were primarily staffed with civil servants coming from the region. Therefore, 
civil society and state representatives were often from the same ethnicity and the use of ethnic-based 
networks for influencing political decision-making did not reflect a strategic approach to the same 
degree as at the federal level. 
139 HTPs in Ethiopia include a variety of different practices, such as uvulectimy – cutting of the uvula 
and sometimes nearby structures such as the tonsils, milk teeth extraction and marriage by abduction. 
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charities and societies to improve the availability of local funding for Ethiopian 
charities and societies, the Ministry of Finance included the possibility to deduct 
charitable donations to such organisations amounting to up to 10% of the taxable 
income in the revised tax legislation140 (Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum, 
2016a; Proclamation No. 979, 2016: Article 24). Although far from being sufficient, 
the ChSA revised some of its interpretations of the 70/30 directive, after charities and 
societies had repeatedly brought up the issue in joint meetings (Fieldnotes, 2016i; 
Gebre, 2016: 17; Interviewee Nr. 12, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 32, 2015). The best 
strategy to persuade state officials to cooperate, according to charities and societies, 
was to conduct research on a specific issue and approach the government with well 
documented proof of a problem. “Evidence-based claims” were more likely to 
persuade state officials to act upon them (Interviewee Nr. 16, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 
43, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017). 
Although the tight cooperation facilitated state control over the activities of 
charities and societies, it simultaneously provided organisations with access to 
political decision makers and state resources, testifying to the reciprocal character of 
infrastructural power. Increased presence of the state in civil society exposed the 
former to influence from the latter, however the majority of negotiations and 
bargaining between civil society and state actors took place behind closed doors and 
was thus not visible to the public eye. Charities and societies often directly provided 
services to the government, while at the same time negotiating space for action. 
Relinquishing some autonomy in many cases was seen necessary to gain space for 
action (Interviewee Nr. 3, 2015). Charities and societies that were well politically 
networked had an advantage compared to those that were more independent but 
lacked political contacts. 
Co-existence 
Many of the provisions of the ChSP aimed at rendering the work of charities and 
societies “readable” for the EPRDF government, e.g. through the annual reporting, 
                                                        
140 This did not address the concern that charitable donations were discouraged due to people’s fear 
to fund charities and societies that worked on rights related issues and questioned the EPRDF’s respect 
of citizens’ democratic rights. 
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ad-hoc and planned field visits, monitoring of internal meetings etc. (Proclamation 
No. 621, 2009). The aim was to avoid co-existence and keep relevant state offices 
informed about the work of organisations, to prevent the secret formation of 
oppositional movements. Many charities and societies held that transparency in their 
work was important to avoid repression from state offices (Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 117, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 146, 2017). Although co-existence was 
much less frequent than cooperation, several charities and societies attempted to 
operate at the margins of the state. In a few cases, resident charities secretly pursued 
activities that the ChSP forbade them, subverting power structures without directly 
contesting the state or its policies. 
Examples of coexistence included resident charities working with and producing 
research both on socioeconomic topics and rights related topics, Ethiopian charities 
practising human rights monitoring and Ethiopian, resident and foreign charities and 
societies providing targeted services to their members, e.g. counselling to victims of 
domestic violence (Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 119, 2016). Avoiding interactions with state offices was meant to prevent them 
from taking control over the activities of organisations, e.g. determining content of 
reports or selecting beneficiaries for services provided by them. Co-existence was 
more practiced at the federal level, given that the tight links between charities and 
societies and state offices at the local level rendered this strategy nearly impossible. 
Although few in number, some resident charities operating at the federal level 
used the blind spots of the ChSA to carry out activities that they were not officially 
allowed to do. They did not report on certain activities to the agency and 
implemented them secretly. The institutional capacity of the ChSA was not sufficient 
to attain control over all charities and societies continuously. However, the danger 
for the resident charities in question was that they could be closed if the agency 
found proof of such illegal activities. Where it suspected secret activism, the agency 
sent warning letters and followed up over the phone and in person, but it was not 
able to reprimand all organisations concerned (Federal Auditor General 2014; 




“One of our projects was blocked for five months. They told us we 
should do service delivery and work on child care. We implemented 
the project without their approval. They called us to check, but then 
they stopped. They forgot about it. They don’t have the capacity to 
monitor all the projects” (Interviewee Nr. 36, 2016). 
Several resident charities started working with organisations that did not fall 
under the ChSP (Interviewee Nr. 14, 2015), like iddirs (funerary associations) or the 
chambers of commerce , to avoid the 90/10 directive and work on rights related 
questions. Resident charities provided technical and financial support e.g. for 
advocacy campaigns, without officially appearing in their implementation. Examples 
involved working on labour rights for women, advocating against FGM and providing 
support for victims of domestic violence. Organisations admitted that the strategy 
could potentially backfire if the agency or other state offices picked up on their 
engagement in rights related work (Interviewee Nr. 36, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 133, 
2017; Interviewee Nr. 146, 2017). The existence of such subversive actions testified 
to the fact that while the state’s infrastructural power was high, it was not absolute. 
The threat of using despotic power discouraged open contestation, but it also 
increased defiance among some charities and societies, that opted for hidden 
subversive practices 
In some instances, forcing charities and societies, particular Ethiopian and 
resident charities and resident societies, into co-existence, denying access to state 
structures and hence decision-making processes, was a strategy chosen by state 
offices. Some charities and societies tried to establish cooperative agreements with 
state offices, but without success (Interviewee Nr. 30, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 86, 
2016). Denying organisations access to state structures was meant to “starve them 
out” and prevent them from gaining public influence (Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 131, 2016). As infrastructural power was 
reciprocal, state actors opted against establishing close links to charities and societies 
where they expected unwanted influence from the latter. 
Contestation 
Given the high costs associated with public contestation, it often took the form of 
verbal criticism or subversion of power structures. The more critical charities and 
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societies were, the more problems they encountered with the ChSA and other state 
offices (Interviewee Nr. 69, 2016). Repression ranged from threat, to denial or 
withdrawal of the licence, to imprisonment and torture of organisations’ leaders and 
staff (Brechenmacher, 2017: 65ff; Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 115, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016). Nevertheless, charities and societies developed 
different ways to question state power and their strategies often depended on their 
respective political network and existing power relations. Contesting state policy was 
not an activity reserved to organisations led by EPRDF critics (Interviewee Nr. 2 
2015b; Interviewee Nr. 29 2015). Well networked resident and Ethiopian charities 
and societies used their contacts in the EPRDF and the state to influence political 
decision-making (Interviewee Nr. 25, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
146, 2017) and even charities and societies whose leaders were closely affiliated with 
the EPRDF, sometimes criticised political measures where they harmed their 
organisational goals (Interviewee Nr. 33, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 43, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 137, 2017). 
To avoid negative repercussions from questioning state organisations, criticism 
was often targeted towards specific policies, not the EPRDF government as such. 
Accusations were backed with as much documentary proof as possible, delivered in 
person and behind closed doors rather than in public. Moreover, charities and 
societies often carefully chose the individual to deliver criticism, to ensure best use 
of networks and prevent escalation of conflict (Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016; Interviewee 
Nr. 90, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016). Many charities and societies applied self-
censorship to avoid confrontation (Interviewee Nr. 27, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 37, 
2016; Interviewee Nr. 54, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016). Interviewees explained: 
 “We apply international research standards in our work. The 
government is waiting for us to make a mistake. They wait for us to 
report opinions. You’d end up in jail for that. So, we are careful and 
back all our arguments by evidence. If we are not sure about 
evidence it stays pending” (Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016). “Everything 
has to be evidence based and backed by hard facts because in the 
worst case scenario it would have to hold in court” (Interviewee Nr. 
16, 2015). 
When encountering problems with one specific state organisation or civil 
servant, charities and societies tried to use their political contacts to solve the issues 
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(Interviewee Nr. 35, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 68, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016). 
Rather than openly contesting state organisations, charities and societies often tried 
to circumvent them, encouraging resolving the difficulties within the state. Where a 
problem occurred with one particular civil servant, organisations often focused on 
finding an ally within the same state office. Where problems occurred with the 
leadership of a state office, alliances had to be built with other state offices. The 
hierarchy between civil servants and state offices played a significant role regarding 
the outcome (Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016b; Interviewee Nr. 109, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 
111, 2016). Alliances relied on personal connections, e.g. family/ethnicity/work 
connections between civil servants and the leaders/staff of charities and societies, 
mutual interests, and/or the dependence of state organisations on the services of 
charities and societies. While also subversive in character, in contrast to subversive 
interactions under co-existence that involved secretly working on censored areas, 
alliance building by definition relied on approaching state actors. 
Sometimes charities and societies contested decisions of state organisations or 
civil servants directly, instead of using state or EPRDF channels. However, rather than 
engaging in public protests, often such instances were confined to direct interactions 
between civil servants and charities and societies. Avoiding public dissemination of 
information about conflict with state organisations or public criticism of the EPRDF 
was seen as key to avoid repression, given that “the government takes it personal if 
you go on the media” (Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016). Examples of more direct 
contestation included charities and societies setting limits to the interference of the 
ChSA in their internal affairs. Two resident charities reported that they had prevented 
agency officers from interfering in their meetings (Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016). An 
interviewee remembered: 
“The agency did want to observe and use its power. We told them 
thank you for coming. We told them as well that they could observe 
but not speak out as they are no member. The agency 
representative was very furious” (Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016b). 
Some charities and societies operating at the local level successfully used their 
potential to mobilise significant numbers of people to put pressure on state offices 
(Interviewee Nr. 138, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 139, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 146, 2017). 
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Two resident charities visited, threatened, for example, to stage strikes to get their 
licences or force the government to revise an official decision. The importance of 
community based organisations for socio-economic life in Ethiopia favoured such 
practices. Interviewees shared:  
“The government blocked the CSO’s licence. The CSO said they 
intended to go on the street. The government was afraid and gave 
them their licence” (Interviewee Nr. 140, 2017). “They [a local 
resident charity] went to the government and made it change its 
decision. The government didn’t want them to operate bajaj [moto-
taxi]. But the CSO told the government. They forced it” (Fieldnotes, 
2017). 
Nearly all charities and societies interviewed (including mass societies that were 
directly tied into EPRDF structures) contested specific decisions of state 
organisations. Only few organisations contested the EPRDF regime as such and they 
were under constant surveillance of the ChSA and other state offices. Politically well-
networked charities and societies had an advantage over those lacking connections 
to the EPRDF structures, as they could use their contacts to push for their criticism to 
be heard and possibly even addressed in their favour. Contestation on one hand 
testified to the limits of state power, on the other hand, the form it took, exemplified 
that the high degree of infrastructural power and the presence of the state in civil 
society provided the latter with access to state structures and allowed charities and 
societies to question state policies and decisions at times. 
Conclusion 
While the preamble of the ChSP suggested that the law was passed to ensure the 
contribution of charities and societies to Ethiopia’s development and to guarantee 
citizens’ right to association, the findings in this chapter suggest that the ChSA 
primarily used the proclamation to control charities and societies rather than to 
mobilise them as part of the EPRDF’s developmental state programme. In theory, the 
new legal framework coerced charities and societies to align themselves to the EPRDF 
developmental state agenda and contribute to its fulfilment: resident and foreign 
charities and societies through securing external finance for socioeconomic 
development interventions and Ethiopian societies (professional- and mass 
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associations) through mobilising the population behind the EPRDF. Ethiopian 
charities, essentially human rights NGOs, were also officially allowed to work on 
political issues, but their role was not further detailed. In practice, nearly all charities 
and societies interviewed, with the exception of mass societies, reported problems 
regarding their operations under the ChSP. While foreign and resident charities and 
societies and many Ethiopian charities were under higher scrutiny by the ChSA than 
Ethiopian societies, the latter could seldom make use of this due to their low human 
and financial capacity. 
Security concerns took primacy over developmental concerns in the regulation 
of charities and societies, but more so at the federal than the local level. The 
securitisation of civil society created conflict within state structures, between the 
ChSA and other state organisations, as the latter wanted to mobilise organisations, 
especially resident charities and societies, to reach the EPRDF’s development targets. 
This was the case both at the federal level (between the ChSA and other federal state 
offices), as well as between the federal and local level (between the ChSA and local 
state offices). Given that the ChSA’s influence at the local level was smaller than at 
the federal level, local state officials and charities and societies developed 
cooperative agreements that somewhat circumvented the ChSA imposed rules. 
Due to the tight grip that the EPRDF had established over charities and societies, 
many interactions between state and civil society actors testified to co-optation. 
However, charities and societies tried to negotiate and bargain with state actors to 
increase their space for action, sometimes cooperating with them, sometimes 
contesting them. Charities and societies that were politically well-connected, were 
often better able to influence political decision-making than those that lacked links 
to state structures. In several cases charities and societies were able to push for the 
rights of their members and improve service provisions to them, testifying to the fact 
that their members’ interests were not at all times subordinated to the state’s 
interests. Contestation did not take the form of public protests, due to the high costs 
associated with public dissent. Where possible, charities and societies often tried to 
build alliances with specific state officials to solve problems encountered with public 
structures. In theory, the ChSP ruled out coexistence through making the activities of 
charities and societies readable to the state (reporting, monitoring visits etc.). While 
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some organisations were able to operate at a distance from the state and exploit the 
blind spots of a state agency, others were forced into coexistence by the state that 
denied them access to political decision-making structures. Charities and societies 
had greater influence on state policy and political decision-making at the local, than 
at the federal level, partly because of the close links between state and charities and 
societies at the local level and partly because of the limited reach of the ChSA. The 
ChSA’s incorporation and exercise of despotic power in many cases hindered 
cooperation between charities and societies and state actors. This reduced the 
state’s infrastructural power that specifically relied on collaborative interactions. 
Moreover, due to the visibility of state control over charities and societies, the latter 
in many cases lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the population, creating a vacuum 
between state and society. 
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Chapter 8: The Politics of “Public Silence” - Civil Society, 
Authoritarianism and Regime Stability in Ethiopia 
Addis Ababa, 15th of February 2018 (Yekatit 8 2010) 
Sitting at the campus café in Sidist Kilo, my friend and I are shocked by the news we 
just received by text. I look at Debebe141 whose disbelief is written all over his face. He 
tries to load the website of Fana broadcasting. After several failed attempts, there it 
is, in black and white: Prime Minister Hailemariam Deselegn resigned. After over two 
years of unrest and political turmoil, things seem to change and events are picking up 
speed. People have barely had time to digest the news regarding the release of 
political prisoners last week. 
‘Mengist yellem’ [There is no government] I think to myself. I have heard this 
phrase numerous times in the past two years, but it’s the first time I think I understand 
the feeling of disquiet that comes with it. What will happen next? What are the rules 
now? Who is in charge? As we walk down to Arat kilo to catch our ‘taxis’, I look at 
other people wondering whether they already know. People queue and wait as if 
nothing had happened. Crisis has long become the new normal and in Addis life has 
gone on despite the upheavals in the regions. Will this change? 
‘Worej ale’ [I want to get off]. The minibus stops in front of Jonny’s where our 
neighbours sit and drink beer. I say hello before heading home. We exchange the 
usual greetings, but no mention of the latest political news. As I walk home, 
everything looks as usual. The atmosphere in Addis is deceptive; the resignation of 
the Prime Minister indicates that the political situation is more dire than many people 
think. What forced the changes? Will the regime collapse? Or will it open up from 
within? In which direction is Ethiopia heading? 
* * * 
                                                        




“Authoritarian regimes try to be responsive in a smart way. They 
don’t have a safety valve for expression and they risk that a little 
thing can become existential. There is no way to express frustration. 
Ethiopia is not a free country and the government knows that its 
legitimacy depends on growth. For system survival, it tries to 
promote growth. But it tries to do this alone and it doesn’t work. 
The government cannot be insular and survive, but it hasn’t 
understood this yet. It doesn’t allow civil society to express itself and 
it doesn’t listen. There is no safety valve to air frustration. This can 
be dangerous.” (Interviewee Nr. 76, 2016a) 
The final chapter is divided into five main parts. The first section of the chapter 
answers the research question and summarises the empirical contributions. Drawing 
on the findings from chapters 5 to 7, it compares civil society - state relations in the 
three civil society sectors under study and reflects on how the existing relationships 
have affected regime stability. The second and third sections of the chapter outline 
two further areas in which the study has made contributions to the existing literature: 
theoretical and methodological contributions. The fourth part of the chapter outlines 
avenues for future research. The last part of the chapter reflects on the latest political 
developments and sources of regime instability beyond civil society - state relations. 
Answering the Research Question- The Empirical Contribution 
Contributing to a larger canon of work that investigates how the presence of civil 
society organisations in authoritarian settings influences the durability of regimes in 
power, this thesis set out to explain how the relationship between the Ethiopian state 
under the EPRDF rule and different types of civil society organisations have affected 
regime stability. 
The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between civil society 
organisations and the state under the EPRDF regime both strengthened and 
weakened regime stability: (1) The strict control established over formal civil society 
organisations protected the regime from large-scale public contestation by CSOs and 
thus strengthened regime stability. Although civil society organisations tried, 
sometimes successfully, to represent their members’ and beneficiaries’ interests and 
to influence state policies, they stayed clear of open conflict to avoid repression. (2) 
 
266 
The domination established by the EPRDF over civil society organisations prevented 
them from functioning as a bridge between citizens and the state and created a 
vacuum between them. This weakened regime stability, as grievances in the 
population could not be communicated to the state through institutionalised 
channels and state officials were often unwilling and unable to listen to demands in 
society. (3) The EPRDF’s focus on control over cooperation reduced the ruling 
coalition’s ability to work with civil society organisations to achieve its ambitious 
development goals. This weakened regime stability, as the EPRDF sought to build 
legitimacy on developmental outputs, but was unable to mobilise CSOs effectively 
behind the developmental state programme. 
The EPRDF managed to ensure “negative stability” through preventing public 
contestation by civil society organisations. However, it failed to interact with civil 
society organisations proactively, to create links with society and cater to some of its 
demands, thus failing to generate “positive stability”. The EPRDF tried to 
institutionalise cooperation with civil society organisations through establishing 
platforms, for example, the GO-NGO forums with charities and societies, the PPCFs 
with the chambers of commerce and sectoral associations, and the tri-partite forums 
with CETU and the employers federation. However, the strict control exercised by the 
EPRDF over such forums meant that they could not function as “safety valves” 
through which claims in society could be communicated to the government or joint 
activities planned and executed (PSRC, 2017). While negative stability ensured 
regime survival for a long time, the failure of the EPRDF to embed itself more in 
society contributed to regime fragility. The EPRDF lacked ‘embedded autonomy’ – 
“an autonomy embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society 
and provide institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation 
of goals and policies” (Evans, 1995: 59). 
Due to the absence of public contestation, civil society organisations in Ethiopia 
have often been portrayed as weak and co-opted in scholarship and were said to 
stabilise the EPRDF regime (Burgess, 2012; Dupuy et al., 2015; Sisay, 2012). However, 
this thesis challenges previous findings in several ways. First, the analysis 
demonstrates that the “public silence” of civil society organisations was not sufficient 
proof of co-optation, as negotiations and conflicts between state and civil society 
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organisations took place, but not often in the formal political realm. Second, the 
findings show that the “public silence” concealed existing grievances among civil 
society organisations and in the population, providing a false sense of regime 
stability. Third, the thesis questions the idea that civil society organisations are 
always most effective when independent from the state, demonstrating that 
organisations with close political ties to the EPRDF were better able to influence 
political decision-making and that co-optation could bear seeds for concealed and 
even more open contestation. Finally, the analysis demonstrates that the macro-
political environment was not enough to explain the absence of widespread public 
dissent among formal civil society organisations and uncovers hidden mechanisms 
established to control civil society organisations. 
Following Scott’s (1990: xii, 2) approach to the study of power relations and 
resistance to state control, the analysis uncovers the hidden transcripts of civil society 
organisations142 – the “[…] critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant” 
and of state organisations “[…] the practices and claims of their rule that cannot be 
openly avowed” - and compares them with the formal interactions between civil 
society and state actors, the public transcripts. 
The Politics of Repression: From Public Dissent to State Control 
In all three civil society sectors under study, organisations at different points in time 
had proven that they could challenge the EPRDF regime and threaten regime 
stability. Similar to experiences in authoritarian countries in the Middle-East and Asia 
(Cavatorta, 2013b; Deyo, 1987b; Fu, 2017c; Rivetti, 2013), periods of open 
confrontation between state and civil society organisations in Ethiopia, were 
followed by repression and forced restructuring to prevent future contestation 
(Dupuy et al., 2015; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8; Weis, 2016: 260ff). In the case of the 
trade unions, the restructuring was carried out through the direct intervention of an 
                                                        
142 I included contestation of power addressed to specific organisations and individuals in the state, 
that took place in the grey zone of politics, in the hidden transcripts of civil society organisations. While 
not hidden from the dominant, the state, in general, such subversion of power structures was not 
visible to all parts of the state and was often used to question central state power. Disaggregating the 
state, the dominant, I showed that hiding critique from some parts of the state, while targeting others 
was used by civil society organisations to contest state domination. 
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EPRDF internal organisation, the labader committee, that connected EPRDF and 
trade union structures (Admasie, 2018a: 153). In the case of the chambers of 
commerce and charities and societies, the restructuring was carried out through 
establishing new legal frameworks that forcefully altered the formal structure of the 
sectors143 (Weis, 2016: 260ff; Yitayehu, 2010: Chapter 4). 
After the restructuring, control was established through direct oversight. In the 
case of the unions and the charities and societies, the oversight bodies were 
controlled by the TPLF and more specifically former fighters, indicating that handling 
of civil society was considered an issue of national security. The labader committee 
was part of the EPRDF’s labour wing and directly linked to the Prime Minister’s Office 
(Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018) and the charities and societies agency was connected to 
the Ethiopian security apparatus, both through its leadership and its ministerial 
affiliation (Interviewee Nr. 119, 2016). The chambers of commerce and sectoral 
associations constituted somewhat of an exception, as oversight was shared between 
the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Industry (Proclamation No. 691, 2010: Art. 20, 
21) and there did not exist a specialised organisation in charge of monitoring their 
work (Interviewee Nr. 62, 2016a). However, interviews suggested that control was 
exercised through EPRDF internal channels but more informally than the other two 
sectors (Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 132, 2017). 
The tools used to ensure compliance of civil society organisations with EPRDF 
policies and prevent contestation bore many resemblances across the civil society 
sectors studied. Moreover, they reflected practices used by other authoritarian 
regimes, such as China (Hsu and Hasmath, 2014; Teets, 2014) and Russia 
(Brechenmacher, 2017; Evans et al., 2006). Dissolution of existing civil society 
organisations and setting up EPRDF affiliated organisations under the same name was 
a common tool used to bring civil society organisations in line with the EPRDF 
programme. Examples included basic trade unions, for example at the Sheraton and 
Dashen Bank (Interviewee Nr 61, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 125, 2016), Ethiopian 
                                                        
143 In both cases, official legal drafting processes had begun nearly a decade before the actual 
restructuring, but bills were only passed after open conflict had emerged. While drafting processes 
had been formally participatory, the legislation passed to restructure the sectors did not reflect the 
concerns of civil society organisations (‘Addis Business Vol. 6 No. 2’, 2003: 1; Interviewee Nr. 8, 2015; 
Interviewee Nr. 32, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 151, 2018). 
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societies such as the Ethiopian teachers’ association and the Ethiopian Bar 
Association (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 49, 2016), and business 
membership organisations such as the Ethiopian Manufacturers Association and the 
Ethiopian Transitors Association (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016c; Interviewee Nr. 76, 
2016a). Interviewees at the chambers of commerce, trade unions and charities and 
societies reported that infiltration through forced change of leadership, closing of 
bank accounts, revoking of licenses and imprisoning of leaders were used to deter 
contestation. Memories of past clashes and violent repression of civil society 
organisations also functioned as an effective deterrence (Interviewee Nr. 82, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 101, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 152, 2018). 
Despite the high level of control established over civil society organisations, 
similar to experiences in Syria pre-2011 (Kawakibi, 2013), Russia (Kulmala, 2011; 
Mikirova et al., 2013) and China (He and Huang, 2015; Hildebrandt, 2013; Teets, 
2013), interactions between state and civil society organisations in Ethiopia, ranged 
from co-optation to contestation over various forms of cooperation and coexistence. 
While the majority of civil society organisations exhibited all types of interactions, 
both at sector as well as at organisational level there existed patterns of interaction. 
In the case of the trade unions, the majority of interactions observed fell in the 
categories of co-optation and cooperation. CETU and its members helped control the 
demands of workers and mobilised workers to support the EPRDF’s development 
projects (Interviewee Nr. 98, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 108, 2016). CETU in return got 
access to state structures and resources for its work and support in unionisation 
(Interviewee Nr. 96, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 97, 2016). Despite this trend of political 
alignment, CETU and some of its members became more vocal over the course of my 
fieldwork. CETU threatened a general strike over the EPRDFs suggestions for 
redrafting the labour law, as the EPRDF was unwilling to listen to workers claims 
(Addis Fortune, 2017). Nearly no co-existence of trade unions with the state was 
observed, mainly due to the direct control exercised over the unions through the 
EPRDF. The relationship between trade unions and the MoLSA and BoLSAs was 
mostly marked by co-optation and cooperation (Interviewee Nr. 107, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 118, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 122, 2016), but unions were more in 
conflict for example with the Ethiopian Investment Commission or the Industrial Park 
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Corporation, organisations that were in charge of implementing the EPRDF’s 
development programme (Interviewee Nr. 153, 2018). 
In the case of the chambers of commerce sector, interactions testifying to co-
optation were primarily observed in the case of the new chamber structures 
established through the 2003 proclamation, especially the sectoral associations 
representing manufacturing and the ECCSA, rather than the original chambers of 
commerce structures representing trade and services (Interviewee Nr. 40, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 70, 2016). The same patterns in terms of actors held true for 
cooperation, as state organisations cooperated less willingly with the old chamber 
structures (Interviewee Nr. 104, 2016). However, the relative weakness of many of 
the newly established organisations prevented them from becoming efficient 
partners for the EPRDF. Large parts of the chambers sector that represented the 
interests of trade and services and predated the 2003 proclamation were forced into 
coexistence, to prevent them from influencing policy-making and the work of state 
organisations. Contestation, although less pronounced than in the case of trade 
unions (AACCSA somewhat of an exception), remained at policy level and was 
primarily verbal and directed against specific state organisations and their policies 
(Interviewee Nr. 94, 2016). While the sectoral associations worked closely with the 
Ministry of Industry and often complained about the Ministry of Trade and its 
favouritism for the chamber structures representing traders (Interviewee Nr. 126, 
2016), the latter worked more closely with the Ministry of Trade and reported more 
problems with the Ministry of Industry (Interviewee Nr. 151, 2018). 
Regarding charities and societies, interactions testifying to co-optation were 
observed primarily in the case of societies, especially those with large numbers of 
members like mass associations (Interviewee Nr. 137, 2017). Moreover, interactions 
testifying to co-optation among charities and societies were more predominant at 
the local than at the federal level, with charities and societies at woreda and kebele 
level being closely linked to state offices (Interviewee Nr. 135, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 
144, 2017). At the federal level, there existed more coexistence than at the local level, 
mainly to prevent Ethiopian and resident charities from accessing decision-making 
structures and state officials (Interviewee Nr. 36, 2016). Consequently, I observed 
more cooperation at the local level than at the federal level (‘Focus Group, 9 adults, 
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Hawassa’, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 15, 2015). Contestation often took the form of 
subverting power structures as charities and societies partnered up with specific 
state actors to question political decisions and policies (Interviewee Nr. 133, 2017). 
With the exception of Ethiopian societies, most Ethiopian, resident and foreign 
charities reported problems with the Charities and Societies Agency. However, within 
their specific sectors of expertise, e.g. health, environment, gender, labour or law, 
the majority reported that they had established relatively fruitful collaboration with 
relevant state organisations. 
Within the three sectors under study, the history of conflict was an important 
driver to understand the state’s stance towards particular civil society organisations. 
Regarding the chamber system for example, AACCSA was a clear example of how its 
past political activism, e.g. the ‘Addis Vote’ campaign around the 2000 elections, 
meant that it was still viewed with more suspicion than other chambers and sectoral 
associations (Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016). This negatively affected AACCSA’s ability to 
access state actors and influence policy making. In the case of the trade unions, 
unions that had in the past been very vocal and that the state had failed to restructure 
comprehensively, such as the CBE union, often remained side-lined in CETU 
(Interviewee Nr. 95, 2016a). Forced coexistence, was chosen by the EPRDF to prevent 
the union from influencing state organisations. In the case of the charities and 
societies, the Human Rights Council, Action Professionals' Association for the People 
and the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA) were also examples showing how their 
involvement in the 2005 elections still affected their ability to operate despite their 
efforts to improve their working relationships with state organisations. EEA for 
example was not able to change the negative attitude of ChSA staff that still 
suspected the organisation of being affiliated to opposition forces, although some of 
its board members worked in different ministries and even the PMO (Interviewee Nr. 
48, 2016a). 
Corroborating the findings of studies on civil society - state relations in other 
authoritarian countries (Hildebrandt, 2013; Khatib, 2013; Liverani, 2008; Unger and 
Chan, 2015), the patterns of interaction observed between state and civil society 
organisations in Ethiopia indicated that the latter did not directly challenge the EPRDF 
regime and threaten its stability through contestation. The majority of interactions 
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fell into the categories of co-optation and cooperation, and less so coexistence and 
contestation, indicating that civil society organisations stabilised rather than 
threatened the EPRDF’s authoritarian rule. Although the patterns of interactions 
between civil society and state organisations testified to the fact that the 
relationships between civil society and state organisations were complex and marked 
by continuous negotiations, the EPRDF successfully managed to prevent large-scale 
open contestation of its rule. Civil society organisations were often stuck between 
demands received from their members and beneficiaries and those from state 
organisations, however state organisations were commonly unwilling to listen and 
react to claims made by civil society organisations that did not overlap with the state 
agenda. This demonstrated that civil society organisations were not able to function 
as safety-valves through which grievances in the population could be expressed and 
addressed effectively. 
Removed Despotism not Embedded Autonomy: Civil Society and Developmentalism 
As already mentioned, the EPRDF’s rule was characterised by a high degree of 
despotic power and a lesser, though varying, proportion of infrastructural power, 
which translated into reduced embeddedness in society. While the independence of 
the EPRDF from formal civil society organisations enabled the ruling coalition to push 
its development programme without having to take into account claims for example 
for redistribution, equality and rights, it prevented it from successfully mobilising civil 
society organisations behind its developmental endeavours and in some cases fuelled 
contestation. Moreover, the weakness of institutionalised channels for negotiations 
prevented civil society organisations from participating in negotiations of policies and 
targets under the developmental state programme, and meant that the EPRDF lacked 
information about demands in society. 
For a long while, the EPRDF’s approach to trade unions was characterised by 
control, rather than an attempt to mobilise them as part of the developmentalist 
policies. Memories of the strikes in the 1990s and the mobilisation of CETU against 
the regime guided the EPRDF’s way of dealing with the unions and the original 
restructuring and establishment of control pre-dated the EPRDF’s developmental 
state programme (Admasie, 2018a: Chapter 5; Praeg, 2006: Chapter 8). However, 
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evidence presented in this thesis indicates that the EPRDF increasingly tried to use 
unionisation to control workers, keep their claims in check and favour industrial 
peace, necessary for its ambitious development targets (EPRDF, 2011b, 2013b; 
Interviewee Nr. 93, 2016). Following the practices of the Asian Tigers (Deyo, 1989: 
154), the EPRDF exploited cheap labour for industrialisation and looked towards 
Asian labour regimes to adjust its national labour legislation to this strategy (CETU, 
2017; MoLSA, 2016). Moreover, the EPRDF’s approach to CETU and other unions in 
some instances resembled experiences of the Asian Tigers. As in Singapore (Deyo, 
1989: 160), the EPRDF demanded that CETU and the industrial federations handle the 
demands of workers for social redistribution and prevent an independent labour 
movement from forming (Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). However, similar to 
experiences in South Korea (Deyo, 1987b: 189), the EPRDF often prevented 
unionisation in international enterprises to please the investors and reverted, for 
example, to establishing non-union labour-management councils in the industrial 
parks that reduced the organisational backing of labour (Interviewee Nr. 153, 2018). 
Labour regimes differed between the different Asian developmental states and some 
were more repressive than others, but in all cases labour was not able to make 
substantial gains for workers for an extended of period of time (Deyo, 1987b). 
Repression of labour was feasible, partly, and in contrast to Ethiopia, because 
unemployment decreased and real wages increased over time (Deyo, 1987b: 196f). 
In Ethiopia unemployment rates remained high, youth-unemployment rose and real 
wages declined (Admasie, 2018a: 197f), questioning the EPRDF’s ability to forge a 
social contract based on developmental performance. However, the EPRDF remained 
unwilling to listen to labour and respond to the growing grievances. While the 
relationship between trade unions and the EPRDF in some cases resembled the 
experiences of its Asian role models, the increasing number of wildcat strikes and the 
opposition of CETU to EPRDF policies in 2017 (Addis Fortune, 2017) showed that the 
ability of the EPRDF to control labour was lower in Ethiopia than in the Asian cases. 
Unions in Ethiopia received increasing pressure from workers and needed to gain 
legitimacy among their constituency, at the same time as, due to the EPRDF internal 
conflict, the influence of the labader committee on the confederation decreased. 
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As mentioned by several scholars, the relationship between the EPRDF and the 
Ethiopian private sector differed substantially from its Asian role models and posed 
limits to the EPRDF’s ability to engender rapid and sustained development. The Asian 
Tigers developed close links between the state and the local private sector, however 
there existed differences for example with respect to the structure of the private 
sectors and the states’ reliance on FDI for industrialisation (Unger and Chan, 2015). 
Instead of comprehensively developing the Ethiopian private sector, the EPRDF built 
its development operations on state-owned enterprises, party endowment funds and 
party-affiliated businesses, as well as the attraction of foreign direct investment 
(Clapham, 2018: 1158f; Lefort, 2013; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011). The 
restructuring of the chambers of commerce system in Ethiopia and its ensuing 
disintegration testified to the fact that regime survival concerns took primacy over 
developmental concerns when it came to the Ethiopian private sector (Interviewee 
Nr. 81, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 132, 2017). While, to a large degree, this prevented 
contestation of the EPRDF rule and its policies, the failure to institutionalise state-
business relations through the intermediary of strong business associations and the 
reliance on personalised relationships between individual entrepreneurs and state 
officials fuelled corruption (Young, 1997: 99). Moreover, it prevented collective 
approaches to problem solving in the private sector, differing significantly from the 
experiences of the Asian Tigers (Lucas, 1997: 74). Contrary to the Ethiopian 
experience, in the Asian developmental states, several business associations became 
partners, though junior partners, of the regimes in power (Kim, 1997; Park, 2009). In 
South Korea for example several business associations coordinated strategies and 
activities of their members, ensuring the implementation of development plans, 
participated in policy elaboration and provided state offices with information about 
their members to monitor policy implementation (Park, 2009: 842f). While fulfilling 
important functions for the states, business associations in the Asian Tiger states 
exercised significant pressure on state offices to take concerns of private 
entrepreneurs into account. In Taiwan and South Korea, business associations were 
much less restricted than, for example, trade unions and other civil society 
organisations, as states needed private sector capital to implement their ambitious 
development plans (Park, 2009: 837; Unger and Chan, 2015: 182). While business 
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associations in the Asian developmental states functioned as social ties to the 
business community, in Ethiopia the focus often lay on control rather than 
institutionalised negotiation, which decreased the associations’ legitimacy in the 
eyes of their members. 
Evidence from the Asian developmental states indicated that strict control over 
NGOs, other charitable organisations, professional organisations and mass 
organisations was established to prevent contestation (Douglass, 2005; Evans, 2010; 
Hirata, 2002). While the approach of the EPRDF to charities and societies could 
therefore be interpreted as a copy of the Asian approach, evidence presented in this 
thesis indicates that the focus on control and repression was sometimes 
counterproductive to achieving the EPRDF’s developmental goals. Several Ethiopian 
state organisations wanted to cooperate with charities and societies, but repeatedly 
reported problems with their oversight body, that, because of its affiliation to the 
security apparatus, prioritised security and regime survival over development 
(Interviewee Nr. 28, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 152, 2018). 
Due to resource constraints state organisations wanted to collaborate with charities 
and societies to help them in meeting their development targets, but encountered 
problems due to the ChSA blocking the work of their CSO partners (Interviewee Nr. 
142, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 143, 2017). 
There exists considerable evidence that the EPRDF looked towards the Asian 
developmental states when it came to regulating civil society organisation in 
Ethiopia, testifying to the coalition’s ideological commitment to the developmental 
state model. For the drafting of the ChSP and the latest labour law, the Prime 
Minister’s office was directly involved and pushed for the integration of the East 
Asian experience (Interviewee Nr. 1, 2018; MoLSA, 2016; Yamamoto, 2008b). 
Rumours suggested that this was also the case for the chambers proclamation but 
evidence was more scarce (Interviewee Nr. 81, 2016a; Interviewee Nr. 89, 2016; 
Interviewee Nr. 151, 2018). The PMO’s involvement in all three cases indicated not 
only that the regulation of civil society organisations was treated as a matter of 
national priority, but, as the PMO was the centre of the developmental state 
programming (Brautigam et al., 2016), that it was part of a wider political agenda. 
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Despite the ideological commitment to using civil society organisations for the 
developmental state, a recent research report by the Federal Policy Studies and 
Research Centre indicated that civil servants and politicians exhibited negative 
attitudes towards different civil society actors and failed to meaningfully engage with 
them in policy design and implementation (PSRC, 2017). My interviewees 
corroborated these findings; many civil servants and politicians held that civil society 
organisations needed to be strictly regulated and disciplined (Interviewee Nr. 44, 
2016b; Interviewee Nr. 45, 2016). As the analysis in this thesis shows, the overall 
approach of the EPRDF towards civil society was largely focused on averting 
contestation through control and repression. This negatively affected the perceived 
legitimacy of CSOs among the population and reduced the potential of the EPRDF to 
engage with them meaningfully in the design and implementation of its development 
programme. While civil society organisations pushed to influence state organisations 
and engaged in bargaining and negotiations, the EPRDF tried as much as possible to 
reduce the influence of civil society organisations on politicians and civil servants. The 
resulting lack of embeddedness increased regime fragility, despite the absence of 
public protests, as the EPRDF was not able to use civil society organisations to bolster 
its rule, either through institutionalising exchange with society or through mobilising 
CSOs to operationalise the developmental state programme. 
Revisiting the Analytical Framework: Co-optation, Cooperation, Coexistence, 
Contestation - The Theoretical Contribution 
Drawing on sociological theories of state and civil society, the analytical framework I 
propose in this thesis, is dualistic and understands civil society and the state as 
relational concepts. Although it sees them as analytically and empirically separate, 
the proposed framework explores the nature and degree of the respective 
independence/autonomy of civil society and the state and the consequences such 
independence produces in terms of observable interactions between states and their 
civil societies. The strength of the analytical approach lies in the disaggregation of the 
state and civil society, capturing the heterogeneity among state and civil society 
actors and the diversity of existing links and interactions taking place between the 
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two spheres. Drawing on Michal Mann’s conceptions of infrastructural and despotic 
power helps in understanding how interactions between states and their civil 
societies are driven and shaped by the respective power autonomy of states and civil 
society and the type of power exercised (see Table 11) (Mann, 1984: 185, 206). 
Using the data collected through my fieldwork, I refined the analytical 
framework, through linking the categorisation of interactions between civil society 
and state organisations with Mann’s conceptions of power. Moreover, I added 
reflections on factors beyond power that affected patterns of interactions. While the 
categorisation of interactions reflects ideal types, the empirical data collected helps 
shed light on the overlaps between categories of interactions and created nuance in 
their differentiation. 
Studies of civil society – state relations in non-democratic settings have 
demonstrated that co-optation at the initial stages has often required high despotic 
power to force change (Khatib, 2013; Rivetti, 2013). Civil society organisations have 
often contested states’ attempts to influence the organisations’ work (Praeg, 2006: 
chapter 8). In the case of the trade unions in Ethiopia, the EPRDF had to use security 
forces and the police to close the old CETU and force the election of new and party-
affiliated leaders, before being able to control the confederation’s work (Interviewee 
Nr. 112, 2016). Attempts at co-optation through infiltration, like in the case of the 
chambers of commerce or the Human Rights Council, failed and provoked opposition 
(Interviewee Nr. 90, 2016; Interviewee Nr. 111, 2016). While coercion in 
authoritarian contexts has proven important to establish co-optation, it has also 
often provoked resistance over time. Hence, to exercise long-term control, states 
have needed infrastructural power to ensure alignment between the agendas of civil 
society organisations and state offices (Lee and Zhang, 2013: 1476f; Slater and 
Fenner, 2011: 20). The trade unions in Ethiopia were a case in point, as obligatory 
party membership for union leaders and the oversight over unions by the labader 
committee, rather than continued force and repression, allowed for 
institutionalisation of control and co-optation over time (Interviewee Nr. 95, 2018; 
Interviewee Nr. 130, 2018). Although in the literature co-optation has often been 
portrayed as something finite, indicating the inability of civil society organisations to 
represent their members, evidence presented in this thesis shows that co-optation 
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bore seeds for subversion of power structures and even more open contestation 
thanks to the dualistic character of infrastructural power. 
Cooperation testifies to the co-dependency of states and their civil societies and 
exemplifies the dualistic character of infrastructural power. States have never been 
completely independent of civil society and relied on human, economic and political 
resources of organisations both to provide services and/or to organise and control 
society (Cavatorta, 2013a; Hildebrandt, 2013). To ensure implementation of policies 
throughout civil society, penetrating it, states have exposed themselves to influence 
of the latter. Registration, monitoring of civil society organisations, tax collection and 
execution of joint projects for example, have increased the interactions between 
state and civil society organisations and provided both state and civil society actors 
with access to the other sphere, opening the possibility for negotiation and 
bargaining (Hsu, 2010; Teets, 2014). In the case of resident charities in Ethiopia for 
example, state organisations collaborated with civil society organisations to meet 
their development targets and civil society organisations used their ability to access 
foreign funding to push state organisations that were in need of their help to increase 
their space for work (Interviewee Nr. 134, 2017; Interviewee Nr. 136, 2017). The 
threat of use of despotic power was applied to prevent civil society organisations 
from crossing the EPRDF’s red-lines and transition from cooperation to contestation 
in the negotiations with state offices. 
Coexistence can both show the limits of states’ infrastructural power and/or the 
reticence to exercise it to avoid influence from civil society organisations that can 
result due to its dualistic character. Studies have shown that while the threat of use 
of despotic power can prevent civil society organisations from using coexistence for 
open and direct contestation, it cannot necessarily prevent subversion of power 
structures (Fu, 2017c; Spires, 2011). In the Ethiopian case, this was exemplified by 
the fact that resident charities used the blind spots of the charities agency to work 
on issues and projects they were not officially allowed to. Organisations did not 
report on such activities to the ChSA (Interviewee Nr. 35, 2015; Interviewee Nr. 140, 
2017) and as the state’s infrastructural power was not limitless, civil society 
organisations operated at its margin. Forcing civil society organisations into 
coexistence, like in the case of parts of the chambers system, limited both the 
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influence of the state on civil society organisations as well as the latter’s access and 
potential influence on state structures (Interviewee Nr. 20, 2016e; Interviewee Nr. 
81, 2016a). 
Contestation, rather than simply reflecting the lack of state power, can result 
from both the use of infrastructural and of despotic power (Lee and Zhang, 2013). 
Due to the dualistic character of infrastructural power, contestation can be an 
outcome of the penetration of civil society by the state (Mann, 1984). In Ethiopia, 
charities and societies, for example, used their contacts within state offices, often 
forged as a result of the continuous oversight exercised over them, to contest 
decisions taken by politicians and public officials (Interviewee Nr. 48, 2016a; 
Interviewee Nr. 135, 2017). Open contestation directed at regimes rather than 
policies, has historically often been the outcome of excessive use of despotic power. 
Force and coercion have created grievances that undermined states’ infrastructural 
power and their ability to enforce their policies throughout civil society by alternative 
means (Slater and Fenner, 2011). In the Ethiopian case, the EPRDF’s repressive rule 
led to the eruption of social movements especially in Oromia and Amhara regional 
states in 2015/16. Open contestation was initially countered with more use of 
despotic power, which fuelled the protests even further and uncovered the fragility 
of the EPRDF regime. After the election of the new Prime Minister Abyi Ahmed in 
March 2018, the EPRDF has invested considerable resources in building bridges to 
the Ethiopian population and reducing the use of despotic power. 
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Table 12: Simplified presentation of the existing links between types/sources of power and 
interactions between state and civil society organisations 
 
















High Co-optation144 Contestation 
Low Cooperation Coexistence 
 
Apart from the state’s exercise of despotic and infrastructural power, I found that 
resources and strategies of both state and civil society organisations influenced the 
patterns of interactions observed. 
An important finding from this analysis is that state organisations reverted to co-
optation when they had something to gain from civil society organisations. 
Otherwise, many opted for forcing organisations into coexistence, preventing them 
from accessing state structures and influencing political decision-making. As co-
optation was costly and the state had finite resources, it did not constitute the default 
approach to civil society organisations, but represented a strategic decision to use a 
civil society organisation, rather than rendering it harmless. Resembling research 
findings on civil society - state relations in China, Malaysia and Syria pre-2011 (Clark, 
2013; Haddad, 2013; Miles and Croucher, 2013; Unger and Chan, 2015), state 
organisations in Ethiopia were more likely to co-opt membership-based 
organisations rather than non-membership-based organisations, because of the 
former’s potential to mobilise larger number of people. Apart from aiming at 
preventing contestation, the EPRDF government used membership-based 
organisations to mobilise resources (financial and human) from the organisations’ 
members and to disseminate political messages. 
                                                        
144 During initial stages of co-optation non-democratic states have needed to exercise substantial 
degrees of despotic power to enforce co-optation. To ensure alignment of civil society organisations 
over time states have needed to employ infrastructural power.  
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Corroborating findings from studies on civil society - state relations in other 
authoritarian contexts (Cavatorta, 2013b; Hildebrandt, 2013; Liverani, 2008), 
cooperation in the Ethiopian case was often driven by an overlap of agendas, as well 
as the respective attempts to gain access to the other party’s resources (human, 
financial and political). Moreover, civil society organisations used it to reduce 
suspicion among state officials and increase their space of action. In many cases, 
cooperation was driven by resource needs among state organisations, as they relied 
on civil society organisations to provide services to citizens, where public resources 
were not sufficient to meet the needs of communities. Hence for state actors, 
cooperation was primarily driven by the objective to access supplementary human 
and financial resources, especially at the local level. Many civil society organisations 
strategically used the needs of the government to push their agendas without risking 
confrontation. 
Several studies on civil society - state relations in authoritarian settings found 
that CSOs used coexistence to prevent state actors from influencing their work and 
using their resources (Fu, 2017c; Gibson, 2001). However, in the Ethiopian case, state 
organisations often forced civil society organisations into coexistence to stop them 
from exercising political influence or accessing state resources. While constituting a 
strategy also used by civil society organisations, I found that CSOs were more often 
pushed into coexistence than actively choosing it. Although the EPRDF government 
invested significant resources to render civil society organisations’ actions legible for 
the state and prevent independent civic action, it often minimised direct interactions 
to ensure its independence from CSOs. State organisations were less likely to push 
membership-based organisations into coexistence or to allow them to coexist, given 
their potential of mobilising large numbers of people. 
Similar to experiences of civil society organisations in other authoritarian settings 
(Cavatorta, 2013a; Lewis, 2013), CSOs in Ethiopia mostly refrained from open public 
contestations due to the high costs associated with such actions. However, 
contestation in the form of construction of an alternative discourse (verbal criticism) 
and various covert, and sometimes overt, forms of subversion of power structures 
existed, where the agendas of state and civil society organisations diverged 
significantly and where CSOs were able to bear or mitigate the costs for contestation. 
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Similar to research findings on Chinese civil society - state relations (Fu, 2017c), state 
organisations in Ethiopia were more likely to tolerate contestation by individuals 
rather than organisations. Civil society organisations thus often decided to deliver 
criticism and bargain with state actors behind closed doors and used personal 
contacts of their leaders and/or employees, instead of organising campaigns at 
organisational level. 
The Politics of Civil Society – State Relations under the Microscope – A 
methodological contribution 
Ethnography, is uniquely suited to explore the everyday practices of politics, 
capturing what and why actors do that is not publicly observable (Auyero and Joseph, 
2007: 1). Studying civil society - state relations using ethnographic methods for data 
collection allowed me to explore the grey zone of politics and go beyond the publicly 
observable “silence” of civil society organisations, revealing the ongoing negotiations 
and conflicts between actors and organisations operating in both spheres, as well as 
the hidden mechanisms of control established by the EPRDF over civil society 
organisations. 
In the political sciences literature, previous studies have often adopted a top-
down approach, focussing on elites and formal politics and have failed to capture civil 
society - state relations beyond this realm (Burgess, 2012; Dupuy et al., 2015; Jalale 
and Wolff, 2017; Sisay, 2012; Yitayehu, 2010). Relying on key informant interviews, 
document reviews and secondary literature, has not allowed them to render the 
micro-politics of civil society – state relations visible and research has often limited 
itself to noting the absence of contestation and the existence of control, concluding 
that civil society organisations did not threaten regime stability. This thesis challenges 
previous literature, revealing the existence of negotiations and conflict between 
state and civil society organisations, the limitations of reach of central state power 
when it came to regulating civil society organisations at the local level and the 
disputes between different state organisations revolving around their preferred 
approach to civil society. Carefully disaggregating state and civil society and analysing 
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their interactions, this thesis demonstrates that the control established over formal 
civil society organisations had both strengthened and weakened regime stability. 
While several previous studies on civil society in Ethiopia stated that the EPRDF 
regime had established a tight control over civil society, they did not identify the 
mechanisms of control established beyond the visible repressive legal frameworks 
and threats used to deter dissident actions (Dupuy et al., 2015; Jalale and Wolff, 
2017; Yitayehu, 2010). Their focus on formal politics did not enable them to capture 
the tools used to establish control in the everyday activities of civil society 
organisations or explain why some state actors decide to co-opt certain civil society 
organisations but not others. To gain such insights it was necessary to explore 
informal politics, combining semi-structured and unstructured interviews with more 
informal conversations and observation, both participatory and passive. I learned for 
example about the labader committee, that did not officially exist, when I was using 
office space at a trade union to go through their internal archives. Only after having 
spent several months with trade unionists did people feel confident they could share 
such pieces of information with me. Another example on the importance of 
observations was that it took participation in meetings between state and chamber 
officials to confirm that state representatives were critical, sometimes even 
aggressive, when interacting with representatives from the AACCSA. While this kind 
of observation corroborated what chamber representatives had claimed, it falsified 
the information provided by public officials in interviews. 
Only thanks to the ethnographic approach was I able to go beyond the dominant 
narratives of different groups presented in Chapter 2 and through triangulating oral 
information with observations I gained a more complex picture of civil society - state 
relations in Ethiopia. Spending time with civil society organisations allowed me to 
understand which state organisations they regularly interacted with, uncovering 
hidden links that existed between civil society and state actors. Observing, for 
example, that leaders of sectoral associations could directly call high level politicians 
on their personal phones and direct office lines to arrange meetings, while 
representatives from the chambers of commerce mostly had to go through formal 
processes of arranging appointments through secretaries, indicated differences 
regarding their access to political decision makers. 
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As ethnicity in Ethiopia was a taboo topic in conversations, it took observations 
and informal conversations to understand how ethnic politics influenced civil society 
- state relations. A trade unionist for example, during one of our coffee breaks, 
complained about his colleague’s unwillingness to embrace political changes in the 
ruling coalition, making direct references to ethnic origin. “He is against change. His 
people, they don’t like it. He comes from Mekelle [capital of Tigray]” (Interviewee Nr 
61, 2018). Only through spending time with different civil society organisations, did I 
realise that they used ethnic networks when interacting with state actors. Civil 
society leaders and employees would for example, if possible, contact a public official 
from the same, rather than someone from another, ethnic group. Moreover, working 
with the same civil servants over extended periods of time allowed me to build trust, 
and some were willing to admit that political and ethnic connections played a role in 
receiving licences, permits and accessing financial support. 
While ethnographic approaches to studying society-state relations in Ethiopia are 
no novelty, previous research has often been conducted at a micro-level, for 
example, studying the link between peasants and the local state apparatus (Di 
Nunzio, 2015; Emmenegger, 2016; Lefort, 2007; Planel, 2014). Instead, I adopted a 
meso-level approach, focusing on links between civil society and state organisations 
and covered different types of civil society and state organisations, as well as 
different geographical locations. While limiting the depth of the analysis compared 
to the traditional micro-level, single-sighted ethnographies, I was able to capture how 
different state and civil society organisations operating at different administrative 
levels were linked to, and interacted with each other, disaggregating both the state 
and civil society. 
Avenues for Future Research 
Fifty years ago, James Billington warned that “We are producing a generation of 
scholars who prefer to provide definitive answers to small questions rather than 
tentative answers to important ones” (Billington, 1968: 32). In this research project I 
opted for the opposite and attempted to contribute tentative answers to some of the 
most fundamental questions in social sciences revolving around civil society, the 
state, development and democracy. Choosing an under-researched empirical case 
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only amplified this tendency. While this empirically grounded case study contributes 
many important insights on the relationships between civil society and the state in 
Ethiopia, the attempts of the EPRDF to build a developmental state and reflections 
on regime stability, much more remains to be explored. 
One avenue to further analyse regime stability in Ethiopia under the EPRDF rule 
would be to explore citizen – state relations more closely. While there exist some 
ethnographic studies on the subject (Di Nunzio, 2014; Emmenegger et al., 2011; 
Lefort, 2012; Planel, 2014), this canon of work needs to be expanded to better 
capture every-day forms of interactions between state actors and citizens and record 
control by the state, as well as resistance and subversion of state power by citizens. 
Although the 2015/18 political crisis and the public protests came as a surprise to 
many, there is evidence that it had been long in the making and its trajectory merits 
exploration. Grievances among citizens had been growing long before the outbreak 
of the protests and despite its best efforts to control and discipline citizens, the 
EPRDF did not manage to prevent all opposition from below. Just as much as the 
public silence of formal civil society organisations has been interpreted widely as a 
sign of the EPRDF’s ability to exert control and prevent contestation of its rule, the 
long-time absence of public dissent among citizens has frequently been understood 
as proof of the subjugation of citizens to the regime. However, as recent political 
developments in Ethiopia suggest, the failure to study the politics of “public silence” 
and go beyond the formally visible absence of resistance constitutes a blind spot of 
scholarship on contemporary Ethiopia. 
Another important area for future research includes the regional, ethnic-based 
social movements that emerged in 2015/16 and forced the ruling coalition to 
implement radical changes in its way of governing during the course of 2018. It would 
be important to explore the differences between formal civil society organisations 
studied in this thesis and the social movements that emerged, to understand why the 
latter were better able to contest the EPRDF regime and to affect political change. 
There exists some evidence that the analytical framework developed in this thesis 
could possibly be used to analyse the relationship between the Ethiopian state under 
the EPRDF and the social movements between 2015 and 2018. In Oromia regional 
state, for example, the OPDO used the querro (youth movement) to advance its 
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claims within the EPRDF. Whether it managed to (partly) co-opt the querro remains 
yet to be answered. While the social movement contested parts of the Oromia 
regional state, there also exists some evidence of collaboration. Moreover, the OPDO 
allowed the querro to coexist with state organisations despite the ongoing 
contestation, in order to put pressure on the EPRDF and federal level state 
organisations. 
To go beyond state-society relations and their relationship to regime stability, it 
is also important to further study the EPRDF. Previous research often described the 
coalition as cohesive and disciplined (de Waal, 2013b; Weis, 2016), but recent 
political developments indicate deep fissures and conflict within it. Studies often 
found that the TPLF de facto controlled the EPRDF (Bach, 2011; Hagmann and Abbink, 
2011). However, although scholars acknowledged that the fact that the TPLF 
represented an ethnic minority rendered its position in the EPRDF fragile (Asnake, 
2013; Semahagn, 2014), this insight did not engender comprehensive research into 
the political realities of the TPLF rule. Several studies included an analysis of the 
TPFL’s history (Aregawi, 2009; Young, 2006), however little is known about the 
functioning of the TPLF after 1991. Moreover, the other coalition members have 
remained understudied, and politics within the ruling coalition and its parties have 
yet to be systematically explored. 
Most previous studies on the EPRDF’s developmental state focused on 
development policies and outputs (Brautigam et al., 2016; Hauge, 2017; Mulu, 2013), 
treating it as a technocratic project, without sufficiently discussing the politics 
underpinning its design and operationalisation. However, analysing its politics is 
important for understanding the effect of the developmental state programme on 
regime stability. Some questions that need to be answered in order to analyse the 
commitment of the EPRDF to the programme and the possibility to engender 
legitimacy through it are: Which organisations/individuals in the EPRDF and which 
organisations in the state pushed the programme? Who got access to resources 
distributed under it and what were the criteria for selection? How did the 
operationalisation of the developmental state programme affect the country’s 
different regions and its citizens? I found some evidence during my research that 
resource distribution followed both ethnic and party politics and decreased the 
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legitimacy of the project in the eyes of the citizens as well as the ability of the EPRDF 
to implement its ambitious development policies. 
To further build on the findings of this thesis and go beyond research on Ethiopia, 
it would be interesting to test the analytical framework in other geographical 
contexts, both in Africa and elsewhere, to see how far it can capture civil society - 
state relations on a broader level and in different regime types. Given that the 
framework is built on existing theoretical and empirical literature capturing both 
democratic and non-democratic regimes, it is likely to yield explanatory power in 
both contexts. Based on a review of previous literature, I would expect the patterns 
of interaction to be different in democratic and non-democratic contexts and to see 
more contestation and co-existence between state and civil society actors in 
democracies than in authoritarian states and less co-optation. However, it is likely 
that the typology of interaction still holds. 
The Roots of Fragility: Ethnic Politics, Despotic and Infrastructural Power 
The non-participation of formal civil society organisations in the political protests 
from 2015 to 2018, and in power re-negotiations after the progressive political 
opening in 2018, indicated that they did not pose a direct threat to regime stability 
through contestation. Instead, the political crisis revealed that the roots of regime 
fragility lay in the EPRDF’s inability to overcome the image of an ethnic minority 
government and the ensuing failure to build legitimacy. Moreover, it became clear 
that the fragility of the political settlement had led the EPRDF to prioritise loyalty over 
merit, reducing state capacity and hampering its ability to operationalise the 
developmental state programme on which it tried to build legitimacy. 
The fact that the TPLF had monopolised key positions in the ruling coalition and 
the state since 1991, including the control over organisations representing despotic 
power, such as police, security and the army, has been widely known (Aregawi, 2009; 
Markakis, 2011; van Veen, 2016). Although there existed less information on the TPLF 
domination of the economy, according to Lefort, “Tigrayan leaders control around 
 
288 
two-thirds of the country’s economy, excluding traditional agriculture145” (Lefort, 
2013: 463). Despite the evidence of inequalities within the ruling coalition, previous 
research often described the EPRDF as a cohesive organisation, able to ensure central 
execution of political decisions from federal down to the lowest administrative level 
(Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Weis, 2016). While there existed some information on the 
grievances that the EPRDF’s ethnic and party politics had caused among the 
population (Lefort, 2013; Planel, 2014), the degree to which it had caused internal 
disagreements in the EPRDF and the state constitute an under-researched area. 
Apart from information on more open conflicts like for example the TPLF split in 2001 
and the ensuing reshuffling in the EPRDF (Milkias, 2003; Tadesse and Young, 2003), 
little has been known about how the EPRDF’s ethnic politics affected its functioning. 
The smooth leadership transition after Meles Zenawi’s death had generally been 
interpreted as a sign of the stability of the EPRDF regime and, according to Arriola 
and Lyons, “the fact that the EPRDF has held together in the wake of Meles’ death 
speaks to its institutionalization as a strong political organization with links running 
from the capital to the smallest villages” (Arriola and Lyons, 2016: 79). However, 
political developments in the years following Meles’ death have profoundly 
questioned such assumptions and revealed that the monopolisation of political and 
economic power by the TPLF created conflicts in the ruling coalition and the state 
(Interviewee Nr. 17, 2018; Interviewee Nr 61, 2018; Interviewee Nr. 150, 2018). 
Leaders of the EPRDF coalition members and different state offices, especially in 
Oromia regional state, used the 2015/18 crisis to air their grievances publicly. Several 
accused the TPLF of unfair distribution of political and economic resources among 
the country’s different ethnic groups and denounced the lack of decentralisation. 
Over the course of the winter and spring of 2017/18, the split in the ruling coalition 
became increasingly visible and OPDO and ANDM leaders also criticised the response 
of the federal government to the protests, sometimes siding with the social 
                                                        
145 In the early 1990s, many TPLF cadres had to leave their positions in the state to allow for more 
equal representation of the other coalition members, many of whom got preferential treatment in 
acquiring enterprises in the formal privatisation process and/or were employed in enterprises owned 
by EFFORT – the TPLF’s endowment fund (Young, 1996: 539). 
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movements to gain legitimacy among their constituents (Aaron, 2018; AfricaNews, 
2017; Deutsche Welle, 2018). 
Protesters criticised the EPRDF for having failed to deliver on developmental 
promises and for the political allocation of resources distributed under the 
development programme. Public discussions after the election of the new Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed revealed that the priority given to loyalty over merit in public 
offices and the dominance of party over state structures had fostered corruption and 
underperformance. Merera Gudina, opposition politician, and Solome Tadesse, a 
social activist, stated at a public meeting: 
“Cadres have been collected from the streets, they are incompetent 
but loyal. They steal the voice of the people in the 21st century. How 
can we teach thieves not to steal goods and other things?”. “The 
criteria for recruitment are not high, it’s not meritocratic 
recruitment or excellence. I met a student half Amhara half 
Tigrayan and she asked me which party she should join to realise 
her dream. The universities become little Ethiopia. The students are 
grouped according to their origin and language. The same is true 
for the civil service. There is no meritocracy. Institutions don’t 
produce professionals, because to enter you need to be a party 
member” (Fieldnotes, 2018).  
Milkessa Midega, a civil servant in Oromia, added: 
“The recruitment is wrong. They are wrongly assigned. They don’t 
deserve to be in the position. The state and the party structure are 
competing. The party structure is the strongest. From my office If I 
call the zonal office, they won’t listen. They only listen if the party 
office calls. The system we built is wrong” (Fieldnotes, 2018). 
 Corroborating findings from previous studies (Segers et al., 2008; Smit et al., 
2017), such allegations cast serious doubts on the ability of the EPRDF to implement 
its ambitious development policies and hence to engender legitimacy over 
developmental performance. 
Protesters also denounced the EPRDF’s excessive use of despotic power, both in 
the implementation of developmental policies as well as in its rule more broadly. 
Interestingly, Getachew Reda, the former Minister of Information, admitted publicly:  
“We used short cuts to achieve development. Kebele officials forced 
farmers to buy fertilisers. We didn’t do it to force them but to put 
positive pressures. But we understand now, the farmers are not 
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using the fertiliser not because of illiteracy but because it is imposed 
and they are not convinced to do so. People don’t want to use it”.  
Milkessa Midega went even further in his criticism, claiming: 
“The leaders at the kebele level, they don’t have to force farmers. 
It’s not positive pressure. They beat and force farmers. In Ethiopia, 
the police is the state. What does government mean for someone 
in the rural area? It means the police. It’s the person who holds 
arms. The government is the military. Who is the state? Who is the 
government? The government if you ask people are those who hold 
guns. People are in fear” (Fieldnotes, 2018).  
While the extension of the state and party apparatus down to the household 
level had allowed for increased penetration of society, despotic, rather than 
infrastructural power, remained the main vehicle through which power was exerted. 
Although the excessive (threat of) use of despotic power, testified to the EPRDF’s fear 
of contestation and reflected the fragility of the political settlement, the practices in 





      Uppsala, 20th of September 2018 
When I arrived in Addis in October 2015, just at the beginning of the anti-EPRDF 
protests, none of the people I met and talked to predicted the coming political crisis 
and the profound changes in state and EPRDF’s structures we would witness two and 
a half years later. The first months of my fieldwork were marked by accounts of the 
increasing authoritarian character of the EPRDF regime and a mounting fear among 
interviewees, and friends, due to growing control and repression. Although some 
scattered warnings were expressed about the potential political consequences of the 
uprisings and the EPRDF’s oppressive response to them, most observers and citizens 
did not believe in an end to the EPRDF’s authoritarian rule. 
The state of emergency declared in October 2016 and the following military, 
federal police and security interventions to calm the protests, seemed to prove that 
the EPRDF was not going to go down easily. Even when the split in the ruling coalition 
became increasingly visible over the course of the year 2017 and the EPRDF’s member 
organisations in Oromia and Amhara started using the public protests to question the 
existing power sharing agreement within the EPRDF, few believed that the EPRDF’s 
politics would become more democratic. Instead conversations with friends and 
interviewees were marked by the question of possible regime collapse. News about 
growing ethnic conflict in the regions started to reach Addis, questioning the 
democratic character of the growing social movements in Oromia and Amhara 
regional states and added to the worry. Where was the country heading? As most of 
the events were happening away from the capital city, in Addis the narrative of crisis 
became the new normal. It was hard to tell how dire the situation was apart from the 
insights we got travelling to the regions or talking to our friends and contacts outside 
of the capital. What we saw and heard worried us but it was still difficult to judge the 
extent of the crisis. 
When Prime Minister Hailemariam announced the release of political prisoners in 
January 2018, it came as a surprise to most of us. We hadn’t seen it coming. While 
our Facebook feeds filled with messages of joy and hope they also contained warnings 
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about the resilient character of authoritarian regimes, cautioning people against 
becoming too optimistic. A Facebook post read for example: 
“History has shown that authoritarian regimes are, sadly, resilient. 
The power they hold serves them for longer than we would deem 
acceptable. Specially those willing to kill for it. They don’t 
change/reform, if they ever truly do, without putting up a “fight”. 
As much as I would like to believe something good can happen now, 
I see no reason to believe that those in “real power” will quietly step 
aside without letting things spiral out of control” [Blen Sahilu, 16th 
of February 2018]. 
We didn’t foresee the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam in February 
2018. We had heard rumours about his resignation, but it was too early. Resignation 
wasn’t due before the next EPRDF congress to make sure his replacement was decided 
on. We had heard that the planned change had been instigated by high level EPRDF 
officials to re-tighten control. We tried to find out what was going on from our 
contacts in the EPRDF, but we received contradictory information; no one really 
seemed to know. When Abiy Ahmed was elected as the new Prime Minister, there was 
a sense of exhilaration because of the potential for change, still we stayed cautious. 
His inauguration speech gave hope, the changes he ordered seemed unprecedented 
and nearly impossible. Against all odds, politics in Ethiopia suddenly seemed to take 
a turn towards more democratic government. The speed of events accelerated until 
it seemed impossible to keep up with the details of the change we were witnessing: a 
peace agreement signed with Eritrea, an amnesty law passed to lift the status “terror 
organisation” from organisations such as Ginbot 7, the ONLF and the OLF, the release 
of political prisoners, promises for revision of laws such as the anti-terrorism law and 
the charities and societies proclamation and promises for economic reforms. Abiy-
mania started to break out, among citizens, diaspora Ethiopians and international 
observers. Prime Minister Abiy was winning the hearts of the people, with pro-Abiy 
rallies being staged across the country. T-shirt printing businesses reported an 
increase in their activity due to people ordering Abiy supporter T-shirts. 
The old guard of EPRDF politicians was blamed for the country’s political and 
economic problems and Abiy publicly admitted the existence of “state terrorism”, 
torture, corruption and mismanagement of the country’s politics and economy. While 
people celebrated Abiy’s messages, admission of past wrongs also fuelled hatred 
 
293 
against the TPLF, and in several cases against Tigrayans as a people, who had been 
at the helm of EPRDF politics for the past three decades. Adding to the disquiet, news 
about inter- and intra-regional ethnic conflicts in SNNP, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul 
Gumuz and Amhara regional states called into question the narrative of democratic 
transition, as did news about lynching of civilians by protesters, mob violence and the 
‘querro’ hindering state offices in their operations. The number of IDPs in Ethiopia in 
2018 exceeded 1.4 million people, outpacing Syria and constituting an actual 
humanitarian crisis. However, amidst the celebrations that befell large parts of the 
country, little reflection has so far been given to the, at times, devastating impacts 
that the changes of federal politics brought at the local level due to a shift in power 
balances. There exists a lack of objective analysis of ongoing political events. Abiy’s 
main critics are still to be found among the former ruling elite trying to discredit the 
new Prime Minister, which reduces the credibility of their claims. Only a few other 
observers have dared to question the Abiy-folly and the “Ethiopia is democratising” 
narrative, drawing attention to the undemocratic nature of ethnic-based social 
movements, regional conflicts, political problems and reminding people that it is not 
clear which direction Ethiopia is heading. Is the Abiy-era an interlude or a transition? 
And if it is a transition, a transition to what? 




The Party and the Afterparty 
---------------------------------------------- 
Don't ruin the party 
It is ordered! 
From inside and the outside 
Don't ruin the party 
And ruin it for everybody. 
It is a long time coming 
For people who have long endured repression and atrocities 
In the hands of the Party with no parties. 
Now with the Party in tatters 
And brand-new hosts at the helm 
The people are finally released from the jail 
And enjoying their freedoms 
It is time for the people to rejoice 
The Party is gone 
And the Party has arrived! 
It is a music of "love" and "unity" now playing. 
Don't bother people on stage and on the dance floor talking about the millions. 
Those whose lives are shattered by hatred and ethnic cleansing. 
And those who are said to deserve their suffering. 
Because it is inflicted by a party within the Party. 
Which parties are responsible for the mayhem requires attention and discernment. 
But who is there to attend to the victims' plight? 
Don't ruin the party 
It is ordered! 
Don't ruin the party for the new host 
And the artists 
Don't ruin the party for the Party 
Don't ruin it for the newly recruited avid partygoers. 
For once allow them to dance to the rhythm. 
The repeated injunction not to ruin the Party! 
And then... the disturbing realization that perhaps the party is already ruined. 
Albeit the partygoers are too drugged to notice. 
With their hosts catering to their favorite addictions. 
So that they can forget their misery 
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List of Interviews 
Below a list of interviewees. To guarantee anonymity to the informants of the 
research project, names and positions have been omitted. Given the sensitive nature 
of the research, it was deemed necessary to guarantee sources anonymity and 
confidentiality. Interviewees have been sorted into relevant analytical categories and 
their rank and nationality indicated where relevant and possible without revealing 
the identity of the person. The list only contains formal interviews, not informal 
conversations with informants. 
Table : List of Interviewees 
Number Sector Date(s) of 
Interview 






2 Consultant Charities and Societies, Ethiopian 10.07.2015147, 
11.11.2015 
3 Donor Representative, International 10.11.2015 
4 Civil Servant Public University 08.02.2016 
5 Researcher, International 09.11.2015 
6 Civil Servant Public University 06.11.2015 
7 Consultant Charities and Societies, International 10.11.2015, 
09.02.2018 
8 Civil Servant 12.11.2015, 
29.02.2016 
9 Consultant Charities and Societies, Ethiopian 11.11.2015 
10  Civil Servant 12.11.2015, 
24.05.2016, 
30.10.2016 
11 International Foundation, Director 12.11.2015 
12 Donor Representative, International 13.11.2015 
13 Civil Service Consultant, International 10.11.2015 
14 Researcher, Ethiopian 15.11.2015 
15 Donor Representative, International 16.11.2015 
16 President, Ethiopian Resident Charity 16.11.2015 
17 Civil Servant Public University  22.11.2015, 
08.02.2016, 
                                                        
146 All interviews with informant Nr. 1 were conducted via Skype. 





18 Civil Servant 17.11.2015 
19 NGO  17.11.2015 







21 Donor Representative, International 18.11.2015 
22 Civil Service Consultant, Ethiopian 18.11.2015 
23 Consultant, Charities and Societies, Ethiopian 19.11.2015 
24 Consultant, Charities and Societies, Ethiopian 19.11.2015 
25 NGO, Head of the Secretariat 20.11.2015, 
09.06.2016, 
01.11.2016  
26 Civil Servant Public University 22.11.2015 
27 Civil Servant Public University  23.11.2015, 
17.05.2016 
28 Donor Representative, International 23.11.2015 
29 Donor Representative, Ethiopian 23.11.2015 
30 Ethiopian Resident Charity, President 24.11.2015 
31 Trade Union, Leadership 24.11.2015, 
23.05.2016 
32 Civil Servant 25.11.2015 
33 Consortium of Resident and International Charities and 
Societies, President 25.11.2015 
34 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Employee 26.11.2015 
35 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Employee 27.11.2015 
36 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Executive Director 10.02.2016 
37 Ethiopian Society, Employee 10.02.2016 
38 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 12.02.2016 
39  Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 12.02.2016 
40 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 12.02.2016 
41 Trade Union, Leadership 12.02.2016 
42 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 15.02.2016 
43 Consortium Resident and International Charities and 
Societies, Employee 16.02.2016 




45 Civil Servant 17.02.2016 
46 Consultant, Chambers of Commerce, Ethiopian 17.02.2016 
47 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 17.02.2016 
48 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Secretary General 18.02.2016, 
17.10.2016 
49 Ethiopian Society, Director General 19.02.2016 
50 Civil Servant 22.02.2016 
51 Trade Union, Employee 23.02.2016 
52 Civil Servant 02.03.2016 
53 Trade Union, Leadership 24.02.2016 
54 Ethiopian Charity, Employee 03.03.2016 
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55 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 04.03.2016 
56 Consultant, Chambers of Commerce, Ethiopian 04.03.2016 
57 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 04.03.2016 
58 Donor Representative, Ethiopian 08.03.2016 
59 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Member 07.03.2016, 
08.03.2016 
60 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Member 09.03.2016 
61 Trade Union, President 09.03.2016, 
21.02.2018 
62 Civil Servant 10.03.2016, 
26.05.2016 
63 Donor Representative, Ethiopian 11.03.2016 
64 Trade Union, Leadership 14.03.2016 
65 Trade Union, Leadership 14.03.2016 
66 Donor Representative, International148 14.03.2016 
67 Trade Union, Leadership 15.03.2016 
68 International Charity, Employee 16.03.2016 
69 International Charity, Director 16.03.2016 
70 Sectoral Association, President 17.03.2016 
71 Consultant, Charities and Societies, International 17.03.2016 
72 International Foundation, Ethiopian 18.03.2016, 
24.05.2016 
73 Trade Union, Leadership 18.03.2016 
74 Civil Servant 21.03.2016 
75 Consultant, Chambers of Commerce, Ethiopian 22.03.2016, 
07.06.2016 
76 Donor Representative, Ethiopian 22.03.2016, 
25.05.2016 
77 International Foundation, International 23.03.2016,  
78 Sectoral Association, President149 19.05.2016 








80 Trade Union, Leadership 23.05.2016 




82 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Member 30.05.2016 
83 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Member 30.05.2016 
84 Civil Servant 20.06.2016 
85 Civil Servant Public University 01.06.2016, 
28.06.2016, 
23.02.2018 
86 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Employee 03.06.2016 
                                                        
148 The informant responded to questions via email. 
149 The informant responded to questions via email. 
150 Interviews between July 2016 and June 2018 were conducted via Whatsapp. 
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87 Representative, International Enterprise 06.06.2016 
88 Researcher, International 06.06.2016 
89 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, President 07.06.2016, 
26.02.2018 
90 Ethiopian Charity, Director 13.06.2016 
91 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 
and Civil Servant 16.06.2016 
92 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Secretary 
General 16.06.2016 
93 Politician 17.06.2016 
94 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, President 17.06.2016 
95 Trade Union, President 20.06.2016, 
09.10.2016, 
02.03.2016 
96 Trade Union, President 20.06.2016 
97 Trade Union, President 20.06.2016 






99 Trade Union, President 23.06.2016 






101 Trade Union, Employee 24.06.2016 
102 Trade Union, President 29.06.2016 
103 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, President, 
Secretary General 30.05.2016 
104 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, President 30.06.2016 
105 Politician 14.07.2016, 
10.10.2016 
106 Civil Servant151 18.07.2016 
107 Civil Servant 13.10.2016 
108 Trade Union, Leadership 13.10.2016 
109 Donor Representative, Ethiopian 13.10.2016 
110 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Member 14.10.2016 
111 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, President 14.10.2016 
112 Trade Union, Leadership 19.10.2016 
113 Employer Representative/enterprise management 21.10.2016 
114 Employer Representative/enterprise management 21.10.2016 
115 Ethiopian Charity, President 21.10.2016 
116 Consultant, Civil Service, Ethiopian 24.10.2016 
117 Ethiopian Charity, President 25.10.2016 
118 Civil Servant 20.10.2016, 
25.10.2016 
119 Ethiopian Resident Charity, President 26.10.2016 
120 Politician 26.10.2016 
                                                        
151 Interview carried out by research assistant. 
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121 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, President 25.10.2016 
122 Civil Servant 26.10.2016 
123 Trade Union, Leadership 27.10.2016 
124 NGO, Executive Director 27.10.2016 
125 Trade Union, Leadership 31.10.2016 
126 Sectoral Association, President 01.11.2016 
127 Trade Union, Leadership 02.11.2016 
128 Trade Union, President 02.11.2016 
129 Sectoral Association, President 03.11.2016 
130 Trade Union, Leadership 03.11.2016, 
21.02.2018 
131 NGO, Project Manager 05.12.2016 
132 Consultant, Private Sector, International 21.02.2017 
133 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Executive Director 15.03.2017 
134 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Executive Director 14.03.2017 
135 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Executive Director 16.03.2017 
136 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Employee 13.03.2017 
137 Ethiopian Society, President 09.03.2017 
138 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Employee 12.03.2017 
139 Ethiopian Resident Charity, Employee 09.03.2017 
140 Ethiopian Resident Charity, President 08.03.2017 
141 Civil Servant 17.03.2017 
142 Civil Servant 10.03.2017 
143 Civil Servant 14.03.2017 
144 Civil Servant 16.03.2017 
145 Civil Servant 17.03.2017 
146 Consortium Resident and International Charities, President 07.03.2017 
147 Trade Unions, Employee 19.02.2018 
148 Civil Servant 20.02.2018 
149 Civil Servant 20.02.2018 
150 Journalist, Ethiopian 23.02.2018 
151 Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Employee 26.02.2018 
152 Consortium Resident and International Charities, President 27.02.2018 
153 Civil Servant 27.02.2018 
154 Researcher, International 20.11.2015 
155 Ethiopian Resident Charity, President 20.11.2015 
156 Civil Servant, Public University 18.11.2015 
157 Researcher, International 09.11.2015 
158 Donor Representative, International 13.11.2015 





Interviews by Sector/Category 
The table below lists number of interviewees per sector and category. 
Table 13: Number of Interviewees per Stakeholder Group 
Sector/Category Number of Interviewees 
Civil Servants and Politicians 34 
Charities and Societies152 33 
Chambers of Commerce 27 
Trade Unions153 30 
Experts154 19 
International Donors155 15 
List of Workshops and Events Attended 
The table below contains a list of relevant workshops and conferences attended 
during the fieldwork. It only contains information about public meetings, not internal 
and informal meetings attended within trade unions and chambers of commerce, to 
guarantee anonymity to organisations and people who hosted me during my 
research. Information collected during those events has been referenced in the thesis 
as part of the field notes. 
Table 14: Observation at Public Events 
Date Title of Event Summary 
18.11.2015 Good Corporate Governance 
Institute Annual Meeting – 
Addis Ababa Chamber of 
Commerce 
Selected Participants: 
Mr. Ayanew Ferede, Legal Adivser, Ministry of 
Trade 
Mr. Elias Geneti, President, Addis Ababab 
Chamber of Commerce 
25.02.2016 Opening of the 20th Edition 
of the Addis Ababa 
Chambers of Commerce and 
Sectoral Associations 
International Trade Fair 
Selected Participants: 
H.E. Mr. Tadesse Haile, State Minister of the 
Ministry of Industry 
Mr. Elias Geneti, President of Addis Ababa 
Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral 
Association 




Closing of the 20th Edition of 
the Addis Ababa Chambers 
The presenter, Bayisa Tesfaye, PhD candidate 
AAU presents on “Prospects, Challenges and 
                                                        
152 This category includes civil society organisations that have obtained an exemption from the 
Charities and Societies Proclamation (International NGOs and local NGOs). 
153 The category includes representatives from employers (management of enterprises etc.). 
154 The category includes researchers and consultants. 




of Commerce and Sectoral 
Associations International 
Trade Fair 
Opportunities of Industry Zones Development 
for Industrialisation in Ethiopia”. 
Discussion chaired by Dr Teshome Adugna 
from the civil service university 
The State minister for Industry Tadesse Haile 
attended the meeting 
01.03.2016 Charities and Societies: The 
Resource Challenge 
Workshop 
Organised by the Ethiopian Charities and 
Societies Forum, selected speakers: 
Tigabu Haile, ECSF, Head of the Secretariat 
Negash Teklu, Director of PHE 
Meseret Gebremariam, Director Charities and 
Societies Agency 
Bezuwork Ketete, Irish Aid 
24.05.2016 “Agenda Building Workshop 
on Common Concerns and 
Challenges of Ethiopian 
Charities and Societies” 
 
Organised by the Ethiopian Charities and 
Societies Forum 
Speakers: 
Ato Tigabu Haile, ECSF Head of the Secretariat 
W/ro Yetneberish Nigussie, ECSF Vice 
Chairperson 
27.05.2016 Ethiopia Federalism and 
Minority Rights Workshop 
 
Organised by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
selected Participants 
Sebat Nega 
Dr. Dereje Feyissa, adjunct professor at Addis 
Ababa University 
Dr. Sisay Mengiste, lecturer and researcher of 
Human Rights and Federalism at Addis Ababa 
University 
Dr. Aseffa Fisseha, Associate Professor, Centre 
for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University 
04/5.06.2016 Workshop with the Addis 
and Adama Chambers of 
Commerce and Sectoral 
Associations on Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
Held at the Adama Chamber of Commerce and 
Sectoral Associations 
04.07.2016 Developmental State of 
Ethiopia: A Political and 
Economic Order in the 
Making 
Selected participants of talks/panels attended: 
H.E Dr Debretsion Gebremichael, Deputy Prime 
Minister for Finance and Economic Cluster 
Dr Negasso Gidgidda, Former President of 
Ethiopia (1995-2001) 
H. E. Ato Zadig Abreha, Deputy Minister of 
Communication Affairs Office 
Sebhat Nega, Ethiopian Foreign Relations 
Strategic Studies Institute 
H.E. Mr Neway Gebreab, Prime Minister’s 
Chief Economic Advisor 
Professor Andreas Eshete, Special Advisor to 
the Prime Minister 
05.10.2016 First International Agro-
industry Investment Forum – 
Ethiopia 
Selected participants of talks/panels attended: 
H.E. Ahmed Shide, State Minister, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Cooperation 
H.E. Ahmed Abtew, Minister of Industry 
H.E. Hailemariam Desalegn, Prime Minister 
Mr. Fitsum Arega, Commissioner, Ethiopian 
Investment Commission 
Endalkachew Sime, Secretary General 




Professor Tekalign Mamo, Senior Director, 
Agricultural Transformation Agency, 
H.E. Dr. Mehbratu Meles, State Minister, 
Ministry of Industry 
H.E. Dr. Gebregzihabher Gebreyohannes, State 
Minister, Ministry of Lifestock and Fishery 
Resources 
H.E. Wondirat Mandefro, State Minister, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Mr. Fasil Tadesse, Managing Director, Textile 
and Garment Manufacturers Association 
Mr. Yigzaw Aseffa, President, Leather and 
Leather Products Industry Association 
06.10.2016 AACCSA Annual Meeting and 
Chamber elections 
Held at the New Intercontinental Hotel 
 
18.10.2016 Sustainable Manufacturing 
Matters for Ethiopia and 
Africa 
Selected participants of talks/panels attended: 
Endalkachew Sime, Secretary General 
Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral 
Associations 
H.E. Tadesse Haile, State Minister, Ministry of 
Industry 
Kebour Ghenna, Executive Director, Pan 
African Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Solomon Afwork, President, Ethiopian 
Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral 
Associations 
H.E. Dr. Mulatu Teshome, President, Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
Tilahun Gemechu, Director, Industrial Park 
Cooperation 
H.E. Belete Tafere, Minister of Environment 
and Forestry 
24th of May 
2018 
Ethiopia’s Promise to the 
Next Generation: Challenges 
and Prospects for 
Governance in Ethiopia 
  
Organised by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and 
the Centre for Dialogue, Research and 
Cooperation 
Keynote speech H.E. Getachew Reda, TPLF 
executive committee member 
Discussants: 
Dr. Elisabeth Woldegiorgis, Addis Ababa 
University 
Dr. Milkessa Midega, Oromia Youth and Sports 
Bureau Head 
Ms. Selome Tadesse, social activist 
Dr. Gedion Timothewos, lawyer and 
constitutional expert 
Dr. Merera Gudina, scholar and politician Mr. 
Tsedeke Yihune, business owner and political 
commentator 
Closing speech Professor Ephrem Issac 
25th of May 
2018 
 
A Country at a Political 
Crossroad: Dialogue on 
institutional reforms in the 
context of recent political 
dynamics 
Organised by the Hanns Seidel Stiftung and 
Addis Ababa University, selected speakers and 
participants 
H.E. Ato Awol Wogris, State Minister of Federal 
and Pastoralist 




Dr. Aseffa Fisseha, Associate Professor, Centre 
for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University 
Dr Solomon Negussie, Dean, College of 
Law and Governance Studies, Addis Ababa 
University 
Dr Asnake Kefale, Assistant Professor, Addis 
Ababa University 
List of Focus Groups 
Below a list of focus groups conducted with beneficiaries of resident charities in Addis 
Ababa, Sheshemene, Hawassa, Asella and Wonji. 
Table 15: Focus Groups with members and beneficiaries of Ethiopian Resident Charities 
Date Location Number of Participants 
10.03.2017 Addis Ketema 13 
13.03.2017 Sheshemane 11 
14.03.2017 Sheshemane 7 
15.03.2017 Hawassa 9 
16.03.2017 Asella 9 
17.03.2017 Wonji 14 
List of Preparatory Interviews 
Below the list of preparatory interviews conducted with experts in London and Addis 
Ababa (via Skype) for research design purposes before the first scoping trip. 
Table 16: List of Preparatory Interviews 
Number Sector Date of Interview 
Preparatory Interview 1 International NGO, Director 13.03.2015 
Preparatory Interview 2 Consultant, International 01.04.2015 
Preparatory Interview 3 International NGO, Project 
Manager 
17.04.2015 
Preparatory Interview 4 International NGO, Country 
Analyst 
08.05.2017 
Preparatory Interview 5 Researcher, International 02.06.2015 
Preparatory Interview 6 Researcher, Ethiopian 12.06.2015 
Preparatory Interview 7 Researcher, Ethiopian 19.06.2015 
Preparatory Interview 8 Diaspora citizen 22.06.2015 
Preparatory Interview 9 Researcher, Ethiopian 27.06.2015 
Preparatory Interview 10 Consultant, International 16.07.2015 




Data on Economic Growth and Development in Ethiopia 
Table 17: Data on Economic Growth and Development in Ethiopia156 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
GDP Growth in Ethiopia and Other LDCs 
GDP growth at factor costs 
in Ethiopia (annual %)  
11.5 
 
11.8  11.2  10.0  10.6  11.4  8.7  9.8  10.3  10.4  8.0 
GDP growth at factor costs 
in LDCs (annual %)  8.4 9.5 7.5 4.8 5.9 4.2 5.6 5.9 5.4 3.8 3.6 
GDP per capita in Ethiopia 




325.38 379.76 341.31 354.85 468.51 502.15 571.16 645.47 712.88 
GDP per capita in current 
USD    
705.75 703.25 779.38 871.92 904.20 958.90 1011.20 970.42 949.24 
Growth of Manufacturing Sector in Ethiopia and other LDCs 
Manufacturing value added 
in Ethiopia (% of GDP)    4.1 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.4 5.6 
Manufacturing value added 
in LDCs (% of GDP)    10.9 11.2 10.9 11.1 11.6 11.5 11.5 11.9 12.8 
                                                        
156 The Data presented in the table below was compiled using the following sources (last accessed 13.12.2018): 
World Development Indicators, downloaded from https://knoema.com/WBWDI2018Jul/world-development-indicators-wdi and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Human Development Indicators, downloaded from http://hdr.undp.org/ 
Open Data for Africa, downloaded from http://ethiopia.opendataforafrica.org/ 
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Manufacturing value added 
in Ethiopia (annual % 
growth) 
   9.3 8.6 9.2 9.2 11.8 16.9 16.6 18.2 18.4 
Manufacturing value added 
LDCs (annual % growth)    6.1 5.2 10.1 8.1 7.4 8.0 7.5 7.9 8.3 
Manufacturing value added 
in Ethiopia (constant 2010 
$) 
















Disaggregated Data on Growth in Ethiopia 



























Industry value added 
annual percentage 
growth157 
9.43 10.16 9.52 10.13 9.67 10.82 15.01 19.64 24.10 17.04 19.85 20.56 
Industry, value added (% of 
GDP) 11.79 11.60 11.59 10.21 9.68 9.44 9.66 9.48 10.94 13.47 16.30 22.10 
Share of construction in 
real GDP growth158       14.94 19.19 14.56 21.15 26.25 32.11 
Services value added 


























Services value added 
annual %growth 12.32 12.84 15.76 16.4 14.68 16.74 13.00 9.91 9.05 12.87 11.11 8.59 
Services, value added (% of 
GDP) 39.14 38.57 39.11 37.90 38.77 41.76 41.43 38.58 39.67 39.89 39.55 36.48 
Agriculture value added 
annual % growth 13.54 10.91 9.45 7.50 6.36 5.13 9.01 4.92 7.10 5.45 6.38 2.33 
                                                        
157 During the GDP I period, construction accounted for 68.5 % of the growth in the industrial sector and 17.7% in the overall GDP growth (Wakiaga and Haile, 2017: 15). 
158 Adapted from Mesfin et al.(2018: 3). 
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Agriculture value added as 
% of GDP 41.17 42.52 42.27 45.18 45.88 41.45 41.25 44.33 41.24 38.52 36.06 34.84 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco % value added in 
manufacturing 
48.4 46.6 41.2 46 45.4 46.4 59.5 35.2 38.1 36.6   
Chemicals % value added in 
manufacturing 5.2 4.4 4.9 5.8 8 8.1 8.9 8.5 11 10.6   
Industry % value added in 
manufacturing 12.8 12.5 12.5 10.9 10.3 10.2 10.5 10.3 11.9 14.7 17.7 21.3 
Machinery and transport 
equipment % value added 
in manufacturing 
1.1 2.4 4.7 1.9 1.4 2.8 1.5 2.9 5.7 5.5   
Textiles and clothing % 
value added in 
manufacturing 
10 8.8 9.2 7.4 8 10.3 10.7 8.4 10.4 10   
Employment Structures in Ethiopia 
Employment in agriculture 
(% of total employment) 
(modelled ILO estimate) 
80.0 79.5 79.2 78.7 77.2 75.5 74.9 72.7 71.4 69.9 69.0  
Employment in industry (% 
of total employment) 
(modelled ILO estimate) 
6.6 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 7.1 7.3 7.4 8.0 8.6 9.0  
Employment in services (% 
of total employment) 
(modelled ILO estimate) 
13.4 14.0 14.5 15.0 16.6 17.4 17.8 19.9 20.7 21.5 22.0  
Self-employed, total (% of 
total employment) 
(modelled ILO estimate) 
92.0 91.7 91.7 91.4 90.6 90.3 90.5 89.9 89.4 89.0 88.8  
Wage and salaried workers, 
total (% of total 
employment) (modelled ILO 
estimate) 
8.0 8.3 8.3 8.6 9.4 9.7 9.5 10.1 10.6 11.0 11.2  
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Unemployment, total (% of 
total labour force) (national 
estimate) 
5.4 17.0   20.5 19.1 18.1 17.8 5.0 17.6 17.0 17.1 
Unemployment, youth total 
(% of total labour force ages 
15-24) (national estimate) 
7.7 24.9   29 27.1 27.5 26.3 7.3 26.7 27.1 25.2 
Data on Imports and Exports in Ethiopia 
Exports of goods and 
services as % of GDP 
      16.7 13.8 12.5 11.6 9.4 7.9 
Imports of goods and 
services as % of GDP 
      31.5 31.6 29.0 29.1 30.3 27.6 
Agricultural raw materials 
exports (% of merchandise 
exports) 
15.3 17.3 20.4 14.1 11.9 9.0 8.6 8.0 15.9 16.3 18.9 1.8 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
4.6 5.4 13.8 9.0 8.7 8.9 10.4 8.8 8.6 6.8 7.3 12.5 
Food exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
78.7 76.5 62.1 75.3 77.5 78.5 78.4 80.3 66.9 74.0 71.7 83.8 
Current account balance in 
% 
-12.64 -11.69 -4.201 -6.67 -6.75 -1.42 -2.45 -6.89 -6.29 -10.30 -11.65 -11.33 
Business Environment in Ethiopia 
Doing Business Ranking  101 
 
97  102  116  107  104  111  124  148  146  
Firms experiencing 
electrical outages (% of 
firms) 
      89    80  
Number of power outages 
experienced by firms per 
month 
 1.7     5.6    8.2  
% of firms reporting at least 
one bribe payment request 
per year 




index: Competence and 
quality of logistics services 
(1=low to 5=high) 
  2   2.14  2.16  2.62  2.37 
Logistics performance 
index: Efficiency of customs 
clearance process (1=low to 
5=high) 
  2.14   2.13  2.03  2.42  2.60 
FDI, net inflows as % of GDP      1.0 2.0 0.6 2.0 3.8 3.5  
Data on ODA Flows to Ethiopia 
Net ODA received per 
capita in current $ 25.14 25.80 31.5 39.87 44.77 39.40 38.79 34.88 40.95 36.82 32.38  
Net official development 
assistance and official aid 






























Selected Human Development Indicators 
Table 18: Selected Human Development Indicators159 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Annual HDI 
ranking   
170 
 
169 169 171 157 174 172 173 173 175  
Life Expectancy 
Life expectancy at 
birth     59.6 60.6 61.6 62.5 63.3 64 64.5 65 65.5 
Life expectancy at 
birth, female 
(years) 
 57.64 58.80 59.98 61.15 62.27 63.31 64.24 65.05 65.77 66.38 66.91  
Life expectancy at 
birth, male (years)  54.85 55.91 56.99 58.05 59.05 59.98 60.80 61.53 62.17 62.72 63.2  
Population and Health Data 
Fertility rate, total 
(births per 
woman) 
 5.69 5.52 5.36 5.20 5.06 4.92 4.80 4.68 4.56 4.44 4.32  
Population growth 
(annual %)  2.78 2.73 2.69 2.66 2.65 2.64 2.64 2.63 2.61 2.58 2.54 2.50 
Mortality rate 
infant per 1000 
birth 
 70.2 66.4 62.9 59.5 56.5 53.7 51.1 48.6 46.4 44.4 42.6 41 
                                                        
159 The Data presented in the table below was compiled using the following sources (last accessed 13.12.2018): 
World Development Indicators, downloaded from https://knoema.com/WBWDI2018Jul/world-development-indicators-wdi and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Human Development Indicators, downloaded from http://hdr.undp.org/ 






100,000 live births) 
 743 698 654 608 566 523 482 447 410 378 353  
Births attended by 
skilled health staff 
(% of total) 
 5.7      10  23.1 15.5  27.7 
Prevalence of 
stunting, height 
for age (% of 
children under 5) 
 50.70      44.20   40.40   
Prevalence of 
underweight, 
weight for age (% 
of children under 
5) 
 34.60      29.20   25.20   
Prevalence of 
undernourishment 
(% of population) 




primary (% of 
primary school age 
children) 





 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.93  0.92 0.91  
Mean years of 
schooling 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5   
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Persistence to last 
grade of primary 
school total (% of 
cohort) 
    38 36.7 40.7 36.6   38.2   
Poverty and Income Data 
Poverty headcount 
ratio at $1.90 a 




     33.6  
32.4 
 
29.6 28.3 27.1 26.4 
Consumer Price 


























GINI coefficient160 29.8      33.2     39.1  
Rural population 
as % of total 
population 
 84.3 84.1 83.9 83.5 83.1 82.7 82.3 81.8 81.4 81.0 80.5 80.1 
Urban population 
growth (annual %)  4.03 3.99 4.045 5.08 5.04 5.03 5.01 5.00 4.95 4.91 4.85  
Access to 
electricity, urban 
(% of urban 
population) 
 85.7 91.72 93.29 93.82 94.29 94.70 85.2 95.41 95.73 91.98   
Access to 
electricity, rural (% 
of rural 
population) 
 1.9 3.50 4.25 5.018 5.80 6.61 4.8 8.24 9.06 12.2   
People using safely 
managed drinking  0.50 0.71 0.95 1.22 1.52 1.85 2.20 2.59 3.01 3.46 3.93  
                                                        




rural (% of rural 
population) 
People using safely 
managed drinking 
water services, 
urban (% of urban 
population) 
 36.04 36.22 36.40 36.58 36.76 36.94 37.12 37.31 37.49 37.67 37.85  
Communication 
Internet users % of 


















Phases of the EPRDF Rule, 1991-2018 
Table 19: Phases of EPRDF Rule, Developments in the State, The EPRDF, The Family, The Market and Civil Society 
 State The Family The Market Civil Society 
Time The State The Ruling 
Coalition 
The Family The Market Charities and 
Societies 
Chambers Unions 












democracy - not 
liberal democracy 




by party cadres 
but partly staffed 
with technocrats 
TPLF took lead in 
the establishment 
of the EPRDF and 
its members, 
officially state and 
party structures 
were separated, 
the EPRDF as 
vanguard party 
was said to rule on 
behalf of the 
population 
Urban elites were 
side-lined in the 
political 
settlement, focus 




rallying of the 
rural population 
behind the EPRDF 
regime 
Adoption of SAPs, 
privatisation of 
many SOEs (but 
many were 




funds ensured the 
EPRDF’s 
involvement in 
the private sector 








political issues, the 
EPRDF government 
initially tried to 
hamper the 
establishment of 
human rights NGOs 















campaign tried to 
influence the 
federal elections 






unions at public 
enterprises 
demanded better 







the unions and 
alignment with 
the EPRDF, 









2001 – 2005 
 







state, reform of 














Split in the TPLF 
and Meles won by 
small margin, 
recentralisation of 










the EPRDF tended 
to vote for the 





even among the 
rural population 
some who were 
dissatisfied with 
the results of 
EPRDF policies 
and its tight grip 

















Some human rights 
NGOs like EWLA 
and HRCO gained 
influence, CSOs 
were active during 
the 2005 election, 
supporting the 
opposition, 






system in 2003 











president of the 
national chamber 





skills and were 
























of state and EPRDF 
structures, 











state was far 
reaching, however 
Promotion of 








attraction of FDI 
Imprisonment of 
many CSO leaders 

















EPRDF and the 
Unions became 
members of the 
CSO coalition and 
were tasked with 
election 
monitoring on 
behalf of the 
government, 





Office led the 
process 
Mobilisation of 









in agriculture and 
manufacturing 
rights related 
issues but increase 
in total number of 
CSOs, 
establishment of 
“peoples’ wings” in 
state organisations 








the hizb kinf and 
linked to state 
structures, 
dispute between 
the Ethiopian and 
the Addis 
Chamber over 
who was the 
rightful 
representative of 





afraid to pose 
























to deal with 
corruption and 
rent seeking in the 
party and improve 
service delivery 
(also used to get 
rid of dissidents 
within the EPRDF), 
new PM lacked 
capacity to enforce 
The regime’s 






















Light Rail system 
in Addis etc.) 
CSOs tried to stay 
clear of the 
protests, the 
federal police 




















to engage with 
the government 
on the protests, 






the new labour 
law, CETU 
threatened 












leadership), split in 
the TPLF, PM 
resigned indicating 
the seriousness of 
the political crisis, 
restructuring of 
the EPRDF and its 
member parties 
and renegotiation 
of power within 
the coalition 
government 
activism 
proclamation 
officially launched 
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